FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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FOREIGN POLICY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
James Chace
Lee H. Hamilton and Michael H. Van Dusen—Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.

The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir—*Nathaniel Davis*
Zaïre: The Unending Crisis—*Crawford Young*
Peacemaking—*Shlomo Avineri*
Zionist Ideology and the Reality of Israel—*Nahum Goldmann*
The New Thrust in China's Foreign Policy—*Chalmers Johnson*
Facing Up to the Trade Gap with Japan—*James C. Abegglen and Thomas M. Hout*
Cuban Foreign Policy—*Jorge I. Domínguez*

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The fact that this issue starts with three grouped articles dealing with the overall topic of foreign policy in the American democratic process, as of 1978, offers a useful peg for answering in this space a few questions we occasionally get about how the articles in *Foreign Affairs* come to us and how they are then chosen and edited. How much do we plan an issue? How many of our articles are specifically commissioned, as opposed to those that come to us either totally unsolicited or after a brief prior exploration of our receptivity? Do we, as is common in journals devoted to an academic discipline, hold articles for long periods of time before publication?

Planning and commissioning, of course, go together, and the two articles directed to the role of Congress in foreign policy were in fact both. Statistically, such instances now account for perhaps 25 percent of our regular output—although, as we noted in this space in July, the whole of our new year-end issue analyzing the events and trends of 1978 will consist necessarily of such articles. In the ordinary course, we are finding today that the number of individual authors and topics that call for this special treatment is less than it may have been a decade or two ago. Or, to put it the other way around, the flow of other manuscripts seems to have increased, both in quality and quantity, to the point where we can achieve both timeliness and depth by choosing largely from that flow.

Almost as a corollary, we rarely hold over an article once it has reached concert pitch—one reason this issue is bigger than our norm is that we had two last-minute manuscripts we thought could not wait till our Winter issue. Only in a very few cases, where a manuscript is of high quality and on a topic not too time-bound, do we carry a backlog.

In essence, then, we like to think that we "plan" much as a good restaurant cook in France might do—in small part from knowledge of basic staples, but relying to a very great extent on what seems freshest and best in the market that day.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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James Chace

IS A FOREIGN POLICY CONSENSUS POSSIBLE?

Does the American government require a single overarching concept in order to build domestic support for foreign policy objectives? At a time when foreign policy is clearly vulnerable to pressures from a variety of interest groups, is it even possible to erect a broad foreign policy consensus as was done in the cold war era?

The Carter Administration came into office by emphasizing the variety and complexity of foreign policy problems, with an evident desire to avoid linking a whole range of issues under one umbrella. In a disorderly world, Carter stressed a deep concern with human rights and at the same time emphasized traditional American pragmatism, a combination of the evangelist and the engineer. But of late it has seemed that the priorities of the Administration are unclear. In particular, the President seems to tack back and forth on Soviet policy. His speeches focusing on U.S.-Soviet relations have veered sharply from a combative to an accommodating approach. His deeds have shown the same tendency. On the one hand, there have been denunciations of Soviet meddling in Africa, retaliatory measures for Soviet abuses of human rights (culminating in the Shcharansky trial), and a commitment to developing the cruise missile; on the other, he brought the Soviet Union formally back into the Middle East negotiations last October, canceled the B-1 bomber and deferred a decision on whether to develop the so-called neutron bomb. Yet the result has not been to strike a balance. Carter's cautionary words last June at Annapolis, warning the American people against "excessive swings" in attitude toward the Russians "from an exaggerated sense of compatibility . . . to open expressions of hostility" could be read as self-criticism. An oscillation between two extremes rather than measure and balance has too often been the perception both at home and abroad.

Congressional involvement in the making and execution of foreign policy has added to the difficulties of the Administration. No doubt the legacy of Vietnam is largely responsible for congres-

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sional activism in the realm of foreign policy. The 1973 War Powers Resolution, restricting the right of the President to commit U.S. forces abroad without explicit congressional approval, is the most telling example of the reins Congress has imposed upon executive action. In the last phase of the Kissinger era, in the light of congressional restraints on U.S. actions abroad, the then Secretary of State went so far as to proclaim that "America seems bent on eroding its influence and destroying its achievements in world affairs." And during the Carter Administration, Congress has continued to assert itself in foreign policy. In the debate over the Panama Treaties and arms sales to the Middle East, in the efforts of the Administration to rescind the arms embargo to Turkey and to maintain compliance with the U.N. trade embargo toward Rhodesia, to cite several examples, the role of Congress has been scarcely diminished.

Criticism of the Administration—both inside and outside the Congress—has centered on the Administration's response to a perceived global Soviet threat. A so-called Republican manifesto, signed this year by every Republican member of the Senate, not only charged President Carter with "incoherence, inconsistency and ineptitude," but also claimed that as a result "our foreign policy and national security objectives are confused and we are being challenged around the globe by Soviet arrogance." Nor is the accusation of inconsistency and timorous behavior toward the U.S.S.R. confined to the political opposition. Concerned Democrats such as Senators Jackson and Moynihan, and other articulate conservative spokesmen, share the view put forth by Paul Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and a member of the U.S. SALT delegation from 1969 to 1974, that "the position of the world not dominated from Moscow is more precarious today than it has been for some time."

To an American public told a scant six years ago by the Nixon Administration that détente promised to ease Soviet-American tensions over the long term, the reemergence of these tensions, in new and heightened forms, is bound to be unsettling. Once again the endless contest between the United States and the Soviet Union seems to dominate all else, even though one's mind—and one's pocketbook—may at the same time bear constant witness to the importance and complexity of economic and other foreign problems. In such a situation, the search for a clear-cut, clarifying theme can become compelling, and the theme of anti-Sovietism may appear to provide the Administration with the elusive broad foreign policy consensus that would give it the impetus it needs to

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achieve its goals. It was not so long ago, after all, that a range of issues was lumped under the rubric of anti-communism, and, by so doing, different administrations built up a broad consensus on foreign policy that was able to sustain American initiatives, both successful and unsuccessful, through the years of the cold war, a period which began roughly in 1946 and might be said to have ended in 1968—the year of assassins at home and of the communist Tet offensive abroad.

Let us, therefore, look back at that period and assess the impact of the anti-communist consensus in the overall sweep of American policy. Then, if we examine the period since 1968 in the same way, perhaps we shall develop additional clues as to whether a new consensus or theme is possible today. And, finally, let us look hardest at the central problems of today, and how they can best be approached.

II

Selling programs to Congress and the American people in the postwar era was always made easier if they could be clothed in one garment. In 1947, the Truman Administration's desire to provide aid to Greece and Turkey was sold to Congress as something larger than the containment of the Soviet Union solely in Europe and the Near East. In order to persuade a budget-conscious Republican Congress and an apathetic public of the dangers, President Truman drew a stark and dramatic picture—the existence of the Greek nation was threatened by communist guerrillas, and this clash was only part of the global struggle "between alternative ways of life." "It must be the policy of the United States," said the President, in words that were to become known as the Truman Doctrine, "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

It seems clear now that in seeking a consensus for American aid against possible Soviet expansion in one area, words were used to open the door later to a universalizing of American foreign policy objectives. Aid and alliance directed against the threat from the Soviet Union in one region became, with the Korean War in 1950, a crusade against communism in virtually every corner of the globe. Moreover, largely as a result of that war, the struggle became defined as broadly based anti-communism rather than the original theme of containing perceived Soviet expansion.

Meanwhile, America's relationships with the Third World suffered, in no small part because Secretary of State John Foster

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Dulles insisted that neutralism or "nonalignment" was morally untenable in a struggle between the communists and the "free world." Too often the United States expended military and financial assistance on those countries that were willing to line up behind Washington in its ideological crusade against communism. And while the Kennedy Administration (and the Eisenhower Administration to some degree) tried to make greater efforts, particularly in South Asia and South America, to assist less-developed countries to grow in economic strength, that Administration, too, found itself obsessed with the need to confront the Soviet Union wherever it seemed to threaten. From Cuba to Africa, and with growing concern in Indochina, Kennedy felt obliged to continue to pursue the broad strategy of containment that had been developed since the Truman Doctrine was enunciated. In this respect, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 seemed to mark an end game in the Soviet-American confrontation. And in its aftermath, with the signing of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, it also seemed possible that a relaxation of tensions, what was later christened détente, might be in the offing.

While the issues that divided the United States from the communist world were hardly so black and white as they seemed between the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, it was not unreasonable to center the elaboration and definition of America's vital interests in those years on the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, both in trying to counter Soviet ambitions and in seeking ways to control the struggle. Yet the costs of the anti-communist consensus were also grave: the growth of a military-industrial complex, which President Eisenhower warned of in his farewell address, the misuse of foreign aid to the Third World, and, above all, the excessive concern with areas of the world of peripheral strategic interest. In a sense, the American involvement in Vietnam, which grew in intensity in the period right after the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, epitomized these very distortions of postwar U.S. policy. To support a non-communist regime in a part of the world that was always marginal to U.S. strategic concerns, aid was provided in ever greater quantity and, as the aid increased, so did the American commitment. Finally, with full-fledged war, American forces were sent; and, as the war intensified, the spending did likewise but without adequate taxes, and this, in turn, led to spiraling inflation and a weakened economy. With America's deepening involvement in that tragic and frustrating conflict, the consensus successive administrations had sought broke down in favor of a strong public rejection of commitments outside Western Europe, Japan and South Korea.

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As much as anything else, Richard Nixon was elected in 1968 to end the American military involvement in Indochina. It took him four long, bloody years. And in this task he was dependent upon his foreign policy adviser and later Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. A new American foreign policy seemed in the making, one that would eschew moral crusades and adopt the Bismarckian belief that ideology was foolish and policy was "the art of the possible." Such a nonideological foreign policy, resting on balance-of-power considerations, produced notable achievements from 1969 to 1973.

The triangular diplomacy of the period capitalized on the Soviet-Chinese rift, which worsened so much in 1969 that an armed border clash on the Ussuri River seemed the prelude to a possible Sino-Soviet war. Both Chinese and Soviet policy helped in reaching the 1973 Paris accords on Indochina, and thus the direct American military involvement in Southeast Asia was liquidated. A pragmatic balance of power now seemed in the offing, with the United States in the pivotal role in both the U.S.-U.S.S.R.-China and the U.S.-Europe-Japan triangles. At the same time, Third World security problems were being downgraded, with the Nixon Doctrine serving as the military-strategic rationale that was to allow America to maintain her basic global commitments but with reduced capabilities.

For all this and the attendant statements of purpose and policy, the substance of a new broad consensus was not achieved, even in 1972-73. In those halcyon days, what was most effective was a foreign policy style that was able to manage America's retreat from an overextension of power in Southeast Asia while initiating the opening to China, the conclusion of the first phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and the reinsertion of U.S. presence and influence in the Middle East, and carrying these out with Gaullist verve and gusto. Moreover, the activist role America continued to pursue in world affairs was accompanied by the conscious elaboration of a policy of relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union, now openly labeled détente, even while Washington was still engulfed in the final phase of the Indochina conflict; in this sense, détente represented a deliberate entangling of American and Soviet interests on a global scale. It was hoped that from such a policy would flow the benefits of further agreements in the strategic realm and broader economic ties between the two superpowers. The so-called new realism was designed to avoid ideological rhetoric and to begin to weave a web of agreements—large and small—that would encompass the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Détente, embodying as it did the notion that the superpowers would

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exercise self-restraint as regards third countries, also seemed to mean that anti-Sovietism and the accompanying themes of the cold war would now be muted.

III

Détente notwithstanding, the Nixon and Ford Administrations, in practice, went on regarding the Soviet problem as central, not only in itself but in relation to other emerging areas. Even the attempt to shore up the dollar—whose weakness had been reflected in the 1971 suspension of gold convertibility and two later devaluations—was linked in 1973 to the U.S. defense role; Nixon tried to pressure the Europeans by explicitly underlining the linkage between their security—as provided by the United States—and economic and political cooperation, which he insisted be aligned to American interests. The effort, in the form of the so-called "Year of Europe," was, to say the least, ill-received by our closest allies.

The proclivity to project regional situations onto a global scale continued; both internal and external conflicts were seen as affecting relations between America and Russia whenever the two superpowers found themselves on opposite sides. This was as true in the case of Portugal after the overthrow of Caetano as in Chile under Allende. Although the Nixon Administration, in deference to changed public opinion and in pursuing its overall theme of détente, claimed at the time that its policies toward Allende were simply cool and correct, the reality that emerged from later revelations was that all along Allende was regarded as a grave threat in the political sphere alone; a sort of domino theory of internal politics in Latin America, and later in southern Europe, was the largely unstated mainspring of the Administration's actions.[1]

Moreover, long simmering economic issues between the industrialized and developing nations were treated as secondary in this period unless they were perceived as involving the two superpowers. The 1973 Arab oil embargo, after all, not only highlighted American strategic interests in the oil-producing nations but also helped draw attention to the rapidly increasing power of the Arab oil producers over the previous three years and to the growing demands of the Third World for a new international economic order. Such an "order" focused on efforts by the poorer nations of the world to narrow the income gap between themselves and the

[1] See Richard Fagen, "The United States and Chile: Roots and Branches," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975, pp. 297-313.

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rich. But in the United States, the Third World demands more often than not appeared as economic blackmail; in this view, for the advanced industrial nations to go very far along the path of accommodation only encouraged the blackmailers to increase their already unreasonable demands. The United States did finally respond to the calls of the developing nations for a new North-South dialogue in 1975 and 1976, though little was accomplished. Thus, while some Americans did recognize a need to reorder North-South relations, the image presented was a forbidding one, more characterized by conflict than cooperation.

When regional problems involved important superpower interests, however, Kissinger was able to act with deftness and notable success. The 1973 October War allowed him to seize the initiative by reinserting the American political presence in the Arab Middle East, from which it had been effectively excluded since 1957. By capitalizing on Egypt's problems with the Soviet Union, he made the United States the essential peacemaker between Israel and Egypt. At the same time, he eased the Soviets out of the peacemaking process. In these initial stages, when Kissinger decided to try for limited progress, this was a productive policy. No conflict arose between making peace and making gains at the expense of the Soviets, though it was always latent. For, while step-by-step diplomacy might prepare the way for a settlement, the durability of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement would be severely tested without Soviet participation in the negotiation process.

But in other cases where local factors favored Soviet initiatives —as, for example, in Angola—an anti-Soviet stance failed to carry the day. Here local factors were determinant. The Soviets (with their Cuban allies) were supporting the MPLA liberation movement while the Americans sided with factions also aided by white South Africa. In such a situation, other black African states inevitably lined up with the MPLA. And in the United States, Congress approved the Clark Amendment to the Arms Export Act that prohibited "any kind" of assistance to promote military operations in Angola. The final result was an increased Soviet/Cuban presence in southern Africa and a regime friendly to Moscow in a strategically placed country.

Kissinger, however, recognized the need to adjust U.S. policy to the new realities in Africa with his speech in Lusaka in 1976, calling for majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, and for the end of "institutionalized separation of races" in South Africa. Local factors were not to be scanted in future U.S. policy toward Africa; support for blacks struggling for the right to govern themselves

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was no longer to be confined to the Soviets, the Chinese and the Cubans.

But at home the Soviet aid to Egypt at the outbreak of the 1973 October War, and the perception of growing Soviet military outreach, now clearly manifest in southern Africa, eroded the support for détente and brought forth a new wave of anti-Sovietism. In effect, a broad foreign policy consensus had never been reestablished after 1968. The foreign policy successes of the Nixon-Kissinger period might have served as the groundwork for a coherent American foreign policy that could conceivably have led to a new consensus; but faced with the debacle of Watergate and a host of new problems—most notably the "low politics" of economic issues as the West struggled simultaneously with the problems of inflation, low growth and unemployment—the Ford Administration was unable to present a new theme that would mobilize the American people to cope with a seemingly unmanageable world.

IV

Indeed, when Jimmy Carter came into office, as I have noted above, he emphasized the complexity of the problems and, at the outset, sought support for his initiatives by calling for a stronger component of morality in the exercise of American foreign policy. Very early on, President Carter stated that the United States "had a historical birthright to promote political freedom throughout the globe." With these words, the Administration seemed to make the human rights campaign a spearhead of its attempt to set a new course. It was a theme that was very much in the American grain. Only a month after the Administration came into office, Washington took a tough stance toward arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union while at the same time launching an apparently unrelated campaign against Russia's violation of human rights. It was evident that the new Administration wanted to demonstrate that the linkage between different sets of foreign policy problems, which had been at least rhetorically emphasized by the previous Administration, was going to be downplayed.

Though the human rights campaign was designed to strengthen support at home and put America more in tune with certain political and emotional realities abroad—and, of course, to meet deep feelings within President Carter himself—it was seriously flawed as a unifying theme. Its appeal both to the Left and to the Right actually rested on inconsistent premises—the one saw it as being tough on Chile and Korea, the other as a hard-line policy

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toward the Soviet Union. In retrospect, the human rights campaign was, at best, a change of tone; it could never have served as an overarching theme on which to build a new consensus, and if this was an expectation, it was dashed precisely because of its inconsistent application. Yet it is a crusade that is unlikely to die out. One would hope, however, that it will be pursued with greater subtlety and skill than heretofore, with more results that can be demonstrated and with rather less rhetoric, which could in the long run prove self-defeating.

Along with its desire to provide a stronger moral thrust to our foreign policy, the Carter Administration was determined to address itself to the new international agenda, and in particular to the new primacy of economic issues and, in so doing, to deemphasize the importance of the superpower relationship. Despite its good intentions, the Soviet-American rivalry soon again became paramount. Not only was the détente policy of the Kissinger years being openly questioned, but the growing Soviet military thrust sharpened the edge of the Soviet-American competition for power and influence.

No longer did the United States enjoy, as it did in the 1950s, a distinct nuclear superiority. The Soviets' new nuclear capability was acknowledged in the late 1960s and early 1970s and was defined as "nuclear parity" or "essential equivalence." But beyond the nuclear question was the growing ability of the Soviet Union to project power by conventional means throughout the globe. Often over the past 30 years the United States had perceived a global threat from the Soviet Union when, in fact, no such global military capability was possible. The Soviet Union had been essentially a Eurasian power, as was most dramatically demonstrated in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 when it found itself dangerously overextended. Today, Soviet naval and air capabilities are such that it is possible for the Soviet Union effectively to airlift operations to other parts of the globe and so to render the possibility of Soviet military intervention far greater than was true during the harsh period of the cold war. But this did not become sharply evident until the Soviets intervened in southern Africa in 1975 by airlifting Cuban troops and equipment into Angola. And, partly as a result of the Soviet buildup, the Soviet Union, like the United States, now insists that problems outside its own sphere not be settled without its acquiescence. As Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko baldly put it in a speech at the 24th Party Congress in 1971: "No question of any significance . . . can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it." This is clearly an exaggeration,

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for U.S. actions in Latin America are far from being circumscribed by the Soviet Union's behavior, and Kissinger proved in Egypt that it is indeed possible to conduct a successful negotiation that excludes and is even opposed by the Soviet Union. But Gromyko's statement certainly reflects the desires of the Soviet leadership and was designed to impress Americans and their allies with the new Soviet status as a power co-equal with the United States.[2]

We have already seen that in Angola the Soviet Union and its Cuban ally intervened successfully in the Angolan civil war. Subsequently, the Soviet Union became deeply embroiled in the Horn of Africa, again accompanied by the Cubans. And in supporting the black liberation movements on Rhodesia's borders, the Russians were no less active. Faced with Soviet behavior in Africa, the Carter Administration reacted in contrary ways. In the Horn, where Moscow had switched its support from Somalia to Ethiopia and was then in the position of aiding Ethiopia in turning back an invasion from Somalia and quelling a guerrilla war in Eritrea, the Administration reacted by accusing the Soviets of violating "the code of détente." The May 1978 invasion of Shaba province in Zaïre by Katangan rebels based in Angola was cited as a further example of Soviet/Cuban meddling in African affairs.

Yet toward Namibia and Rhodesia, regional considerations predominated. Washington continued to work for a peace settlement in Namibia that would allow all parties involved to participate in a U.N.-supervised election; and in Rhodesia, the "internal settlement" worked out in Salisbury in March 1978 was not supported by the United States, largely because it failed to receive the backing of the front-line African states.

What is of equal if not more importance than Soviet military hardware, however, is the perception of the Soviet ability to project power and influence in the area of the Persian Gulf, a region seen as vital to the United States and its European allies. In a situation where access to resources is vulnerable, American concern over the Soviet presence in the area was inevitable, and even if the Soviets initially took advantage of what they believed were targets of opportunity—no matter how dangerous or unstable these opportunities might prove to be—a consolidation of Soviet influence through massive military aid and Cuban forces cannot be ruled out.

In short, there are two problems facing the Administration — the near-term geopolitical situation in the Horn where a Soviet

[2] See Robert Legvold, "The Nature of Soviet Power," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1977, pp. 49-71.

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strategic foothold could pose a threat to an area vital for its resources and in proximity to Israel, whose integrity the United States is committed to, and second, the impact on public opinion at home and abroad, and most particularly on the Soviet leadership, if the United States appears to be indifferent to Soviet behavior. Thus, even if the real Soviet gain is not long-standing, due to the local conditions prevailing in the Horn, the image of a Soviet/Cuban combination that *can* act effectively in support of any African-endorsed cause could set a serious and dangerous precedent for what may be coming up in southern Africa.

Some critics—and apparently some within the Administration—have urged that security problems in peripheral areas such as the Horn and southern Africa be treated as confrontations, calling for significant pressure on the Soviet Union. From relatively small retaliatory moves such as suspending cultural and scientific exchanges or withholding particular trade items thought to be of special importance—both moves now actually taken over the Shcharansky trial issue—suggestions ascend to a more drastic limitation of trade, curtailing food exports, suspending arms control negotiations, or announcing that the whole "framework of détente" is no longer operative.

But the difficulty here is twofold. First, the means to exert effective pressure are severely limited, at least so long as our allies trade with the Soviet Union without restraint, and carefully worked out arms control accords are clearly in America's national interest. Second, the Soviet/Cuban element, as in Angola, can only take hold and score lasting gains if it alone is aligned with regional forces and sentiment. In Ethiopia, this was indeed the case—given the African states' view of the sanctity of borders—and it is striking that even the most determined American hard-liners came up with no real alternative to laying off. There was, in short, no persuasive "Soviet-oriented" alternative in either Ethiopia or Rhodesia. For Washington to have backed the Salisbury "internal settlement" would have been to alienate African sentiment and to run the risk of handing over not only the guerrillas but also the front-line states to stronger Soviet ties. These states, in turn, would have had great leverage on their colleagues in the Organization of African Unity, thus increasing the very Soviet leverage Washington should be trying to avoid.

Not that anyone should be sanguine over the outcomes—the Horn, at the time of this writing, *is* a Soviet gain in prestige, and the Cubans remain in Angola; nor is there any assurance that the Dergue in Ethiopia or Angola's Neto will soon turn against their

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helpers. But any hypothetical alternative would probably have been worse; moreover, in Luanda the regime does not seem unwilling to work with the United States for regional stability, as witness the negotiations over Namibia. In both situations, regional factors should rightly predominate in the making of U.S. foreign policy.

Likewise in the Middle East, a cold war approach is precisely what is not called for. The October 1977 initiative taken by the Administration to involve the Soviet Union in the diplomacy of the Middle East was not misplaced. The joint statement issued by Moscow and Washington was keyed to the willingness of the two powers to participate in the guarantees of the terms of the settlement. Sadat's spectacular démarche to Jerusalem put the U.S.-Soviet role in abeyance, and, for a time at least, new momentum was put into the drive for peace. However, a year later, it can be argued that the need for the Soviets has not diminished in gaining a final settlement. Doubtless, the chief aim of Soviet cooperation with Middle Eastern governments and national liberation movements, in the words of Middle East specialist John C. Campbell, "is to pave the way to an enhanced military and political position for the Soviet Union in the region."[3] But this long-term goal does not mean that the Soviets do not really want an Arab-Israeli settlement. The terms they have committed themselves to publicly are not so very different from those of the Carter Administration. And the Soviets' main reason for signing the statement was to get recognition of their status and interests in the region. In the last analysis, as Campbell put it: "Washington could not by itself bring about, and maintain, a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. It had to take account of the fact of Soviet influence in the area and capacity to disrupt the process of negotiation or nullify it. The real question was one of timing, and even on that score the judgment of contemporary critics may not be the judgment of history."[4] Even if a return to some variant of step-by-step diplomacy is indicated in order to move the negotiations forward, Campbell's analysis of the role of the Soviet Union in any final settlement remains valid.

At the same time as Washington struggles for a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the geopolitical situation in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region cannot be neglected. Moderate regimes there remain a key American interest for multiple reasons and not

[3] See John C. Campbell, "The Soviet Union in the Middle East," *The Middle East Journal,* Winter 1978, p.5.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

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simply to counter Soviet influence and power in the region. Moreover, to paint American support for an Iran or a Saudi Arabia in simplistic anti-Soviet terms would be to put those governments themselves in a much more exposed position vis-à-vis the radical elements that lurk in the wings.

It has been, after all, a long-standing U.S. policy to try to aid Saudi Arabia and Iran with modern military weapons in order to fulfill a dual function. On the one hand, such arms deals are part and parcel of a U.S. policy of being friends with oil suppliers for the sake of price and availability of petroleum as well as maintaining moderate (in the Arab context) regimes in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, the recent arms deals also serve notice that America would supply real military power and support Saudi Arabia and Iran if they were ever pressured by the Soviet Union. In this respect, any so-called loss in the Horn is to be balanced by U.S. support of non-radical, anti-Soviet regimes. Thus, when Defense Secretary Harold Brown declared last spring that "we intend to safeguard the production of oil and its transportation to consumer nations without interference by hostile powers," it could be read less as a new anti-Soviet move than as a reassurance of a continued U.S. capacity to act militarily in case of need. There are sound reasons for making clear that the United States—though not so militarily predominant by any means as it was at the time of the 1958 Lebanon landings—retains strike forces tailored to deal with limited military contingencies in a rapid manner (and thus keep them limited).

But military capabilities are only part of the problem, and the Secretary's statement is surely as far as it is wise to go in an area where we have no official security commitments. What matters most over the long term is the need to preserve regional stability, help Iran and Saudi Arabia in their efforts to transform themselves economically, and yet at the same time avoid wedding the United States irrevocably to the political status quo. This basic task is in fact widely shared—the very diversity of European, American and Japanese activity is a source of strength. Each of these is acting for its own complex motives, in which an assured oil supply certainly looms large; to depict what is going on as primarily directed against Russia (though it seems to appeal to conservative geopolitical thinkers in Europe as well as here) would divide the supporting nations far more than it could conceivably stimulate them to greater effectiveness.

As for the key social and economic issues that divide the West—both within itself and in the North-South context—their resolution

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too is not likely to be facilitated in an atmosphere pervaded by anti-Sovietism. There is certainly no possibility of going back to an era where the Europeans and Japanese receive American military protection in return for American dominance in economic matters. The Atlantic Alliance not only possesses vast military forces and armaments as well as the capacity to match any overall Soviet military buildup, but also far exceeds the Soviet bloc's economic performance. Yet, the economic problems that Jimmy Carter inherited are still far from being solved. The characterization of a "troubled world economy" that existed when President Carter was elected has scarcely changed. And the modest results of the July 1978 Bonn summit meeting of the leaders of the advanced industrial nations only reinforces this definition. It may still come to pass that the nations of the European Community will be able to coordinate their economic, trade and monetary policies and even, as was hoped a decade ago, move toward economic and monetary union. But that has not happened yet. The protectionist sentiments that threaten the trilateral world have not been dispelled. Nor has there been an effective U.S. energy program that would serve both to strengthen the dollar and to reduce American resource vulnerability. Anti-Sovietism is not likely to provide the push the West needs in order to solve these grave problems.

The same is true of the attempt, through complex negotiations among the communist and noncommunist nations, to control transnational forces that threaten the international order—such issues as the environment, exploitation of the seabeds, nuclear nonproliferation, and international terrorism. To deal effectively with such problems requires, at the outset, the recognition that there are overlapping alliances and shifting coalitions— and occasions where the United States and the Soviet Union may find themselves in the same boat or else both risk drowning in a sea of troubles. An anti-Soviet consensus would most likely lead to a breakdown in the search for a coherent policy to cope with the new international agenda.

None of this argues for a moment that the United States should neglect to balance the Soviets militarily. This, after all, is what the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are about; and NATO is preparing to strengthen its conventional forces precisely in order to counter the Soviet buildup in Europe. But the hardest problems today—bilateral relations with the U.S.S.R., southern Africa, the Middle East, the world economy—are inherently dilemmas requiring the most careful balancing of forces and interests. To force

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them into a hard-line Soviet mold would be ineffective at best and dangerous at worst.

V

If anti-Sovietism provides a poor answer to the dilemmas that the United States faces, is there any other broad foreign policy consensus we can look to? The answer, it would seem, is no. The complexity of the issues, as Stanley Hoffmann has recently pointed out, is too often such that "foreign policy and domestic politics seem to point in opposite directions." In calling for an American foreign policy that will have some chance of "internal solidity," he says: "It is not easy to define in clear and comprehensive *political* terms a policy of great complexity. And it would be perilous as in the past to compress its necessary diversity into a few simple *moral* slogans."[5]

Certainly, those attempting to set up "the American national interest" as the guiding principle—as more conservative critics are wont to do—usually end up by dodging all the hard questions that surround such situations as the Middle East or southern Africa, not to mention bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. In every case, there are elements of the "national interest" on both sides of any difficult decision; too often those who invoke the phrase are trying to load the dice in favor of the outcome they think most important. As Justice Holmes once put it: "Let us talk things, not words." Critics must be prepared to say what they would actually *do* differently—in the Horn, Rhodesia, the SALT talks, or any other area of debate—and to be as honest as possible about its implications.

As we confront the foreign policy problems that bedevil us, then, consensus may indeed be hard to come by. The kind of broad consensus that obtained during the postwar era and which became a shibboleth of American foreign policy may no longer be possible to resurrect short of war. American interests are too diverse and American power now much less predominant. The conflicts between domestic and foreign interests that beset U.S. policy today should be discussed candidly. In this respect, public debates such as those over Panama and the Middle East arms deal can have a clarifying effect by demonstrating the limits and diversity of American interests and power. Most issues may have to be taken up on a case-by-case basis, and the President will have

[5] Stanley Hoffmann, *Primacy or World Order*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1978, p. 227.

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to look for support for his foreign policies much as he might seek to do for his domestic programs. This would mean building coalitions, and appealing to, satisfying, or, if need be, appeasing domestic constituencies.

Despite the new international agenda, the dialectic of foreign policy still remains as it was defined a century ago in Britain as a tension between the imperatives of the national interest even at times at the expense of justice—the so-called realist position—and the need to champion liberal and humane policies at home and abroad. Polls have shown time and again that the public is capable of making sensible distinctions; for example, a recent sounding revealed a desire both to stand up to the Russians and to have arms control. Even a less than great President can set a tone and mood which can make sense to the public, providing he is fairly consistent and his line coincides largely with reality.

In the end, we may have to do something we are not used to doing and thus may not be very good at. We may simply have to learn to conduct foreign policy for a very long time without a single unifying theme on which to base a broad national consensus. Both the nature of the problems abroad and their diverse impact on American public opinion at home now point strongly to such a conclusion. To accept it may be not merely the path of common sense and humane realism, but may also offer the best chance of exerting American influence toward constructive change in a world that is in a complex stage of transition.

Such a world is bound to contain all kinds of possibilities for serious conflict. But its dangers too must be dealt with in terms of their root causes and not simply in terms of those who seek to exploit them. A disorderly world need not also be a more dangerous one. It was, after all, an American idealist, Margaret Fuller, who is said to have exclaimed: "I accept the universe!" And an Old World realist, Thomas Carlyle, who then commented: "By God, she'd better."

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Lee H. Hamilton
Michael H. Van Dusen

MAKING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS WORK

The United States is faced with a critical problem today. How can Congress and the President work together most effectively to formulate and implement a foreign policy that is attuned to our national interests, consistent in all its facets, well understood at home and respected abroad?

Three decades ago, President Harry Truman could boast that he alone was the overriding force in American foreign affairs. A mere 15 years ago Secretary of State Dean Rusk could express the same categorical point of view in five simple words: The President makes foreign policy. For nearly 20 years, from 1950 to the mid-1960s, there was a national consensus on the main lines of foreign policy associated with the cold war; with strong executive leadership there developed a mystique of the President and State Department being absolutely in control, and of Congress, with rare exceptions, going along.

The national trauma over Vietnam ended this phase, both in terms of the consensus (and overriding emphasis on security issues that went with it) and in terms of congressional or popular willingness to accept executive leadership as had been done in the 1950–68 period. Over the past decade, and especially since 1974, Congress has assumed an ever greater role in security matters, and simultaneously the newly central importance of economic issues—always a congressional major responsibility— has thrust Congress more to the fore. Slowly and painfully at first, but later quickly and with much less effort, Congress has asserted the full range of its authority, and its members have developed both the concern and professional capability to participate in a new range of foreign policy decisions. And initial successes in the drive to reassert neglected powers have prompted Congress to involve itself even more deeply in the actual execution of policy.

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So today Congress, beyond question, is playing a greatly enlarged role in foreign policy. When President Carter went to the Bonn economic summit in July 1978, his power to commit his country was in large measure a prediction of how Congress will eventually legislate on energy policy. On key security issues, the Israelis and now the Arabs, the Greeks and now the Turks, the Organization of African Unity and now Bishop Muzorewa, take their cases direct to the Hill, sensing that there is where the action is. And we have seen the unprecedented spectacle of criminal charges of corruption against individual Congressmen, deriving from their involvement not only in policy decisions on aid to South Korea, but in administrative decisions concerning the sale of rice to that country.

Some of this is new only in degree; much of it, we shall argue, has in fact been both inevitable and constructive. But there *are* serious problems, and they are recognized on the Hill as well as elsewhere. Congressional attempts to attach policy conditions to its authorizations and appropriations, and its attempts, through the so-called legislative veto, to control how policy is carried out in practice, have led to growing concern in some quarters about the steadiness of overall American foreign policy. It is unquestionably more democratic and responsive than it was a decade ago—but it may on occasion be inconsistent and confusing to friend and foe alike.

It is easier to explain the development and nature of executive-legislative conflict in foreign policy than it is to offer solutions or remedial action. Nonetheless, there is broad agreement that executive-congressional relations and conflict can be managed better and that improvements in management are essential for an effective and coherent American foreign policy.

II

The new assertiveness and activism of Congress has stemmed from many factors. But to any member whose service goes back to 1965, there is no question that Vietnam was the single most important event in the transformation. Most members, reacting to their constituents' complaints about the war, became concerned that during the war period the United States had moved too far and too fast in concentrating war-making and other powers in the hands of one man. For Congress, a strong and independent foreign policy role was the best hope to prevent one-man decisions on crucial issues of war and peace. Unrestricted presidential power in foreign policy-making came to be viewed as neither necessary,

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desirable nor tolerable in a free society.

Although it failed until 1973 to intervene decisively to end American participation in the Indochina War itself, Congress began in the early 1970s to flex its muscles on the antiballistic missile and supersonic transport issues, discovering in both cases that official experts could be convincingly challenged, that even on technical issues the executive was less than omniscient. More directly to the Vietnam point, the War Powers Resolution of 1973, passed over President Nixon's veto, imposed substantial procedural restraints on the unilateral power of the President to commit U.S. armed forces abroad, compelling him to seek affirmative congressional authority within 60 days of any such action.

Yet in 1972–73, the executive was able to undertake several key foreign policy initiatives without paying much attention to the Congress. Rapprochement with China, détente and SALT I with the Soviet Union, and the Paris Accords on Vietnam (their accompanying secret presidential undertakings then concealed from Congress) briefly revived the prestige of the executive; on these central issues, there *was* a national consensus, but it turned out to be short-lived and inadequate to embrace the new range of foreign policy issues that was even then visibly emerging.

The first Watergate revelations in the spring of 1973 had, of course, a devastating impact on the position of President Nixon personally. But at least as significant, in the 1973–76 period, was a series of cases of real policy disagreement, compounded by a sense that the executive was trying to short-circuit Congress and by revelations of past executive failures and even scandals.

1. In 1973 and 1974, in an atmosphere charged by the Middle East War and the apparent Soviet role in support of the Arabs, the Congress enacted *the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments,* tying central economic features of the Nixon détente agreements of 1972 to issues of freedom of emigration, which the Soviet Union has always regarded as "internal" and not open to public discussion. The result was twofold: Soviet refusal to go through with the trade agreements and a resulting stagnation in trade levels since, and—in practice—less emigration from the Soviet Union than had been achieved in the previous year or two by executive diplomacy. It was a prime example of the power of both general and specific forces of public opinion on Congress, and of the danger that such forces can put foreign policy into a counterproductive straitjacket that then becomes immensely hard to remove.

2. The Nixon-Agnew embrace of the regime of the "colonels" in Greece had never sat well with large elements in Congress. Thus,

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when *the Cyprus crisis of July and August 1974* broke, and Secretary of State Kissinger was unable to stop either the initial Greek coup or the successive Turkish military responses, culminating in the large-scale August invasion and occupation of Cyprus, a clear majority of Congress was hardly in a mood to accept the Administration's refusal, in defiance of long-standing legal provisions, to cut off military aid to Turkey. The result was a flat congressional prohibition, which—however justified for a short period—has undoubtedly operated once again to make American policy inflexible and ineffective.

No doubt historians will long debate these two initial cases, where Congress in effect substituted its policy for that of the executive. It may well be argued that the provocation was great and the moral and legal grounds for the position taken at least tenable. At bottom, a majority of Congress in each case just did not trust the executive to take effective action. But what is clear above all is that when Congress gets itself in this position, it has a tendency to adopt Abraham Lincoln's whimsical maxim: "If you have made a bad bargain, hug it all the tighter!"

3. Revelations in the fall of 1974 concerning *American policy in Chile* in 1970–73, and the use of the CIA there, contradicted public testimony before Congress and (in the case of the Track II operation of 1970) had never been disclosed to *any* member of Congress even in the then-operative committee structure entitled to full knowledge of major CIA operations. These, in turn, led rapidly to:

4. *Wholesale revelations of CIA conduct,* going beyond its legal charter and beyond any recognized norm of American behavior, making it plain that Congress too had fallen short in its oversight function and that only a wholesale examination and housecleaning, by the Congress, could define the proper scope and thus restore the necessary foundation for the CIA's secret operations. Congress had to step in, however clumsily it may have acted in individual instances.

5. Indeed, the case of *Angola*, in 1975, was one in which the executive—with only limited and too-secret consultation—again resorted to the use of the CIA to handle a crisis that quickly ballooned beyond any conceivable limits of truly covert operation. By December, Congress had concluded that the Administration was playing a losing hand—as it clearly was, and not just because of any apparent resemblance to Vietnam—and blew the whistle by legislative prohibition and then by the sweeping Clark Amendment banning future aid of any sort to rebels within the new Angola.

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And in this case the Administration—in Secretary Kissinger's speech at Lusaka in the spring of 1976—changed the whole thrust of its policy in southern Africa, in a more constructive direction.

6. Although Congress for the most part supported Henry Kissinger's diplomacy in the *Middle East*—the exception being the resolution backed by 76 Senators in the spring of 1975, objecting to any attempt to pressure Israel by cutting back on military supplies—there was an even more significant reaction when the Sinai deal in the fall of 1975 turned out to contain long-term American obligations that were only reluctantly disclosed to the Congress at all. Against this background, as well as general concern over massive military aid and sales commitments made without consultation, Congress moved into this area as well, enacting in late 1975 an amendment to the Arms Export Control Act requiring that any sale of military equipment totaling over seven million dollars be laid before Congress for 30 days before becoming final, with Congress entitled to reject the proposed sale by majority vote of both houses. It was perhaps the most far-reaching use of the so-called legislative veto, and it soon became apparent—in the case of a proposed sale of HAWK missiles to Jordan—that the new power to reject was bound to thrust Congress into the consideration of such sales more importantly than had been true in the past, and that it was having an anticipatory impact on executive actions.

7. The executive also seemed high-handed in its tendency to conduct foreign policy through executive agreements. Resentment on the Hill mounted over the long-standing executive practice of using such agreements rather than (and, at times it seemed, to evade) the treaty provision of the Constitution. From 1946 to the end of 1974, the United States entered into 411 treaties and over 6,300 presidential agreements. Although proposals to subject all executive agreements to possible review by Congress have not been legislated, Congress has started to assert its latent powers of control, through the purse, over executive agreements, especially long-term, base-related agreements.

In sum, there emerged in the 1973-76 period a whole new array of legislative controls in the security area alone of foreign policy—controls by way of strict legislative conditions, by way of forms of new oversight and requirements for information on policy actions, and extending into the area of execution itself. At the same time, even at its peak, the enlarged congressional role never warranted the labels applied by a few correspondents who spoke of "congressional foreign policy" or "congressional dominance in foreign policy." Basically, it was still the President and the executive that

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conducted foreign policy and took action, the Congress that reacted and played a secondary, though increasingly important, role.

And, in many central areas of policy, a national consensus persisted and was reflected in congressional support for the Administration. Indeed, in the case of defense budgets and American troops in Europe, earlier congressional pressures for reduction have now sharply receded. In the increasingly important policy areas of economic relations with the other major industrialized nations and with the developing nations (the West-West and North-South fronts as they are sometimes called), Congress left the running to the executive, intervening only mildly, for example, even in the prolonged negotiations for a Law of the Sea Treaty, which must in the end come to Congress for approval.

When President Carter was elected in 1976, with apparently clear-cut Democratic majorities in both houses, some observers predicted that the problems of friction between Congress and the executive would be reduced, and that Congress would retreat at least from its attempts to control security-related foreign policy actions. In hindsight, this was never in the cards. As our listing has shown, the basic disagreements and concerns had come from both parties, and from "conservatives" as much as from "liberals"—dubious labels at best on foreign policy issues and certainly ones that cut across party lines today. The large Democratic majority rested, as in the past, predominantly on domestic factors, and as a matter of history, a President with a large party majority has never been thereby in a strong position to bend Congress to his will on foreign policy; on the contrary, the "great" periods of executive leadership and congressional cooperation have come when the majorities (in terms of party labels) were narrow or nonexistent, so that the two branches had to work together.[1]

Moreover, the new President could not have avoided tackling a pair of problems—the Panama Treaties and a national energy policy—where the role of Congress was inescapably central. Most basically, there were by this time certain ingrained changes in

[1] For example, Franklin Roosevelt in 1937 was powerless to block a Neutrality Act that tied his hands in the looming war in Europe. In 1953, Dwight Eisenhower's greatest problems came from the Brickers and Knowlands of his own party. Even Lyndon Johnson, in 1964, drew primarily on the bipartisan tradition and consensus dating from 1950; the earliest opponents of the Vietnam War were, almost without exception, liberal Democrats. We would venture that it is almost a law of contemporary American politics that a Republican President with a majority is under great pressure from the extreme Right, while a Democratic President is under similar pressure from his liberal constituency. If a President finds—as both Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter have recently found—that foreign problems rarely yield to extreme approaches, he needs the opposing party to neutralize his own zealots. Although the tradition of bipartisanship grew up in the time of cold war national consensus—and can itself be carried to extremes that stifle needed debate—the pragmatic reasons for cultivating support in foreign policy from both parties are extremely powerful.

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Congress itself, as well as in the pressures of American public opinion that beat upon its members.

First, the membership of Congress has changed. Well over half of the House of Representatives has been elected since 1972 and there are few members around elected before the early 1960s. After Pearl Harbor, a whole generation in Congress tended to defer to the executive branch on foreign affairs. After Vietnam, many new members of Congress felt they could do as well as the executive branch in the conduct of foreign policy. The number of members interested in foreign affairs has expanded significantly beyond the traditional committees, leading to many more foreign policy amendments on the floor. The feeling exists that if Congress does not specifically prohibit action through legislation, then the executive branch will feel it can carry out any policy.

Not only do many of the newer, younger members have specific foreign policy interests because of their travels and experiences, but they can be strong individualists with loose party ties and little personal loyalty to the President. They do not know past decades of executive-legislative cooperation in foreign affairs. They can exhibit strong anti-institutionalism: many of them ran for Congress by running against Congress and against Washington. Recent increases in mid-career retirements have only accelerated these tendencies.

Second, the fivefold increase in congressional staff, both on members' and committee staffs, has had a demonstrable impact on all activities of Congress, including foreign policy. In 1947, there were fewer than 500 committee staffers in Congress. Today, there are more than 3,000. The House International Relations Committee staff has tripled since 1971. With the large pool of professionals at hand, Congress can now compete with the executive branch in matters requiring expertise.

Similarly, a lot more information is available to Congress and helps Congressmen support foreign policy initiatives. The Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, the General Accounting Office and the Office of Technology Assessment combine with private research sources to provide Congress with much that it never had before.

Third, as the energy crisis shows most dramatically, the issues in an age of interdependence, and the constant play of these issues in the media, have exploded upon the American people—confronting them at every turn in their daily lives, and making them and their representatives more interested in the world about them. Even if they wanted to, members can no longer escape foreign

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policy issues.

The new congressional mood has roots in the increased activity of special interest groups. Members encounter such groups in Washington and in their constituencies, pressing for protectionism, support for the interests of a particular country, human rights, and environmental concerns, or whatever. These groups are more sophisticated, better prepared and equipped to heighten members' interest in specific foreign policy issues and to promote specific legislation.

All these forces have operated with special impact on the House of Representatives, once considered a very junior partner in the legislative branch on foreign policy matters and often ignored. The Senate no longer plays the exclusive legislative role in foreign policy, even though it is the Senate that still passes on appointments and on treaties.

Given all of these factors, there is today no sign that congressional assertiveness in foreign policy will abate. On the contrary, the experience of the first two congressional sessions under President Carter seems to make it clear the Congress' enlarged role is here to stay. In this relatively short period we have seen:

—Two "great debates," on the Panama Treaties and on the packaged sales of military aircraft to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in the Senate. Disconcerting as the Panama debate must have been to our Latin American friends, it appears in the end to have cleared the air, both reflecting and contributing to a significant change in American public opinion on the wisdom of holding onto outmoded positions abroad. And the debate on the Middle East arms sales, we would submit, was in the end equally inevitable and probably also healthy; arising as it did from one of the "legislative veto" provisions to which many in the executive object, surely it also showed that what is technically a question of execution may on occasion go to the very roots of a vital national policy toward Israel and the Arab states.

—The removal by the Congress, on Administration initiative, of the congressional embargo on new arms supplies to Turkey, the repeal of the Byrd Amendment that had permitted imports of chrome from Rhodesia in breach of the U.N.-sanctioned embargo there—and the rejection by the Senate of a Danforth amendment that would have lifted the same embargo during the period of possible elections under the Smith-Muzorewa interim settlement. It is too much to say that these actions add up to a trend—yet in each case the Congress did respond to Administration arguments on overall policy, despite its own very real continuing concerns

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(about Turkish intransigence in the one case, and the dangers of letting policy be dictated by militant guerrillas, in the other). In practice, in all five of these "great debate" and "special amendment" cases, the Administration got its way, at the expense of a lot of time and shoe leather, but in the end with only minor congressional reservations of a kind that may—at least in the Turkish case—be actually helpful to sound policy.

—Noteworthy resolutions and other expressions challenging two Administration initiatives in East Asia, the Carter plan to withdraw American ground forces from Korea by 1982, and the initiation of discussions to normalize relations with Vietnam. To date, one of these has been significantly modified, the other (at least for the time being) shelved. However one judges the merits of the congressional objections, both cases reflected far too little prior consultation even with the proper formal committees, let alone with the members outside the committee structure who (predictably) formed the nucleus of the opposition. The Administration played both hands badly even by the old rules; under the new ones, it was courting trouble.

—Closely related, a clear congressional go-slow on normalizing relations with China, at least at the expense of the defense treaty with Taiwan. Legal questions aside, it is surely evident to all that in the present uncertain state of American public opinion it would be extraordinarily unwise for any Administration to move on this issue without another "great debate" in Congress.

—Attempts by a few in the Administration to blame congressional restrictions for the inability of the United States to stem the unquestioned Soviet and Cuban role in helping Ethiopia defeat Somalia in the Ogaden, or the more debatable Cuban role in the Shaba rebels' incursion into Zaïre. Without getting into the details of two complex situations, may one not argue that the War Powers Resolution and the Clark Amendment were in fact healthy factors, restraining any urge the Administration may have felt to act with force or covert means in situations that would hardly have responded to either?

—Continuing disagreement between the executive and Congress on the wisdom of a series of human rights amendments that tie the hands of our own Export-Import Bank and of American representatives in the international lending agencies. Most recently, however, efforts in this field have usually been rejected or modified; Congress is tending to realize the disadvantages of inflexibility and tending to trust an executive dramatically committed to press for human rights improvement.

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—The almost complete airing of the Korean scandals. Again without getting into detail, at the heart of this issue has been the excessive involvement of individual members of Congress in decisions of an administrative character that should have been left to the executive. Neither branch is immune to the appeals of corrupt gain, but the checks and balances—including congressional oversight—are more extensive in the executive branch.

—An impressively detailed and continuous program of briefings by the Administration on the progress of the negotiations for a SALT II arms control agreement. Here, with long experience and clearly identified groups with major interests, the process of consultation has been a reality. What now looms as the "great debate" of 1979 will have been prepared much better than Panama—or for that matter SALT I—and in the process the overall American position may have been both stiffened and brought more in tune with growing public concern over Soviet military weapons programs. With the agreements likely to take the form both of a Treaty and a three-year Protocol, and with future strategic arms programs in the military budget directly at issue, SALT II will surely see the House playing a role only less central and evident than that of the Senate—and the Administration has shown itself sensitive to this added dimension.

—And, of course, the "energy bill"—shorthand for what may well be the most complex and multiple legislation ever tackled by Congress—key, in the eyes of most foreigners and many Americans, to the wavering status of the dollar and to the ability of the United States to lead in summit economic discussions.

To attempt an overall evaluation of these diverse examples would be bold indeed. On the good side, Congress *is* reflecting in most cases not merely the pressure of special interests, ethnic or other, but valid and widely felt concerns that (as in the case of the SALT II negotiations) would surely have come up later if not now, or if left unanswered would have caused support for the Administration's whole policy toward the Soviet Union to erode. Congress *has* acted to remove or modify some of the more questionable of past legislative conditions on policy. On the other hand, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment remains in force, depriving us of the potential economic benefits of expanded Soviet-American trade, and at the same time limiting the use of trade as leverage when the atmosphere warrants (as it may now). The Turkish arms embargo came close to seriously impairing NATO cohesion on the southern front, and probably delayed progress toward a negotiated Cyprus agreement. And congressional conditions, however well intended,

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have unduly politicized the multilateral aid agencies, which some members used to urge as the preferred avenue for our foreign aid on the ground of their concentrating on economic essentials.

Apart from one's judgment of special cases, what the record seems to us to show most clearly is that Congress is still far too deeply into policy *execution*—and that this has come about largely because of the hangover of frustration over not having been adequately consulted on policy *formulation*, from Vietnam on. This factor, more than any other, lies behind the degree of unhealthy tension that persists.

But in the last analysis the events of these 18 months have reinforced the role of Congress in foreign policy. At both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, there has been a spirit of cooperation that was far from present in many earlier periods. Both the executive and Congress have embarked, if you will, on a "learning curve" in the handling of an agenda of problems, and a degree of congressional involvement, that must surely exceed in complexity any prior period in the history of American foreign policy. Yet the tide of criticism continues, and there are still respected voices—George Kennan notably, and at times Henry Kissinger—who argue that Congress should adopt its own self-denying ordinance and get out of the way of the professionals from the executive branch. Let us take a moment and consider their arguments, in the light of the Constitution and the experience of history.

III

The role of Congress in the formulation of American foreign policy has been a subject of intense discussion and debate almost from the time the United States declared its independence. But there is neither in this debate nor in the Constitution any answer to the dilemma we face today: neither past history nor the Constitution argue for a basic realignment of foreign policy roles—nor do they suggest the conclusion that Congress is acting in a wrong fashion.

The Constitution is vague in its treatment of foreign policy issues and in providing that foreign policy powers be shared by both the President and the Congress. Powers on war, treaties, appointments, and commerce are all shared powers under the Constitution, requiring the Congress to play an important and continuing role in the formulation of foreign policy. Indeed, the bulk of the foreign policy powers enumerated in the Constitution are with Congress, while the President's role in specific areas is left

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vague and in many cases implicit.

Periods of congressional assertiveness in foreign policy have been frequent in the nation's history. The Vietnam experience has merely been the latest, and perhaps most potent, catalyst for congressional activism in foreign affairs. Viewed in the long term, the recent activism of Congress in foreign affairs has been both a cause and an effect of stresses in the foreign policy consensus that existed in the postwar period. Constitutional dictates and political considerations have in decades past and in this present period of activism put Congress in the paradoxical position of being both a partner and an adversary in foreign policy-making.

The competition between the two branches, however, need not have a winner and a loser. Debate, creative tension and review of policy can bring about decisions and actions that stand a better chance of serving the interests and values of the American people. Total cooperation between the two branches should not be considered the sine qua non of foreign policy-making. While many benefits can come from a strong executive-legislative consensus on foreign policy and improved and formalized consultative processes, Congress, constitutionally and historically, needs to continue to pursue its crucial role as a critic of executive branch policy. The concern of Congress should be to strike a balance between responsible criticism, based on appropriate and measured oversight and review of executive branch policy, and necessary cooperation with the executive branch, stimulated by strengthened consultation procedures.

In retrospect, Professor Edward S. Corwin's maxim that the U.S. Constitution "is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy" best characterizes the state of executive-legislative relations throughout most of American history, except perhaps for that remarkable era of consensus immediately following World War II.[2] Yet, the nature of the problem is not that each branch engage in running conflict with the other branch for control over the formulation of our foreign policy; when conflict becomes a goal in itself or enters into policy implementation, it is nearly impossible for a coherent policy to emerge. Rather, each should be working to ensure that the wisest policies, with the broadest support, are implemented.

We should not necessarily expect the process of policy formulation to be tidy. But if Congress is able to participate in that process

[2] For a more complete treatment of this issue, see *Congress and Foreign Policy*, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., June-September 1976, Washington: GPO, 1976.

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and there is adequate consultation in that phase, Congress should leave policy execution to the executive branch. It has almost become a self-fulfilling prophecy in the last several years: when Congress or some members perceive they are denied a role in policy formulation, they are determined to play havoc with policy implementation.

Clearly, the Constitution will not answer our present dilemma—nor can past periods of foreign policy consensus be recreated at any given time. The unifying themes that shaped the postwar foreign policy consensus are not on the horizon today unless we are willing to contemplate a war crisis or a re-creation of the cold war which few in their senses want. We have to cope with the proposition that even with the best of cooperation and intentions between Capitol Hill and the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, and even with creative and responsive institutions, there is still a problem in formulating foreign policy given the complex and unforeseen foreign policy agenda this nation faces. The unpleasant, but predictable conclusion, then, is that we have to try simply to improve the system we have and make it work better.

As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote over 20 years ago:

> The central question is not whether the Congress should be stronger than the Presidency, or vice versa; but, how the Congress and the Presidency can both be strengthened to do the pressing work that falls to each to do, and to both to do together.[3]

Let us, then, look at the strengths and weaknesses of both the Congress and the executive branch, as they are operating today, and then consider what might be done to give the fullest possible play to the strengths of each, while at the same time seeking to control and limit the weaknesses.

IV

National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recently said: "The new found influence of Congress is not as disturbing as the lack of discipline one sees on Capitol Hill."

A realistic assessment of Congress' performance in foreign policy has to concur in part with this assessment and admit mixed results. Congress' principal strength in the foreign policy field is its representation of diverse public opinion. Its main weakness is diffusion of power and authority.

One major set of congressional problems in dealing with foreign

[3] Dean Acheson, *A Citizen Looks at Congress*, New York: Harper, 1957, p. 56.

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policy matters stems from the attitudes many Congressmen have developed. Deference to, and disrespect for, the executive branch, periodic disinterest in foreign policy issues, lack of sustained interest in any particular issue, parochial motivations due to constituent interest groups or ethnic pressures, and fear of "meddling" with the national security apparatus or reluctance to take responsibility for actions on a given issue, are all problems members have had on occasion—and which no amount of structural reform can remedy.

A second deficiency is that Congress tends to handle foreign policy as it handles domestic policy. Too often it asks what the politics are, not what the national interest is. When domestic politics control the judgment of members, Congress can make serious mistakes. With few exceptions, members are not held accountable on foreign policy issues by their constituents. One result of this perspective is that Congress has difficulty in developing a coherent foreign policy. Its members tend to focus on one aspect of a problem and to let a judgment on that aspect determine broad policy on a complex issue.

Third, Congress is not good at keeping secrets. The problem is not just intentional leaks: the executive branch is probably as guilty as Congress in this regard. Rather, the problem is that Congressmen have to react constantly in public to headline events. Television and the media generally have accentuated the outside game for Congress and have weakened the old, less glamorous inside game of deliberate discussion and consideration of complex issues. Increased openness in government and less secrecy are often abused before the cameras, and as consultation widens the problem of confidentiality increases. Classified information does present a member of Congress with difficult decisions. What can a member do when confronted with classified information about a policy with which he had nothing to do and of which he may strongly disapprove?

To make matters worse, confidentiality is often viewed by Congress as deception. A member does have a responsibility to express his views on policy. He is often restrained from doing so because the information available to him has been classified as secret, oftentimes for arbitrary reasons. Faced with this dilemma, some members choose not to know secrets.

Fourth, Congress lacks leadership in foreign policy matters. It is hard to determine who speaks for Congress on foreign policy — unlike many domestic issues where it is possible to delineate a clear leadership position. Although there can be valuable checks and

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balances in a measure of congressional untidiness, an activist Congress which at times appears from an outside perspective to have 535 Secretaries of State does make formulation of a coherent foreign policy difficult. A related difficulty is the lack of party unity in Congress and the increase in influence of the staffs.

Fifth, Congress is beset by several structural weaknesses. Jurisdictional diffusion, particularly in the area of foreign economic policy, is a crucial reason for Congress' lack of effectiveness. Presently, 17 of 22 committees of the House of Representatives deal with aspects of foreign policy, and in the Senate 16 of 19 committees have some jurisdiction over foreign policy. Overlapping committee jurisdictions and vague mandates inhibit efforts by Congress to address many important foreign policy issues.

A final weakness of Congress is that it does not easily differentiate among opinions it hears, or appropriately evaluate information it receives. Congress today does have much more information available to it, but that information is not always rounded or balanced. There are data to support any cause or any position, and members often give foreign governments the wrong signals based on poor or selective information.

But Congress has strengths as well as weaknesses in its foreign policy-making role. The activism and assertiveness of Congress in foreign policy can be viewed positively. The representativeness of Congress and its accessibility remain its major sources of strength, and have ensured a healthy input of the people's opinions into foreign policy-making. They often convey directly to the executive the doubts and the confusions about policy as well as approval or disapproval of policy. Angola and CIA behavior in Chile are among recent examples. Congress is often better able and more willing to obtain a policy input from the outside, from academia and from the private sector. But this can be a double-edged sword: one of the problems is Congress' susceptibility to constituent and special interest pressures.

The representativeness of Congress is important because the executive branch cannot for an extended period effectively pursue any foreign policy objective without a genuine consensus of support. Congressional support is necessary for long-term policy, while congressional opposition to a policy can impede and undermine that policy. When issues of peace, aid and recognition are subject to intense debate and discussion in a collegial body, policy is often strengthened.

In short, because Congress and the executive branch share constitutional responsibilities in foreign policy, Congress can serve

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several important purposes: it can help formulate policies; it can act to check the growing power of the presidency; it can support the President, when necessary and desirable, in his foreign policy initiatives; it can monitor the attitudes of the American people; it can convey the view of the people to the President; and it can help inform and educate the people on foreign policy.

The burden on Congress is to provide informed consent on foreign policy matters. Many people question the competence of Congress: they see its ethnic orientation, its eclectic approval and its lack of sustained interest. The legislative pace alone does not lend itself to detailed supervision of the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy, and this means that Congress should not try to get too detailed in its legal prescriptions. Again, the greater the trust and *early* interaction between branches, the broader and more general the approach of Congress in foreign policy issues is likely to be.

The strength of the executive branch in the foreign policy process, on the other hand, lies first in the nature and mandate of the office of the presidency. As Commander in Chief of the armed forces and the principal governmental officer responsible for policy execution, the President is at the center of American foreign policy. People look to him for leadership and consider him their representative before the world. People expect the President to articulate and support the national interest.

The unparalleled access of the executive branch to information and expertise has also been a major source of its strength. In fact, these resources will have to be shared with Congress more often and in greater detail if Congress is to begin to share effectively in the making of foreign policy with the executive.

And third, the very organization of the executive branch of government gives it another advantage in carrying out American foreign policy. With authority centralized in one man and an ability to view the whole picture in a given situation, decision-making can be rapid and execution of policy immediate.

While diffusion of power in Congress, its decentralization and its attitudes are considered by the executive branch to be congressional weaknesses, comparable criticisms can be addressed to the organization of the executive branch.

Perhaps the executive branch's greatest weakness is that its foreign policy bureaucracies are inaccessible to the people. Despite efforts to bring foreign policy issues to the people, officials of the State Department remain quite isolated from the blunt common sense of constituents who probe and test the foreign policy views

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of elected officials.

Second, the attitude that the executive branch is best suited and equipped to conduct foreign relations has led many in the executive branch to look upon Congress as a nuisance and upon Capitol Hill as enemy territory. Congressional attempts to limit executive action are often considered too blunt and restrictive for career bureaucrats to mesh with the subtleties of U.S. global diplomacy. Distrustful of congressional assertiveness, wary of the congressional power to oversee and investigate, the executive branch has frequently felt torn between its awareness of the congressional role in foreign affairs dictated by the Constitution and its own clear preference for ignoring Congress.

Today, the executive branch is poorly organized for the conduct of aspects of foreign affairs, especially foreign economic policy. As global economic issues share prominence with political and security affairs, not only will there be a need for executive agencies to consult and coordinate more effectively with each other, but the State Department, as the principal focal point in foreign policy, will have to affirm its leadership in many areas of foreign relations, including economic policy, while taking into account the legitimate and sometimes contradictory interests of other executive departments, especially the Treasury.

From the congressional perspective, then, the executive branch needs to allow Congress a defined role in policy formulation and needs to concentrate on four tasks. First, the executive must keep Congress informed of policy, its premises and its purposes as well as the facts upon which its decisions are based. Second, it must actively seek the views of as many members as possible, especially all those concerned with a particular problem. Third, the executive must exercise its authority with restraint. And fourth, the executive needs to understand better the political problems of members.

V

From the viewpoint of the Congress, the crux of the problem between the executive branch and the Congress, which prevents the formulation and execution of a more coherent foreign policy, is the inadequate system of consultation between the two branches. While effective prior consultation should not be viewed as a panacea for executive-legislative conflict in foreign affairs, the process can be vastly improved. If the executive branch and Congress are able to agree on what consultation should involve, which members of Congress are to be consulted, and at what point

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in the decision-making process consultation ought to occur, the potential for conflict and confrontation between the two branches can be reduced and a better working relationship facilitated.

In an attempt to ensure such consultation, Congress from time to time has enacted legislation that requires "consultation" for certain types of executive action (security assistance, energy policy and trade policy are examples), as the War Powers Resolution does for the commitment of American troops to hostilities abroad. Congress has also tried to encourage consultation by requiring that certain actions be expressly authorized by Congress or by providing for a legislative veto of certain actions.

Ensuring that consultation does in fact occur, however, is only part of the problem. No matter how routine and accepted consultation might become, members of Congress have often not focused on the particular issue and are not prepared for consultation meetings: They may be put up to it by eager staff, their arduous schedules may preclude effective discussions, or they may want to avoid consultation on certain subjects.

Some members, prizing highly their independence, are also reluctant to be consulted too much for fear of being co-opted by the executive branch. Consultation should not seek to preempt the congressional role as critic and overseer of the executive branch. The goal must be a proper balance between the confrontation generated by the constitutional nature of the relationship and the co-optation risked by a too cozy relationship with the executive branch.

The major defect in executive branch consultation with Congress has not been that it does not occur but that the approach is wrong—or that it is too little and too late. Consultation has all too often meant a post facto or simultaneous notification of action taken, rather than a genuine presentation of options involving their full discussion and consideration and seeking advice and counsel. At best, Congress is in a position to affect only nuances of policy, not its substance.

If the need for prior consultation is crucial, so also is a mutual understanding of the objectives of consultation. Is it to gain support? Is it to inform members in advance of something that will occur? Is it to obtain approval? Is it to try to affect joint action? Or is it to survey policy options?

In his later years, Dean Acheson used to tell the story of his visit to General de Gaulle in October 1962, just prior to President Kennedy's dramatic public announcement that touched off the public phase of the Cuban missile crisis. After Acheson had

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described the American view of the evidence of the introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba and the actions that the President proposed to take in response, the General led off with one incisive question: "Am I being informed or consulted?" Acheson's equally incisive response was that he was being informed, and in that instance the General accepted (and then lent his full support to) the actions taken.

There may be cases today when Congress would accept a similar reply—though they are far more rare than in the postwar period. But it is fundamental that the President and members of the executive branch, in *any* contacts with Congress about a pending action or decision, make clear exactly what the ground rules are. Nothing is more frustrating, or more destructive of trust, than for a member of Congress to get the impression that he is being asked for serious advice, only to find that he is in fact being presented with a fait accompli, that the executive has already committed itself and feels it cannot now change what is planned. Far too often, the cry is heard: "We had no other choice" than the course chosen.

As a general rule, any proposed executive action that goes beyond a clearly logical step in pursuance of an already accepted policy must involve a genuine exchange of views and the possibility of modification (or even reversal) of what the executive initially proposes. In short, "consultation" in the generally intended meaning of the word must mean more than "touching base" with key congressional leaders. The procedures by which consultation is carried out must give Congress a legitimate opportunity to participate in the making of policy.

VI

There is no single or neat answer to improving the patterns of consultation and interaction between the branches to ensure a healthy debate over policy formulation and later a coherent strategy for policy execution. Among the most practical suggestions to improve the consultative process are the following:

1. In foreign policy crises or when confronted with special foreign policy problems, bipartisan ad hoc groups should be formed in Congress to serve as focal points for consultation with the White House and State Department.

The ad hoc groups would include not only chairmen and ranking minority members of the four or five standing committees having international concerns, but also other members, particularly middle- and junior-ranking members, who are known to have

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special interest or expertise in the crisis area or problem at hand.

The members of these ad hoc groups could be chosen by the leadership of each house. Because the membership of these ad hoc groups might be appointed by the congressional leadership rather than by the White House, as current "leadership groups" are, Congress could control who would be consulted and would have greater leverage in consulting with the executive branch. Consultation through ad hoc groups would come to be regarded as a congressional prerogative and any White House failure to consult would look less like the White House refraining from exercising a privilege of consultation and more like a failure to comply with a congressional mandate.

Such groups would not and could not speak for Congress as a whole on foreign policy issues, nor would they have permanent charters as standing committees have. Rather, these groups would function as long as the issue that prompted their formation was viable. Discussions and consultation might, in a crisis situation, be concentrated in them, but it should never be confined solely to them. They could be empowered to call witnesses to testify, but the thrust of their activities should be in the form of direct, constant, and informal contact and consultation with the relevant executive agencies.

To some this proposal may seem modest. When confronted with discussions on improving consultative procedures, executive branch officials tend to focus on the need for correcting structural deficiencies in Congress, and this has led to considerably more far-reaching suggestions. Two in particular have been the establishment of a Joint Committee on National Security, and a basic realignment and reform of the committee structure. Such a joint committee, which might be comparable to the one recommended by the Murphy Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, is seen by many observers as the best method for improving Congress' coordination of foreign policy matters. Committee reform also has many proponents.

In our judgment, neither proposal would be useful at present. A joint committee, composed of the leadership of Congress and the senior members of the several committees concerned generally with foreign policy, would likely be unwieldy in size, too demanding on those senior members who would compose its membership and not necessarily inclusive of the very members with the greatest interest in the pending issue. Such a committee would provide only a fraction of the consultation needed on many crucial issues.

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Because it involves the realignment of power, committee reform has proved difficult for the Congress. In the last decade, there have been major efforts in both houses of Congress to reform and streamline committee structures and jurisdictions. The results are meager. Further major reform efforts in the near future appear unlikely, but it is possible that initiatives could occur to improve intercommittee coordination on foreign policy issues and strengthen the overall responsibility of the foreign affairs committees in coordinating foreign policy activities in the Congress.

2. To enhance further the consultative process, the State Department needs to improve the briefing system by providing (a) regularly scheduled formal briefings; (b) special briefings before committees on sudden and developing crises (without exception and as soon as the crises occur); and (c) frequent informal briefings of members by senior and junior foreign policy officials (at the request of individual members and committees or at the initiative of the officials) on other foreign policy concerns that may arise.

The executive branch needs to recognize the need of members of Congress for prompt and up-to-the-minute information and counsel on world events and developing crises. By the nature of their jobs, members are crisis-oriented. They are invariably called upon to comment on pressing and immediate foreign policy issues. Existing briefing systems need expansion and a mosaic of briefing patterns should be developed to deal with different types of situations (headline crises, upcoming meetings, conferences or trips, long-range issues, legislative votes, updates on specific problems, etc.).

Informal conversations can supplement more formal meetings. Informal discussions permit a freer exchange of information and ideas between members of Congress and Administration officials because they can break down the adversary relationship that is usually prevalent in the hearing room. Such increased informal contacts can have a more immediate and stronger impact on attitudes than other suggested proposals for better contacts between branches, including extensive staff-swapping.

3. A "question hour" period should be instituted during which the President and Secretaries of State and Defense would answer questions from members of Congress in as informal a setting as possible.

Like the "question hour" or interpellation period used in the parliamentary system of government, the use of such a procedure by Congress could provide direct and regular access to the senior foreign policy officials. Such sessions could be of two types. First,

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senior officials of the executive branch could appear frequently before each house of Congress separately while Congress is in session. Second, more informal sessions for a broad spectrum of members could be held on or off the Hill. The sessions could be limited to foreign policy matters and would be open or closed depending on the sensitivity of the issues and on the will of the parties. They would supplement appearances by these officials before the standing committees of Congress.

Although these two types of meetings have been tried in 1978, regularity will be needed if significant results are to be achieved. Secretary Vance has made himself available once to all members to answer, in a private meeting, their foreign policy concerns. Questions ranged widely and many members benefited from the exchange. In addition, President Carter has, on at least two occasions, invited groups of well over 50 members to lengthy briefings by the President and his Cabinet officers dealing with their strategy, priorities and goals in foreign affairs.

4. Congress needs to legislate a statutory basis for information classification and develop new security procedures for handling classified information and dealing with sensitive intelligence reports.

Such a statute should ensure a congressional role in classification procedures now exclusively controlled by the executive branch and should guarantee Congress' access to classified documents of all agencies within the executive branch. It should also provide for restraints and sanctions for misuse of information by members of Congress and their staffs. Congress has been slow in producing such legislation.

5. The legislative veto should continue to be used as a device for ensuring effective prior consultation by the executive branch despite the debate over its constitutionality.

Even if the climate of confidence between Congress and the executive branch can be reestablished, the legislative veto will be essential as a device of last resort. When denied a role in the early stages of policy formulation, Congress, through the use, or threat of use, of the legislative veto, would be able to involve itself in policymaking. Of course, Congress would tend to use its veto less frequently if it were consulted in a timely and regular fashion by the executive branch.

In the final analysis, attitudinal change in both branches and improvement of present procedures are more important and promising avenues than structural change for achieving better dialogue and prior consultation—even though the basic attitudes

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toward each other will continue to exhibit a degree of tension, though hopefully less distrust. The nature of executive-legislative interaction will be more instrumental in shaping a coherent foreign policy than the forum in which the executive and the legislature meet. History supports the proposition that structural changes in both the legislative and executive branches only tend to slice the bureaucracy differently: they do not change attitudes or modify behavior.

VII

It is not easy for either Congress or the executive branch to balance conflicting pressures and responsibilities and ensure that we are able to formulate and project a coherent foreign policy which serves our national interests. Congress has constantly to balance its representation of the people and its own judgment of what is in our best interest. The two are sometimes not the same. Congress has to balance its role as adversary and as partner in the foreign policy process, its role as critic and supporter, its inside, private game and its outside, public game, its appropriate role in confronting the executive branch in policy formulation and its uneasiness in standing back and watching policy implementation when it does not agree with how the policy is being executed.

Effective prior consultation, better information flow and education on the issues are the best available vehicles to lubricate the foreign policy process, reduce frictions and ensure that out of any foreign policy debate over what policy to pursue there emerges a coherent strategy that has been significantly strengthened by congressional participation. Members of both branches must be willing to listen, as well as advocate, and show a sensitive understanding of their respective constitutional roles.

The separation of powers produces a healthy and potentially creative tension between the legislative and executive branches. The foreign policy-making process will never be tidy and clear-cut so that each step in the process can be delineated. The diversity and complexity of foreign policy issues is such as to guarantee a series of running battles between Congress and the President. Our expectations should not be too high, given the nature of the process. But the alternative to trying to make the system work better can be chaos and an ineffective foreign policy for a complex world.

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Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.

CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY: WHO NEEDS IT?

Congress has asserted its authority in foreign policy over the last dozen years. Is this phenomenon temporary or permanent? Good or bad? Workable or not? The thesis here is that active congressional participation is both desirable and unavoidable, and that the executive and Congress share responsibility for making it constructive rather than otherwise. To the degree that this joint effort fails, so does our democracy.

II

The 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution may have marked the apogee of executive authority in foreign affairs in our time. Adopted in 48 hours almost without a challenge on the basis of inadequate information from the White House, it had the practical effect of a declaration of war. By 1966, however, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had begun hearings to probe America's role in the Vietnam War. Public reaction to the war, diffuse and chaotic at first, found an institutional expression through the Congress and thereby accelerated Congress' resurgence. Although the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was repealed in 1971, it took until 1973 for Congress to mandate American disengagement in Vietnam. That same year Congress adopted the War Powers Resolution over a Nixon veto. The War Powers Resolution gave formal affirmation to Congress' growing sense of its own responsibilities in foreign affairs. In 1974 Congress embargoed U.S. arms shipments to Turkey in the name of the law. In 1975, Congress vetoed the executive's covert intervention in Angola. In 1975 and 1976 an investigation of U.S. foreign intelligence activities generated continuing efforts to ensure congressional oversight of the CIA.

The pace and intensity of these developments was heightened

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by concurrent forces—partisanship, with a Democratic Congress increasingly anxious to pin responsibility for the Vietnam debacle on a Republican White House; the Watergate break-in, the Saturday Night Massacre and related events; an era in which U.S. foreign policy seemed frequently to be made in secrecy and executed by surprise.

Anyone who thought a change of Administration and party in the White House in 1976 would restore the status quo ante has been disappointed. The experience of the Carter Administration suggests that partisanship does not bind the majority in Congress to the White House as much as the separation of powers separates them.

The staying power of Congress' reaction is hard to estimate. It will depend partly upon the evolution of post-Watergate public attitudes, which may fundamentally affect the viability and cohesion of American democracy. Within the Congress itself, however, this reaction has prompted important institutional changes that will tend to perpetuate congressional influence even after memories of the Vietnam-Watergate years have faded.

The War Powers Resolution, although it remains untested because Congress has never voted to stop a military action initiated by the President, nonetheless serves as a procedural guide which the executive must take into account in weighing any military option. A range of other procedural innovations has permitted (or perhaps forced) Congress to address foreign policy matters. There are reporting requirements that cause the executive to keep Congress informed on issues ranging from nuclear fuel exports to human rights. Congress has enacted measures such as Section 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, which permits both houses of Congress to disapprove any military equipment sale over seven million dollars. It is this provision that has made Congress a major participant in decisions to sell Hawk missiles to Jordan, AWACS aircraft to Iran, and F-15s to Saudi Arabia.

The congressional budget process, established in 1974, has given Congress both the analytical tools and the self-discipline to make decisions quite independently of the executive in economic and fiscal policy matters. The budget process itself has already begun to have an important impact on foreign policy to the extent that it affects the success of U.S. economic policy, the size of the defense budget and U.S. foreign assistance.

The committees on intelligence established in 1976 give each house a watchdog assigned to the area of foreign activity heretofore most jealously protected as an executive prerogative. They

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also give Congress regular access to highly sensitive intelligence information.

Congress has increased the size of members' staffs, devoting more manpower to foreign policy and military matters. Because members can be more confident of the advice and information they receive, they often pursue their own foreign policy concerns rather than acquiesce in congressional or executive branch leadership.

Another legacy of Vietnam-Watergate that tends to keep Congress engaged in foreign policy is government "in the sunshine," a concept the Carter Administration embraces. As the process of policymaking in general becomes more public, members of Congress are forced to address issues which, if treated in traditional diplomatic secrecy, might have been ignored.

An important procedural and institutional item remains on the active agenda in congressional-executive relations. The Carter Administration continues a long-standing executive branch tradition in challenging the constitutionality of legislative vetoes on grounds that they give Congress the right unilaterally to reverse decisions made pursuant to law, and therefore circumvent the President's constitutional role in the legislative process.[1] The Administration has said that it means nevertheless to comply with the terms of Section 36(b) and with the War Powers Resolution. The legislative veto question will probably be decided in the courts.

How long will Congress' new engagement in foreign policy last? Reaction fades, budget and intelligence committees may grow stale, staffs move on, and one might expect the sheer messiness of most foreign policy issues to dampen Congress' zeal for addressing them. The pendulum of power, it is said, swings back and forth along Pennsylvania Avenue as events elevate the authority of the presidency or of the Congress. After another dozen years, will foreign policy once again be back in the hands of the diplomats and generals? I think not, for there are forces at work that go beyond the reaction to Vietnam and Watergate, and beyond the procedural and institutional changes Congress has made.

We are in the midst of a fundamental change in the foreign policy agenda which seems certain to keep Congress permanently in foreign affairs. The intricate diplomacy of traditional political

[1] A "legislative veto" gives the whole Congress, a single house or sometimes even a single committee, the option of blocking an executive branch action under existing law, usually within 30 or 60 days of announcement. The number of these legislative veto provisions has increased sharply in the last few years. The objection to them is that they infringe on the President's constitutional authority to execute the laws.

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relations among nation-states has been something most Americans and their elected representatives could choose to ignore. The same is not true of the contemporary global issues that are rapidly becoming the primary substance of American foreign policy. Issues like economic recovery, nuclear safety, environmental protection, and product safety, once domestic issues exclusively, now have international repercussions and international constituencies. Trade has been such an issue for decades and now has a rapidly increasing impact. When Americans work or not, depending on the condition of the OECD economies, when U.S. farm prices depend on sales to the Soviet Union and China, and when U.S. fuel prices are set in places like Riyadh, no member of Congress can ignore foreign policy decisions and expect to be reelected. He cannot say: "That's up to the President and Congress can't do anything about it."

These "intermestic" issues, as Bayless Manning has called them, are not all ones that Congress would embrace, given any choice. They are complicated, frustrating reminders of America's changed role in the world. As Manning put it:

> We are no longer Gulliver in the world of Lilliputian states. As to the items on tomorrow's international agenda, the United States cannot obtain what it will by simply expressing that will. As other nations must, the United States today has to negotiate for what it gets on many issues. In negotiations, one must often make difficult trade-offs, settle for half a loaf, or even make do with damage limitation. The American people have not been conditioned by history to that kind of foreign policy.[2]

Not only will Congress have to address international issues because of constituent pressure to do so, but Presidents will need the support and participation of Congress for their own political protection and to help cushion the political shock these issues portend. Presidents and Congresses of the future will find themselves thrust together in a tar-baby embrace on the central international issues of their times, each unable to abdicate its responsibilities to the other, each compelled to justify itself to an impatient public, and each constrained to seek the other's support. Each will need all the legitimacy the other can convey. Every excursion into buck passing and one-upmanship will in some measure hurt both, and hurt the country as well.

III

So it is not only reaction to past events but the pull of present and future needs that will keep Congress in the business of helping

[2] Bayless Manning, "The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1977, p. 308.

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to make American foreign policy. This can be good for several reasons. First, a public scrubbing of options is likely to give us better policy. Many of the new global issues are technically and diplomatically complex, which means that they can quickly become the special preserve of experts. Policy subjected to the diversity of insights and political experience Congress represents is more likely to reflect the real interests of the United States, and also more likely to work in the real world.

The second benefit is that congressional attention to international issues offers some hope of developing a public consensus which will support a positive American role in the world. Not only are policies scrutinized by Congress more likely to reflect the public will, but members of Congress, once engaged in the policymaking process, should be better able to teach and lead their constituencies through the intricacies of international issues in a world where the United States is neither chief policeman nor economic czar. This is not to say that we can expect the rebirth of a simple cold war type of consensus. What we can hope and work for is a consensus in which Americans, faced with a fluid and confusing international scene, are sufficiently confident of their governmental institutions and their own personal futures to be able to accept the adjustment being thrust upon them.

Finally, if Congress really does contribute actively to policy formulation and if it really does help educate the public, the result should be greater stability and predictability in American foreign policy—a benefit not only to us but to the world. Our allies should find us more predictable, and our opponents will find us stronger.

Can Congress make a coherent contribution in foreign policy? The skeptics will say Congress is already hopelessly anarchic and getting worse; it is overloaded with its domestic agenda alone; vast political and institutional changes are long overdue. By next January, half of the House of Representatives will have served only since 1975; and Congress has not learned to organize its affairs without the discipline of seniority. Congressional leadership lacks the clout it had when there were goodies in the pork barrel to be parceled out. Faced with an increasing number of decisions, Congress nevertheless seems to be delegating less to its committees and indulging more and more in extended floor fights. Some members of Congress (the skeptic continues) are so parochial and so ill-informed about international issues that people abroad can only be confused or insulted by any foreign policy debate that does occur.

This is a caricature, and one wishes a quick institutional face-lift

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could erase it overnight. It cannot. Congress will meet its institutional challenges only through a slow evolution, only if the imperatives of politics and national interest force it forward, and only if there are skillful midwives at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue to help its progress.

IV

The central theme of this effort should be a very simple one—to work toward an orderly decision-making process in which both Congress and the executive contribute according to their distinct capacities.

One obvious requirement for orderly decision-making is good information. On traditional domestic issues Congress has a limitless menu of information sources—constituents, lobbyists, the professional expertise its members bring from private life, and its own support institutions such as the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Technology Assessment, the Library of Congress and the General Accounting Office. The information on the basis of which Congress must decide international questions, while it increases as the domestic component of these questions increases, still comes largely from the executive branch. Congress cannot have its own embassies or the CIA collecting information abroad. Frequently it must depend on the best estimates of the executive branch about how foreign governments will react to a certain decision. The executive branch, therefore, has a special obligation to provide Congress with the best, most objective information available, and to distinguish clearly between facts and advocacy in what it sends to the Hill.

Next, Congress must be brought into the decision-making process as early as possible. "Consultation" is the sacred principle of congressional relations. Too often it has been something the executive branch does out of politeness to committee chairmen and to avoid startled reactions to important announcements. Members of Congress complain that consultation often occurs too late to do any good. In any case, the value of consultation with a few leaders on Capitol Hill is declining as more members become interested in international issues.

The remedy Congress usually demands (and Assistant Secretaries of State for Congressional Relations earnestly promise) is earlier consultation with more members—a worthwhile objective which the Carter Administration has pursued. But last-minute consultation is often an unavoidable fact of life. It occurs not because the executive branch wants to present Congress with a fait

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accompli, but simply because executive branch decision-making often has to be done at the last minute under the pressure of events. Sometimes there is a crisis; sometimes important and difficult decisions are simply postponed so that as much information as possible can be accumulated before the United States commits itself to a course of action. Congress has tried to get hold of some types of decisions by insisting on several weeks' notification before decisions are put into effect or by creating the possibility of a legislative veto. In neither case, however, does Congress have effective participation in the decision-making process because the foreign policy cost of derailing a decision so far advanced leaves little choice but acquiescence.

On many specific and important decisions, the option of bringing Congress in significantly earlier probably does not exist. But most major decisions take place in an atmosphere of long-standing prior assumptions about how the world works, about the direction in which America wants to move, and about the political alignments bearing on a given issue. Congress has to cut itself in on the formation of these assumptions in a much more pointed and coherent way. Through its committees, Congress should spend most of its time establishing—and causing the executive branch to address—some basic assumptions, e.g., about U.S. objectives in China, Europe, human rights, international economic recovery, or international economic integration, and spend less time playing catch-up ball on specific decisions it can seldom, in practice, constructively affect. This is not to denigrate the oversight function. In addition to holding the pursestrings, Congress needs a follow-up mechanism to assure itself that the executive is meeting its obligations and executing policy more or less as intended. It does, however, mean difficult, thoughtful, regular, low-publicity scrutiny of this nation's basic foreign policy assumptions—a process which would benefit the executive branch, help educate the public, and substantially enhance the coherence of specific decisions.

This discussion requires an admonition about secrecy. President Carter has taken up the struggle against excessive classification in the executive branch. The Freedom of Information Act gives both Congress and the public a way to free information and to get away from unnecessary secrecy. Nonetheless, in diplomatic and military matters there is a continuing need to protect some kinds of information; and the fact remains that some people in both the executive branch and Congress from time to time find it desirable to exploit sensitive information rather than protect it. The result, invariably, is mistrust on all sides and a tendency to limit the

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number in the know. Nothing will more surely scuttle a policy of freer information flow, early consultation and thorough public debate than misuse of truly sensitive information at either end of Pennsylvania Avenue.

Orderly decision-making requires a more rational division of labor and clearer definition of responsibilities. Congress cannot manage, it is not designed to manage, and should not try to manage. Every hour it spends micro-managing the execution of some minute foreign policy issue is an hour lost to policymaking. Once policy has been set, through effective executive-congressional interaction at a reasonable level of detail, the Congress should welcome the opportunity to hand day-to-day management over to the executive. President Carter has expressed concern about "legislative constraints," affecting foreign assistance in particular, which impair the executive's ability to function in foreign policy. The most troublesome of these are a patchwork of inconsistent and overlapping country-by-country restrictions on kinds of assistance which can be given. For example, foreign military sales credits are prohibited for Uruguay, Brazil, El Salvador, and Guatemala; Uruguay is inexplicably singled out for an additional prohibition of funds for military training. Angola and Mozambique may receive no direct economic assistance unless the President waives this prohibition. Ethiopia can receive economic assistance but no military assistance, and so forth. The list of such prohibitions is extensive. Some provide for presidential waivers in cases of overriding U.S. interests; others do not. Each is a legal stumbling block which may prevent the United States from responding to changed circumstances in a way consistent with our national interests. Each represents a standing insult to another nation, deserved or otherwise. Worse, each one is the legacy of time wasted debating the tail rather than the dog.

The Administration is now studying the whole array of constraints, and intends to propose changes to the Congress later this year. The proposal will not be to shift power from Congress to the executive, but rather to streamline and simplify an array of provisions so as to permit both Congress and the executive to function efficiently in international matters.

Congress must look to its internal processes if it is to deal effectively with its international agenda. The more "intermestic" issues it faces, the less traditional committee jurisdictions will apply. Congress regularly deals successfully with multi-jurisdictional issues using sequential referral and occasionally ad hoc committees. These mechanisms can continue to work, provided

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only that committees accustomed to dealing with purely domestic affairs recognize and give full weight to the international implications of their recommendations. It might be desirable for the existing foreign relations committees to move beyond their traditional function as overseers of U.S. political and diplomatic relations, and to begin serving as coordinators to ensure that the international dimensions of issues handled primarily by other committees are fully taken into account.

Lopsided constituent pressures on international issues will present an increasingly difficult political challenge which Congress and the executive must solve jointly. When interests collide over domestic issues, Congress usually produces a compromise result, which a charitable Jeffersonian can accept as being in the national interest. When points of view collide on foreign policy, the results are similar. When the issue is *both* international and domestic, however, our political ecology may be thrown out of whack by the predominant force of domestic constituencies. If these interests cover a broad enough spectrum—consumers seeking lower prices can balance producers seeking protection—the outcome may be acceptable in foreign policy terms. The burgeoning single-interest organizations in American politics and the likely further development of single-interest "caucuses" like the Steel Caucus on Capitol Hill, make it all the more likely, however, that limited but intensely powerful domestic interests will win out in the battle to define U.S. international interests.[3]

One responsibility of the executive branch is to ensure that the overall U.S. national interest is forcefully enough expressed to equalize the political equation when international issues are decided. In matters of foreign aid and foreign trade, this has traditionally been the job of Presidents, supported by a few hardy internationalists on Capitol Hill. As the number of international-domestic issues increases, the executive branch will simply have to work harder to explain and dramatize U.S. international interests. Both branches will have to cooperate in creating a public climate for informed debate. The trade negotiations now being concluded will give both Congress and the executive an excellent opportunity to retest the political assumptions and institutional arrangements with which we now handle trade, our oldest "intermestic" issue.

Finally, both Congress and the executive must begin to bring

[3] One consequence of the fact that Congress' decisions have greater and greater impact on other countries is an increasing number of foreign interests lobbying on Capitol Hill. This is not an entirely attractive development, but probably inevitable. These pressures may help rectify the imbalance between U.S. domestic and international issues; but management of them will represent a further new dimension in congressional politics.

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more foresight into their joint decision-making process. In this land of plenty, we have neither developed the political institutions nor yet shown the political will to cope well with future needs. One does not bother to plan for alternative energy sources when cheap fuel is plentiful. One does not worry about pollution until clean air and clean water start to run out. One does not accept the complications of interdependence with other nations until one's own vulnerability leaves no choice. But now the political and institutional challenge of coping with international issues is part and parcel of a broader need for future planning. Our own institutions are not as well suited to this challenge as those of other nations, democratic and otherwise, which have known scarcity much longer and more seriously than we. Unless we can sustain both domestic and foreign policies which anticipate tomorrow's needs, we will not only be outclassed or outmoded by our competitors, but may very well drag them down with us because of the sheer size of our economy.

V

Active congressional participation in foreign affairs is obviously consistent with the tenets of representative democracy. It is only consistent, however, with a certain kind of foreign policy, and to this extent implies accepting real limitations on the kinds of things the United States tries to do in the world. Congressional participation makes a decision to commit U.S. troops abroad less likely. It inhibits extralegal and covert activities. It makes bold departures less feasible. It implies that the pace at which America adjusts to new global realities will not be much faster than the public consensus can move. But having abandoned the notion that we can manage our foreign affairs successfully through sheer power, and having rejected isolationism, one essential goal of American foreign policy today must be to help the American people adjust to the realities of global citizenship. For this we need Congress to refine, to legitimate and to help sell effective international policies.

There is no question but that the Congress is staggering under the weight of new responsibilities. Improvement will not come automatically through some unforeseen processes of history, and it will not come quickly in any case. It will come only if there are enough people of vision—enough leaders who understand both the limitations and the potential of Congress and who understand the agenda ahead of us—to establish standards of performance to which the rest can repair. This leadership must come equally from the legislative and executive branches and it must be bipartisan,

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not only because the stakes are so high but because partisanship is as unlikely today as ever before to produce any satisfactory answers to international questions.

I am convinced that Congress can meet the complicated challenge of today's international agenda. If it does not, we will be unable to excuse ourselves by saying the institution failed us, for the truth will be the reverse.

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Shlomo Avineri

PEACEMAKING: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Despite the hectic diplomatic activity of the last few months, peace in the Middle East seems as elusive today as ever. Sadat's dramatic visit to Jerusalem less than a year ago appears now as a semi-legendary event that must have happened eons ago, hardly related to the real texture of Israeli-Arab relations. Both sides have reverted to accusations and counter-accusations, questions and counter-questions, and appear to be bogged down in a procedural quagmire, with a harassed United States serving as a go-between, desperately trying to keep the flicker of hope from being extinguished.

In such a situation, each side naturally blames the other for the apparent failure, with world public opinion neatly divided according to its previous sympathies toward either of the contending parties. Dissension in the Arab world may be brought forward as explaining the constraints under which President Sadat finds it extremely difficult to maintain some of the flexibility and imagination connected with his visit to Jerusalem. Similarly, the victory of the ideologically more dogmatic Likud in the Israeli elections of 1977 over the more moderate and pragmatic Labor government can be cited as the main reason for the stalemate.

Yet it seems that the major stumbling block for peace in the Middle East at this moment is much more a question of approach than of substance: here the key issue is the methodology adopted by the United States in its quest to further an effective settlement in the Middle East. Because I think this approach is futile and counterproductive, some account of previous American approaches to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is necessary. For the major problem in my mind is not *what* is the final peace settlement in the Middle East going to look like, but *how* is it going

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to be achieved. Here I feel all sides are at present on the wrong track.

II

The strategies employed by the United States in trying to achieve a settlement in the Middle East were completely overhauled on the coming into power of President Carter in January 1977, and the rules of the game have not been the same since then. While this new strategy has not, until now, moved the Middle East perceptibly nearer to a settlement accepted by all sides concerned, it has created stasis in many aspects of Middle Eastern affairs, and significantly weakened the bargaining position of the United States and its clout in pushing the contending sides in the area toward eventual agreement. It could also be argued that this new strategy, with its occasional zigzags and tensions, has contributed to the general public unease in the United States and abroad about some aspects of Carter's Administration and its grip on policy decisions.

Prior to 1977, there had been a number of tacit assumptions underlying American attitudes toward the peacemaking process in the Middle East, which were particularly evident during 1973–1976. These involved a fine balancing of America's commitment to Israel with its obvious interests, economic, political and military, in the Arab world, culminating in the astute turnaround from Egypt's pro-Soviet stance to an orientation toward the United States and the latter's chief ally in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia. Underlying all these complex maneuvers was a basic assumption that could be discerned all through the tortuous ways and by-ways through which Henry Kissinger's Middle Eastern diplomacy passed: *the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be solved through a comprehensive solution, but only through a series of piecemeal agreements.*

This approach, popularly known as "step by step," grew out of a combination of causes and considerations and certainly was not decided upon by an a priori grand design. It grew out of the realization that previous attempts at comprehensive solutions—Jarring's mission, the Rogers Plan and others—must have failed because of structural, and not accidental, reasons; that the complexities of the Middle Eastern conflict may defy any attempt at an overall solution; and, given Henry Kissinger's historical vision, one cannot escape the conclusion that his understanding of the way post-1945 conflicts have been resolved must have had an impact on his thinking about the methodology to be followed in the Middle East crisis.

One of the major aspects of the post-1945 international scene has been the failure of all comprehensive attempts at grand

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solutions and the relative success of piecemeal approaches to concretely defined and specifically circumscribed limited issues. Contrary to the Wilsonian concepts that informed the grand vision of Versailles in 1919 and were (one has to admit) responsible for the collapse of the post-1918 new order in Europe, none of the post-1945 problems has been solved in a comprehensive way. Until this very day, no overall peace conference has been convened to formulate solutions to the loose ends left in the wake of the collapse of the Third Reich; the partition of Germany—an abomination by any standard—has not been done away with; the brutal partition of Berlin, epitomized by the obscenity of the Wall, has not been solved; and beyond Europe, Peking-Washington relations have not yet been fully normalized.

Yet the absence of overall solutions did not preclude successful attempts to decrease tension, to reach limited agreements and to enable all sides concerned to learn to live with half-way houses and sometimes absurd contradictions. While the unification of Germany is today as far away as ever, the two German states have learned to live with each other, to accept—after a tortuous exercise of restraint and some garbled semantics—each other's sovereignty; the Berlin Wall has not been taken down; and the partition of Berlin seems as permanent today as ever. Although no agreement on Berlin's status has been achieved—there appear to be at least five versions as to its status in international law—all sides concerned have learned, at a heavy price, to live with the ambiguities of a situation which is as abnormal and absurd as could be imagined. Yet the chances that World War III is going to break out because of someone's desperate attempt to cross the Wall from the German Democratic Republic are virtually nil.

Similarly, the United States and the People's Republic of China have not yet fully normalized their relations. But, by a process in which private and public diplomacy alternated over a period of time, they were able to move toward some sort of normalization of their relations, identifying issues of common interest while leaving open areas of contention (e.g., Taiwan). In all these cases, and in many more, the way toward agreement and normalization was a process, not an act. Peoples and governments learned to live with contradictions and slowly to grasp the other side's view of the conflict; it was such a process of learning and mutual accommodation, rather than dramatic conferences and verbal declarations, that helped to defuse issues and neutralize areas of conflict. And when declarations were made—the Helsinki agreements, the Shanghai statement—this came at the end, rather than at the

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beginning, of the process of accommodation. In most cases these declarations were nothing more than a formalization of previously accepted de facto arrangements; or, as in both declarations mentioned, the areas left open and unresolved cover as wide a spectrum of issues as those over which agreements have been reached.

Such considerations have informed Kissinger's approach to Middle Eastern problems: the historian in him might have added that the so-called Eastern Question has been on the international agenda since at least the mid-nineteenth century, and no one has ever successfully proposed a comprehensive solution to its multifaceted problems. Even the much more limited Arab-Israeli conflict has its own multiple aspects: it is, on the one hand, a conflict between two national movements—the Arab national movement and Zionism, i.e., the Jewish national movement; it is also a conflict about the legitimacy of Israel, and will have to decide the future of the Palestinian Arab community; it has religious overtones; because of Jerusalem, it involves the attention of hundreds of millions of people outside the Middle East; it has strategic, economic and geopolitical aspects reaching far beyond the interests and preoccupations of the contending parties; because of oil, it impinges upon the economies of practically all countries of the world; and because of the sympathy for Israel of the Jewish communities in the United States and elsewhere, it is linked to the internal politics of such disparate countries as the United States and the Soviet Union.

To imagine that such a conflict could be resolved through one conference or one single document, brilliantly drafted as it may be, appeared to the U.S. Administrations under both Nixon and Ford, as well as to the Israeli government under Yitzhak Rabin, as sheer naïveté. For this reason, both the United States and Israel chose, after the Yom Kippur War, the piecemeal option; and although this was initially opposed by the Soviet Union as well as by Egypt and Syria, eventually they went along with this approach when the dogged determination of Secretary of State Kissinger proved to the recalcitrant parties that despite their initial misgivings, there was something in this approach for them as well.

Analytically speaking, the two interim agreements between Israel and Egypt as well as the one with Syria may be said to have had a triple function: first, they did bring the contending parties to an agreement about a number of clearly defined issues, limited as they may be; second, by the very dynamics of negotiating the agreement, imminent warfare was avoided and the general tem-

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perature in the area was cooled; third, by creating a certain amount of trust between the parties through the process of negotiating the agreements and abiding by them, a certain relaxation in the deep-seated suspicions and mutual fears that have haunted the parties could be perceived, and thus a way for preparing further, and more far-reaching agreements, was made feasible. It is of some significance that President Sadat acknowledged, in his remarks to the Labor Alignment parliamentary party during their meeting in the Knesset, that the interim agreements signed between Egypt and the previous Labor governments in Israel made his visit to Jerusalem possible. Everyone would agree that it would have been inconceivable for Sadat to come to Jerusalem immediately after the Yom Kippur War, when both sides, each in its own way, were still traumatized by the war and its outcome. A process of slow de-escalation and incremental change in mutual perceptions was needed, and this was achieved through the interim agreements.

To this one should add that the Sinai II Agreement enabled Egypt to repatriate the refugees from the Canal Zone towns and to rehabilitate the whole area devastated by the wars of 1967 and 1973 and the war of attrition between the two major wars; to reopen the Suez Canal as a token of normalization and to reorder the national policy priorities of Egypt from foreign involvement to internal socioeconomic development. Similarly, even the much less relaxed Ba'ath regime in Syria, which originally balked at any agreement that would fall short of what it considered to be the only correct interpretation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, did find that the Disengagement Agreement with Israel enabled it to take a longer view of the issues involved, and, if Damascus' first agreement to extend the mandate of U.N. peacekeeping forces on the Golan Heights was accompanied by extreme tension and some blackmail, eventually the Syrians have come to live with these semi-annual extensions as matters of routine. In retrospect, Syrian leaders now acknowledge that it was this agreement, with all its imperfections, which also gave them the free hand they eventually needed to intervene in the Lebanese civil war and gradually to establish their hegemony in Lebanon.

All sides involved in the piecemeal process were aware not only of its limitations—it had no automatic built-in mechanism for further agreements—but also of a number of dangers it posed to all parties concerned: to the Israelis, a "step-by-step" approach might appear dangerously close to "salami tactics": they were requested to give up, one by one, sizable chunks of the territory

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that had been under their control since 1967 without getting in return the kind of full peace and ultimate recognition and security they sought. The Arab countries, on the other hand, might see it as a sly Israeli approach, trying to hold on to these same chunks of territory for a lengthy period of time rather than withdraw from them forthwith as, according to the Arab interpretation, Resolution 242 had called for. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) clearly saw a "step-by-step" approach as bypassing the necessity of coming to grips with the Palestinian issue and ultimately leaving them out in the cold.

To the Americans, a piecemeal approach meant that rather than being able to get the Middle East issue off the President's desk through a dramatic breakthrough, it would continue to haunt American politics for some time to come, and the United States would have to foot the bill for some time for *both* sides – as indeed happened after Sinai II. That the Soviets were far from happy with this approach, which left them practically without any leverage in the area, is obvious (and had, of course, been one of the intended goals of the exercise as envisaged by Kissinger); it also left them with little alternative but, with gnashing teeth, to go along, since they never possessed a more viable and more acceptable avenue for practically resolving the conflict.

That the piecemeal method did not have built-in mechanisms for further development was pointed out in the Brookings Report,[1] and this was perhaps one of the intellectually most persuasive criticisms of Kissinger's approach. This criticism, however, has not been altogether accurate: first, the very mechanism of abiding by agreements and carrying them out, as well as Arab pressure for further concessions from Israel and Israeli pressure for Arab clarifications about the nature of eventual peace, should not be underestimated as wholly ineffectual – the issue was still on the agenda and could not simply be left to linger there. Second, one tends to overlook the fact that it was the civil war in Lebanon, and the resultant split in the Arab world, which made it virtually impossible in 1975–76 to move ahead with further agreements. Given the dissension in the Arab world surrounding Lebanon and a situation that almost verged on a major intra-Arab war – with Syria and the PLO moving from a close alliance against the Lebanese Christians to a shooting war in which the Syrians and the Christians were fighting the PLO with Israel standing by – such a

[1] *Toward Peace in the Middle East: Report of a Study Group*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975.

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fluid situation certainly did not facilitate any further Israeli-Arab détente.

One should not forget, however, that it was precisely the Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement which made it possible for both Syria and Israel to evolve, by implication, the much more relaxed atmosphere vis-à-vis each other and the mutual restraint which both sides showed during the Lebanese civil war (as well as during the Israeli operation in southern Lebanon in the spring of 1978). Anyone familiar with the signal language exchanged between Jerusalem and Damascus in 1975–76 could not fail to realize that an implicit infrastructure for future bargaining was being laid out during that period and that it would have been unthinkable not to relate it to the fact that interim agreements, for all their imperfections, did have in the Israeli-Syrian arena, just as in the Israeli-Egyptian arena, a beneficial impact on the quality of mutual perception and public rhetoric, resulting in a much more sophisticated reading of each side's signals by the other.

III

All these finely balanced structures, with their potential for further evolution and development, were abruptly upset with the new quest for a comprehensive solution adopted by the Carter Administration. As early as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's first visit to the Middle East in February 1977, it became immediately clear that the new Administration not only had set its mind on an overall solution, but had also decided its substance. Both President Carter and Secretary Vance have identified three aspects of the conflict to be solved and, through "identifying" these areas, have also given formulas for this solution. Despite the various formulations, this "agenda" boiled down to: (a) the establishment of a full peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors; (b) Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders, with minor modifications; and (c) a solution to the Palestinian problem, involving—as President Carter has repeatedly said—a "homeland" for the Palestinians.

The very publication of such an "agenda," buttressed as it was by the authority of a newly elected and popular President, created expectations as well as fears among all concerned in the Middle East. It brought latent differences of opinion between the United States and Israel into the open and thus contributed to the further weakening of the Labor government in Israel just before the crucial elections of May 1977. It strengthened the PLO in its aspirations against the more moderate Palestinians working within

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the framework of the Jordanian polity—and it committed the United States to seeking a mechanism for the implementation of this "agenda."

Such a mechanism was found in the reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference. Between 1974 and 1977, only the Soviet Union and the Secretary General of the United Nations viewed a full-fledged conference as an adequate mechanism for the settlement of the conflict. Since the first meeting of the Conference in December 1973, the United States has realized that nothing useful could be achieved from a formal reconvening of such a meeting, unless it were for the formal ratification of an agreement already achieved *outside* its format. The format itself was exactly the sort of formalistic structure that would precipitate confrontation, polarization and futility. Serious negotiations could never take place in such a context, and like U.N. Resolution 242 "Geneva" should be viewed as a convenient code word whose ambiguity enabled all sides to push their disparate aims under the umbrella of verbal unanimity.

But the Carter Administration took the view that the reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference was a viable political objective and set itself the task of bringing it about during 1977. When it found itself bogged down toward the fall of 1977 in what it called "procedural problems," it only reaped the whirlwind it had sown earlier.

The attempt to reconvene the Geneva Peace Conference meant that before its very opening some very basic substantive decisions would have to be made. According to the ground rules worked out for the opening of the first Geneva Peace Conference in 1973, it was to be chaired by the United States and the Soviet Union, and its participants were Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria (the latter did not appear and was in a somewhat tortuous way represented by Egypt). Once the Arab countries called for the participation of the Palestinians in the conference and decided that the PLO was to be considered the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the reconvening of the conference meant, under such conditions, one of two things: either the Palestinians, in the guise of the PLO, would participate or they would not. Even the proposal to include Palestinian representatives as part of a joint Arab delegation presupposes a prior commitment by all Arab front-line governments. If the PLO were invited to participate, this means that before the opening of the conference, Israel would be asked to make the major concession of recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. If, on the other hand, the

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conference met without Palestinian representation, it would again mean that prior to negotiations, the Arab countries would have given up their major demand of Israel—recognition of the PLO.

In either case, a major concession by one of the parties became the *conditio sine qua non* for the very convening of the conference. And, while it could be argued that during a process of complex and protracted negotiations Israel might be persuaded to shift its position on the Palestinian issue or, alternatively, the Arab countries might be persuaded to shift *their* position toward giving the Jordanians a mandate to speak on behalf of the Palestinians, it was sheer naïveté, to say the least, to imagine that either side (and for the purposes of this discussion it does not matter which) would make such a substantive concession *before* the start of negotiations. The parallel to this would have been to make a Washington-Peking rapprochement dependent upon a prior formal agreement between both sides about the status of Taiwan, or to make the very beginning of German *Ostpolitik* dependent upon prior agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the status of Berlin.

The United States also found itself in a position in which it was taking the most moderate Arab governments—Jordan and Egypt—for granted, while wooing the extremist elements, like Syria and the PLO. In a piecemeal approach you naturally start from the more moderate elements; in a comprehensive approach you have to bring everyone to the negotiating table. Hence President Carter found himself courting President Assad of Syria to the consternation not only of Israel but of President Sadat as well. Carter's going out of his way to meet Assad in Geneva and the fulsome praise he lavished on that occasion on the Syrian President were, while tactically necessary given the comprehensive strategy adopted by the United States, a very deep humiliation for President Sadat, who saw himself virtually punished for his more moderate stance. Similarly, the convoluted way in which the United States tried, through its Saudi connection, to exact from the PLO some verbal statement that could be construed even most indirectly as an acceptance of Israel, unnerved not only the Israelis but also Jordan's King Hussein, who began to wonder whether his steadfast adherence to American policy in the Middle East would now be rewarded with U.S. support of the very organization that had tried to bring him down in September 1970.

To crown all this, the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. communiqué of October 1, 1977 signalled to all concerned that the American attempt to go for an overall solution necessarily meant giving the

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Soviets a great say in the very process of peacemaking, rather than leaving them out of the process itself and making them underwrite the product—as Kissinger had so deftly done during 1973–75. The October 1 communiqué made the Israelis lose whatever trust they still had in the sound judgment of the American Administration, and it was a slap in the face to Sadat, who must have contemplated whether all his efforts—taken at considerable risk to himself and to his country—of rather brutally kicking the Soviets out of Egypt were not being nullified by the phantasmagoric approach of Washington, which was trying to bring back into an active role in the area the one global power that certainly had no interest in resolving the conflict.

Had it not been for the dramatic move initiated by Sadat that eventually brought him to Jerusalem, American Middle East policy would have been an utter shambles toward the end of 1977: the Geneva Peace Conference was not about to be reopened; the PLO had not been nudged toward a more conciliatory approach toward Israel; Syria had not been detached from its Soviet connection and had not given evidence of a more relaxed policy vis-à-vis Israel; and Israel itself was not assured that it could rely on some modicum of understanding in Washington.

It would be futile to suggest what another American administration, guided by the spirit of a piecemeal approach, would or could have done. But while the most cogent criticism voiced by the authors of the Brookings Report of the Kissinger approach has always been that his approach does not appear to move on to further agreements in the Middle East, it is now beyond any doubt that the inept handling of the issue by the Carter Administration in 1977 did not move the area one inch nearer to any agreement either. By trying to do too much, by attempting to reach a comprehensive solution that did not work in any other area of international conflict, the Carter Administration only exacerbated the situation. It penalized the moderates (Egypt, Jordan—and Israel); it put a premium on extremism and intransigence (Syria, the PLO)—and achieved very little in return for its pains.

In all fairness to the Carter Administration, one has to add that, ironical as it might seem, it had a strange ally in its approach: the newly formed Likud government in Israel under Menachem Begin. Observers abroad sometimes tend to overlook the fact that among the issues that have divided the Labor Party from Likud in the last decade has been the question of how to approach a peace settlement with the Arab countries. Labor—perhaps out of its experience in government and its moderate, somewhat world-

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weary outlook—always believed that the only feasible agreement would be a series of piecemeal agreements; therefore it followed the policy suggested by Kissinger after 1973 and signed three interim agreements, in each case trying to maximize the benefits to Israel. The Likud, on the other hand—perhaps out of inexperience in government, perhaps out of its generally formalistic and all-or-nothing general attitude to politics—always opposed piecemeal agreements and vowed that when *it* would come to power there would be no more interim agreements.

So when President Carter met Prime Minister Rabin in March 1977, he immediately found that they basically disagreed—because the Israeli leader strongly opposed President Carter's choosing the comprehensive approach; but when President Carter met the newly elected Prime Minister Menachem Begin, he surprisingly found in him a person who wholeheartedly agreed with him that the next step should be a full, ultimate and comprehensive peace agreement. Was it inexperience that gave both leaders the same outlook? Was it their deep religious feelings, which pointed toward a common belief in peace on earth, here and now? It would be idle to speculate—just as it would be idle to speculate on who fell into whose trap in July 1977: Was it Carter who mistook Begin's biblical quotations about peace in our time for political moderation, or was it Begin who mistook Carter's promise to bring peace to the Middle East for a commitment to accept the Likud's views of what the peace requirements of Israel would be? In any case, it was an exercise in futility.

IV

It was this same comprehensiveness, the attempt to reach an ultimate and final agreement, that bedeviled the most dramatic event of the last year—Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. This is not the place to try and ascertain the reasons that prompted President Sadat to undertake what was by all tokens a very daring step. The joint American-Soviet communiqué of October 1, as well as his feeling that the United States was favoring Syria in its attempt to bring it into line for a comprehensive agreement—these and other elements must have had an impact upon his timing, if not upon the very reasoning itself which prompted him to undertake his journey. The Carter Administration, it should be recalled, after an initial shock and some hesitation welcomed and endorsed the initiative, and since then has been instrumental in maintaining its momentum.

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Again, precisely because even these limited negotiations between Israel and Egypt had as their aim a full and final peace agreement, this attempt was destined to be futile. Granted that all sides have made serious mistakes in the process of negotiations: Sadat by not sufficiently covering his flanks and thus isolating himself in the Arab world; Israel by going on with the construction of new settlements during the process of negotiations itself; Sadat by inexplicably recalling his delegation from the Jerusalem meeting of the Political Committee. These, and probably other moves as well, could be cited as serious blunders, but what was basically wrong in the approach appears to be much more fundamental and refers again to the methodology rather than the substance of the negotiations.

Let us try to define—beyond the mistakes and blunders of both sides—what the basic issues of disagreement between Israel and Egypt turned out to be, first, on the bilateral level and, second, on the broader issue of the future of the Palestinian question.

On the bilateral issue regarding Sinai, it is sometimes forgotten that *both sides agreed very early in the negotiation process on the disposition of about 95 percent of the territory of Sinai;* the bone of contention does not amount to much more than five percent of Sinai's territory—the Rafiah-Yamit salient and the area of the two airfields, Etam and Etzion, that the Israelis have built in the Sinai area immediately adjacent to the old Egyptian-Israeli international boundary. Because of the comprehensive approach, the negotiations got stuck despite the broad basis of agreement.

In negotiating an agreement that would determine the *final* border between Israel and Egypt under conditions of full peace, it would be very difficult to imagine Egypt—the first Arab country to sign a full peace agreement with Israel—ceding *formally* to Israel Egyptian territory in Sinai. Even Israelis who would like to see this have to realize how difficult this would be for Egypt, and Moshe Dayan said as much in a Knesset debate. On the other hand, neither is it easy for Israel, under conditions where it might achieve peace with Egypt but could still be under attack from Syria and Iraq, to give up those airfields whose chief importance is that they are as far away from the northeastern front as possible and that within the old borders of Israel there can hardly be found adequate substitutes for them. Similarly, the Rafiah-Yamit salient, strategically aimed at creating a wedge between Egyptian-controlled Sinai and the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip, is an area that Israel may find difficult to give up as long as the security considerations connected with the dangers of Palestinian terrorism

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have not been resolved.

Again, one might argue that Israel should be more flexible, just as one might argue that Egypt should not stand by its pounds of flesh—uninhabited minor areas of desert in Sinai—if they are stumbling blocks to peace. Both sides have good arguments against the other, but it is difficult to see how these arguments will make it easier for them to accept the other side's view. Consequently, since the aim is to achieve—even on the limited Israeli-Egyptian front—a full-fledged peace treaty, *to disagree over merely five percent of Sinai means that no agreement can be signed at all.*

If, on the other hand, both sides were to lower their aims and try for another interim agreement, which might, of course, be euphemistically called "Phase I" of an Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, they could agree upon Israeli withdrawal from 95 percent of Sinai, including Sharm-el-Sheikh, in return for some sort of demilitarization of the evacuated area—a procedure to which Egypt does not appear to object. Since this would not be a full peace agreement, there would not be full normalization in bilateral Egyptian-Israeli relations. Instead of moving immediately toward full diplomatic relations, both sides would have to do with a more limited form of relationship—e.g., merely consular relations, or a trade mission, or some other sort of low-profile representation that would not amount to full diplomatic relations (U.S.-China relations have been very imaginative here, as have been those between Federal and Democratic Germany during their initial stages of rapprochement).

Under such an agreement, the issue of the Rafiah-Yamit salient and the airfields would be referred to further negotiations, conceivably with a time limit that should indicate to the Egyptians that the Israelis do not view this as just a delaying tactic.

This could then be tied to further progress toward an agreement on the Palestinian issue. As long as Israel and Egypt aim at a full peace treaty, agreement on the Palestinian issue has to be concurrently achieved on this issue *pari passu* with an agreement on the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli issues. Since the Ismailia meeting of December 1977, when both sides decided to work for a declaration of principles on the Palestinian issue, not much progress has been registered on this. Both sides have been caught in a vicious circle: Egypt claiming it is not interested in more than a mere declaration about Palestinian rights to self-determination; Israel claiming that such a declaration, verbal as it might be, would prejudice any further possibility of negotiating the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Conversely, Israel's detailed autonomy plan for the

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West Bank and Gaza has been flatly turned down by the Egyptians as a recipe for continued Israeli occupation—nay, more, say the Egyptians, the Begin government now wants the Egyptians, by endorsing the autonomy plan, to legitimize Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Again, both sides have good reasons to stick to their positions. The process of negotiation is certainly not helped by this reiteration of the constraints each party feels itself laboring under.

If, on the other hand, Egypt and Israel were negotiating an interim agreement, the time factor could be brought into play by separating the negotiations on bilateral Egyptian-Israeli issues from the much more complex Palestinian problem. Obviously, Egypt would need some indication from Israel that it is not signing a mere separate peace and that Israel would be ready for concessions regarding the West Bank and Gaza. In negotiations for full peace, Egypt needs a specific declaration from Israel about its intentions toward the West Bank and Gaza; in negotiations for a limited agreement a much more general statement from Israel, to the effect that the future of the West Bank and Gaza would be negotiated later by all parties concerned, might suffice. The very ambiguity of the terms "by all parties concerned" might help each side to present such a declaration as expressing its view on the subject—a function similar to the blessed ambiguities of Resolution 242.

Such a phased agreement would then make it possible to bring Jordan into the picture. Jordanian readiness to enter into serious peace negotiations with Israel has never been in doubt, but Jordan could never be the *first* Arab country to deal openly with Israel, nor could it be the *first* Arab country to openly flout the Rabat decisions which legitimized the PLO as the "sole representative of the Palestinian people." Egypt, by Sadat's move, has broken the taboo on both issues: it has openly begun negotiations with Israel, and Sadat no longer reiterates his demand that the PLO be recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians or that a PLO-controlled state should be set up on the West Bank and in Gaza. His present position is much less specific and much more inclined toward a Jordanian option. Nonetheless, King Hussein still finds it extremely difficult to join negotiations at this stage. If, on the other hand, a major interim agreement between Egypt and Israel were to result in an Israeli withdrawal from 95 percent of Sinai, Hussein might see it as a reason for, as well as legitimization of, joining public negotiations with Israel.

It is here that one should add a caveat about the format of any

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future negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza. As with the issue of Berlin, clarity may be the enemy of peace, and some obfuscation may be the useful handmaid of reasonableness and ultimate agreement. It is my conviction that at this stage no *explicit* agreement about the ultimate frontiers on the West Bank and Gaza Strip is feasible—not only with the Likud government but also with a Labor government in Israel. Any government in Israel, no matter how willing it may be to return the bulk of the area to Jordan, will find it extremely difficult to give up the (largely unpopulated) *cordon sanitaire* along the Jordan River; nor will it be feasible to think of an Israeli government accepting the obscene repartitioning of Jerusalem. Conversely, it would be very difficult for Hussein to cede the Jordan Valley to Israel, just as it would be most unthinkable for him to sign away, publicly and formally, the Old City of Jerusalem.

The solution to the West Bank and Gaza has to be found in an incremental and implicit agreement that starts not from the end result but from an adequate reading of the present situation, for the present situation on the West Bank and in Gaza is not just that of Israeli occupation. On the ground, the situation is much more complex: in purely analytical terms (without the highly emotional terminology of "occupation" versus "liberation") the area is virtually an Israeli-Jordanian condominium.

This does not mean that Israel and Jordan have *equal* power in the area—certainly not. But it does mean that Israel does not have the *monopoly* of power. True, in matters of security—and this is naturally quite widely interpreted—Israel controls the West Bank and Gaza rather tightly, and its no-nonsense approach has made it possible for it to maintain relative tranquillity in the area for 11 years. But there is another side to the equation: on everything *outside* security, there is a silent partner very active in running the area—and this is Jordan. Public servants in the West Bank are paid a Jordanian salary on top of the salary they receive from the Israeli Military Government; municipalities have their budgets approved by the Ministry of Interior in Jordan; Jordanian currency is legal tender on the West Bank; schoolbooks and school curricula are decided upon in Amman; municipalities receive development loans from the Jordanian government; and every local decision—a town receiving a loan from the Israeli Military Government or deciding to join the Israeli power grid or irrigation system—is checked with the appropriate Jordanian authorities. The population on the West Bank holds on to its Jordanian passports, and the Gaza population (which has not had valid passports since 1948)

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now has the option of quietly applying for Jordanian passports through the Gaza municipality, which is acting, for all practical purposes, as a Jordanian consulate (on the West Bank proper this Jordanian consular function is carried out by the local Arab Chambers of Commerce). The Israeli Minister of Education would have no difficulty in changing schoolbooks in Israel overnight; he can hardly change one comma in a West Bank schoolbook without a major conflagration, and has therefore refrained from doing this.

Yet this condominium (like the "open bridges" policy, which the Jordanians view as an expression of their claim that the West Bank is merely under temporary Israeli military occupation and remains an integral part of Jordan) has not been achieved through any explicit agreement, nor could it have been achieved in that way. It grew out of numerous implicit piecemeal agreements, mutual blackmail and mutual consideration of even worse alternatives. It has worked for 11 years; it has given Israel its modicum of security; it has made it a little more palatable, never pleasant, for the Palestinian population to live on the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli occupation without feeling that they have been cut off from an alternative and *Arab* form of legitimate sovereignty—Jordan.

This de facto condominium should be the starting point for imaginative and constructive development undertaken in the spirit of the Byzantine doubletalk that has made the present status quo possible, and not through a dramatic public agreement on the ultimate disposition of the area. The latter is unachievable. What is achievable is a judicious move toward a change in the mix of the condominium: less salience for Israeli power, more power to the Jordanians and the local population. For example, departmental directors general could slowly replace Military Government staff officers in charge of various functions; Jordanian banks could be reopened; provincial authorities—district officers, etc.—could be appointed from the local population by joint agreement, creating another intermediate layer of power between the municipal and the central government.

Such cooperation is not unthinkable: one has only to see how the more pro-PLO mayors elected on the West Bank in the April 1976 municipal elections have learned to work within the Byzantine Israeli-Jordanian de facto condominium in order to realize that such piecemeal solutions, objectionable as they may be to the abstract logic of the constitutional lawyer, do indeed serve a positive and constructive purpose as far as the local population is concerned and make it easier for the contending parties to move

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from one situation to another one without publicly appearing to do so.

Such an approach, and such a solution, is far preferable to an attempt to establish an independent state on the West Bank and in Gaza. Even if such a state did not automatically become a base for PLO activities against Israel, which is doubtful, it would be unable to solve the existential and national problems of those Palestinians who still linger as refugees in camps. The West Bank is an overpopulated area that has served for the last three decades as an area of *emigration;* it cannot absorb and rehabilitate any sizable number of refugees. This population could, on the other hand, be absorbed on the East Bank of the Jordan River, which is not only part of historical Palestine but also is more than ten times larger than the West Bank and is sparsely populated.

For this reason, the Palestinian problem has to be solved on *both* banks of the Jordan, especially since about a million Palestinians today live on the East Bank, not as refugees but as well-integrated members of the Jordanian polity and economy. They serve in the Jordanian army, sit in the Jordanian parliament, and fill top positions in the Jordanian bureaucracy and economy. The establishment of a separate, West Bank Palestinian state would seriously jeopardize their integration into Jordanian society and would create constant friction between the West Bank Palestinian state and the Palestinian population in a truncated Jordan limited to the East Bank.

V

At this stage it appears that all attempts at a grand solution have failed. The American attempt to reconvene the Geneva Conference has turned out to be futile, and any similar attempt in the future is doomed to be equally counterproductive. The wish to reach a comprehensive agreement has borne no fruit, and Sadat's visit to Jerusalem—also aimed at a final agreement, albeit on a more limited basis between only Israel and Egypt—has turned out to be stillborn.

There is now only one way open to all sides concerned: to revert from the comprehensive to the piecemeal approach; to try to define areas of limited agreement between Israel and Egypt and to reach such agreements; to move slowly toward deemphasizing Israeli presence on the West Bank without having to achieve at this stage a clear delineation of the form of the ultimate arrangement; to try to create, on the basis of a wide interim agreement between Israel and Egypt, a new structure of relationships between the two

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countries, which may lead them toward further agreements; to open avenues for a moderate Palestinian leadership to find for itself a place in the sun within the framework of slowly reestablishing more elements of Jordanian authority on the West Bank; and, one would hope, to draw the Syrians into the network of these changing relationships.

While this is being written during the summer of 1978, it appears that the U.S. Administration is slowly beginning to realize that this may be the only way out of the impasse. Similarly, Sadat's gropings for an Israeli gesture—as evidenced in his hint to Defense Minister Ezer Weizman at Salzburg that Israel could gain Egyptian goodwill by returning the Sinai town of El-Arish—also suggest that Egypt may be quietly accommodating itself to a drawn-out series of agreements; and on July 24, 1978, Begin announced in the Knesset that if a full peace treaty between Israel and Egypt could be achieved, Israel would be ready to contemplate "peaceful relations" in the absence of a formal peace, more or less on the "post-1945 German model": a significant, yet not widely acknowledged departure from the Likud's erstwhile position of "no more interim agreements."

Peace cannot be achieved by fiat: it requires a period of gestation and mutual accommodation in which both sides will learn to live with each other, fear each other a little less, and trust each other a little more. The attempt to reach a comprehensive agreement over a short period of time is a counsel of despair; it tries to abstract from the real complex relationships among the contending parties, to overlook the constraints of intra-Arab rivalries as well as those of the internal politics of Israel, in order to arrive at a neat and tidy solution. But no international conflict since 1945 has been solved in a neat and tidy way, and there is no compelling reason to believe the Middle East should or could be different.

It requires patience and a lot of goodwill, as well as a willingness to live with ambiguities, half-way houses and some hypocrisy. Some of these virtues may be questionable or even abhorrent, but they are necessary if an agreement—any agreement—is to be found. Gordian knots may be cut through by a sword, but knots are not made of people, with their hopes, ideologies and conflicting aspirations. Therefore, there are no Gordian knots in the Middle East, only bundles of peoples trying to find their way, within their respective cultures, in a world of national, ideological and economic conflicts. They need time to accommodate to each other; their leaders need enough elbow room for complex maneuvers—and all this can be achieved only through a return to a piecemeal approach to the problem. The alternative—a compre-

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hensive approach—only maximizes the dangers of war by presenting false alternatives—either a comprehensive peace agreement or war.

There is a third alternative to full peace and the outbreak of war—the alternative of piecemeal agreements; and the sooner all sides concerned will pick up this option again, the better.

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Nahum Goldmann

ZIONIST IDEOLOGY AND THE REALITY OF ISRAEL

The purpose of this article is to review the situation of Israel from a Zionist point of view, at this most critical moment—in the real sense of the word "crisis," which, in medical terms, may lead either to full recovery or to a tragic end. I am now 83 years old and, having made my first Zionist speech at the age of 13, I can look back on a Zionist career of 70 years. I asked myself whether my views at this particular time should not rather be published in a Jewish paper. But the fact is that the issue of Israel and Zionism has been and continues to be much more than a purely Jewish problem: it is a front-page international one, in which the United States has been getting more and more intensely involved, both directly and through the United Nations.

The creation of the State of Israel was an international act, based on a U.N. decision, and since then both the General Assembly and the Security Council have had many times to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. There is no other example of a state of three million inhabitants that so much occupies public opinion, provoking deep emotional reactions, both positive and negative. This is just another indication of the uniqueness of the Jewish problem.

Jewish history and the character of the Jewish people are unique and represent, both in their totality and in many partial aspects—as for instance the Soviet-Jewish problem—a unique phenomenon. Without taking this uniqueness into account—and "unique" does not include any qualitative connotation but only that it is exceptional—it is impossible to understand the history of the Jewish people, which is a combination of religion, nationalism and race. This history always moved between two poles, the center in its state and the Diaspora around it, and defies most of the rules normally dominating the history of peoples. The present State of Israel is the third "commonwealth" in Jewish history and, although it is the

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culmination of 2,000 years of prayers of Jews all over the world for their return to their ancestral country, now that they have the possibility of going back, the majority prefer to remain in their dispersion. Zionism, too, which, from a universal point of view, may be regarded as one of the many manifestations of the nationalistic idea which came into being in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is unique. A normal national movement is the expression of an oppressed people ruled by a foreign power, which revolts against this domination, wins the fight and proclaims its independence. Zionism, however, was born not as an expression of an untenable reality but as the result of a dream, a longing, an ideal. When Theodor Herzl wrote *The Jewish State* and soon afterward, in 1894, called the first Zionist Congress, there were about 60,000 Jews in Palestine, living as a minority among a much larger Arab population.

I stress this point because I see a deep wisdom in Goethe's saying that peoples and human beings have to live "by the law by which they started their existence." The extent to which it is capable of realizing its ideals is decisive for any people, but the Jewish people is surely *the* one in the world that owes its survival not to its economic, political or military power, but to its ideals—religious, cultural and social. If the reality of Jewish history had determined the fate of the Jewish people, it would have disappeared long ago. There were periods when there may have been no more than one or one-and-a-half million Jews in the world, but they survived 2,000 years of discrimination, lack of equality and persecution—climaxing in the Nazi Holocaust—not because of their power but because of their loyalty to their ideals and their indestructible faith in a better future, in being "the chosen people," in the coming of the Messiah. Among the many new states created during the last 50 years, Israel is the only one that has its origin not in reality but in an ideal, not in a factual situation but in the hope and faith of a people.

II

The 30th anniversary of Israel, celebrated a few months ago, is a fitting occasion to draw a balance. Having devoted most of my life to help realize the Zionist ideal and having occupied important positions in the Zionist leadership during several decades, I am able to compare the reality of Israel today with the vision by which it was created. The conclusion of such a critical comparison is that on the one hand only a part of the Zionist ideal has been implemented in the reality of Israel of today and that, on the

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other, many aspects of this reality, even the dominant character of Israel's image—both internally and externally—constitute a radical distortion of the Zionist ideal.

I fully realize that no revolutionary movement can totally fulfill its ideals and that these are often distorted in the process of implementation, as the history of the French and Russian Revolutions, among others, proves. The relationship between the ideal and the realization is one of the touchstones of the success of any movement: for a people whose existence is primarily based on the creative challenges of ideals and hopes, it is more decisive than for any other.

When it emerged about 80 years ago, the Zionist idea, like most phenomena of Jewish life, was quite exceptional, unique and, in a way, even absurd. As a matter of fact, Herzl's idea of a Jewish state as the solution of the Jewish problem was, for quite some time, considered quixotic, unrealistic and utopian by a majority of Jews and non-Jews alike. One need only imagine what would happen in the world if all the peoples who lost their states centuries or millennia ago—such as the Indians in North and South America, for instance—were to reclaim their land. It was Herzl's good luck that he was ignorant of the complexities of Jewish history and Jewish life. I have long felt that what characterizes genius is the ability to simplify a very complicated problem and to reduce it to one striking formula: Marx did this for economics, Freud for psychology, and so on. Herzl defined the Jewish problem as a question of logistics: "a people without a land should be transferred to a land without a people," and by this stroke he believed the Jewish problem, which had been embarrassing the world for thousands of years, would be solved. Nothing in this formula, of course, was true: most of the Jews throughout the world were not people without a land but loyal citizens of their countries, and Palestine—although not as densely populated as it is today—was certainly not a land without a people. Nor has the transfer of nearly three million Jews to Israel solved the Jewish problem in the world, as is unfortunately apparent in the recent resurgence of anti-Semitism, often in the form of anti-Zionism. As a matter of fact, the creation of the State of Israel, though certainly enriching Jewish life and giving it more dignity and new challenges, has doubtless created serious political difficulties for many Jewish communities in various countries.

The main or primary purpose of the Zionist movement was never just to create a state and to move all the Jews of the world to it. The real aim of the thinkers and ideologues of the Zionist

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movement was twofold: on the one hand to create a country in which Jews who are persecuted or driven out could find a home in their own right and, on the other, to establish a center to bring about a renaissance of Jewish culture and Judaism, in whatever form it expresses itself, in order to secure the survival of the Jewish people. The first aim was more or less achieved by the creation of a normal state, where Jews are the majority and which is open to every Jew who wishes to live within a Jewish atmosphere or who is obliged to leave another country. But the second task of Zionism, to secure Jewish survival, has not really begun to be implemented. It is not only because three million Jews in the Soviet Union are prevented de facto from remaining Jews that the future of the Jewish people is more threatened today, in my opinion, than it was in the days of the Holocaust. The greater danger lies in the fact that the internal front of the Jewish people, which assured its existence during the thousands of years of its history much more than its external front, which was always weak, is seriously menaced nowadays.

In many European countries, where the Jewish population was decimated by the Holocaust, not only in Eastern Europe but also in countries such as Holland, Germany, Italy or Belgium, there may not be a Jewish community at all in ten or 20 years. At best, half of American Jews are in any form active as Jews, either by belonging to a synagogue or by participating in Zionist or communal affairs, and there are statisticians who predict that, in a decade or two, half of them will have lost all Jewish consciousness. The lack of Jewish education, the complete assimilation of a generation of Jews who enjoy full equality—economic, political and cultural—in their countries, as well as mixed marriages, endanger the survival of a considerable part of the people. Realizing this threat to Jewish survival, some of the ideological creators of the Zionist movement, chief among them the great Hebrew writer and thinker Ahad Haam, regarded it as the main task of Zionism not just to create a state for homeless Jews but a country with a special character which, in the form of a sovereign state, would become the spiritual center for the majority of Jews who were living outside the Jewish state and would continue to do so for an unforeseeable future. The purpose was to create new values to inspire the young generation all over the world to remain Jewish, in place of the religious tradition—that portable fatherland, to use a famous term of Heinrich Heine—which had dominated Jewish life for centuries but which has lost a great part of its significance for the majority of the people that no longer lives the

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separate life of the ghetto.

From this point of view, Israel is far from even having begun to fulfill the deeper meaning of Zionism. The reasons for this failure—despite all the successes Israel has achieved in building up a state, forging a strong army and winning victories—are both objective and subjective, and it is the purpose of this article to elaborate them.

III

The objective reasons are two tragic events which no philosopher of Zionism could ever have foreseen. One was the Holocaust, which annihilated a third of the Jewish people and, in particular, the great cultural and religious centers of Jewish existence in Central and Eastern Europe, which had for centuries been the bearers of Jewish tradition and values and would have been the natural reservoir for large-scale immigration into a Jewish state. The second tragic development, which neither Theodor Herzl, Chaim Weizmann, nor any of the other founders of Zionism had ever considered possible, was that the career of the State started with a war against the Arab world.

The Zionist movement had always been convinced that the Arabs would receive it with open arms, and be happy for its bringing the values, the ideas and the know-how of West European and American civilization into the Middle East. Because of this illusion—a result of the lack of political experience of the Jews during 2,000 years of Diaspora life—Zionism committed the unintentional error of ignoring the importance of the Arab attitude for the realization of Zionist aspirations. The leadership of the Zionist movement, to which I belonged for several decades, concentrated primarily on winning the sympathy and the support of the great powers and of world public opinion, and in this it was successful, as the U.N. decision of 1947 proves. Attempts were made occasionally to try to win over the Arabs to agree to the establishment of a Jewish state in their midst, but these efforts were never intensive nor flexible enough. When the Zionist movement won its great political victory and the United Nations voted for the creation of a Jewish state by a two-thirds majority, the Arab world was more isolated than Israel is today because both the democratic countries and the communist bloc voted for the resolution. Some of us then suggested that the proclamation of the State should be delayed for a few weeks or months, in order to try to reach an agreement with the Arabs, if not to accept Israel at least not to react to its creation by war. This might not have succeeded, but, as it was not even

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tried, there is no way to assess the alternative, and for the major part of its 30-years' history, Israel has had to fight wars with the Arabs in order to secure its survival.

The tragedy of the situation is that, although Israel won all the wars—more or less decisively—nothing definite was achieved by the victories. As formulated by Nietzsche, great victories are less easy to digest than defeats, and the psychological effect of the repeated Israeli victories was the hardening of positions on both sides of the barricades. Instead of leading to peace, the victories only aggravated the conflict: the Arabs felt more humiliated and insulted with each defeat, and the Israelis acquired a feeling of superiority and the conviction that they need not worry too much because of the Arabs' refusal to recognize them. Characteristic of this attitude is Prime Minister Begin's statement that Israel does not require Arab acceptance because its existence is the affirmation of God's promise and Jewish tradition.

In this connection it may be useful to recall that, on his return from Yalta, President Roosevelt had a meeting with Ibn Saud, who expressed his utter refusal of the idea of a Jewish state and so impressed the President that, in a subsequent talk with Rabbi Stephen Wise, he warned him that the Zionists were taking upon themselves a terrible responsibility, as they might, by the creation of the State, lead to the extermination of millions of Jews. Similar views were conveyed in 1948 by Secretary of State Marshall to Moshe Sharett and by Under Secretary of State Lovett to myself. It is difficult to understand how a people so brilliant, resourceful and intelligent as the Jews fail to realize that, if the acceptance of the Jewish state by the Arabs and ensuing peace does not occur in the near future, the outlook is grim indeed.

The undeniable fact that determines the present situation and the evolution of the Middle East is that time does not work for Israel. Israel's belief in its superiority as a permanent phenomenon has no foundation in reality. On the one hand, 100 or 120 million Arabs are lined up against three million Jews—or even four or five million in the coming years—and their natural intelligence will enable them in the very near future to learn the use of the most modern weapons. On the other hand, the tremendous wealth of the Arab oil-producing states and the political power this gives the Arab world influences American policy. Israel cannot take for granted, from a long-term point of view, America's total and unlimited political, military and economic support. The most decisive and, for Israel, the most ominous fact is that one cannot, under any circumstances, imagine the elimination of the Arabs

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from the Middle East, whereas it is unfortunately quite conceivable that, in case of an overwhelming Arab victory and the indifference of the world in general, Israel might be destroyed. Indeed, this fear is often used by Israelis in defense of their intransigent policy.

IV

As a matter of fact, deep in the heart of the Israelis, despite their over-publicized feeling of superiority based on military victories, is the worry of what the next day may bring. This was the reason for the miraculous impact of Anwar Sadat's gesture in coming to Jerusalem last November. It created not only a joyful surprise all over the world but a heartfelt and intense enthusiasm in Israel—and at the same time in Egypt, where the population is tired of the misery that 30 years of war has brought about. It would be a real tragedy, for Israel as well as for the Arab states of the Middle East and indeed the whole world, if Sadat's great initiative were to remain a short-lived episode leading to a new war, with the danger of a big-power confrontation in the background.

For all these reasons, Israel and the Arab world have reached a crucial point in the history of their conflict. The coming year will probably decide whether there will be an agreement leading to peace or an increase of tension and a hardening of positions on both sides, culminating in a brutal war with all its international complications. Due to its military superiority throughout the 30 years of its existence, Israel has achieved a significant success—Sadat's offer to accept the Jewish state as an equal member of the family of nations of the Middle East, after the solution of the Palestinian problem and the settlement of the border question. It is likely that Lebanon, Jordan, and even Syria and Saudi Arabia would follow his example, and this should be regarded by Israel as a major political victory. For 30 years Israel proclaimed that the basic condition for peace was the readiness of the Arabs to recognize the Jewish state, formally and factually. Levi Eshkol, the Israeli Prime Minister at the time of the Six Day War, solemnly declared a few days before the war started that Israel had no desire for territorial expansion; after the big conquests of 1967, this promise was forgotten—as the French say, "*l'appétit vient en mangeant*." Today, now that the leading Arab states are ready to recognize Israel on condition that it return to the 1967 borders, with certain ameliorations, Israel refuses. It should, I believe, consider what would have happened had the Arabs agreed 30 years ago to the U.N. decision on partition, which foresaw a Jewish

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state less than half as big as Israel is today, and which Israel then enthusiastically accepted.

The Israeli arguments in interpreting the crucial Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 may be useful for a logical dispute, but are meaningless from a historical and political point of view. One of the objections is that in many cases peoples have kept territories conquered in war. This in fact occurred when the conquerors were strong enough to impose the territorial changes on their defeated opponents and to achieve peace, but the past 30 years have proved that the Arabs cannot be forced to yield and, as they get permanently stronger, it is unlikely that they will do so in the future. There is, however, a real chance that the moderate Arab countries will accept certain territorial changes due to security considerations which, as I know from conversations with various Arab representatives, many of them understand—as, for instance, on the border between Israel and Jordan, which, near Natania, leaves only 18 kilometers to Israel from the coastline to the frontier.

The second Israeli argument against relinquishing any territory, that of the so-called historical borders, is no less untenable. In the history of the biblical and post-biblical Jewish States, there were many different borders at various periods between Israel and its neighbors, and neither the Bible nor the Talmud specify what these borders should be. Moreover, and though the loyalty of the Jewish people to its tradition is one of the reasons for Jewish survival, one may legitimately wonder why the Arabs or the Americans should be committed to the promises of the Jewish God! Great religious Jewish leaders, with whom I have discussed this issue, state unequivocally that it is contrary to the spirit of Jewish law, in which the welfare of every human being is a major commandment, to fight a war and risk the lives of thousands of young Jewish men and women to gain territories. And there are some extreme and logically most consistent groups of Orthodox Jews who reject the creation of the Jewish state without the Messiah having yet come, and who regard the establishment of Israel rather as a violation than as the fulfillment of divine promise.

The only remaining argument that is understandable and acceptable is that of security, but it is also greatly distorted and misrepresented. In a period when warfare is based on supersonic airplanes and missiles, the importance of borders, from a security point of view, has not disappeared but has greatly decreased. Syrians, Jordanians and even Saudi Arabians could bomb Israeli cities from beyond the present borders—as Israel could do as well

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in retaliation—and there is, as a matter of fact, great fear on both sides that a new war may be directed more against civilians than conducted on the battlefield.

The history of the Middle East in the last 30 years is one of the sad chapters of missed opportunity. It would be a real crime if the intransigence on both sides were to bring to naught the extraordinary and, maybe, last chance offered by Sadat's courageous gesture. Psychologically, one can understand the doubts and hesitations of the Israeli leadership to take a more flexible stand. The Jews survived the last 2,000 years because of their stubbornness, because they refused to accept realities, because of their faith in miracles which would save them, because of a mixture of an inferiority complex with compensatory superiority feelings in their relations with the non-Jewish world, because of their refusal to rely on promises and guarantees from outside. Mr. Begin and most other leaders of Israel are still an incarnation of *Galut* (exile) psychology, and this is the major obstacle for reaching a settlement as far as Israel and the Jewish people are concerned. But I am confident that a new generation, free from many of the complexes developed during the Diaspora, will emerge, exemplified even today in the Peace Now movement, led by some of the most decorated heroes of the Israeli Army.

The great question is whether the Arabs will be ready to wait until such a psychological change occurs. The future of Israel, however, will depend on it, and the Israelis must realize that the psychology that enabled Jews to survive 2,000 years of ghetto and *mellah*, of living not really within history but on the verge of it, cannot be the basis of the existence of a modern state established in the midst of hostile Arab countries. Without a definite acceptance of Israel by the Arab world, which, in the long run, must mean not merely a formal peace treaty but also normal diplomatic, economic and cultural relations—on which Israel rightly insists as the condition for any settlement—there is no future and no security for the Jewish state in the Middle East.

Such Israelis as believe that the Arabs will never accept a Jewish state should pack their bags and leave the country. I, for one, have always felt that, given the proper psychological attitude by the Israelis, the Arabs will finally accept Israel and cooperate with it. Sadat's initiative and the attitude of the moderate Arab states prove that there is a basis for this hope, and it would be a historical crime—not only vis-à-vis the Jewish people but with regard to all the peoples of the Middle East and humanity—if either Israel or the Arabs, by their intransigence on nonessential details, were to

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destroy the possibility of beginning an era of good neighborliness, friendship and real cooperation.

V

The main consideration for Israel in determining its position at this most crucial moment in its history must be the understanding that, without peace, there is no chance for it to fulfill the real mission of the Zionist movement. While the menace of Arab destruction may enthuse the Diaspora for a certain time in support of Israel, it is insufficient, from a long-term point of view, to inspire Jewish youth throughout the world and to influence it in remaining loyal to its people. Some of the young generation, I am afraid, is lost already—not only in the U.S.S.R. but also in the Western world; the only hope to maintain at least a large part of it within the Jewish fold is for Israel no longer to be obliged to use its resources and talents for winning battles—with the danger, as the Germans say, of "*sich tod zu siegen*," to be victorious to death—but to be able to devote its immense creative energies to the establishment of a new society and new values which would inspire the Jewish Diaspora.

In order to implement this major ideal of Zionism, Israel must, in my opinion, not only achieve peace and be as strong as possible, but it must become a state unlike all others. It is obvious that, even after signing a peace treaty, Israel will have to remain strongly armed for quite some time so as to prevent the violation of the agreement. But this alone cannot suffice. The peace treaty must be implemented by real guarantees, either on the part of the United States alone or, preferably, by a number of major powers, with the stationing of international forces on Israel's borders for a long time. The more countries that participate in such guarantees, the better for the Middle East and for the world, and this may even serve as a precedent for other parts of the world, which would benefit from demilitarization and realistic guarantees instead of engaging in the armaments race.

As I argued in detail several years ago in *Foreign Affairs*, it would be advisable, in my opinion, if Israel were proclaimed a neutral state by the United Nations and enjoyed international protection of its neutrality.[1] For the time being, I believe Israel's security would have to be guaranteed by the presence of international forces around its borders. To affirm, as many in Israel do, that this would be undignified and a violation of Israel's sovereignty, is

[1] See "The Future of Israel," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1970, particularly pp. 453–59.

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quite absurd. West Germany, Belgium and Holland see no infringement of their sovereignty by having American soldiers on their soil and, on the contrary, they worry at the mere mention of their number being reduced. The friends of Israel in the United States who are genuinely interested in Israel's security and survival should be more ready to insist on the stationing of American forces than to agitate against the supply of arms to Arab countries, thus endangering the good relations between the United States and the Middle East.

The role of the Soviet Union in the effort to reach peace in the Middle East should not be overlooked. Any attempt to eliminate the U.S.S.R. from that area is, in my opinion, unwise and shortsighted. The Soviet Union is certainly not strong enough to impose a peace agreement in the Middle East, but it is well capable of sabotaging any settlement reached without it. For that reason the Vance-Gromyko agreement of October 1977 was a piece of real statesmanship, and it is regrettable that Israel's opposition and that of the pro-Israel lobby in America rendered the agreement ineffective. Likewise, whatever may be achieved in the direct negotiations again undertaken between Israeli and Egyptian representatives—and certainly if these talks fail—will make necessary a reconvocation of the Geneva conference, notwithstanding the reluctance of Israel and some Arab states.

One last remark concerning a very essential aspect of the problem. Israel's claim that neither Jews outside Israel nor even the U.S. government have a right to criticize its policies or make suggestions is the expression of a lack of psychological security and without any justification. Without the partnership of the Jewish people and its support of Zionism after the Second World War, Israel would never have come into existence, nor could it have survived for long. It is obvious that formal decisions on Israel's policies must remain in the hands of its elected parliament and government, but it would be morally unfair and realistically untenable to deny Jewish individuals and organizations in the Diaspora, who have constantly shown their solidarity with Israel and who help it politically, financially and in many other ways, the right to express an opinion on Israel's policies or criticize them. Jews in the Diaspora, in the long run, will not continue to feel responsible if they are refused the right to influence Israel, by private views and by public utterances.

No less absurd is the demand that America should not "impose" a peace. This is nothing but a clever and demagogic formula. International politics are based on permanent interference and

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pressures, and even Israel very often demands that the United States should influence its allies in NATO or pressure its adversaries like the Soviet Union. Why should it therefore deny the United States the right to make proposals or suggestions, while accepting billions of dollars annually in support and arms supplies and leaving the United States in the uncomfortable position of being Israel's only supporter in the United Nations? I have maintained for years that America, by its reluctance to influence Israel and through having given in to too many Israeli demands—for instance, with regard to the Jarring mission, the Rogers Plan, etc.—not only failed to help Israel but harmed it in the long run. With greater American interference, peace could have been brought about long ago, in situations more favorable to Israel than today.

Experience has shown that the Arabs and Israelis, left alone, will not achieve an agreement. The conflict is, in a certain way, a family affair between two Semitic peoples, who are characterized by stubbornness and lack of flexibility. The United States, which has intervened in many other conflicts and helped to bring about settlements, should not only have the right but the obligation to use all its influence in the Arab-Israeli issue, which has occupied the headlines of the world for 30 years.

VI

We have reached a point in the history of Israel and the Middle East where the whole world is beginning to be sick and tired of this conflict. In the long run, the tiny state of Israel cannot keep the center of world attention and will, by its attitude, provoke indifference and even increasing hostility. American Jews who support Israel in its present intransigent policy and who feel they must prevent America from taking a position are harming Israel more than many of its adversaries. It is my feeling that not only has Israel the obligation to make use of the present unique opportunity for a settlement, but the United States must do whatever it can to take a hand in it.

Finally, I believe that the number of Jews in Israel and in the Diaspora who are beginning to doubt the validity of Israel's rigid policy—which, as a matter of fact, has not changed radically from Ben Gurion to Begin—is growing. Despite all the negative elements that characterize the momentary situation, I am more optimistic than ever before about a positive solution of the Middle East conflict. Once the major Arab states have reached the psychological maturity to accept Israel and be ready for peace, the intransigence of Israel and of certain Arabs will not endure. When

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the United States and, I hope, other major powers cease to be reluctant to interfere in a situation that is a potential danger for the whole world, the chances for a true settlement and for the beginning of a new and creative chapter in the history of the Middle East will become real.

The Israeli-Arab conflict, despite the fact that it concerns only a tiny territory, is morally and historically one of the main problems of today's world politics. Just as the major powers bear responsibility for the tragic past of the Jewish people—for their participation in or indifference to its sufferings and persecutions, culminating in the Holocaust—so they are responsible for the survival and security of the Jewish state, which alone can avoid possible future persecutions and dangers to the Jews.

The insistence of Israel's present leaders that the world should not interfere and should leave Israel and the Arabs to solve their issues by themselves results in a paradoxical negation of the real ideal of Zionism. The fact that Israel depends exclusively on the United States, politically, financially, economically and militarily, and could not continue to exist as it is today if the United States were to abandon it—which fortunately is not likely—is a denial of the Zionist ambition to make the Jewish people independent of others in determining its future.

Zionism and Israel are, as explained above, a unique problem. Its solution must also be unique and not be brought about by the usual methods of routine diplomacy, which, for 30 years, have failed to solve it. Only an Israel guaranteed by as many powers of the world as possible, being allowed to create a new civilization and new values, will be the true fulfillment of the classic ideology of Zionism. Israel as it is today is the realization of that part of the Zionist ideal which wanted a state for the Jewish people, but it is still far from, and in a certain respect even in contradiction to, that more decisive aspect of Zionism which aims at creating a spiritual center for the Jewish people as a whole, the real guarantee for Jewish survival.

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Jorge I. Domínguez

CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY

Cuba has approximately 35,000 troops in Africa today. Relative to its population, that is comparable to U.S. involvement in Vietnam at the height of the war. The Cuban military presence in Africa, with Soviet support, has become a major and divisive concern of the Carter Administration, leading in the spring of 1978 to a public shouting match between Presidents Castro and Carter over the degree of Cuban involvement in the invasion of Zaïre's Shaba province by former Katanga gendarmes based in Angola.

In the debate on how to respond to Cuban overseas activities, a major argument is whether Cuba has a foreign policy of its own. Some routinely describe Cuba as a puppet of the Soviet Union, and Cuban soldiers as mercenaries in the pay of their Soviet master. Because the Cuban government's autonomy in foreign policy is perceived as close to zero, it becomes impossible to treat a mere province as a sovereign government. Sino-Soviet relations and Soviet-Yugoslav relations were once similarly portrayed, and time proved each perspective wrong. I believe it is wrong in the case of Cuba, too.

Cuba is a small country, but it has a big country's foreign policy. It has tried to carry out such a policy since the beginning of the revolution, but only in the second half of the 1970s did it have the conditions—internal resources, lack of U.S. opposition, and an African context that welcomed what Cuba seemed best able to provide—to become a visible and important actor actually shaping the course of events.

II

Cuban foreign policy may, in fact, be the outstanding success of the Cuban Revolution. Its foremost accomplishment is that it has

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made it possible for revolutionary rule to survive for two decades, in the face of what was until very recently implacable and multifaceted U.S. opposition. In 1959–60, suspicion hardened into hostility and serious disputes emerged with the United States, and for nearly a decade thereafter Washington, as we know, literally spared no effort to bring down Fidel Castro and his associates. Yet 20 years later—after the Bay of Pigs, the missile crisis, intense covert pressures, a continuing U.S. embargo, and now the Cuban engagement in Angola and Ethiopia—Cuba's revolutionary family remains in control. The economy fell and rose; political forms at home were changed; but the same set of individuals that consolidated its hold on government in the early 1960s remains at the helm today.

The survival of revolutionary rule remains the foremost objective of their foreign policy. And I think it would today be widely accepted—as it was not, at least in American capitals, in the 1960s—that it was the practical imperative of survival, considerably more than ideological affinity, that made the Soviet connection as strong as it was from the outset. Cuba had to have foreign support, and in the international political climate of the early revolutionary years only the Soviet Union had the military, political and economic capacity to help Cuba effectively in its confrontation with the United States.

Cuba required the Soviet connection, not only to make a Marxist-Leninist regime—with tropical flavor—possible in the American Mediterranean, but also to fund an economic growth and redistribution program. The gaining of foreign support for economic development has all along been the second objective of Cuban foreign policy. Its relative priority was made clear early in the new regime, however. In the critical choices it had to make between 1959 and 1961 about relations with the United States, Cuba might have avoided the economic dislocations of the 1960s (whose shape was even then visible) if it had simply slowed down or aborted its revolutionary program, especially by eschewing policies of government control and redistribution of resources. Instead, the revolutionary government sacrificed short-run internal welfare to its principal aim: the survival and consolidation of its own kind of political regime.

These early priorities, and the needs and choices they dictated, did lead to a persistent characteristic of Cuban foreign policy, namely that it operates under what must be described as Soviet hegemony. So long as the Soviet Union is Cuba's principal guarantor and the principal supporter of its internal development

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policies, it is in a position to set the permissible boundaries for Cuban behavior in the foreign sphere. We shall return to the twin questions of just what those boundaries have been at different times, and how much Cuba has availed itself of the discretion it has had within them. The mix of dependence and independence has varied in degree, but it has always been there.

Yet the experience of those same early years also conditioned the Cuban leadership to the need for an active foreign policy beyond mere reliance on the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union was far away; its ability to support Cuba was hampered by geography, compounded by inefficiencies at both ends of the relationship. Soviet support for Cuba, at the outset, was far from unqualified; Soviet leaders had learned to distrust revolutions made without Soviet armed support. At first, in the 1960s, even Soviet missile protection was rather more figurative than real in the perception of the Cuban leadership, and Fidel Castro was outraged in 1962 when the Soviet Union bowed to the United States in the missile crisis without consulting the Cuban government.

Insufficiently reassured by the Soviet Union, Cuba turned wherever it could for support and assistance. Among its friends in the early 1960s, for example, were the People's Republic of China and Morocco—both by then anathema to Moscow, and both described today in Havana as somewhat beneath the scum of the earth.

In addition, when the U.S. policy of economic denial became worldwide, seeking to enlist allies in the effort to strangle the Cuban government, Cuba was virtually forced for practical reasons alone to "go global" in its own foreign policy. Until the Ford Administration lifted these restrictions in 1975, foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-based transnational enterprises could not trade with Cuba; merchant ships calling at Cuban ports could not be serviced in the United States; and foreign recipients of U.S. aid were threatened with aid cutoffs if they traded with Cuba. Washington sought, and eventually achieved, the imposition of collective sanctions by the Organization of American States.

The impact on Cuban policy was twofold. Where it could hope to do so, Cuba sought to persuade others not to go along with the United States, through widespread and increasingly skillful bilateral diplomacy and through participation in multilateral groupings. Its membership in the nonaligned movement dates from 1961. (Later on, Cuba joined the so-called Group of 77 to press for the economic demands of the less-developed countries.) Over the years Cuba has become a leader of the nonaligned's highest rank-

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ing coordinating committee—even though few countries are more deeply aligned with a superpower. And the nonaligned countries responded by early and strong condemnation of U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba, and by more specific resolutions such as a long-standing appeal for U.S. withdrawal from its Guantanamo naval base in eastern Cuba. It is a reflection of Cuba's continued high standing among the nonaligned nations that, notwithstanding the vigorous debates in Belgrade this summer (to which we shall return), Havana will be the site of the 1979 summit meeting of the heads of nonaligned governments.

In the Western Hemisphere, however, Cuban policy took a different turn. Because the United States had great leverage especially over Latin American governments—the weaker the government, the greater the leverage, generally speaking—Cuba had the most concrete of national interests in supporting the oppositions to those governments that sided with the United States against Cuba.

Outside the hemisphere, although Cuba supported some opposition movements in the early years, it is noteworthy that it generally chose to work with governments—in Franco's Spain, for example—as part of a policy of diversifying its foreign policy partners wherever possible and wherever there was an economic or political interest involved. Relations with governments have generally had a higher priority than efforts to influence the Left and to support revolutions.

Yet, of course, the global thrust of Cuban policy—while grounded primarily in Cuba's experience—also has a basis in the ideology of the leadership. The official ideology is not of the biblical variety: while policy pronouncements do include at times references to the Marxist-Leninist classics—more so by some officials and at some times—most Cuban policy and ideological formulations rely strongly on the speeches of Fidel Castro and of other leaders of the Cuban government. These, in turn, reflect a mix of vision and pragmatism that has evolved over the years. For the study of foreign policy, official ideology, too, emphasizes the importance of a worldwide perspective.

Thus ideology provides a frame of reference for reflection, a lens through which to see the world, scales with which to weigh the evidence. Fidel Castro's own biography as a revolutionary in the 1940s involved him in efforts to advance radical causes in Colombia and in the Dominican Republic. The collective experience of the Cuban leadership, as guerrillas in the 1950s, underlined the importance of support from abroad. After 1959, they received

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substantial assistance not only from the Soviet Union, but also from other East European countries and China. These events have strengthened an ideology that urges them to support their friends and allies overseas as others supported them in their time of need—to do their duty of "internationalist solidarity."

Ideology had a target, too—to oppose the U.S.-led forces of "imperialism" wherever those forces were weak. An ideological set to Cuban thinking became stronger over the years, as Cuba became isolated from many currents of international thought other than those flowing from communist movements and countries, and in part because its own political system tended to become more rigid, discouraging dissent and less than full loyalty to the "correct" position.

So both ideology and practical interest combined to lead Cuba, in the 1960s, to the active policy of supporting revolution that was associated with the name of Ernesto (Che) Guevara and culminated in his ill-fated attempt to create a "second Cuba" in the hinterlands of Bolivia. Che was assisted by several members of the Cuban Communist Party, including some Central Committee members who died with him there. It was Guevara, also, who established some of the key early contacts with the Congo (Brazzaville) and Angola's MPLA in 1965.

But the general goal of support of revolution remained secondary to a higher goal consistently preferred, namely, a preference for Cuba's "own" Left over a unified revolutionary stance. The attack on the Soviet-oriented Venezuelan Communist Party severely divided the Left in that country. The Bolivian Left was also fractured between those supporting the Guevara-led insurrection and the more cautious policies of that country's Soviet-oriented Communist Party. Cuba even contributed to splits within the armed struggle wing of the Left in Guatemala, where it denounced those whom it did not like as Trotskyites.

In time, an ideology that emerged from early experience acquired a life of its own, and now serves as a somewhat independent factor in the explanation of Cuban foreign policy, shaping the leadership's perceptions and providing ready explanations to the public for many of Cuba's actions. Nevertheless, it is also tempered by contemporary experience, and subordinate to the superior goals of survival and internal development. Cuba does not answer every call from every quarter; at times it supports the less ideologically worthy but more strategically important. But there remains an ideological element to the formulation and implementation of Cuban foreign policy.

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III

Thus, Cuba's foreign policy can be seen as reflecting a fairly clear hierarchy of objectives, in descending order: (1) survival of the revolutionary government; (2) economic development; (3) influence over governments; (4) influence over the Left; and (5) support of revolution. Although many specific Cuban policies have changed from the 1960s to the 1970s, the choices among policies have been made consistently as if they were following such an explicit hierarchy. Individual policies have varied; the pattern of choice has remained stable.

And, in the 1960s, Cuba's marching to its own drum led to significant Cuban-Soviet differences, and what appeared to be an almost constant testing of the limits of Soviet tolerance. Cuba refused to take sides in the Sino-Soviet split during the first half of the 1960s. It criticized publicly Soviet policies of trade and cooperation with some of Cuba's Latin American enemies, including the military government of Brazil and President Frei's Chile. It criticized Soviet-oriented communist parties, especially Venezuela's, as having given up their revolutionary commitments, and its support of revolutionary groups in Latin America was often in explicit opposition to Soviet wishes. Cuban-Soviet differences included many disputes motivated by ideological differences but, more generally, they should be seen as efforts by both countries to establish appropriate norms for their relationship.

Similarly, the effort to diversify partners often led to considerable independence from Soviet policy and, one may assume, from Soviet desires. Cuba traded more with Spain in the mid-1960s than it did with East Germany, Poland, Hungary, or Bulgaria. It maintained its relations with the Mexican government even at the time of the 1968 Olympics, when repression against the Mexican Left prevailed. And, when the world price of sugar rose in 1963–64, revolutionary Cuba had the possibility, albeit limited, of choosing for the first time whether to emphasize trade with socialist or capitalist countries. The result was clear. Exports to the socialist countries fell from 82 percent in 1962 to 59 percent in 1964, and imports from these countries fell from 83 percent in 1962 to 68 percent in 1964, edging back to the 1962 levels thereafter. The policy to diversify trading partners, seen as economically desirable as well as politically prudent, prevailed for as long as Cuba had the foreign exchange to afford it.

Despite Cuba's rather independent foreign policy in the 1960s, Soviet assistance continued without interruption, and bilateral

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relations reached a low ebb only in 1967–68. The testing of the hegemonic boundaries set by the Soviet Union for Cuba reached a climax at that time.

For the Soviet Union, Cuba's independence was one more element in the dismemberment of the Soviet alliance: from Yugoslavia in the 1940s to China in the 1950s, now to Czechoslovakia and Cuba in the 1960s. And Soviet concern with Cuba's independent policies, many of which were directly and overtly opposed to Soviet wishes, was manifested in part by the establishment of links by Soviet and East European diplomats and party leaders with some of their Cuban counterparts. This dissenting, internationally orthodox wing of the Cuban Communist Party, led by Aníbal Escalante, was uncovered by Fidel and Raúl Castro's wing of the party, and labeled the "microfaction." Its principal crimes were to gather to discuss and criticize Cuban government leaders and prevailing policies, and to seek to establish a transnational alliance with like-minded Soviet and East European leaders. Some "microfaction" members were expelled from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba; others were expelled from the Party itself; and the principal leaders were imprisoned for their crimes of opinion and association.

The Soviet Union at last retaliated, behaving as a hegemonic power setting more firmly the limits of Cuba's permissible foreign policy behavior. It slowed down the delivery of petroleum products to Cuba at the same time that it was increasing them to Cuba's Latin American enemies; this occurred at a time of Soviet oil production increases. The Cuban government had to implement drastic rationing procedures to respond to these Soviet sanctions. Soviet political and economic pressures on Cuba continued throughout the first half of 1968.

At the same time, Guevara had been killed in Bolivia in late 1967. The prospects for successful armed struggle in Latin America looked poorer than ever. Guerrillas had been defeated decisively from Venezuela all the way south to Bolivia. The Andes would not become South America's Sierra Maestra. Moreover, Cuba could not become a "second Albania," depending on Chinese support. Cuban relations with China had deteriorated sharply in late 1965 and early 1966, when Cuba objected to Chinese efforts to build political support within the Cuban Party and armed forces, and when China imposed its own brand of economic sanctions on Cuba by refusing to sell as much rice or buy as much sugar as Cuba claimed had been contracted for.

In the early months of 1968, then, the Cuban leadership con-

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fronted the failure of its revolutionary policies in Latin America and triple economic sanctions—from the United States, China and now even the Soviet Union. Political and some economic support from North Vietnam, North Korea and Romania could not keep Cuban foreign policies afloat. The turning point came in August 1968. Prime Minister Fidel Castro went on national television, opening his remarks by noting that they would be somewhat different from what some comrades might have expected. Czechoslovakia was not to be thought of as a Soviet Bay of Pigs. The Prime Minister endorsed the Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Consistent with its hierarchy of policy goals, Cuba chose survival and development over creating its own Left or promoting revolution. The Prague spring had ended in the Caribbean, too.

IV

Since 1968, many specific Cuban policies have changed, and the thrust of these changes does reflect a greater degree of convergence with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Once Castro had toed the line over Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union moved to step up its funding of Cuban internal development in the early 1970s, when such assistance was particularly important to get the Cuban economy back on its feet after the collapse of 1968–71. The principal forms of Soviet economic help—direct subsidies to meet bilateral trade deficits with the U.S.S.R., high subsidy prices for Cuban sugar, and concessionary prices for Soviet petroleum products—have all been used to the full throughout the 1970s. The Soviet Union has also provided several hundred million dollars worth of credits for economic development, more in the 1970s than before, and on generous terms. And Soviet arms transfers to Cuba, which are free of charge, have likewise increased sharply in the current decade.[1]

[1] Between 1960 and 1974, Soviet subsidies directed specifically to bilateral trade deficits with Cuba are estimated to have totaled approximately $3.8 billion. These deficits would have been larger if the Soviet Union had not also subsidized Cuban sugar exports to the U.S.S.R. during most years—to the tune of over a billion dollars in total during the 1960s. Since the mid-1970s, the Soviet price for Cuban sugar has been three to five times larger than prevailing low world prices. In the 1970s, also, the Soviet Union has subsidized the price of petroleum products it has sold to Cuba, continuing this policy in the last two to three years although Moscow reduced it, as in the cases of East European countries. Soviet arms transfers to Cuba were worth about $1.5 billion in total during the 1960s and have risen to several billion dollars in the current decade.

Currently, Soviet-Cuban economic relations are governed by an agreement signed in December 1972, which among other things postponed payments of interest and principal on all credits granted to Cuba before January 1973, until January 1986. Soviet credits to cover trade balance deficits for 1973–75 were granted free of interest, with the principal to be repaid also beginning in 1986. Repayment schedules now stretch from 1986 to 2010.

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In the face of such increased dependence, it would have been surprising not to see some shifts that seem to bear the stamp of accepting narrower limits to Cuban autonomy. Perhaps the foremost such case is policy toward Israel: after the 1967 Six-Day War, Cuba had stood out with Romania among Soviet allies in refusing to break with Israel; when the 1973 war erupted, Cuba sent troops to the Syrian front, and in diplomatic forums since then Cuba has been a strident voice on the Arab side.

Yet even this shift had a rationale in terms of Cuba's special role in the nonaligned movement; it was consistent with the long-standing Cuban emphasis on relations with governments and on strengthening and diversifying its foreign ties. And, of course, the economic demands of the Group of 77—to which the Arab oil producers' price rises gave a whole new dimension and weight in the mid-1970s—have all along struck a particularly responsive chord in an embargoed Cuba that traces many of its ills to past economic domination and exploitation from an "imperialist" United States.

Other shifts in the pattern of Cuban foreign policy were clearly consistent with the hierarchy of objectives established after 1960. Thus, Cuba's dropping of its support for insurrectionary oppositions in Latin America reflected the willingness of new governments to put OAS sanctions to one side and deal bilaterally with Cuba; the general Cuban preference for dealing through governments where it could was thus able to flourish more successfully in a changed international environment. The military coup in Peru in 1968 brought to power a group of officers who confronted the United States for their own nationalist reasons. Allende's election in Chile opened new vistas, albeit short-lived, for socialism in the hemisphere. A leader of the Venezuelan guerrillas, Douglas Bravo, once a close Cuban ally, denounced Cuba's abandonment of revolution in the Americas. The rise of Cámpora and then Perón to the Argentine presidency permitted substantial commercial relations with that country. Having failed in what it sought to do in the 1960s, Cuban policy in Latin America shifted in the 1970s. But this policy change was consistent with the hierarchy of priorities established in the early 1960s. There was continuity in policy patterns, but change in specific policies.

After early successes in the 1970s, Cuba's Latin American experience in recent years has been much more discouraging. Cuban diplomats and other personnel were expelled from Chile after the 1973 coup. Recent changes in Peru seem to have embarrassed the Cuban government, and bilateral relations have cooled. Having

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opened relations with President Cámpora's government in Argentina, including a billion dollars worth of credit, Cuba has seen relations become much poorer in recent years. Hopes of close collaboration with Venezuela, Colombia or Mexico have yielded only modest benefits. Cuba is now an active but not terribly influential participant in official Latin American forums, and it participates in some joint activities such as the Caribbean shipping enterprise (NAMUCAR). Indeed, Cuba has warm relations in the Western Hemisphere today only with Jamaica and Guyana, and not really with any Latin American country. Cuba has been self-restrained in its policies toward weak governments in Central America and the Caribbean as a part of this policy of dealing with governments. Cuban foreign policy has succeeded in Latin America to the extent that Cuba is no longer subject to collective OAS sanctions, and that many countries have reestablished relations with Cuba. But Cuba's influence and importance in the Americas remain very modest.

Similarly, Cuba continues to give weight to pragmatic economic factors. Its political relations with China and Brazil are terrible, but it has continued to conduct a lively rice and sugar trade with China, notwithstanding the political falling-out of the mid-1960s, and it has collaborated with Brazil, as well as with other beacons of revolution such as the Marcos government of the Philippines or the former Balaguer government of the Dominican Republic, to defend the world price of sugar and the producers' perspective in the world sugar market. Having substantial trade with Argentina, Cuba gets along (minimally) with the current Argentine government, but not at all with the current government of Chile, where it has nothing to lose. In Eastern Europe, ideological preference and the Soviet tie may play a part in Cuba's getting along better with East Germany than with Poland, and with Bulgaria than with Yugoslavia, but there are also trade factors.

Most important, Cuba's role in the nonaligned movement has steadily become greater. What was in the early years a rather desperate reaching for support to counter U.S. pressures has evolved over the years into a centerpiece of Cuban foreign policy. In addition to its support for the economic demands of the Group of 77, Cuba has been vocal in supporting the themes of continued revolution, ending all vestiges of colonialism and white domination, and combating economic "neocolonialism." These positions have a life of their own. They have been central to the Cuban policies in Africa that we shall next examine in detail.

Has Cuba since 1968 had less discretion within narrower Soviet

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hegemonic boundaries than it had and exercised in the 1960s? The answer must be that it has had a good deal less. But it also appears that Cuba retains a substantial degree of independence to pursue its own ends and priorities, provided only that these do not conflict in any significant way—as they often did in the 1960s—with the interests and preferences of the U.S.S.R. This point—as well as its opposite, namely, that Cuba is only a puppet—cannot be proven satisfactorily. We do not know the details of Cuban foreign policy-making nor, in fact, how much discretion Cuba has. And yet, the case that Cuba has discretion within Soviet hegemony in the making of its foreign policy seems the more plausible. Cuban foreign policy in the 1970s shows a consistent evolution from the early days of revolutionary rule. It is as global today as it has ever been—the difference lies in the degree of success, the methods used, the scale of action, and the theater of operations. It emphasizes the Soviet alliance and influence over governments as it always has. Partners in alliance, however unequal their influence and capabilities, seek joint gains; the Cuban-Soviet alliance meets that standard.

Apart from the case of Israel, it is difficult to identify what specific policy Cuba is pursuing today that is inconsistent with past policies as mediated through the hierarchy of policy goals. Today, as in the past, Cuba has preferred success to failure, overt to covert involvement, more influence and activity rather than less. The shift in theater of operations—from Latin America to Africa—seems to be explained best by failure in one and success in the other. Finally, it seems difficult to imagine that Cuban personnel would have performed as effectively as they have in Africa if their government and leaders had not made the fundamental decisions, if there were no real commitment on the part of their leadership to the development of such a foreign policy. Slaves could not have done that well.

V

Cuba has had an African policy from the early years of the revolution. That included an effort to diversify political and diplomatic relations, to build up trade, and to provide elements of military assistance whenever that seemed appropriate. In 1963, a few Cuban troops performed in logistical support roles in Algeria in its fight against Morocco. By the mid-1960s, Cuba's long association with the Congo (Brazzaville) was underway. Cuba developed an early interest in guerrillas fighting against Portugal, partly for ideological reasons, and partly for the sake of gaining

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political influence. Current members of the Cuban Central Committee gained their "revolutionary merits" fighting against the Portuguese, and they were promoted precisely for their performance of the duty of "internationalist solidarity." Cubans have served as bodyguards for President Touré of Guinea (Conakry).

Two internal changes within Cuba made possible the shift of scale that characterized Cuba's African policy from the 1960s to the 1970s. After a dismal performance in the 1960s, the Cuban economy recovered throughout the first half-decade of the 1970s, helped by the soaring world price of sugar, and also by internal changes in economic management and organization. Second, the Cuban armed forces underwent an important program of professionalization and specialization in the early 1970s, which allowed them to become the effective troops later engaged in African wars. Cuba developed also a large, competent and ready military reserve; 70 percent of its force in Angola in 1975–76 were reservists. Reservists are ordinarily a majority of Cuban troops engaged in war games. The Cuban armed forces seem to be incapable of going into war without a majority reserve component.[2]

International factors, however, affected other aspects of Cuba's involvement more directly. The United States emerged from the Vietnam War reluctant to become involved again in similar adventures. It had also gradually abandoned its once active policy of isolating Cuba, so that governments no longer incurred costs by becoming friendly with Cuba. If Cuba was only moderately successful in its efforts to woo Latin American governments, it was far more so in Africa. Cuba has little to offer many Latin American countries; its level of development or expertise, with few exceptions, is not much above the Latin American level. But Cuba can offer a number of programs to African countries, such as the successor states of the Iberian empires, or the countries of the Horn of Africa, that may be valuable to them.

Thus, it was natural that Cuba's early special ties to anticolonial

[2] Official publications of the U.S. government, and of independent research organizations, had systematically underestimated Cuban military capabilities in the early 1970s. Little attention was paid to the ready reserves; thus real Cuban strength was not perceived. Estimates of the military budget were well below what the Cuban government had admitted in public. Soviet weapons transfers to Cuba were supposed to be declining, when they were in fact increasing. And Cuba's foreign aid program in 1975 had not been discovered by the Central Intelligence Agency in a 1976 publication, even though many of the minor East European programs had been and even though Cuba had been so engaged for some time.

Since the Angolan war, Fidel Castro has said that the U.S. government underestimated the number of Cuban troops in Angola at the war's peak; he has also said that the U.S. government has overestimated the size of the Cuban foreign military aid program and the total Cuban troop presence in Africa. It is difficult, however, to verify or refute these assertions independently.

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liberation movements in the Portuguese- and Spanish-held territories of Africa led to a continuing Cuban presence. Even in the smaller territories of São Tomé-Principe, Equatorial Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau, following their independence, Cuba initiated full-fledged foreign aid programs comparable to those it had already used the world over—from Vietnam and Laos to Jamaica, Guyana and Syria. Africa became the main theater of operations of Cuban government-to-government programs.

These Cuban foreign aid programs have certain continuing characteristics. They have emphasized sending personnel, not cash or goods. Cuba does not send construction materials; it sends people to build a road. It does not equip a hospital, but it sends health personnel to staff it. It does not provide weaponry, but it supplies military instructors to teach how to use Soviet weaponry.

Until 1975, at least, the general foreign assistance program, therefore, was not expensive. Cuba is able to respond to requests for aid very quickly, especially so at the time of natural disasters. It pursues long-term objectives, rather than short-term rewards; it has even sent some modest disaster relief assistance to countries such as Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, with which it did not have diplomatic relations at the time. And it rewards its personnel engaged overseas with promotions and honors. Even before the Angolan war, eight percent of the delegates to the First Party Congress had done their "internationalist duty." All told, the Cuban foreign aid program has operated at various times in two dozen countries. Of the countries that Cuba had once supported, however modestly, only three utterly disparate countries have broken sharply with Cuba: Cambodia, related to its closeness with China and its dispute with Vietnam, Chile after the overthrow of Allende in the 1973 military coup, and Somalia, because of Cuban support for Ethiopia.

The Cuban foreign military aid program offers a package of services. Troops, to be sure, are taught how to use weaponry, but they are also enrolled in political education classes, and they are taught how to become engaged in community service and to support economically productive activities. These programs emphasize the need for loyalty and discipline to the government that sends forces into battle and, for these reasons, the Cuban military training program may be of greater value to host governments than some other program that might transfer only technical know-how. Insofar as many Soviet arms transfer programs do not include many support services, a host government may put together a package of Soviet hardware and Cuban instruction that

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might serve it well. That combination may be more appealing than a U.S. program that limits support services to the more technical aspects of weapons maintenance and use.

As noted, all of these Cuban assets had been developed and refined by 1975 with specific emphasis on African colonial and postcolonial settings. And, in Angola, Cuban training of the then-guerrilla forces of the MPLA had actually begun as early as 1966.[3] The MPLA had many attractions for the Cubans. It was actively engaged in armed struggle against a conservative colonial regime. It was more serious about Marxism-Leninism than many other radical movements the Cubans would encounter in Africa. In the 1960s it provided a way to cooperate with the Soviet Union in a revolutionary endeavor—an opportunity then absent in Latin America where the two countries were at odds over Cuba's stress on armed struggle. Since the Angolan war, the Cuban government has stressed that Cuba is an Afro-Spanish country, suggesting that race and history are one link between Cuba and Angola. In fact, a more plausible argument is that the Cubans long found the MPLA more compatible than other movements in Angola precisely because the MPLA has been more cosmopolitan and multiracial, and *less* willing to emphasize ethnicity rather than class. It is not the stress on race, but its absence, that has made for closer links between Cuba and the MPLA.

After the military revolution in Portugal in April 1974, the prospects for Angolan independence increased and the struggle among groups within Angola was sharpened. There was a nearly classic process of escalation including a wide array of countries, in which Cuba and South Africa turned out to be key players. Their interaction proceeded as follows:

First, the MPLA asked Cuba for military advisers in the spring of 1975, and 200–300 arrived at that time to staff several military training camps. Further MPLA requests for Cuban assistance led to the arrival of limited Cuban reinforcements in August 1975, led by General (*Comandante*) Raúl Díaz Argüelles. Summer war games held in Cuba were the most complex conducted up to that time. By the end of August and the beginning of September, the top Cuban officer corps began to prepare for war. In late September, ships sailed from Cuba carrying several hundred additional troops that arrived in Angola and went into action during the first half of October.

[3] See John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Vol II: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare*, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 1978, pp. 172, 225.

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South African military units had begun to move gradually into Angola in June, after the arrival of the first Cuban training groups. The Cuban reinforcements in the late summer of 1975, therefore, could be described in part as a response to increasing South African penetration of Angola. The major South African attack of mid-October 1975 was in turn a response to the presence in Angola, by then, of about 1,000 Cuban troops. And Cuba's massive subsequent intervention from November onward was plainly a response to the South African action. When Angola became formally independent on November 11, major Cuban and South African forces were in place and ready to fight each other.

In sum, Cuban military forces arrived in Angola prior to independence and prior to the most major South African attack, but the bulk of Cuban troops arrived only after these events.

Apart from the exact time sequence, what was abundantly clear even at the time was that South African support for UNITA (and to a lesser extent American support of the FNLA) had created a situation in which Cuban actions responded both to the immediate needs of Neto and the MPLA and to the hardening sentiment of black African nations generally, as expressed in successive resolutions by the Organization of African Unity. What Cuba did in Angola greatly strengthened its position with African countries and thus gained the very sort of international influence, on a government-to-government basis, that had long been a major objective of Cuban policy.

In other respects as well, Angola was a bright constellation of opportunities. Having cut loose from Latin American guerrillas, Cuba was able to support national liberation and revitalize its tarnished reputation on the revolutionary Left. When it said henceforth that it supported the "just struggles of the peoples of country X," it came to have a new and more significant meaning.

Even its leverage with the Soviet Union increased. Soviet commentary on Cuban internal economic performance had long betrayed a disdain for Cuban managerial incompetence; Cuban military accomplishments in Africa provided a cause for admiration. There is no evidence that Cuban forces in Africa are mercenaries in the strict sense that they are being paid by the Soviet Union, or that Cuba is explicitly paying back its huge debt to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Cuba is demonstrating its political and military worth to the Soviet Union, and creating a Soviet debt to Cuba. Thus, at least implicitly, Cuba is making it possible to compare and cancel these mutual debts in the future; if that were to occur, then the African wars would have, indeed,

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repaid the Cuban debt to the Soviet Union.[4]

Cuban dependence on the U.S.S.R., which had deepened in the late 1960s and early 1970s, deepened again. Although Cuba could decide to act on its own, it could not implement that decision without its Soviet ally. The Soviet Union was needed to provide weaponry for use in Africa and essential economic assistance for the joint overseas operations. It also had to provide general political and military cover for Cuba in the event of a possible U.S. response. Thus Cuban foreign policy, and even the personal safety of its tens of thousands of troops overseas, came to depend directly on policy coordination with the Soviet Union. And, as we have noted, Cuba's entry into the Angolan war was further facilitated by the improvement of its military capabilities and by the perceived unwillingness and inability of the United States, in the wake of the Vietnam War and Watergate, and still trying to recover from the economic dislocation that had begun in 1974, to do much in an area of the world to which the U.S. government had not paid sustained and serious attention.

The Angolan war, then, was well related to Cuba's long-standing policy goals. Without threatening the survival of the Cuban government, it increased Cuban international influence over governments and over the Left. It promoted the spread of revolutionary regimes while it consolidated the alliance with the Soviet Union. This was the first time in two decades of revolutionary rule when all of these goals could be achieved simultaneously.

VI

After the Angolan war, Prime Minister Castro[5] sought to clarify the newly blurred aspects of Cuban foreign policy. The last nail entered the coffin of "exporting revolution" to Latin America, when he assured all Latin American governments, regardless of ideology, that they need not fear the Cuban armed forces. All black African governments were similarly assured.

There is much, however, that is not covered by those assurances. They do not extend to Cuban support that might not require the commitment of troops for front-line combat; modest assistance might still be given to the opposition to hostile incumbent govern-

[4] Since Cuba's entry into the Angolan war, it appears that Soviet economic benefits to Cuba have been increased somewhat from the levels that had prevailed earlier under the basic agreement of 1972. The Soviet Union has bought merchandise for Cuba in convertible currency countries, and it has bought goods from Cuba over and beyond what had been agreed before. The amount of the increase attributable to Angola is difficult to specify.

[5] Castro was Prime Minister from 1959–1976, at which time he became also President of the Council of State as well as head of the government.

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ments. The white-ruled regimes of southern Africa were pointedly excluded from these assurances, consistent with Cuba's long support of opposition to them. North Africa was also excluded, particularly because Cuba has been supporting the Polisario Liberation Front's efforts, based in Algeria, to detach the former Spanish Sahara from Morocco and Mauritania. Cuban competition with Morocco, and with France supporting both Morocco and Mauritania, has become a major theme of contemporary African international relations from the Sahara to Shaba.

Cuban training of the former Katanga or Shaba gendarmes in Angola was a case that arose originally from the Angolan war. President Castro has acknowledged that Cuba supplied and reorganized the Shaba exiles in Angola in 1975 and in 1976, and that Cuban troops and Shaba exiles fought together alongside the MPLA in the closing months of the Angolan civil war. He claims, however, that the Cuban government stopped its direct and indirect relations with the Shaba exiles in Angola beginning with the end of the Angolan war in 1976.

The invasions of Shaba in 1977 and 1978 were very similar. Both were the work of the Shaba exile forces that had received some Cuban supplies and training in Angola, both had no Cubans crossing Zaïre's borders, both had poorly disciplined and badly led Shaba invading forces defeated in or after bloodbaths, and both involved Moroccan and French responses in support of Zaïre. The main change was the shift in the Carter Administration's perception of these events, responding more to the general fear of Cuban activity—the war in the Horn of Africa separated the two Shaba incidents—than to a change in the facts in Shaba itself. Even President Carter's charges against Cuba were gradually tempered. From the early accusation that the Cubans were directly responsible for the invasion of Shaba in 1978, President Carter retreated into simply saying that the Cubans could have done more to prevent the invasion this second time, by warning the Organization of African Unity or the government of Zaïre or, conceivably, by interposing their own forces at the border. Yet it was generally agreed that the Cubans had tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Angolan government to stop the 1978 invasion.

Thus even the U.S. government appears to have come reluctantly to the view that Cuban involvement in either Shaba invasion was rather minor.

The Cuban government, in fact, has been troubled by the actions of the Shaba rebels in Angola. The first invasion of Shaba increased Angola's vulnerability and led to the need for a rein-

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forcement of Cuban troops in Angola. Cuba's principal stake in Angola—for the sake of the Luanda government as well as for the sake of protecting Cuban troops from unnecessary combat or casualties—has been to consolidate the Neto regime and reduce its vulnerability. That means avoiding war with Zaïre as much as possible. Cuban troops have also protected the Gulf Oil Corporation's facilities in Cabinda, and the Cuban government appears to have counseled Angola against expropriating Gulf properties. Cuban policies may also help to explain some of the moderate steps of the Neto government toward a settlement in Namibia as well.

In policy terms, Cuba's actions in Angola after the war reflected a willingness to commit troops to support an allied incumbent government that faced an internal insurrection that could be plausibly described as externally supported. This was plainly the case in Angola, with Zaïre, South Africa, and possibly France furnishing support to the remnants of UNITA. In these circumstances, Cuba chose to interpret the Angolan-Cuban 1976 military treaty to include the commitment of Cuban combat troops to fight in the protracted war that has persisted in the country. After an initial withdrawal of Cuban troops in the wake of the quick victory in 1975–76, the number of Cuban troops in Angola increased once again after April 1977, to help consolidate the Neto regime and in part in response to fears of war between Angola and Zaïre.

Finally, of course, Cuba has been willing to provide combat troops to assist an allied incumbent facing a conventional invasion, as in the case of Ethiopia's war against Somalia. Here Cuba had tried to play, albeit unsuccessfully, a moderating role. In March 1977, President Castro visited both countries and conducted extensive negotiations to try to reconcile their differences. The Cuban government had found itself in the uncomfortable role of supporting militarily two regimes about to go to war with each other. Although war was not avoided and Cuba eventually sided with Ethiopia primarily for strategic reasons (and after Somalia broke with Cuba and the Soviet Union for refusing to support Somali claims), the fact remains that Cuba sought to prevent rather than promote that war.

Cuba's position today on Ethiopia's reconquest of Eritrea is more complex. At a minimum, Cuba's willingness to guard the Ogaden region against Somalia releases Ethiopian forces for the Eritrean front, but Cuban combat troops have apparently not yet entered the struggle directly against the Eritrean rebellion. The Cuban government is also on record in support of the territorial unity

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and integrity of Ethiopia, and it is now opposed to the Eritrean secession after having supported the Eritrean rebels against the Emperor—a shift from supporting insurrection to supporting government quite consistent with past Cuban policy. The principal difference between the governments of Ethiopia and Cuba appears to be on the possibility of a peaceful settlement without further war, even though President Castro has said he believes the Ethiopians have the right to fight the secession. The April 1978 joint Cuban-Ethiopian communiqué has no Cuban pledge to Ethiopia concerning Eritrea, and it is vague on the status of that territory except for the condemnation of secessionism.

Throughout these events, Cuba has continued to coordinate policy with the U.S.S.R. in ways that make it difficult to determine who leads and who follows, even though it remains clear that neither the Angolan nor the Ethiopian operations could have been conducted in the absence of either. They were jointly expelled by the Somali government from that country, and they both went to the support of the Ethiopian government in the battle for the Ogaden against Somalia. They have both played a limited role thus far in Ethiopia's campaign against Eritrea. They have shared similar attitudes concerning the invasion of Zaïre by Shaba rebels based in Angola, and for the same reasons, namely, the need to avoid further troubles for the Neto government.

Finally, it appears that both Cuba and the U.S.S.R. have sought to involve other countries as a part of a consortium to support Angola and Ethiopia. The Report of the Central Committee of the MPLA to its First Congress shows the success and limitations of the development of this consortium. Angola acknowledged receipt of assistance from several African countries that have been among the principal recipients of Cuban (and Soviet) aid, such as Guinea-Bissau, Guinea (Conakry), Mozambique and Tanzania. Among the countries of Eastern Europe, gratitude was expressed especially to Yugoslavia, and also to East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. Poland and Czechoslovakia were excluded.

The principal contributor to the socialist consortium idea may have been East Germany. After Fidel Castro's trip to many African countries in 1977, he went to East Germany and to the Soviet Union. East German-Cuban relations had been improving markedly since their principal economic agreement of February 1974. The agreement of April 1977 focused on support for friendly regimes and movements in Africa, including those of southern Africa and "especially support for the revolutionary process in Ethiopia." Thus the rising importance of the East Germans in

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Angola and in Ethiopia need not be seen as a challenge to the Cubans, but rather as the result of Soviet and Cuban diplomacy among communist countries to spread the burden of African operations more widely.

The language of Cuban diplomacy has changed along the way. While there is still attention to the ideological foundations of Cuban foreign policy, there is increasing use of the language of high diplomacy. Cuban publications, public officials and diplomats now engage in discourses concerning the strategic importance of the Red Sea, the stake of African countries in maintaining existing borders against revisionists, and the importance of maintaining territorial integrity against secessions. Along with this language has come the flexibility often associated with its application. Cuba exhibits enormous and often righteous concern for these issues, on the side of existing order, in Ethiopia. It is much less concerned about Zaïre's territorial integrity or the sanctity of its borders, even though its own troops have not crossed them. Cuba denounces the French and the Moroccans in Zaïre for doing approximately the same things, albeit on a smaller scale and with less of a long-term commitment to Zaïre, that the Cubans do for Ethiopia and Angola. To be sure, the United States, France and Morocco are, in turn, alarmed about what the Cubans are doing, even though the substance of the activity is the same. The difference in scale may simply be accounted for by the fact that the job the French and the Moroccans had in Zaïre against unprofessional forces was far easier. On both sides, therefore, the critical factor has been self-interest. Cuba had long supported and trained the Somalis, knowing full well what Somalia's goals were. Fidel Castro had personally praised Siad Barre for his commitment to revolution and socialism. Within a year, the same Siad Barre was being denounced as a "chauvinist" when he used the training the Cubans had provided him.

As we have noted, Cuba's actions in Africa from mid-1975 to mid-1978 have generally had both the strategic and political support of most African countries. This was clearly the case with Cuba's support for the MPLA, against the South African-backed movements, during the Angolan civil war. Cuban opposition to the Somali invasion of Ethiopia was quite consistent with OAU policies, as was the unsuccessful effort to mediate between Somalia and Ethiopia prior to the war. Cuban support for movements against the white-ruled regimes in Zimbabwe and Namibia is also well in line with majority African policies. Only in the case of the Shaba gendarmes invading Zaïre has Cuban policy skirted the principal

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guidelines of the OAU, and even so only in a relatively marginal way.

Hence, as it entered the Belgrade meeting of the nonaligned countries in midsummer of 1978, Cuba, and especially Fidel Castro, must have felt that it had carved out a significant and positive role in Africa in the eyes of most African governments themselves. However, Belgrade in fact produced a sharp wave of criticism of Cuba, not only on general grounds questioning Cuba's continued advocacy of a "revolutionary" posture within the group, but expressing strong objections to any continuing presence of Cubans in African situations once colonial control or invasions had been brought to an end. What African states such as Nigeria seemed to be saying was that Cuba had been welcomed during the critical liberation struggles and also in repelling breaches of the African prohibition against territorial disruption (as in Ethiopia), but that for the longer term major Cuban activity on the ground was regarded as a threat to the independence and autonomy of African governments.

Most important of all, whereas a year ago many African leaders tended to differentiate between a Cuban presence and a Soviet one, today that distinction seems to have almost disappeared. Apparently, the virtual identity of Cuban and Soviet policies, in practice, has for the time being made a deep impression on African leaders. If, as I believe the history of Cuban foreign policy demonstrates, Cuba has a major interest in maximizing its influence among the nonaligned countries, especially in Africa, it may now find itself under pressure to moderate its activities in Africa. It is hard to foresee a case where such pressures would cause Cuba to act in any way that would hamper or obstruct major Soviet policies and objectives. But the degree of Cuban willingness to assist *affirmatively* in causes backed by the Soviet Union could be substantially affected.

VII

Wars have costs, and Cuba's African wars are no exception. The number of casualties is impossible to estimate at this time. It seems, however, that there were more casualties incurred in the war against Somalia than in the Angolan civil war. President Fidel Castro, and the Cuban press, have made a number of references to the "real fighting spirit" of the Somali soldiers. Because Cuban troops for overseas service appear to be drawn from all parts of the country, no one community seems to have suffered unduly.

The military budget was approximately $400 million on the eve

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of the Angolan war, rising to a budgeted $784 million on the eve of the Ethiopian war in December 1977, three years later. The actual costs for 1978 will probably be much higher. The Cuban economy had managed to withstand rather nicely the precipitous decline in the world price of sugar from 1974 to 1975, so that its economic performance in 1975 exceeded the average of the decade's first half. The growth rate for 1976, however, was only one-third the 1975 level, and only two-thirds of the planned annual growth for the 1976–80 five-year plan. Even though the world economy began to recover in 1976, and even though the sharper elements of the sugar price decline were past, 1976 was a poor year for the Cuban economy, where real growth per capita in constant prices was close to zero; performance in 1977 was only slightly better.

While these results cannot be attributed exclusively to the Angolan war, some major portion of that decline in the growth rate is to be explained probably by the war's costs. Cuba is still an underdeveloped country, with limited trained personnel. To win wars, it must commit its best people overseas, who are thus taken away from productive and social activities at home.

There have also been costs within the armed forces, and between them and civilians. There is now evidence of elite civilian resistance to having skilled workers mobilized for war, not production. Dislike for military service has become so high, as President Castro noted himself, that it is used by parents, teachers and government agencies to threaten youngsters into behaving well. The incentive structure within the armed forces has come to reflect the fact that military service is not highly valued by troops. Military indiscipline and troop insubordination problems have appeared.

As of mid-1978, all of these seem to be the expression of minority opinions. There is no reason yet to doubt that most Cubans still support their government's overseas activities, and that a sense of national pride and accomplishment may be contributing to this support. But the costs may be compounded in the months ahead; the continuation of protracted wars in Angola and the Horn in Africa could unravel the Cuban policy. These problems are not yet critical, but they are getting worse.

There are also more general international costs. Cuba tried in the early to mid-1970s to improve its relations with France. While commercial relations have continued, political relations have deteriorated sharply beginning in 1975 with the discovery by the French police of communications between some Cuban diplomats and the international terrorist known as Carlos. The deterioration has continued as a result of both countries' African policies. Cuba

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also improved its relations with Canada; these, too, began to unravel when Canada discovered a Cuban intelligence operation within its borders to recruit English-speaking personnel for use in southern Africa and proceeded to expel some Cuban diplomats, while also beginning to phase out its assistance program to Cuba. Sweden also appears to have begun a phase-out of its foreign aid to Cuba. Notwithstanding continuing commercial relations with the United Kingdom, political relations deteriorated so much in 1978 that the Cuban Foreign Ministry published a personal attack on British Foreign Secretary David Owen. The cooling of Cuban relations with Latin American governments in part occurred against this background, too.

More generally, the Cuban leadership will have to decide how much it values influence abroad, for its own sake, even when it means an indefinite deterioration of Cuba's economy for the sake of revolution abroad. Cuban foreign policy had been successful precisely because it had been closely linked to the internal needs of the polity and the economy. Those links between foreign policy and internal development are much weaker in the case of the African wars. They may break altogether if Cuba is embroiled in wars without end, and without ends that make sense for its people. Tensions thus may develop between internal requirements and the flourish of conquest. How they are resolved will be the core question for Cuban foreign policy in the months ahead.

VIII

The United States has very little leverage on Cuba short of acts of war. This is the result of retaining obsolete policies long after they have outlived their usefulness. The United States failed to offer Cuba credible alternatives to full dependence on the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s. And today, paradoxically, the rising level of anti-Cuban rhetoric of the Carter Administration, and the actions of some U.S. allies, tend to drive Cuba ever deeper into the arms of the Soviet Union, and may persuade the Cuban leadership of the continuing need to fight the United States and its allies the world over, because it has no other choice. The persistence of old U.S. policies, and the efforts to tighten the screws to the extent possible, have the net effect of providing Cuba with disincentives to behave as the United States wants it to.

If the U.S. policy of economic denial did not bring Cuba to its knees in 1962–63, or in 1969–70, it will surely not do so at the end of the 1970s. In the past, while Cuban policies have changed in a number of ways, the United States, with relatively rigid policies,

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has lagged behind. This has prevented the negotiation of any number of outstanding issues, from property compensation to the status of the Guantanamo naval base.

The relations that exist between Cuba and the United States now are quite modest. The interest sections attached to the Czech embassy in Havana and the Swiss embassy in Washington provide minimal consular services, and a few other exchanges of mutual benefit. The agreements on maritime and fishing jurisdiction are necessary to define boundaries. Working relations on hijacking, civil aviation and hurricane tracking have survived even the worst period of relations. Cutting off tourist travel to Cuba or cultural exchanges between the two countries would look somewhat odd for a government claiming to support human rights and would probably only demonstrate the pettiness and impotence of the government in Washington.

Part of the U.S. response to Cuban foreign policy, to be sure, will have to be aimed at other targets. It will require a workable U.S. African policy, and negotiations with the Soviet Union, for many aspects of Cuban foreign policy implementation, as noted earlier, require Soviet participation. But the United States might wish to have a Cuban policy, too, aimed at preventing the use of Cuban combat troops overseas, and inducing the return to their homeland of those already in Africa. The United States might well also seek to moderate Cuban foreign policies among nonaligned countries.

And yet, there should be no illusion about the prospects of the United States bringing about much of a change in Cuban foreign policy even if this country were willing to change its own policies. Twice during the last three years—in the falls of 1975 and of 1977—the process of improving U.S.-Cuban relations has been stopped in large part, though not exclusively, by Cuba's entries into the wars in Angola and in Ethiopia. It is true that events in the United States, such as the beginning of the primary election season in the Republican Party in 1975 and the protracted discussion of the Panama Canal Treaties, led both the Ford and Carter Administrations to slow down their efforts to change U.S. policies toward Cuba, and may have persuaded the Cuban leadership that opportunities to gain influence in Africa were preferable then to a remote and unlikely improvement in relations with the United States. But this also suggests that improvement of relations with the United States ranks less high than might have been supposed in the priorities of the Cuban government, that it is quite willing to forego sustained and admittedly difficult negotiations with the

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United States for the sake of other goals and that, consequently, the prospects for the immediate future are not encouraging.

Difficult as the dealings with Cuba may be, there is no plausible alternative to an effort to moderate Cuban foreign policy through positive incentives. Neither the executive, nor the Congress nor the popular mood in the United States seems ready to countenance acts of war against Cuba in Africa or in the Caribbean. Inertia or the continuation of the present renewed cold war policies is likely to heighten the kinds of actions Cuba has been taking in Africa—the precise opposite of what U.S. policy seeks. It remains necessary, then, to search for ways to renew the policies that the Ford and Carter Administrations pursued briefly to improve relations with Cuba.

Curiously, Fidel Castro noted the only leverage that the United States now has. The United States could embargo hope. Because the hope for better bilateral relations has been so remote and so abstract the United States has not used even this hypothetical leverage. In the current political climate in Washington, it seems unlikely that the Carter Administration would lift the residues of the economic denial policy against Cuba, including the trade embargo, any time soon. And yet, we can only change Cuba's behavior by offering friendlier U.S. policies toward Cuba.

Would the United States be willing to lift the trade embargo in stages if or when Cuban troops begin their withdrawal from Ethiopia and Angola? Cuba has said that its relations with African countries, and especially those with Angola and Ethiopia, are not negotiable between Cuba and the United States. Certainly an explicit link between the removal of Cuban troops and the removal of the U.S. embargo would need to be avoided. But diplomats can develop policies that occur simultaneously and work implicitly toward conciliatory ends. And it should be remembered that Cuba has already done things it had said it would not do. The Cuban leadership had stated repeatedly that there would be no negotiations with the United States until the U.S. embargo was lifted. And yet negotiations did occur without the embargo having been lifted in 1975, and even more serious ones in early 1977. Agreements were signed between both countries in 1977 on fishing and maritime questions, diplomatic interest sections were exchanged, and Assistant Secretary of State Todman visited Havana as a part of these discussions. Cuba has freed prisoners and cultural exchanges have occurred. To be sure, the joint removal of the troops in Africa and of the embargo would require a far more significant shift in Cuban policy than these past events, but one should not

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take Cuba's "non-negotiable position" entirely at face value. The Cubans have negotiated their non-negotiable positions in the past, and are likely to do so again.

The U.S. government would also need to consider what kinds and value of trade would be feasible. How might issues of property compensation or Cuban claims of damages against the United States be settled? What are U.S. expectations concerning Guantanamo? Purely punitive policies toward Cuba are likely to be as ineffective today as they were in the past. One reason why negotiations are possible with the Soviet Union is precisely that there is a web of relationships that gives each side elements of leverage over the other. That does not now exist in U.S.-Cuban relations. A new embargo cannot be imposed on top of the old one.

Cuba is, of course, aware of these perils of friendship, of the ties and uses of dependence that can develop over time. But Cuba remains interested enough in relations of many kinds with the United States, principally for the sake of trade, technology and easier transportation. It is up to Cuba, after all, to assess the risk of reconciliation with the United States. On the U.S. side, matters are simpler. The choice is between impotence in Washington and continued Cuban activity in Africa, limited only by Cuban problems at home and by the refusal of African countries to take Cubans inside their borders, on the one hand, or, on the other hand, the beginning of high-level discussions that would outline to the Cuban government the nature of U.S. concerns, the possible joint losses if Cuban and U.S. policies remain on a collision course, and the many more joint gains that could be realized if each side was willing to be more cooperative and forthcoming.

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Nathaniel Davis

THE ANGOLA DECISION OF 1975: A PERSONAL MEMOIR

International competition and political action sometimes appear to be channeled between frail dikes. To put the thought another way, it is as if the seething mass of ambition and potential violence so characteristic of international relationships is contained in quieter times behind a thin shell of a veneer. Once the shell of constraint is broken, subsequent adventures become easier to contemplate. It is for some of these reasons that we should, perhaps, examine how the confines of restraint in Angola were broken through, and whether a different American policy in the period before the Soviet/Cuban intervention in 1975 might have produce a different result.

I served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the spring and summer of 1975, and this is essentially an account of my role during that time. In the January-February 1975 issue of *Africa Report,* Bruce Oudes wrote that "Davis reportedly was reluctant to assume the new position." He was right. I asked more than once that the appointment not be made. Although my African experience was greater than Mr. Oudes recognized in his article, a regional Assistant Secretary should have very impressive credentials in his geographic area of responsibility. Moreover, I knew that my service from October 1971 to October 1973 as U.S. Ambassador to Chile would complicate matters.[1] Lastly, it was clear that the replacement of Donald B. Easum as Assistant Secretary would be widely interpreted as a U.S. withdrawal from Ambassador Easum's commitment to black African aspirations. I

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[1] Senator Frank Church and his Select Committee on Intelligence investigated my role in Chile during the Allende time, and the Senator concluded that I "never appeared to have actively engaged in covert efforts to subvert the elected government of Chile. Rather, the available evidence suggested that Davis opposed such a conspiracy and sought to maintain a correct relationship with the Chilean regime." More specifically, the Committee Staff Report released on December 18, 1975 noted my opposition to funding disruptive strikes or supporting subversive groups. But history and world opinion do not always examine the fine print. See *Covert Actions in Chile, 1963–1973,* a Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, December 18, 1975, pp. 2, 10, 30.

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pointed out to Secretary of State Kissinger that I had sympathy for a number of Mr. Easum's views as I understood them, and was not confident that I could satisfy him where Easum apparently had not. The Secretary happened to be out of Washington when the question came to a head, and I telegraphed him, saying that the African Bureau was not a responsibility I would seek under the circumstances. However, Foreign Service officers are bound to accept discipline in assignments. In my telegram to the Secretary, I added, therefore, that I would do my best as chief of the African Bureau if the Secretary nonetheless asked me to discharge that assignment. He did, and the nomination was announced on January 8, 1975.

On February 21, 1975, the Ministerial Council of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), meeting in Addis Ababa, passed without vote a consensus resolution questioning what the nomination might portend in light of what was called "the U.S. policy of 'political destabilization' in Latin America." Nevertheless, after public hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate confirmed my appointment on March 11, 1975.

II

Shortly thereafter, William G. Hyland, the Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, told me that a $300,000 program of covert support for the veteran Angolan liberation fighter, Holden Roberto, had been approved that past January by the Forty Committee, the top-level review board that passes on covert operations abroad.[2] This came as a surprise. While the money was for political action and expenses, and not for arms, I had not been aware that such programs were still being approved in the wake of the congressional investigations and interest in U.S. covert activities abroad. In any case, this was water over the dam.

I was sworn in as Assistant Secretary on April 2, 1975. Shortly thereafter, my colleagues in the African Bureau and I prepared a Staff Study on Angola for the Secretary. It was directed to the developing political situation in Angola and was essentially a status report. However, the Central Intelligence Agency soon posed the question of substantially greater covert support for Holden Roberto and his National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the initiation of support for Jonas Savimbi, the head of the second of the three main Angolan independence movements

[2] Seymour M. Hersh revealed this program in a *New York Times* article of December 19, 1975.

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(UNITA). Savimbi—popular, charismatic, Swiss-educated, and highly energetic—had his roots in the Ovimbundu tribe, the largest in the country, and was probably the most democratically inclined of the Angolan leaders.

The third group, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), was led by Agostinho Neto, a socialist doctor and poet. It had its tribal support in the region around the capital city of Luanda, its intellectual support among the leftists in the country's civil service and educated *mestiço* community, and its foreign support from the Soviet Union and other East European states.

I sent a memorandum on the Savimbi movement to the Secretary on May 1, 1975. That memo pointed out that Mr. Savimbi was soliciting arms "everywhere," and added that "the wide knowledge of Savimbi's solicitations and subventions make me skeptical that U.S. support could long be kept secret." It expressed concern about a possible link between Savimbi and South Africa, cautioning that "the South Africans have expressed interest in providing financial assistance." The conclusion was:

> If the major actors [in Angola] settle on Savimbi, that might be the best solution. However, signs are multiplying that Angola is moving toward a violent *dénouement*.
>
> If we launch a program of covert support for Savimbi, I think we must reckon with probable disclosure. At most we would be in a position to commit limited resources, and buy marginal influence. . . . We might find ourselves drawn in deeper very fast, as the fighting produces more intense pressures for arms and ammunition—as well as money. The political price we might pay—as reports of bloodshed and alleged atrocities multiply— would, I believe, exceed the possibility of accomplishment.

Between May 5 and 19, I traveled to five countries in West Africa, calling on chiefs of state, foreign ministers and other leaders, and meeting a wide variety of Africans from all walks of life. In the meantime, the world press headlined that MPLA and FNLA militants had attacked each other's offices with grenades and mortars in Luanda, with a thousand people reported killed during the ensuing fighting. I returned to Washington just in time to chair an interagency NSC Task Force on Angola set up by National Security Council staff directive. We submitted our Report on June 13, 1975.

The Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (the Pike Committee) later gave the following account of our conclusions:

> The Committee has learned that a task force composed of high U.S. experts

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on Africa strongly opposed military intervention; instead . . . they called for diplomatic efforts to encourage a political settlement among the three factions to avert bloodshed. Apparently, at the direction of National Security Council aides, the task force recommendation was removed from the report and presented to NSC members as merely one policy option. The other two alternatives were a hands-off policy or substantial military intervention.[3]

Our Task Force, in its great majority, did favor an effort to achieve a peaceful solution through diplomatic-political measures. The "diplomatic option" would have had us urge Portugal to play a stronger—but impartial—role. We would have encouraged Portugal and influential African governments to press the U.S.S.R. to reduce its support to Agostinho Neto and the MPLA faction. We urged that the U.S. government privately approach the U.S.S.R. or build public pressure to induce the U.S.S.R. to reduce its support of the MPLA or, ultimately, to support or promote a U.N. or OAU mediation effort.

The Task Force's "diplomatic option" favored the United States working in concert with Tanzania, Zambia and Zaïre to reduce the arms flow to Angola. We favored a positive U.S. response to Portugese requests that we approach President Mobutu of Zaïre, and that we give encouragement to Portuguese initiatives directed toward a peaceful solution.

The Task Force saw one of the advantages of a diplomatic-political effort as the chance that the factional competition within Angola might be shifted back toward the political arena, thereby improving FNLA and UNITA prospects and reducing the likelihood of Soviet arms determining the outcome. We believed that such an effort might reduce the danger of big-power confrontation and might further our policy of supporting peaceful solutions on that continent. We felt it would reflect our recognition that Angola was basically an African problem, and that Africans could and should play a major role in an Angolan solution. The Task Force also made the point that such a diplomatic-political initiative would probably elicit congressional and public support in the United States.

Regarding the option of covert military intervention, the Task Force pointed out that such intervention would commit U.S. resources and prestige in a situation the outcome of which was in doubt, and over which we could at best exercise limited influence. The Report also observed that U.S. military intervention might contribute to increased involvement by the Soviet Union and other

[3] As quoted in *The Village Voice*, February 16, 1976, which published the text of the Report without official authorization, having received it via Daniel Schorr, then of CBS.

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foreign powers. The Task Force noted that there would be high risk of exposure, and that such exposure would have a negative impact on our relations with other contending factions, with a number of African states, with Portugal, with socialist and Third World countries, and with large segments of the U.S. public and Congress.

The Task Force pointed to the fact that covert military involvement would probably increase the level of violence, with all the foreign and domestic consequences that this would entail for the United States. If widespread tribal or racial massacres should occur—a distinct possibility, it was noted—our support for one or more of the contending forces could become a significant political issue. The Task Force observed that a covert intervention might greatly damage the chances for workable relations with the successor Angolan regime if the MPLA should come to power. The Task Force also discussed the advantages and disadvantages of all options, including drawbacks of the diplomatic-political option and possible advantages of a covert military effort.

III

Almost immediately after the submission of the Task Force Report in June, I left Washington on a second trip to Africa, traveling this time to four East African countries between June 14 and 29, 1975. By the time I returned, the Angola issue was moving toward decision.

In preparation for an impending Forty Committee meeting, I sent a memorandum on July 12 to the State Department representative on the Committee, Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco, with a copy to the Secretary. In essence, the memo argued that covert intervention would not serve larger U.S. interests; that an attempted intervention could not be kept secret; and that a covert intervention would have to be so circumscribed as to fall between stools in any case—while the other side could escalate at will. Most of the memo is quoted below, omitting a few sections whose publication might even now complicate our foreign relations.

A Test of World Power? At present we have no irrevocable commitment of U.S. power and prestige in Angola. A Neto Government would be ideologically rather like the Samora Machel Government in Mozambique. We have so far succeeded in avoiding the engagement of our vital interest in Angola and even the accusations of U.S. intervention are sporadic and not a serious political liability.

So far as concrete interests are concerned, Gulf's $300 million stake in Cabinda is the principal one. . . .

If we become engaged under . . . [the specific proposals put forward for covert military intervention] (and developments over this weekend make it

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clear—if it was not clear before—that . . . [the proposals under consideration] would probably be inadequate), the Soviets will become aware of our decision almost immediately. The CIA paper significantly notes that the "Soviets enjoy greater freedom of action in the covert supply of arm, equipment and ammunition" and "can escalate the level of their aid more readily than we."

I believe the Secretary is right in his conviction—if I understand his views—that if we go in, we must go in quickly, massively and decisively enough to avoid the tempting, gradual, mutual escalation that characterized Vietnam during the 1965–67 period.

Unless we are prepared to go as far as necessary, in world balance of power terms the worst possible outcome would be a test of will and strength which we lose. The CIA paper makes clear that in the best of circumstances we won't be able to win. If we are to have a test of strength with the Soviets, we should find a more advantageous place.

Under the heading, *Lack of Tolerance for Error,* the memo noted that: "The CIA proposal sets forth an intricately constructed mechanism of covert action in which every part must mesh and work."

The paper then discussed the situation in Zaïre and Zambia. It also commented on Savimbi's forces, noting the limited number of armed and trained men he had at the time of the Portuguese coup in April 1974 and pointing out that his recent recruits "have mostly not been tested or trained with real weapons." Leadership deficiencies and troop weaknesses in the FNLA were also pointed out.[4] The July 12 memo continued:

Risks of Disclosure

The CIA paper identified the principal risk of disclosure as in Washington. Besides such risks of compromise as there may be in the Executive Branch, there are certainly high risks in the Congress, where numbers of Senators, Congressmen and staffers must now be briefed—through unstable liaison arrangements.

I believe the CIA paper grossly underestimates the risks of disclosure abroad. The CIA paper itself speaks of . . . [supply] flights to Zaïre. . . . In Angola, "the MPLA is omnipresent." Zaïre, Portugal, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Zambia and neighboring territories are infiltrated by a wide variety of agents and operatives of every political color—where money can buy many things. We would have to reveal our plans and arrangements to senior officials of at least four governments or movements. . . . Even the purely external signs on the ground of changed military capabilities would be almost immediately apparent. . . . The

[4] Seymour M. Hersh quoted a "directly involved" U.S. official, who presumably had access to the memo, as saying it asserted that neither Savimbi nor Roberto could "fight their way out of a paper bag," *The New York Times*, December 14, 1975. The memo did not say this. Considering the brave men from both those movements who died in Angola, I am sorry the remark was ever attributed to me. However, I do not doubt that Mr. Hersh correctly quoted the "directly involved" official, who apparently characterized the memo that way; and Mr. Hersh's piece was remarkably accurate in all other respects. I gave Mr. Hersh no assistance, information or confirmation at this or any other time in developing the story. Mr. Hersh called me in London the day before he published it, and I declined comment.

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risks of discovery are so great as to make compromise virtually certain. And plausible U.S. official denial is no longer the recourse it might once have been thought to be—so the distinction the CIA paper makes between possible disclosure from authoritative or non-authoritative sources loses much significance.

Similarly, the distinction the CIA paper makes between providing arms and the provision of money to buy arms under tutelage does not seem so great as suggested. In any case, time is running out for money subventions. The visible effects on the ground are the same either way. . . .

Legal Aspects

The following are inexpert comments or questions.

For some years the United States has maintained an embargo on arms to the Portuguese territories, under Presidential decision pursuant to authorities granted under the Mutual Security Act of 1954. The Act, as amended by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, also requires prompt reports to the Congress of licenses for arms exports; and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Section 657) requires an annual report of significant arms exports whether or not under license. Whether CIA-exported arms would be covered, or whether the provisions might be evaded by transfers of arms physically outside of the U.S., is not entirely clear. In any case the long-standing U.S. embargo of arms to the Portuguese territories would be effectively broken.

If Zaïre should transfer FMS or MAP equipment or arms, a new authorizing agreement would have to be signed with the U.S., the recipient would have to be eligible, under Presidential Determination, for FMS and MAP, the recipient would have to sign an agreement with the U.S., and a report would have to be made to the Congress—under penalty of termination of military assistance to Zaïre.

Other Questions

. . . The [CIA] Paper (p. 1) suggests that arming Roberto and Savimbi could "discourage further resort to arms and civil war." So far, the arming of the various factions has fed the civil war, not discouraged it. The Paper gives no clear explanation where the courses of action described will take us, explicitly acknowledging that the anti-Neto forces cannot win militarily, and rather hopefully expressing the view that restoration of some sort of triangular "balance" (which has been the past reality) will produce a peaceful, negotiated, collective solution (which the record in Angola and experience elsewhere in Africa indicate is most unlikely).

. . . The CIA Paper envisages covert CIA-organized military training, organization, orientation and leadership. Apparently the CIA did this with considerable success in the Vietnam highlands and elsewhere in East Asia. It is, however, a line of work that our military establishment has traditionally found professionally within its purview. The idea of organizing mercenary troop leadership from ex-Portuguese and Zaïrian Officers and non-coms has obvious hazards.

Much of what is proposed as a covert political program (pp. 17, 21, 22) would more normally be regarded as in the diplomatic or foreign policy area. Why

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must all this be covertly executed? It also seems to be a small sum . . . to accomplish the purposes outlined. . . .

I sent another memo to Under Secretary Sisco and the Secretary on the morning of July 14, the day the Forty Committee was to meet to consider the Angola issue. The memo was designed to serve as the basis for a State Department position at the meeting. It was mostly a synthesis of the July 12 memo quoted above, but the final paragraph referred explicitly to the June 13 Report of the Task Force, saying that the diplomatic-political alternative "was favored by most of the agencies participating." The thrust of the diplomatic-political alternative "would be to reduce the infusion of arms and enlist African, Portuguese and multi-lateral influences toward a political solution."

The July 14 Forty Committee meeting was inconclusive. I had asked for the opportunity to attend, but was not invited. Mr. Kissinger had apparently expected me to be there, since, according to word that reached me later, he asked where I was when the meeting convened.

A small ad-hoc working group was then formed to refine the covert action proposal and answer the questions not satisfactorily resolved. I attended two sessions of this working group in the NSC Situation Room in the West Basement of the White House. On July 16, I sent Under Secretary Sisco another memo, with a copy to Mr. Kissinger. It said:

In the four days since my memorandum to you of July 12, the situation in Angola has importantly changed:

—We have evidence the Soviets are introducing more, heavier and more sophisticated weapons. . . .

—The MPLA appears to have accomplished the expulsion of the FNLA from Luanda; substantial numbers of FNLA troops have surrendered their arms and sought Portuguese protection or fled. . . .

—South Africa is reported to be giving Roberto some support.

If it were not true before, it seems clear now that it is unrealistic to think in terms of a program that could be both effective and covert.

On the following day, July 17, I sent Under Secretary Sisco still another memorandum, with a copy to Mr. Kissinger. While continuing to argue against intervention, it also addressed the fall-between-stools argument:

. . . So far as the CIA draft Action Plan is concerned, my view—which I have expressed—is that the measures proposed are inadequate to accomplish the purposes outlined.

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The memo then went on to argue against several further interventionist proposals which were not adopted.

The CIA Action Plan was considered once again by the Forty Committee (I believe on July 17); it was given to President Gerald Ford sometime within the next several days; and it was approved. The Secretary assured me afterward that he had described my views fully and clearly to the President and had given the President a copy of my memorandum of July 12 to read.

When I received word that the President had decided to go ahead with the proposed covert action program, I submitted my resignation as Assistant Secretary.[5] Mr. Kissinger generously tried to convince me not to resign. I remained firm in my expressed view that I was not the person suited to accomplish the President's and the Secretary's purposes in the African Bureau under the circumstances. In the letter or orally, I said that I would be honored to continue actively serving my country if the President and the Secretary should wish to consider shifting me to other responsibilities abroad, unconnected with the African policy question that had arisen. But I went on to say that I would entirely understand if the President and the Secretary did not wish to consider such a possibility.

IV

Deputy Under Secretary Lawrence S. Eagleburger advised me in a few days that it was the President's and the Secretary's desire that I continue in service. He raised the possibility of my going to Switzerland, where Ambassador Peter Dominick had just retired on account of ill health. I had planned to go on leave during August in any case, and expressed the hope that it would be possible to work out my transfer during the time I was to be away. In particular, the next in a series of Senate Foreign Relations African Subcommittee hearings, an overview on U.S. policy toward southern Africa, was due the following Monday, July 28, 1975. Mr. Eagleburger and I agreed that it would be advisable that I already be on vacation by that date, as my resignation and the reasons for it were not publicly known and a necessity for me to testify could result in disclosures that the Administration wished to

[5] Actually, I was told the President had made the decision somewhat before I now believe he finally and formally did so. This word came orally. I went home, spent a sleepless night trying to figure out what I should do, and typed out my letter of resignation to the Secretary and the President at about 5:30 the next morning. As I subsequently learned, I had submitted my resignation—believing the issue decided—before the President made his conclusive determination.

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avoid, or could result in a public refusal on my part to answer sensitive questions.[6]

On Labor Day, just before my return to work, the story of my resignation broke in a piece by Murray Marder in *The Washington Post*. The "cover story" put out by senior officials at the Department was that I had decided that I was "working against too many psychological obstacles" in overcoming African and congressional opposition. Although prepared to bear up with the only possible explanation of my resignation that would not "blow open" the Angola intervention, I must admit that I found the weeks that followed galling. I was entirely willing to acknowledge that the controversy over my appointment in early 1975 made it difficult for me to do the job of Assistant Secretary. But I did believe I had been overcoming these handicaps, both in Africa and at home. My contacts with African leaders, including most of the founder presidents on the continent, had been constructive. Regarding the Black Caucus on Capitol Hill, I found that once the nomination fight was over, its members treated me with generosity and consideration.

In the weeks that followed, I declined to comment on the subject to anyone. In those same weeks I passed from being a very lame duck in the Department to being a student at the Foreign Service Institute, resuscitating my German.

On September 25, 1975, Leslie H. Gelb of *The New York Times* reported that both "East and West," including the United States, were pouring millions of dollars covertly into Portugal and Angola. The Gelb report continued: " . . . sources said that the funds earmarked for two anti-Soviet liberation fronts in Angola had been dispersed mainly through President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre. . . . What was learned was that American funds were being used to buy arms for both Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi. . . ."

It was, and still is, a mystery to my why the Gelb report had so little public impact in the United States when it was published. Perhaps this was because the main emphasis was on Portugal—where there was considerable U.S. public approval for covert help to the non-communists—and because Mr. Gelb emphasized Soviet actions in support of the leftists in Angola and linked the United States and the People's Republic of China as opponents of them. In any case, the report came and went without creating a great public uproar.

[6] Wishing to guard against the fact and appearance of doing anything that might result in unauthorized disclosure, my wife and I agreed that I would not even tell her the country in Africa to which my policy difference with the Secretary pertained.

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Covert U.S. aid to Angola surfaced again on November 7–8 when both Mr. Gelb of *The New York Times* and Walter Pincus of *The Washington Post* reported that Under Secretary Sisco and CIA Director William E. Colby had defended covert U.S. military assistance to Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi in a closed-door appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I was surprised, once again, by the relative lack of public reaction to these disclosures.

On December 14, 1975, Seymour M. Hersh of *The New York Times* revealed my opposition to the covert intervention in Angola, the substance of my reasons for it, and its relation to my resignation as Assistant Secretary. This did create a stir. I had been in London at a meeting between Secretary Kissinger and U.S. Ambassadors in Europe when the Hersh story broke. On my arrival back in New York, CBS News was waiting for me at the airport. Although my response to the interview was to say "no comment" about eight times, CBS ran footage of me without sound, adding its own commentary. Peter Lisagor, on the Agronsky television show of December 27, 1975, was asked: "What was the best advice given in 1975?" Mr. Lisagor answered: "Nathaniel Davis' advice to Henry Kissinger."

I do not know whether Mr. Hersh's December 14 story triggered the introduction and Senate passage on December 19 of the Tunney Amendment against further covert aid to Angola. According to reports, Senator Dick Clark and a number of other key members of the Congress had already expressed strong opposition to the involvement in executive session.[7] It was also clear by that time that a large and rapidly escalating military and financial commitment would have been necessary to have any hope of blocking an MPLA victory. For whatever reasons, Congress declined to support further covert intervention; in Angola, opposition to the MPLA collapsed.

Virtually everybody has subsequently characterized our Angolan involvement as a costly failure. There has been much argument, however, over where to place the responsibility. The Ford Administration blamed congressional unwillingness to face up to the hard facts of international life and Soviet power. Congressional critics said the Administration's secret policy and the effort to implement it by stealth were doomed from the start.

[7] *The New York Times*, November 7, 1975; *The Washington Post*, November 8, 1975; and *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 8, 1976.

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v

Besides the ex post facto political debate in the United States about the wisdom or unwisdom of covert military intervention in Angola, and the debate over responsibility for its failure, there has been another controversial issue. This has been over the question of cause and effect, as between the successive outside interventions which occurred. Which side provoked the reaction of the other?

On December 19, 1975, Mr. Hersh of *The New York Times* revealed the January 1975 Forty Committee decision to give Holden Roberto $300,000 in covert funds. Mr. Hersh wrote that this authorization came

> more than two months before the first significant Soviet build-up . . . . The Soviet Union has been involved in Angola since 1956, but according to well-informed American intelligence officials, did not substantially increase its support for one of the liberation armies in Angola until March and April of this year [1975]. At that time at least two shiploads and two planeloads of Soviet war materiel were sent.

The implication of the foregoing and considerable other subsequent comment by critics of the Ford Administration was that the United States made the first move and that the Soviet buildup was a reaction.

Perhaps evidence will come to light in the future showing that the January 1975 Forty Committee decision really did trigger the step-up in Soviet aid and arms supply, but I do not believe the case is made. As already noted, the $300,000 was for political action, not weapons, and only part of the money was expended between January and the Soviet arms buildup of March/April—probably decided upon in Moscow somewhat earlier. Considerable sums of money and quantities of arms were filtering into Angola during that period from a multiplicity of sources and to all three movements.

If one is looking for externally visible actions that might be said to have triggered the Soviet buildup, one should perhaps also consider Holden Roberto's movement of troops into northern Angola and the capital city of Luanda, and the Chinese support for Roberto in 1974–75, which no doubt had an impact on Soviet thinking. By March–April 1975, it was clear that the Alvor Accord—which postulated cooperative administration of the country by all three factions—was breaking down. Moreover, fighting between the FNLA and MPLA escalated sharply during that period.

After March–April of 1975, the difficulty of establishing causality

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becomes more complicated, rather than less so. Indeed, there had been varying degrees of involvement by most of the major actors even before the 1974–75 time frame. Nevertheless, the major interventions by Cuba, Zaïre and South Africa—and the covert CIA program—all occurred during the latter half of 1975. It may be helpful to take a careful look at the chronological sequence of over a dozen actions by a half-dozen intervening powers over that period of about six months. One should bear in mind, however, that the time sequences are not always exactly known, and that cause and effect do not necessarily conform to the time relationships.

July 1975: In the course of the month, 40 to 50 additional Cuban advisers for Neto and the MPLA came to Angola via Congo-Brazzaville.[8] In mid-July, President Mobutu of Zaïre sent a commando company and an armored-car squadron across the border and into combat in northern Angola. By then, according to intelligence reports, South Africa was supporting the two factions fighting against the MPLA. In Luanda, the MPLA, strengthened by heavier and more sophisticated weapons supplied by the U.S.S.R., was successfully driving the FNLA from the city. In Washington, the Administration decision in favor of covert military intervention was being made on or about July 17, and concrete implementation followed very quickly.

August 1975: In the second week of August, two additional Zaïrian paratroop companies were committed to action in Angola. At about the same time, South African troops (which may have moved just inside Angola in June) occupied the Cunene Dam complex in southern Angola. The Cuban decision to send combat troops to Angola was being made in Havana, presumably in consultation with Moscow. (The decision in Havana must have been made before the end of August if one considers when troops carried by ship arrived in Africa, as discussed below.)

September 1975: Early in the month, Soviet-made 122-millimeter rockets were committed to battle north of Luanda. In mid-September two more Zaïrian battalions were sent across the border to Angola. By the latter part of September the South Africans were shipping military material to the FNLA and UNITA forces, and had established a training base for the FNLA in southeast Angola. In the latter part of the month, Cuban troops arrived by ship in Pointe Noire (Congo-Brazzaville) and additional Cuban trainers and advisers arrived by air.

[8] There had been up to 100 Cuban advisers in Angola for at least a decade, and the buildup from that number to roughly 250 had already started in the late spring of 1975.

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October 1975: A South African-led strike force was committed to battle in the latter part of the month and made spectacular advances in south-central Angola. In late October, an additional Zaïrian battalion went south. Cuban troops arrived in greater numbers.

November–December 1975: In the first days of November, a mixed Angolan-Zaïrian force moved against Cabinda, which was successfully defended by MPLA troops reinforced by Cuban advisers. Americans were evacuated, and the American Consulate General closed on November 3, eight days before the Portuguese retired and the MPLA proclaimed Angolan independence in the capital. FNLA forces were advancing south toward Luanda, and the South African-led column was rolling north. The Cuban airlift stepped up to as many as five troop flights a week, and there was an increased Cuban sealift. Cuban troops were soon committed to battle in large numbers and threw back the advancing columns on the north and south.

January 1976: By the latter part of the month, there were 10,000 to 12,000 Cuban troops fighting in Angola, backed by increasingly sophisticated Soviet weaponry. The FNLA-Zaïrian forces in the north gave way; the South Africans in the south withdrew; and UNITA was overwhelmed in the sense of conventional combat.

Does the foregoing chronology answer the question of which side caused the other to intervene? This depends, to some extent, on the perspective of the beholder. Angolan spokesmen and Fidel Castro have their answer: it was South African "aggression and invasion" that triggered the Cuban military intervention.[9] However, if this refers to the South African-led strike force that rolled across south-central Angola in October, it must be noted that Cuban troops had been sent to Angola considerably earlier. It could be true that large-scale commitment of Cuban troops to battle was a reaction to the South African-led strike, but the speed and size of the commitment suggest that the troops would have been used if needed in any case.

There is little question that smaller-scale South African involvement in Angola preceded the dispatch of large numbers of Cuban troops from the Caribbean; but small-scale Cuban intervention preceded South African involvement.

The Soviets and Cubans were no doubt aware of both the U.S. covert intervention of July–August 1975 and the open incursions by Zaïre before the final decision was made to dispatch large

[9] *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 19, 1977; United Press International, October 18, 1977, quoting a Fidel Castro speech in Jamaica on October 17, 1977.

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numbers of Cuban troops—if one accepts the probability that this decision was made in August. On the other hand, the massive escalation in the supply of Soviet weapons antedated the U.S. covert intervention of July–August 1975 and the open incursions by Zaïre.

So the answer seems to be that the escalations mutually produced counter-escalations. One would have to go much further back to find the original intervention. Colonialism preceded the Soviet commitment to support "national liberation" movements, by means judged differently by the interested parties and observers. NATO imperatives influenced U.S. policy toward the Portuguese colonies in ways which compromised our policy alternatives in Africa. None of the major actors entered the drama of 1975 unencumbered by the baggage of the past. Nobody can make a very good claim to have been uninvolved until provoked.

VI

It is obvious that the United States made mistakes. Judging from the results, the substantive decisions made were wrong somehow—at some times and at some places in the structure of power in America. Perhaps not only the substance but also the machinery and policymaking processes were flawed in ways which should carry some lesson.

So far as the processes were concerned, my perspective is better than some, but partial at best. I shall not presume to comment on the interaction between President Ford and Secretary Kissinger. My struggle was for some impact on the Secretary's mind, and I cannot complain on that score. Perhaps it was a weakness in our system that Secretary Kissinger's intellect and will so dominated the Department of State. But I am not so sure. In many ways it was also our strength in those times.

As for the substance of the decisions made, it has remained a mystery to me why the Secretary was so determined to push ahead on a course which I thought was so clearly destined to fail. I shall not attempt to speak for the Secretary—as he will undoubtedly give his own account of the Angolan intervention. I hope I understand the depth of his conviction that it was dangerous to permit the Soviet Union to conclude that détente placed restraints only on America, and that the Third World was fair game, unlinked to the totality of our relationship. Both during the final weeks of the Vietnam War and during the Angolan crisis of 1975, the Secretary and the President seem to have believed that it was better to roll the dice against the longest of odds than to abandon

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the competition against our great adversary. The Secretary would freely acknowledge, I believe, that he saw Angola as part of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and not as an African problem.

The foregoing argument is part of the greater question whether containment is a doctrine of universal, inherently interrelated worldwide applicability, or should be limited in the military sense to interests in Western Europe and a few other places which we regard as vital.

The strategic world overview of U.S. policy is the responsibility of the President and the Secretary of State. Necessarily, my focus and argument had to be on a different level. The question I was principally addressing in my memos to the Secretary was whether covert intervention in Angola could work. This issue also led to larger questions, of course, connected with the nature of American society, secret action abroad, and the kinds of foreign policy initiatives the United States can effectively undertake.

I might add a last word to complete the circle of argument and to return to the point where this article began. As noted at the beginning, the veneer of restrained international behavior seems to be thin in the best of circumstances in today's world. It is also true that the responsible answer to the problem cannot be to mistake the veneer for the whole reality—in weakness or self-deception. But it may be one of the higher tasks of statemanship to work to thicken that veneer when the possibility exists.

Angola was a tragedy. It was a tragedy for moderate blacks, for radical blacks wishing to fend off alien influences, for whites in southern Africa, for Mobutu, Kaunda, Roberto, Savimbi, soldiers of fortune, Zaïrian infantrymen, and countless others. Perhaps America's choices were impossible ones. I cannot assert any easy confidence in the likely success of the course of action favored by most of our task force on Angola in June 1975. But I think we would have done better at least to have tried that other course.

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Chalmers Johnson

THE NEW THRUST IN CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Since the death of Mao Tse-tung on September 9, 1976, two sets of influences have combined to produce significant movement in Chinese foreign policy. The first impetus to change, and certainly the most important, has been the domestic political requirements of the new leaders for legitimacy and stability. The second has been external developments to which the Chinese government has had to be responsive. Superficially, very little has changed in Chinese foreign policy since its main parameters were laid down by Chou En-lai around the time of the Lin Piao incident in the fall of 1971. In fact, however, the changes have been considerable. The two influences on China's foreign policy managers have unspectacularly but decisively pushed the People's Republic into positions that are new for China and that hold the promise of a significant effect on the world balance of power.

Domestic political influences on foreign policy arise from Hua Kuo-feng's so far successful succession to the chairmanship. The way in which Hua is continuing to consolidate his position has had very real foreign policy consequences. Facets of this complicated matter include the need to maintain Mao's authority and transfer it to his successors, while reversing many of Mao's policies of the past decade; the need to service Hua Kuo-feng's main military backers; and the need to reestablish the internal solidarity of the Politburo after years of disunity. External political developments include confusion in U.S. foreign policy, worsening of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia, territorial and offshore resource disputes in the China Sea, and the successes of Soviet foreign policy during 1977 in Africa and elsewhere.

These two broad sets of influences, unequally impinging on the Chinese political process, are slowly producing a new Chinese external stance. Some significant components of this stance are

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cooperation with Japan and, to a lesser extent, the United States; recognition of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); rapid conventional modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA); profit-oriented foreign trade; new political allies in the old effort to build a global united front against the Soviet Union; and a willingness, regardless of ideology, to tap the overseas Chinese connection. Chinese foreign policy today is like a complex protein molecule: to understand it at all, the analyst must break it down into its component parts and weigh them individually.

II

The internal political events of 1976 and Hua Kuo-feng's victory will be argued over and debated for decades to come. If a Chinese Machiavelli should emerge and choose to write an updated version of *The Prince,* names such as Chiang Ch'ing, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Yeh Chien-ying, Wang Tung-hsing, and the "Gang of Four" are going to become as well known to students of politics as Borgia, Medici, Sforza and the *condottieri* are today. No outsider knows in any detail what happened in Peking between the T'ien-an-men riot of April 5, 1976 and Wang Tung-hsing's arrest of Mao's widow and her henchmen on October 6, 1976. But the best-educated guesses are that the long-time Vice Chairman of the Central Committee's Military Commission, Yeh Chien-ying, stood up to the aged Mao and insisted that Hua Kuo-feng replace Teng Hsiao-p'ing as Chou En-lai's successor rather than one of the Shanghai Clique.[1] Hua did not belong to either major faction within the party, tended toward the views of the old bureaucrats, was acceptable to the military, and yet could work with Mao's utterly loyal aide and commander of the palace guards, Wang Tung-hsing. The result was that the unknown Hua not only succeeded Chou and Mao; he also garnered Mao's blessing: the last recorded words of the Great Helmsman were, "With you in charge, I am at ease" (*"Ni pan-shih, wo fang-hsin"*).

However, in order to succeed Mao literally, Hua had to betray him politically. By the autumn of 1976 the country had been through ten years of inconclusive turmoil; factories were paralyzed by factional fighting, college-age youths were sullen and educationally a "lost generation," the army held the society together but at the expense of its own primary defense mission, and the public

[1] Two particularly useful analyses are Ting Wang, "A Concise Biography of Hua Kuo-feng," *Chinese Law and Government,* Spring 1978; and Parris Chang, "The Rise of Wang Tung-hsing: Head of China's Security Apparatus," *The China Quarterly,* March 1978.

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longed for (and wept openly at the death of) Chou En-lai, with his cool reason, clear priorities, and commitment to economic growth.

Whatever his own views, Hua Kuo-feng decided to deliver Chou En-lai's policies. To do so he had first to build a massive mausoleum to celebrate Mao (not unlike Chiang Kai-shek's building a mausoleum to Sun Yat-sen at Nanking 50 years earlier), and he had to interpret his new policies in ways that made them coincide at least superficially with the legacy of Mao Tse-tung. Thus, he began the selective publication of Mao's works from the early 1950s, works that are in line with the views of such later anti-Maoist leaders as Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Li Hsien-nien, and that recommend reforms which the military now demands. Hua in effect de-Maoized policy while sanctifying Mao, the latter being indispensable to his own position and because Wang Tung-hsing would not have tolerated anything less.

"We must strengthen our national defense, and for that purpose we must first of all strengthen our work in economic construction." Mao wrote these words in 1956 (*On the Ten Major Relationships*); the fact that they were first published openly in China on December 26, 1976 is a clue to the curiously Janus-faced character of Chinese political discussion today. The public is enthusiastic about the new commitment to growth, scientific and engineering expertise, rewards according to work, entrance exams and strict grading in schools and colleges, and imports of foreign technology. And yet, these new policies are justified in the name of Mao and executed by Mao's chosen successor, while every politically attentive person in the country knows that Mao was the author of the Cultural Revolution and that the Gang of Four could not have existed without his patronage.

Perhaps there is nothing strange about this, however. Cesare Borgia, the outstanding figure of the Italian Renaissance and a person whose political career has certain similarities to Mao's, ended up after his death contributing to the consolidation of the Papal States, although his purpose had been precisely the opposite. Mao's legacy *is* more important than his Cultural Revolution policies, and the public is enjoying the preservation of the one and the demise of the other. Hua Kuo-feng has shown himself to be a skillful builder of coalitions: he has put Mao on a pedestal, implemented Chou's policies, brought Teng back into the government, kept the army happy, and restored unity and purpose to the body politic. When asked about the possible contradictions in all this, the Chinese reply, "Mao is great, Chou is beloved, Hua is wise."

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Is the new coalition stable? We do not know. There is a potential for conflict following the death of the aged Yeh Chien-ying, who has mediated the role of the army since Mao's death. Hua Kuo-feng does not yet seem to have his own independent base of support; he may be only a transitional figure. Perhaps the papering over of Mao's role during the last decade will not hold, resulting in open conflict about the meaning of his legacy. Expectations of the public, particularly of skilled workers and the intellectuals, have been raised so high that some retrenchment may become necessary. But this could have serious consequences for the "four modernizations"—agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology—that Chou promised and that Hua is implementing. On available evidence, it seems that Hua has successfully navigated the succession, including a party congress and a new National People's Congress, and that he is coping with whatever tensions exist within the Politburo. He is also younger than all of his rivals, without being so young that he outrages Chinese sensibilities.

III

In foreign policy, the new directions have had to be explained and justified doctrinally, this being Communist China. In addition to the use of Mao's works of 1956 and earlier, the regime has now attributed to Mao the origin of a "Three Worlds Thesis" that is cited as the authoritative basis of Chinese foreign policy. The basic source here is "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," a 35,000-character treatise that filled all six pages of the *People's Daily* on November 1, 1977.

Actually, the analysis in terms of three worlds seems on the surface to bear a strong resemblance to a line of thinking associated five years ago with Chou En-lai.[2] But the differences, on close examination, are instructive.Then, as now, the two superpowers comprise the First World, but with the difference that it is now clearly and unequivocally the U.S.S.R. that is singled out as likely to cause a new world war. And, then as now, the Third World comprises the underdeveloped ex-colonial nations, and the "Thesis" lays great rhetorical stress on unity within that group, of which China still claims to be a part, against superpower hegemonism.

[2] See Robert A. Scalapino, "China and the Balance of Power," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1974, pp. 357-60. .

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And, then as now, the Second World (or Second Intermediate Zone as it was once called) comprises the advanced industrial societies other than the two superpowers.

But whereas five years ago the Second World's aid was invoked only in general terms, today Hua Kuo-feng's de facto contribution is a much greater emphasis on strong ties with the Second World at the expense of the previous emphasis on the Third. The moral seems clear: China needs the Second World not merely as a general counterweight to the Soviet threat, but for the most concrete economic and strategic forms of cooperation and assistance, in ways it was unwilling even a short time ago to give weight to, or in some cases even to acknowledge.

There are several reasons for this shift. First, a corollary of the "four modernizations" is a recognition of China's technological backwardness; advanced industrial technique must be imported. Given the fact that China perpetuates Mao's opposition to Russia—a policy unquestionably supported by the present leaders, not just because Mao advocated it but also because of Russia's attempt to cripple China economically in 1960 and because of the Soviet military buildup on China's borders—the only other place to obtain the technology is in the Second World (or in the United States).

Second, Russia cannot attack China without transferring some of its forces from Europe to Asia (approximately a quarter of the Soviet ground forces are stationed along China's northern border); one way to keep those forces tied down in Europe is to support by all means possible the resistance of the Second World nations of Western Europe. Hence, China approves the strengthening of NATO, opposes Eurocommunism, signed a most-favored-nation trade agreement with the European Community, and actively consults with the leaders of West Germany, France and England, particularly those leaders who are alert to the Soviet danger.

Third, China needs to modernize its conventional armed forces, and Hua Kuo-feng's backers in the army have shifted their defensive planning from Mao's "people's war" to a more conventional defense. Some equipment will have to be imported from the Second World, and China's buyers have been abroad throughout 1978 (we shall return to this subject). Fourth, China believes that the Third World remains the long-range source of strength against Soviet hegemonism, but that for the present, with the Soviet Union and Cuba operating at will in a dozen different African and Middle Eastern countries, the Second World is needed for direct resistance (e.g., France in Zaïre) and for pressure on the United

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States to meet its responsibilities as a superpower.

There are many lesser axioms included in this Chinese grand strategy. Hua's visit to Bucharest in August 1978 simply underscored a long-standing tie to Romania, but the accompanying visit to Tito symbolized the dramatic recent shift in support from Albania to Yugoslavia, given Belgrade's greater credibility in the Third World as a nonaligned nation. Other recent examples include: cordiality toward Egyptian President Sadat's peace initiative in the Middle East; verbal support for Kim Il-sung in North Korea (even though his policies probably irritate the Chinese) to try to keep him from drifting back to the Russian side; and an endless series of political dinners in Peking for such figures as King Juan Carlos of Spain and Mrs. Thatcher of Great Britain. Three areas of the strategy, however, are more complicated: Sino-Japanese relations, military modernization, and relations with the United States.

IV

By far the most active, and potentially the most important, arena in which China has attempted to unite with the Second World is Japan. The effort did not at first go smoothly. Deputy Foreign Minister Chao Nien-lung opened preliminary negotiations for a treaty of peace and amity on a trip to Tokyo as long ago as November 11–15, 1974. In September 1975 the talks broke down—for two reasons: (a) the Chinese insisted on a so-called antihegemony clause in the treaty, a clause that was contained in both the Nixon and Tanaka communiqués of 1972 and that was directed against Soviet activities in East Asia; and (b) at the end of 1974, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, the author of Sino-Japanese rapprochement, was forced from office and the Liberal Democratic Party entered a period of internal confusion and electoral weakness. For four years the negotiations deadlocked over Japan's fears that the antihegemony clause meant Japan's enlisting on the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Japan preferred, and still prefers, to maintain a position of equally friendly relations with both China and Russia—a variant of the enormously successful postwar Japanese policy of separating politics from economics.

What has changed of late is a marked deterioration in Soviet-Japanese relations, causing many Japanese leaders to come to see the reality of, and the need to resist, "superpower hegemonism." Three days before the death of Mao, on September 6, 1976, a lieutenant of the Soviet Air Force flew his MiG-25 to Hakodate in Hokkaido and asked for political asylum. Thus began the worsen-

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ing of relations between Russia and Japan. The Japanese were alarmed that their radar had failed to detect the Soviet fighter until it was on the ground, and they were even more irritated by Moscow's charge that the pilot was being detained against his will.

The U.S.S.R. followed this incident with a campaign of rough pressure tactics against Japan, probably reflecting a Soviet misassessment of the apparent weakness of the conservative party during 1977 and of the meaning of the shift from Miki to Fukuda as Prime Minister. On March 1, 1977, Russia declared a 200-mile fishing zone, including the disputed four islands off Hokkaido, that really affected only Japan. During the year the Soviets repeatedly warned the Japanese about the dangers of agreeing to the antihegemony clause in a treaty with China; and they vigorously attacked Fukuda's August 1977 tour of the ASEAN nations, a visit that in contrast to Tanaka's January 1974 tour was warmly welcomed in Southeast Asia and also in Peking. Thus, the stage was set for the events of 1978.

From January 8 to 11, 1978, Foreign Minister Sonoda visited Moscow for negotiations with the Russians over the disputed islands. The results were disastrous from the Japanese point of view. The Soviet side tore up the Tanaka-Brezhnev statement of 1972 that "the northern territorial question remains a question unsettled between Japan and the Soviet Union" and replaced it with a new formulation: "there remains no question unsettled after the war." The Russians also initiated large-scale military demonstrations in the seas off Japan. On February 22, 1978, Ambassador Polyanski in Tokyo delivered a Soviet-proposed treaty of friendship to Fukuda, which was then published in the Soviet press the following day. Fukuda rejected the treaty on the spot, noting that its terms were similar to the treaties that the Soviet Union has with the East European states; and the Japanese press commented that Japan's "Finlandization" was apparently a prerequisite to friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. Japan's anger and fear were exacerbated by the confusion that characterized U.S. policy toward Asia during the first year of the Carter Administration. In these circumstances, the antihegemony clause appeared to some Japanese leaders and various segments of the public as less a provocation to Russia than a matter of plain common sense.

On February 16, 1978, China and Japan signed a "private" trade agreement worth $20 billion over the next eight years. China will export crude oil to Japan in return for Japanese steel and factories. The significance of the agreement lies in the unity of the Japanese business community, particularly the Tokyo *zaikai*, which had been

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much cooler toward China six years earlier, and in the Chinese readiness to export large amounts of oil, up to 15 million tons by 1982. On May 10, 1978, official negotiations between China and Japan for a peace treaty resumed; and on August 12, 1978, Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda and Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua signed a treaty of peace in Peking. The treaty contains the antihegemony clause, but on Japan's insistence (and as a mark of China's readiness to come to terms), it also states, "The present treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries." Difficulties remain, including the disputed Senkaku Islands in the Ryukyu chain and the Korean-Japanese treaty delimiting offshore drilling areas. Still, it seems certain that Japan will move closer to China, portending major changes in the Pacific balance of power.

V

The conventional modernization of the People's Liberation Army in China revolves around two issues: a change in strategy, and how to do it. On the strategic level, Mao Tse-tung settled for a so-called people's war defense against Russia, meaning that China would deploy a counter-city nuclear deterrent and wage a war of attrition against a full-scale but non-nuclear invasion. However, China's military leaders recognize a major flaw in this thinking. If the Soviets choose to attack China with conventional forces in order to seize territory or to aid dissidents in Manchuria or Sinkiang, or to knock out the Chinese nuclear development sites, or to support a third-country attack on China (e.g., from Vietnam), Russia's own superpower strategic forces effectively deter a Chinese first use of nuclear weapons; and China has no defense at all against such limited war objectives.

This point was also brought home to the Chinese by former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who visited Chinese military installations precisely at the time of Mao Tse-tung's death. After witnessing horse cavalry, antitank weapons that would bounce off contemporary Soviet armor, and aerial target practice against low-flying balloons, Schlesinger expressed his belief that the Chinese were without an antiaircraft or antitank capability. All subsequent military observers, including officials from France, Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Sweden and Japan, have concurred in this estimate to varying degrees. More to the point, the 1973 Middle East War and the 1975 communist offensive in Vietnam convinced most military specialists, the Chinese included, that a revolution in conventional armaments was underway

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and that modern conventional forces were anything but obsolete in the nuclear era.

As of the end of 1977, China had conducted some 22 nuclear weapons tests, launched seven small earth satellites (the forerunners of a photointelligence system), deployed between 30 and 40 medium-range ballistic missiles of the Soviet SS-4 type and between 30 and 40 intermediate-range ballistic missiles of the Soviet SS-5 type, possessed perhaps 80 Chinese-manufactured Tu-16 medium bombers with a radius of action of 2,000 miles, and fielded a total of 192 conventional divisions (of which 121 are infantry, 40 artillery, and only 12 armored). China has no antitank guided missiles, although it is believed that during 1977 Egypt sent a specimen of the Soviet Sagger wire-guided antitank missile to China in exchange for MiG-21 engine replacements. China lacks an all-weather interceptor capability, modern air-to-air missiles, electronic countermeasures, armored helicopters, a modern battle tank, and most of the other weapons being turned out in the armories of the First and Second Worlds. In short, China's armed forces are at least 10 to 20 years out of date, and Mao's people's war solution to the problem is inadequate for anything but an increasingly unlikely full-scale conventional invasion.[3]

Thus, the Chinese have begun to send military missions abroad to see if they can buy some of the items they need. In September 1977, Deputy Chief of General Staff Yang Ch'eng-wu led a delegation of air force, navy, signals, and artillery officers to France, where they were received by the French Chief of General Staff, General Guy Méry, who had visited China in June 1976. Subsequent missions have gone to Switzerland and England, and European military visitors to Peking invariably meet the highest Chinese leaders. The possibility of a British sale of Harrier VTOL strike aircraft increased after a six-man Chinese delegation observed a demonstration of the weapon at Lulworth on June 22, 1978.

The lines of this new policy seem clear enough. The Chinese are determined to modernize their forces, and this implies closer cooperation with the Second World and a continuing commitment to improvements in science and technology. The outbreak of war between Vietnam and Cambodia at the end of 1977, and the unprecedented inspection trip to the Soviet Far East by Brezhnev and Defense Minister Ustinov (March 28 to April 9, 1978, the first such visit by the highest Soviet leaders since the October Revolution) only confirmed the Chinese in their view that Mao's "dig

[3] See *The Military Balance 1977–1978*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977.

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tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony" slogan was passé. The problem has been the attitude of the United States. Aircraft such as the Harrier contain some American equipment, and their export requires an American license. In more general terms, the Americans will have to express themselves on the purposes, limitations, and overall policy implications of members of the Western alliance arming the Chinese.

VI

American attitudes toward European involvement with China are, of course, only a small part of the complex Sino-American relationship that has developed since 1971. In essence, China wants two things from the United States. First, the Chinese want to see the United States become more actively and coherently engaged in countering the Soviet Union's efforts to expand its sphere of hegemony. Second, the Chinese want the Americans to accept their three conditions for "normalization" of relations between the two countries: the United States must withdraw all of its forces from the island of Taiwan, end diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China, and dissolve the Mutual Defense Treaty that commits the United States to the defense of Taiwan. The problem with these two Chinese desires is that they are politically incompatible.

If the United States should accede to China's terms without gaining assurances of Taiwan's security, the effect on the rest of East Asia would be precisely to destroy the credibility of American security commitments and open the area to an expansion of Soviet influence. China knows this, but it cannot yet bring itself to say so. It also knows that its renunciation of the use of force against Taiwan is the only hope it ever has of reuniting the people of Taiwan with the mainland short of civil war. The Taiwan problem probably cannot be resolved until after Chiang Ching-kuo has been succeeded by a genuinely Taiwanese leader, one who is not obligated by a father's last will and testament. The United States does not need to repudiate the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972; it only needs to adopt a more "Asian" scale of time in which it is to be fully implemented.

It also needs seriously to bolster the credibility of its commitment to maintaining the balance of power in the western Pacific. This is what China really wants from the United States, as do the non-communist countries of the area. Japan, in particular, needs reassurance that the Security Treaty means what it says; without such reassurance, Japan cannot afford to ignore the threatening

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signals coming from the Soviet Union and enter into a more cooperative relationship with China, however the "antihegemony clause" is interpreted in the future. Doubts about the American commitment to the western Pacific have certainly slowed the Sino-Japanese entente in Japanese thinking, and they have also bolstered the hand of the hard-liners concerning Taiwan in Chinese thinking.

During 1978, the Chinese think they detected signs of improvement in Washington's positions. The Korean withdrawal decision was so thoroughly modified that U.S. tactical air strength in the peninsula actually increased; Soviet-American détente became as problematic as the Chinese always thought it would be; and American leaders were once again coming to visit Peking. The most important of these visits was by presidential adviser Brzezinski in May. His open endorsement of Sino-American cooperation against the U.S.S.R. was precisely what the Chinese wanted to hear. In fact, they were still so euphoric about it when I visited China in late June that I felt morally obligated to suggest that the United States was not quite ready to enter a Sino-American alliance.

In my view, what the United States needs is a more nuanced policy toward China, which would aim at a position in between the two things that China wants from us. The primary element in such a policy would be a commitment to normalization of relations with Peking, but only on terms that guarantee Taiwanese security. A corollary of this commitment would be a bolstering of the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific. This last is necessary because of serious doubts in the area as to whether the United States has the means to back up its statements of intent. Equally important in this regard, official Washington must come to understand that the Pacific Fleet performs different functions than the Atlantic Fleet—that its presence in the western Pacific is less oriented toward countering a specific military threat than it is toward preventing such a threat from developing, and that both China and Japan feel this form of an American role is indispensable to stability in the area.[4] Only if there is such an American presence can China's conventional military modernization go ahead without threatening non-communist Asia.

In short, to talk of "playing the China card" in the Soviet-American game is irresponsible. The United States can neither pay for China's foreign policy by seeking outright conflict with the

[4] See Lieutenant Commander Kenneth R. McGruther, "The Dilemma of the U.S. Pacific Fleet," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1978.

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U.S.S.R., nor can it cause China to pay for U.S. foreign policy by using the Sino-American relationship as a substitute for an effective American defense against the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, to accept China's terms concerning Taiwan serves no one's interests—not China's, nor Taiwan's, nor Japan's, nor the United States'. (Interestingly enough, it might serve the U.S.S.R.'s interests, since the Soviets might offer their services as Taiwan's protector.)

The possibility that the Chinese are coming to accept an intermediate U.S. policy is suggested by the success of the July 1978 U.S. technical mission to Peking led by the President's Science Adviser, Dr. Frank Press. Without mentioning either Taiwan or hegemony, the Americans and Chinese agreed to open a range of channels for civilian scientific and technical exchange between the two countries. The Chinese Communist press in Hong Kong called the visit "the most significant since Nixon."

VII

On balance, Chinese foreign policy today is an amalgam of sensible new responses to the needs of domestic development, combined with an intense nationalistic hostility to the Soviet Union. The policy is popular with the Chinese people, this being one of the reasons it was adopted (given the needs of the new leadership for internal stability and unity). Successes of the new policy have been slow in coming, however. This is because of several built-in constraints: new ventures can be undertaken only as the internal political consensus matures and as the highly charged years of the Cultural Revolution recede. Previous Maoist commitments and theories still exert their hold. Today, the "four modernizations" dictate Chinese domestic and foreign policy. But the Chinese can recognize their *full* implications only obliquely and covertly, given the current configurations of their leadership and ideology.

In the meantime, events beyond China's control keep interfering with the course of the grand strategy. The Chinese armed demonstration of April 1978 in the Senkaku Islands clearly set back relations with Japan. Since the Chinese subsequently dismissed the incident as an "accident," it is not clear why it occurred. Were some Chinese trying to pressure the Japanese? If so, the long-standing Chinese lack of a sophisticated understanding of Japanese politics is still undercutting their policies. Is the Chinese government divided over its Japan policy? If so, the propitious set of circumstances created by the signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty of peace may prove to be short-lived.

The best example of new developments diverting Chinese policy

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from its indicated line of advance is Indochina. Fighting between Cambodia and Vietnam poses a major dilemma for China. The Chinese would prefer not to see all of the peninsula come under Hanoi's sway; at the same time, support of its only asset in the area, Cambodia, is both embarrassing (given the nature of the Pol Pot government) and likely to prove ineffective. Meanwhile, the wholesale support of Hanoi by the U.S.S.R. virtually dictates Chinese policy. The unexpected exodus of the Chinese community in Vietnam is a further aggravating element. China cannot afford to ignore these refugees, given its current policy of seeking cordial relations with the overseas Chinese. However, to the extent that China makes a major issue out of the fate of the Chinese in Vietnam, it will cause alarm in the ASEAN states, all of which have significant Chinese populations. Certainly most disturbing to Peking in the entire matter is the ability of the U.S.S.R. to open new fronts on different parts of China's border. China still has many unsettled matters with all of its neighbors, including its support of internal revolutionaries in places such as Burma. Failure to repair relations with the subcontinent and Southeast Asia could severely affect China's overall strategy, and leave open the ominous possibility of Soviet encirclement.

VIII

China is only beginning its recovery from the Cultural Revolution. As late as the end of 1977, Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Politburo member Fang Yi said that the situation in science and education was so bad that "virtually everything needs to be done." In foreign policy, the Chinese have identified the problems and forged policies to deal with them. The world waits to see if the leadership can liberate the creative energies of the Chinese people and lead them to mutually advantageous relationships with other nations. If not, the alternative would appear to be a return to the sterile internal dispute over what the Chinese should do with their revolution now that they have won it—and a heightened Chinese susceptibility to Soviet pressure. The policies of the United States and of its Second World allies will influence, not decisively but importantly, China's progress in either direction.

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Neville Maxwell

WHY THE RUSSIANS LIFTED THE BLOCKADE AT BEAR ISLAND

In the river traffic that swings past the great Soviet city of Khabarovsk this summer, down the Amur and back up the Ussuri and in the opposite direction, there are Chinese as well as Soviet vessels. The great bulk of the traffic is Soviet: passenger ferries, freighters, barge trains loaded with raw materials, agricultural machinery and other cargo for the development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East, occasionally a rakish gunboat setting off upstream to its patrol station. But now, after a ten-year break, some Chinese ferries and cargo boats carrying coal or agricultural produce pass that way too. Such passage of Chinese boat traffic through the confluence of the rivers and past Khabarovsk reflects the lifting last year of a blockade which the Soviet Union had imposed in 1967. The circumstances and motivation behind that action, hidden until now, indicate an important shift of power in the historical confrontation of China and Russia over these river frontiers—in China's favor.

In 1967 the first Chinese river boat attempting after the thaw of that year to navigate down the Amur to the confluence, intending to turn there and go back up the Ussuri, was stopped by Soviet gunboats some 40 kilometers upstream from the confluence, boarded, detained, and finally sent back. Establishing a matching blockade on the Ussuri, the Soviet Union, by the exercise of superior military force, thus denied China the right, which it had exercised since the establishment of the People's Republic, to send vessels from one river to another through the confluence. The blockade forced Chinese vessels wishing to travel from one river into the other to try to navigate through a narrow channel that connects the rivers upstream from their true confluence. At this point the question of navigation rights on the border rivers interlocks with the Sino-Soviet quarrel in its most vexed aspect, the dispute over territory.

The 1860 Treaty of Peking, which made the Amur and the

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

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Ussuri Rivers the boundary between the empires of China and Russia, stipulates that the boundary lies through the rivers' confluence. The Soviet Union, however, basing its claim on maps exchanged between Russia and China in 1861, maintains that the boundary runs instead along the interconnecting channel above the meeting point of the rivers' main streams, known to the Russians as the Kozakevicheva Channel and to the Chinese as the Fuyuan Stream. The alignment claimed by Moscow makes the reaches of the Amur and Ussuri between the Kozakevicheva/Fuyuan channel and the main confluence Soviet inland waterways, and the delta-shaped island between those stretches of water, Soviet territory. The Soviet Union has occupied that island, known to the Chinese as Hei Hsia-tzu or "Bear Island," since the late 1920s; Peking maintains that it is legally Chinese territory, and the stretches of the border rivers alongside it, international waterways. In the Chinese view, the Kozakevicheva/Fuyuan channel is legally a Chinese inland waterway.

The territory involved here is small—Bear Island has an area of only about 300 square kilometers—and the upstream channel makes an economical short-cut for small boats when the rivers are high. But from the Soviets' point of view the security of Khabarovsk is involved: reversion of Bear Island to Chinese control would put them directly across the river from that city. From the Chinese viewpoint, on the other hand, this dispute rests on a fundamental matter of principle: whether Moscow will unilaterally decide the lie of the Sino-Soviet boundaries, in accordance with the Russian perception of Soviet interest, or whether the boundaries will be settled through negotiation on the basis of their only legal foundation, the alignments described in the Treaty of Peking.

The blockade established by the Soviet Union in 1967 not only imposed Moscow's reading of the boundary at the rivers' meeting point, but also marked the most severe step to that date in a progressive attempt to force China to recognize Moscow's sovereignty over the entire width of the border rivers, or, failing such acknowledgment, to deny China all use of the rivers. The intensifying Sino-Soviet quarrel through the 1960s made the question of navigation rights in the rivers a fundamental test of resolve and strength between the two contestants.

II

Like so many other aspects of the hostility between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, this one has deep historical roots. The dispute over navigation rights on the Amur

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and the Ussuri goes back over a century. Tsarist Russia regarded and used the Amur and Ussuri as its own national waterways through most of the nineteenth century, and particularly after the treaties of Aigun and Peking (1858, 1860) made great tracts of what had been Chinese territory part of Imperial Russia and the rivers the boundary. Chinese vessels were excluded. China seized the opportunity in 1918 after the Russian revolution to gain access to the Amur and Ussuri. But the new Soviet authorities excluded Chinese vessels from the Amur once again in 1923, imitating their Tsarist predecessors by using gunboats to block the mouth of the Sungari on the Amur. An agreement signed the following year reopened the common stretches of the Amur and the Ussuri to Chinese navigation; and that was confirmed in an agreement on river navigation reached between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic in 1951.

But beneath those agreements lay a profound and potentially explosive disagreement. Moscow claims that the treaties of Aigun and Peking place the boundary line along the Chinese bank, giving the Soviet Union "exclusive rights of possession and sovereign jurisdiction" over the border rivers in their entirety, and that therefore any Chinese navigation on them, or use of river islands, requires Soviet approval. That Soviet claim, based upon the maps exchanged by Russian and Chinese boundary commissioners in 1861, Peking rejects. China maintains that the texts of the treaties, which cite the rivers as the actual boundary, imply a Chinese right to equal use of their waters for navigation or other purposes. Ownership of islands in the rivers, the Chinese contend, is decided by the run of the deepest part of the main channel (the *thalweg*), along which lies the actual line of separation.

This dispute, though narrow in its territorial scope, has profound implications for relations between the two neighbors. The Chinese would see any coerced surrender of their treaty rights as a return to the old relationship of superiority and inferiority, which could be applied in other realms of Sino-Soviet dealings and certainly in other sectors of their borders. Assertion of right of access to the rivers thus appears to Peking as crucial to China's whole relationship to the Soviet Union and therefore its standing in the world. That perception, not, as some analysts concluded, an exaggerated concern for a tiny and useless patch of territory, led China in March 1969 to give battle on Chenpao Island.

In that winter the Soviet side had brought to maximum pitch its measures to keep the Chinese off the frozen surface of the rivers, and the Chinese at last had no alternative except to concede

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defeat or to fight. They fought. And since they chose as battleground an island not only close to their own bank but also dominated by a substantial hill on which they could deploy artillery, they won. The Soviet forces could have gained control of Chenpao (which they call Damansky) by landing on the Chinese bank and capturing that hill; but such a tactic would have escalated the conflict from a skirmish in disputed territory to an invasion of China. Moscow pulled back from that brink.

The Chinese thus kept control of Chenpao, as they proved when they let this writer visit it in 1973. Their victory there kept their access to the rivers intact, though challenged. When Soviet Premier Kosygin met Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in Peking later in 1969, they negotiated a ceasefire on the rivers. But the Soviet side maintained the blockade at Bear Island.

For China to attempt to force the blockade was always out of the question. The Soviet Union has absolute superiority on the rivers when those are not frozen; the Chinese have nothing which could stand up to the powerful gunboats with which the Soviet side patrols them. Beyond that, to initiate open conflict with Soviet patrol boats could be seen by Moscow as an act of war. China had to submit to the blockade.[1] The Chinese withdrew cooperation in navigational matters (meetings of the joint commission on navigation in 1973 and 1974 broke up without achieving any agreement except on meeting again), but otherwise did nothing about the blockade except protest it.

In May 1974, Moscow made a conditional offer to lift the blockade. Chinese vessels could navigate through the confluence when low water made the Fuyuan Channel unusable—provided that the Chinese acknowledged that in doing so they were using Soviet national waterways with Soviet permission. That "good will offer," as *Pravda* described it, Peking angrily rejected as a "hypocritical and shameless attempt at blackmail." The Chinese read Moscow's démarche as a ploy, put forth in order to be rejected and thus make Peking look intransigent; acceptance would have collapsed the whole Chinese negotiating position on the border question by making China accept the Soviet claim to Bear Island in order to obtain permission to navigate around it. In rejoinder, Peking asserted "the inalienable right for Chinese boats to navigate the main channel [of the two rivers] through the confluence." The

[1] There was a different outcome when the Soviet Union used gunboats to close off a navigational channel of the Amur south of Blagoveshchensk in 1937. The Japanese, then the power affected, sank one of the Soviet boats and landed troops on islands they claimed. The Soviet side backed down.

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deadlock appeared complete.

But last year the joint Sino-Soviet commission on river navigation met again, this time in the Chinese river port of Hei-Ho (the commission meets alternately in Hei-Ho and Blagoveshchensk, just across the Amur), and the two sides announced in October that they had reached agreements. Victor Louis, the journalist and putative KGB agent whom Moscow uses to float ideas in quasi-official form (in 1969 he reported that Soviet patience was at an end and that war with China was at hand), reported from Blagoveshchensk to the London *Evening News* later that month that "Russia and China are getting friendly again." Louis ascribed the improved atmosphere, with Chinese waving across the waters and being "tactful and courteous" in their dealings with Russians, to a "peace overture" just made in a speech by Brezhnev.

It later transpired that in September the Soviet Union had lifted the blockade, and thereafter Chinese vessels had been able to navigate past Khabarovsk, from one river to another. Neither side drew attention to the ending of the decade-long blockade, which consequently passed almost unnoticed in the West. Both sides are still being reticent on this score, but from diplomatic and other sources in Peking and elsewhere it has been possible to put together the background.

One factor that changed the situation behind the apparent deadlock lay in the rivers themselves. Silting in the Kozakevicheva/Fuyuan channel had made navigation there increasingly difficult, even for small boats and at high water. (Help to dredge out an all-summer channel had been part of the Soviet "goodwill" package offered and rejected in 1974.) More important, the vagaries of the river's flow in another stretch of the Amur, well upstream from the confluence, had turned the main channel to run between the Chinese bank and a Chinese-held island. This shift did not affect either side's interpretation of the legal position of the rivers. In Moscow's view only Soviet traffic has unqualified right on the rivers. Peking's position in this regard was spelled out in the 1961 Sino-Burmese boundary treaty: "In case the river changes its course, the boundary line between the two countries shall remain unchanged in the absence of other agreements between the two sides." But since the Chinese perceived the Soviet Union as acting illegally in maintaining a blockade on one sector of disputed waterway, the changed course of the navigational channel, which sent Soviet river traffic through what Peking regarded as a Chinese arm of the river, offered the opportunity to apply reciprocal pressure—by tacitly threatening a counter-blockade.

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III

How explicit was the signal about river navigation sent by Peking to Moscow in 1977, through the usual diplomatic channels, is not known. But it linked the issues of the emerging impossibility of navigating through the Kozakevicheva/Fuyuan channel; the illegality of the blockade at Bear Island; and the fact that Soviet river traffic was now regularly navigating through what Peking saw as a Chinese arm of the Amur. The message clearly intimated that Soviet vessels could not expect to continue to use that passage unhindered unless the Soviets lifted their blockade down-river.

In the negotiations that followed, prior to and separate from the Hei-Ho meetings on navigation, the Chinese compromised. They agreed that if their vessels were again navigating through the confluence they would restrict themselves to daytime, and would give Soviet river traffic authorities notice when passage through the confluence was intended. China had, under protest, bowed to the same Soviet demands in the early 1960s, and Peking now saw itself as merely reverting to the situation that had obtained before the imposition of the blockade. More important from China's point of view, the agreement was explicitly stated to be without prejudice to or bearing on either side's position concerning the boundary-cum-territorial dispute. Moscow's 1974 attempt to tie passage for Chinese traffic through the confluence to Peking's acknowledgment of Soviet sovereignty over Bear Island had no echoes in the 1977 agreement.

In its own perception, Moscow clearly made a substantial concession in removing its gunboats from the permanent stations they had kept at the ends of the Kozakevicheva/Fuyuan channel, and allowing Chinese boats to sail again past Khabarovsk. That there was no attempt to turn this to Soviet propaganda advantage by publicizing the ending of the blockade may seem surprising—until one reflects that the Chinese would surely have countered by calling attention to their own forbearance (and implied threat) toward Soviet traffic in the changed section of the Amur. Thus, publicity would have made the lifting of the Soviet blockade seem a retreat under pressure, rather than a concession.

Concession or retreat, the ending of the blockade must be seen as a significant development, perhaps the only such move that the Soviet Union has made in a territorial dispute since World War II. However Moscow sees it, from Peking's point of view it must be further evidence that the Soviet Union treats every issue, every aspect of the relationship, as a test of strength, and that only when equality of resolve, and even of local advantage, is demonstrated can equitable settlement of disputes be hoped for.

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IV

For all Victor Louis' report of an improved climate in relations across the rivers, later evidence shows that the situation there must still be tense. Whatever the explanation for the mysterious incident on May 9, 1978, when Soviet border guards in platoon strength, supported by helicopters, landed on the Chinese bank of the Ussuri and penetrated a couple of miles inland, it can only have expressed—and accentuated—tension. The Soviet Union's border guards are crack elements of the KGB, and that such troops, operating in their own familiar area, could mistake the Chinese bank for a river island, as Moscow claimed in its apology for the incident, is beyond credence. The only explanation seems to be that the local commander of the KGB took a deliberate risk, for a stake that was worth it, and lost.

What the stake was can only be guessed at. Moscow's apology said the Soviet force was hunting an armed criminal. But the Chinese charged that the Soviet troops put up heavy fire, and the Russians have apparently not denied it, although they do deny that any casualties were inflicted. One senior Soviet official told a visiting Western scholar in Moscow, just before this Ussuri incident, that Soviet border forces on the rivers had orders in case of clashes over territory "to shoot to kill first and inform the government only afterwards," which would at the least tend to make troops trigger-happy.

The situation along the rivers, as elsewhere along the frontier, is clearly such that armed conflict will break out whenever either side seeks to assert what it sees as its rights against the other's resistance. Tranquillity could emerge only in the aftermath of a comprehensive boundary settlement, which would lay down river navigation rights and rules without reservation or dispute over what was exercised as a right, what simply permitted. Negotiations on the general issue of the boundaries continue sporadically in Peking. But those exchanges now focus on the Chinese insistence on implementation of measures for the de-fusing of flashpoints in disputed territory through the joint establishment of limited demilitarized zones. The Chinese side maintains that such measures were agreed at the 1969 Chou En-lai/Kosygin summit—but Moscow flatly denies that the Premiers reached any such agreement. This impasse seems to leave settlement of the boundary dispute itself remote indeed.

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FACING UP TO THE TRADE GAP WITH JAPAN

Last year, the United States ran an eight billion dollar trade deficit with Japan, and this year the figure is running 50 percent higher. As a key component in the overall U.S. balance-of-payments deficit, a recurring irritant in U.S.-Japanese overall relations, and a significant factor in the decline of the dollar over the past year, the state of trade between the United States and Japan is now a critically important problem.

As the deficit grows, so does, for many, discomfort with the long-held explanation of Japanese surplus. Japan did indeed achieve notoriety by promoting exports and restricting imports. But for some time Japan has been doing less promoting and restricting, yet watching its surplus embarrassingly grow. Further, to perceive the problem in these terms tends to emphasize the role of governments on both sides.

Yet, it is increasingly clear that the market mechanism, not distortions of it, is the main driving force in bilateral trade. This brings us to the United States. The more prolonged the mythology about Japanese behavior, the more deferred is analysis of the realities of U.S. competitive performance in Japan. It is appropriate now to examine this latter issue in some detail.

II

For a very long time and until very recently, Japan was utterly protectionist in every aspect of international economic interaction. All transactions—goods in trade, technology sale and purchase, capital inflow and outflow—were closely regulated and circumscribed. Japan had long been isolated, and has a keen sense of

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difference from other societies. It felt itself poor, and in fact both in resources and in accumulated wealth remains poor today. There was a real and sharp anxiety lest the nation be overwhelmed by stronger and wealthier foreign interests. A national policy of exclusion of foreign capital and products found a quite willing public.

This is history. Beginning slowly and cautiously in the mid-1960s, and accelerating steadily into the 1970s, the process of dismantling and relaxing controls and regulations was undertaken. It can be argued that the process took too long, and was too slow, even from the point of view of Japan's own interests. But against the historical background, the transition took place with what must be seen as extraordinary speed. At least in terms of official policy, Japan is now about as open in all aspects of transaction as other OECD member countries.

However, history has left its residual. A Japanese public and, more to the present point, Japanese bureaucracy, long schooled in the grim necessity for export efforts and import defense, do not change their attitudes instantly. Bureaucratic survivals—irritants regarding foreign exchange regulations, cumbersome procedures for "automatic" approvals of company actions, exclusion-oriented customs officials — serve as reminders of Japan's very recent past. And, as will be noted, not all of these surviving practices are innocuous. Still, the main current of events and policy has moved in a different direction.

The more important relic of Japan's obdurately protectionist past, in terms of consequences for present trade flows, is found in the attitudes of the U.S. and European business communities and some government officials toward Japan. Most American companies and most senior U.S. businessmen have had direct experience with Japan. Their experience has been with a closed market into which direct investment was possible only under the most onerous conditions, and into which technology could be sold only under rigid scrutiny. The experience has been at best frustrating for most companies, and at its worst has given rise to dangerous competitors in the domestic market. The West has been slow to perceive the recent rapid changes in this distant and ill-understood society; many views and attitudes that are no longer valid are still tenaciously held.

Japan's economic success has itself fostered misperceptions. A non-Western nation achieving the highest levels of output and income is in the nature of things rather a mystery. From the fact that Japan is on the whole homogeneous socially, it is perhaps an

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inevitable leap to the conclusion that Japan's enormous and complex economy is also homogeneous – that is, centrally directed and monolithic. Thus arose the notion of "Japan, Inc.," an economy that responds instantly to tightly planned and controlled central instructions. Japan's economic policy uncertainties and blunders might well have laid that ghost to rest. The notion persists, however.

These remarks are meant to point out certain hazards in addressing the U.S.-Japan trade interaction. It is well to make some attempt to put these attitudes and historical views to one side, at least for a time, and look instead at the economics of the problem.

III

The well-known U.S. deficit in trade with Japan has a less well-known aspect. Over a wide range of product categories, the United States has for some years been losing its share as an exporter of products to Japan. Table I shows the U.S. share of Japan's imports of both basic materials and manufactured goods, comparing the annual average of the 1968-70 period and the 1976-77 period, and noting the share change over the intervening years.

TABLE I

IMPACT OF IMPORT MARKET SHARE LOSS ON 1977 IMPORTS TO JAPAN FROM THE UNITED STATES

Category	*Total 1977 Japan Imports (billion dollars)*	*1968-70 U.S. Share (percent)*	*1976-77 U.S. Share (percent)*	*Impact of Share Loss (million dollars)*
Food	$11.3	37.8%	33.5%	$ 485
Wood Fiber, Rubber, etc.	6.5	29.6	31.4	(117)
Metal Ores and Scrap	4.8	14.8	5.0	470
Coal	3.5	58.0	32.2	901
Refined Petroleum Products	2.2	21.2	7.0	310
Cotton and Wool	2.0	11.0	17.0	(120)
Basic Materials Sub-Total	$30.3			$ 1,930
Capital Equipment	$ 4.4	61.0%	51.3%	$ 428
Chemicals	2.9	41.2	39.6	46
Finished Metals	2.0	8.6	6.3	46
Consumer Nondurables	1.5	32.4	12.6	296
Consumer Durables	1.3	39.5	27.2	161
Textiles	0.7	8.7	5.6	22
Manufactured Sub-Total	$12 .8			$ 999
TOTAL OF CATEGORIES LISTED	$43 .1			
TOTAL IMPACT				$ 2,929

NOTE: All Japanese imports are calculated on a customs clearance basis. The categories included in this table represent 94 percent of Japan's total imports in 1977, excepting crude petroleum.

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Japan's imports are largely raw materials, fuel and food. It is these basic materials that account for the large swings in Japan's trade balance and which must be looked to first in seeking relief from a deficit in Japan's trade. The trend is not encouraging. The United States has substantially increased its share of Japan's imports only in the category of cotton and wool. This is the smallest of the basic materials categories, and is moreover the slowest growing as Japan's natural fiber processing industries move offshore. In the category of wood fiber, rubber, etc., the United States has slightly improved its position, due no doubt to the favorable location and competitive position of the Pacific Northwest as wood fiber supplier to Japan.

In all other basic material categories the United States has been losing its share, most dramatically as a supplier of coal to Japan. In less than ten years the United States has moved from being the dominant supplier of coal to a second position after Australia. The Pacific Basin countries, Australia, Canada and "developing Asia" (East Asia less the People's Republic of China) are increasingly the suppliers of coal and other raw materials at U.S. expense.

The pattern is more dramatic still with respect to manufactured goods imported into Japan. The United States has lost its share as supplier to Japan in each category of manufactured imports. Western Europe has also tended to lose share although on balance to a lesser degree than the United States. In each category of manufactured goods, not only in textiles but in such sophisticated categories as capital equipment and chemicals, the share loss has largely been to the developing countries in Asia. As Table I shows, the total impact of this share loss was a diminution of exports to Japan from the United States of some three billion dollars in 1977, of which two billion dollars has been in basic materials and one billion dollars in manufactured goods.

It should be noted that the share losses of the United States as a supplier to Japan are calculated here using 1968-70 as the base period. This is the period during which the yen was exchanged with the U.S. dollar at a fixed rate of 360 to 1. The revaluation of the yen against the U.S. dollar began immediately after this period to the late August 1978 level of about 185 to 1. Most Asian currencies and the Australian dollar have tended to move with the U.S. dollar against the yen as the yen rose in value. Thus there has been little, if any, exchange rate disadvantage for the United States as supplier to Japan against other competitors, and an exchange rate advantage against deutschemark-denominated supplies.

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It might be supposed that developing Asia has become a favored source because Japanese investment in the area has won it favored access to the Japanese market. The issue is hard to measure; however, the investment data do not support the notion. At the end of 1976, cumulative direct investment in Asia by Japan and the United States was at a similar level, $5.9 billion for the United States compared with $5.5 billion for Japan. The comparative level of investment in manufacturing is similar, with a difference in mix. For example, U.S. investment in chemical manufacture in Asia is twice that of Japan; the U.S. loss of share of chemical imports to developing Asia might be explained by a multinational company hypothesis, but cannot be explained by a "Japanese conspiracy" theory.

The fact that the United States is losing its share of the Japanese market in most categories of Japanese imports puts the trade balance issue into a rather different perspective. Trade barriers cannot explain these data. Whatever the barriers, the United States is supplying a smaller part of what Japan does in fact take in. This is the case despite U.S. advantages over other suppliers — a longer history of close trade association; much the highest level of what foreign investment there is in Japan; and close strategic association. The United States is losing its market share; it is losing its competitive position. At least this part of the trade balance problem comes back squarely to the United States and its economic performance.

The problem is not confined to U.S. trade with Japan, although it is particularly acute there. The U.S. share of world trade has declined steadily over the last decade, even excluding crude petroleum. In a similar period the U.S. share of Japanese imports (excluding petroleum) declined approximately seven percentage points. The impact of loss of market share in so large a market is great, and Japan's export levels make it especially conspicuous and painful on a bilateral basis. But the basic fact of share decline is the same worldwide and the basic causes are presumably the same. Some considerable part of efforts to redress the Japanese trade balance must be devoted to understanding, and remedying, the total decline in the U.S. world trade position.

IV

When addressing the issue of improvement of the U.S. share, the first question that arises is the ability of the Japanese economy to absorb additional imports. As Japan's 1977 trade balance illus-

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trates, Japan runs a massive surplus in manufactured goods trade, and a massive deficit in trade in food, raw materials and energy. The United States also had a surplus in 1977 on the manufactured goods account but that surplus was down sharply in 1977 from as recently as 1975, owing to a disproportionate increase in imports.[1] As was recently highlighted in public discussion concerning the July economic summit in Bonn, recent increases in American imports of manufactured goods have actually been at least as significant in creating the massive overall U.S. trade deficit as the continued high level of U.S. oil imports.

The differences in trade patterns are striking. Japan essentially exports no food, raw materials or energy. Nearly all of Japan's exports are manufactured goods. At the same time, three-quarters of Japan's imports are basic materials, food and fuel. The numbers illustrate a critical point in considering Japan's position. Japan must import. Without imports, Japan's living standard would drop back to the level of more than a century ago. Any rational Japanese policy must focus on the availability and security of supply of the materials needed to maintain and improve the country's level of well-being.

Exports first of all pay for the imports. It is easy now to forget the long period in which Japan's growth was constrained by balance-of-payments problems. Through the 1950s and 1960s, Japan's growth would periodically require more imports than Japan could afford. At about four- to five-year intervals, growth in domestic demand—which was and remains the engine of Japan's total economic growth—had to be cut back sharply to correct a severe payments imbalance.

Despite the crude oil problem, in 1977 only 44 percent of U.S. imports were fuel, raw materials and food. For Japan, the proportion was 78 percent. In other words, despite Japan's growth and export success, the basic issue has not changed—managing to secure necessary imports. It is not surprising that the manufactured goods trade balance has been massively favorable. Only that

[1] According to the authoritative calculations of the Japanese Ministry of Finance, the overall Japanese trade balance in 1977 showed a surplus of $9.7 billion (comprising $80.5 billion of exports and $70.8 billion of imports). In manufactured goods, the favorable balance was $63.2 billion (comprising $78.9 billion of exports and $15.7 billion of imports). This more than offset the very large unfavorable balance in raw materials and food of $53.5 billion (comprising $1.6 billion of exports and $55.1 billion of imports). Similar authoritative estimates by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris show that the U.S. trade balance in manufactured goods was favorable in 1975 to the tune of $22.3 billion (comprising $71.2 billion of exports and $48.9 billion of imports). In 1977, this favorable balance had shrunk to $6.9 billion, with exports of manufactured goods up to $89.0 billion but imports in the same category substantially increased, to $82.1 billion.

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favorable balance, and a correspondingly favorable exchange rate, made imports possible.

The space available for import of manufactured goods to Japan is certainly much greater now than only a few years ago. In 1974, it required 82 percent of Japan's total export income to pay for imports of raw materials, food and fuel. By 1977, however, this proportion declined to 68 percent, reflecting primarily the export value surge and the decline in the import cost as a result of the combination of the yen revaluation and the large amount of imports denominated in a falling dollar. For the United States, in contrast, the food, raw materials and fuel import bill in 1974 was 53 percent of total exports, and the export income available for import of other goods was substantial. In 1977, the U.S. position was unchanged, with imports of raw materials, food and fuel 54 percent of exports.

How stable this new Japanese ratio may be is, of course, unknown. Japan is under considerable external pressure to increase its economic growth rate, and there are substantial internal reasons as well for the Japanese to place greater emphasis on domestic consumer demand. Yet Japan's dollar exports, swelled by yen revaluation, are now so high that even sustained rapid economic growth around the seven percent level will not raise the ratio significantly. The ability of the Japanese economy to accept manufactured imports, however less proportionately than the United States', is now beyond question. The Japanese consumer can only benefit from any enlarged flow.

This increased capacity to accept manufactured imports means that Japan can in fact accelerate the process of disinvestment in those labor-intensive and energy-intensive sectors that are uneconomic and unsuitable if the economy is to move further forward in output and income. Before examining that issue, however, it must be emphasized again that most of Japan's import market remains in basic materials and most of Japan's foreign exchange income goes to pay for those materials. What is the prospect of U.S. improvements in position in this sector?

V

Taking the principal categories of basic materials shown in Table I in their order of quantitative importance, the picture is roughly as follows:

In *food,* it is fundamental that Japan—like the European Economic Community and to some degree the United States — is bedeviled by an economically inappropriate agricultural policy.

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U.S. protests against import restrictions are appropriate and useful. One unofficial estimate puts lost U.S. food exports to Japan attributable to quantitative restrictions and high duties at $800 million. However, political constraints on the Japanese government make any significant sudden change highly unlikely. At present, the United States is holding or gaining share in the main categories of grain, meat, fish, and soybeans. Although the Japanese mix of food imports has turned modestly away from these staples, the U.S. position remains basically strong.

In other raw material import categories, it is economics that dictate. In the case of *wood and wood products,* for example, improvement in the U.S. position is entirely feasible, for the United States has a plentiful supply and a strong cost position. However, U.S. products typically achieve higher price realizations in the U.S. market and U.S. producers have not been prepared to refit mills to meet Japanese dimension and quality requirements in lumber. There is, too, the problem of prohibition on log exports from federal lands.

In *iron ore, scrap and coal,* where the U.S. share loss has been substantial, there is again no problem of barriers but rather that, with the Japanese seeking lowest cost sources, other nations have been underpricing American exports, and the U.S. share will probably decrease further as a result of the recent Japanese trade agreement with Peking, which specifically provides for imports of these materials from the People's Republic of China.

Similarly, in *refined oil products,* the sharp U.S. share loss (principally to Asian refineries) is not due to any sourcing barriers but to relative economies and supplies availability. The issue of petroleum again raises the question of U.S. willingness to supply Japan. The prohibition on sale of North Slope crude abroad is, of course, aimed directly at Japan, the obvious market for that crude. The United States has chosen not to supply, to the considerable disadvantage of the bilateral trade balance and the North Slope producers.

In *cotton and wool,* the United States is gaining share in a slow-growth category. Again, there are no barriers, and the issue is U.S. competitiveness as Japanese purchases move downstream from basic fibers to yarn, for example. *Copper* has shown a steady decline in the U.S. share, both in ore and processed copper. And, finally, although *paper pulp* has not been significant, the U.S. share position is basically good and there is a growing opportunity once the industry emerges from the present temporary inventory glut.

In short, in all areas except food, the issue is whether the United

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States is the most cost-efficient supplier. It continues to meet this test in food, logs and cotton. But where lower-cost supply has been developed—ores and refined petroleum products—trade has moved away from the United States.

Moreover, it must be said that the credibility of the United States as a reliable supplier is in some question. Japan's needs are for basic materials, which are critical to the Japanese economy. Japan cannot be at the mercy of the world spot market for its basic requirements, nor give a significant proportion of its business to an unreliable supplier. U.S. past practices here raise policy questions for Japan. The long series of restrictions on wood product exports, the restrictions on North Slope crude, the abrogation of soybean contracts—these kinds of U.S. decisions are a real issue for Japan. These decisions may be entirely appropriate for political or other reasons, but they are very expensive for the U.S. economy. In addition, they work against the United States in its efforts to further penetrate Japan's market for imported food, raw materials and energy, and other areas as well. Recent agreements under which Japan will receive substantially increased quantities of basic materials from the People's Republic of China must be seen in this context, and also in terms of Japan's efforts generally to diversify its supply sources.

VI

There can be no question of Japan's move to increase manufactured imports. The foreign exchange position makes it possible; the revaluation of the yen makes it attractive; the further development of the economy requires moves to higher value-added domestic production and increased imports; the economics of the marketplace dictate it; the policy of the Japanese government encourages it. The question is whether the U.S. position will be maintained and improved. The record to date, as indicated in the share loss figures, suggests that while the United States strives with some success to open the trade doors to Japan, other countries' products enter the opening door.

To attempt to assess the Japanese industrial situation in terms of specific product categories and barriers would be a long and tedious task. Rather, let us look broadly at what can be identified as four quite distinct business sectors. Their very diversity helps to convey something of the complexity of the Japanese economy, and to underscore again the limited utility of such stereotypes as "Japan, Inc."

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First, there is *the heavy industry sector*—steel, chemicals, petrochemicals, aluminum, shipbuilding, synthetic fibers. In Japanese terms, this may be called the "Keiretsu/Group Sector," as most of Japan's traditional business groups—Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and others—are entrenched in this sector. Heavily supported by government in the 1950s when it was truly basic to Japan's growth, it is today—like some of the same industries in Europe and America—under the most pressure from changing economics. With the exception of steel, these industries in Japan are now in trouble. They tend to be raw material-intensive, energy-intensive and pollution-intensive, and Japan is now a high-cost and inefficient site for such operations (apart from the already high and increasing labor costs of Japan, which of course have long refuted the ancient myth about Japanese "cheap labor").[2]

Hence, Japan is generally now in a situation of domestic overcapacity, and having to cope with the same problems of dislocation and scrapping of existing facilities that the United States has faced. In many industries, Japan itself is now investing abroad in the producing countries that also now have the capacity to produce intermediate materials—chemical feedstocks, aluminum ingots, paper pulp, and the like. For example, Japanese aluminum projects now underway or committed include major facilities in Indonesia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Canada. All of these are joint ventures with local interests. All are world-scale. They will together add more than 25 percent to Japan's capacity. The United States is unlikely under these conditions to be the supplier.

Indeed, the plans of Dow Chemical to establish a world-scale caustic soda facility in South Korea, in part to supply the very high-cost Japanese market, indicate that U.S. industry itself feels compelled to turn to cost-efficient, third-country sources of supply—which, however, means that the U.S. balance of payments is not improved by Japan's market needs.

From the Japanese standpoint, can this process be managed in an orderly fashion, and can Japan be sure that its overseas investments will in fact be the low-cost suppliers? The answer is, of course, No, and there are protectionist possibilities here that must be watched. Moreover, although Japan's basic dependency on raw material imports is immutable and must be lived with, a similar dependency on imported intermediate materials—at the mercy of price swings in these highly cyclical businesses—raises serious

[2] In his recent article, "Japan: The Problems of Success," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1978, pp. 564–78, Peter F. Drucker has discussed demographic trends and their possible impact on future trends in labor costs in Japan.

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questions. To Japan, security of supply may at times be even more basic than cost, and Japan is likely to seek that goal through diversification of sources.

Here, the United States might conceivably make limited gains, if the U.S. public and private sectors could somehow find the means to ensure Japan the security of supply it seeks and requires. But there must be serious doubt whether this can be done from U.S.-based operations.

The second sector, identified here as *"political wards,"* is familiar if not from Japanese experience then from experience in all other developed countries. These are the businesses that present very real political problems. The group includes agriculture, of course, and also retail and wholesale distribution. Moreover, certain labor-intensive businesses—textile weaving and dyeing for one example, stainless steel flatware for another—are regional in location. Exchange rate changes are completing the process of devastation of a number of these business categories. The regional concentration of employment makes it politically necessary to manage the displacement of these businesses, offering adjustment aid and perhaps some trade protection. All of this sector is low in capital intensity, high in labor intensity and hence low in productivity. Changes are needed and will take place, but cannot be abrupt without severe political consequences.

We have already noted the importance of the issue of agricultural policy. Apart from food, most of the businesses in this "political ward" sector are not unlike those in which the United States has pressed for and obtained voluntary quotas—labor-intensive, with low productivity and regionally concentrated employment. The kinds of product areas that may be shielded by the government of Japan offer little to U.S. suppliers—it is Asian suppliers who will be asked for voluntary quotas by Japan, rather than U.S. suppliers. And it is a difficult sector against which to apply U.S. pressure. We are vulnerable.

Retailing is a somewhat special case. Current regulations do not legally discriminate against foreign companies, but there is a retail store law in Japan that limits the growth of large chains of whatever ownership. The situation is not unlike that in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s, when a number of local and state laws sought to limit supermarket growth.

The problem for the foreign entrant is essentially that of scale. To make entry possible, a minimum number of outlets are required. But the Japanese insist on store-by-store approval, which makes any major front-end effort at wholly owned stores by a U.S.

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retailer risky. Aside from retail investment in Japan, the United States should encourage and support major Japanese retailers in establishing direct buying centers in the United States. The proposed Seibu-Sears link is promising. Seibu, Japan's second largest retailer, has a number of associations with Sears. Access to Sears' buying competence and power by a major Japanese retailer bent on buying and distributing direct will be a real help to U.S. trade.

We have noted that the "Keiretsu/Group" sector is open to American imports from the standpoint of government policy, but the United States may not be the supplier most likely to benefit. In the case of the third business sector, the so-called *public policy companies,* the reverse is true on both counts. And the political roots of Japan's severe and deliberate barriers to foreign supply have no such understandable basis, or parallels to recent American experience, as in the case of the "political wards."

The 115-odd "special legal entities" in the "public policy" sector include, for example, the Japan Telephone and Telegraph Public Corporation, the Japan National Railways, and the Japan Monopoly Corporation. Their separate budgets are estimated to total about half of Japan's official national budget.[3] These corporations are essentially government-managed. They serve an important role as retirement places for Japanese senior bureaucrats, who tend to leave government service when in their fifties. The banking and finance areas, and especially the insurance business, share some of the characteristics of these public corporations in being carefully protected from foreign investment and domestic competition, and in taking in numbers of retired officials, from the Ministry of Finance especially.

The trade barriers against import access to Japan's public corporations are considerble. An example is the public Monopoly Corporation, whose restrictions on the import, sale and marketing of foreign cigarettes and other smoking materials, and whose prices and profits, border on the ludicrous. The barriers here are quite deliberate. The telephone corporation uses product specifications as a thoroughgoing barrier to sales of imported equipment. Public procurement of a broad range of items from computers and telecommunications gear to rolling stock for the rail system is

[3] The total of Japan's so-called second budget, the Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan, amounted to 48.5 percent of the general account budget in 1973, for example, and within the FILP about 80 percent was allocated to the special legal entities. The balance of the FILP went largely to local public policy companies of a closely related nature. Chalmers Johnson, *Japan's Public Policy Companies*, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, and Stanford: Hoover Institution (AEI-Hoover Policy Studies series), 1978, pp. 48, 83.

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broadly restrictive, even prohibitive. Japanese manufacturing companies supplying these products are competitive internationally and are becoming large exporters. This is a sector above all for government-to-government pressures. Some barriers are perhaps appropriate; many others will prove acutely embarrassing to the government of Japan if properly presented.

This general area seems likely to be the subject of at least broad agreement in principle in the current Geneva negotiations concerning all trade barriers. If Japan should fail to observe the spirit of these negotiations, direct U.S. government action will be appropriate—provided it is preceded by careful examination of the trade potential and determination of the appropriate pressure points. It is not clear that the improvement in U.S. exports will be massive. Only basic materials offer that kind of improvement potential. But this public corporation sector is highly visible, many of the products concerned have a high value-added, and the sector is a considerable irritant to the U.S. business community.

Finally, there is the sector most familiar to the individual American consumer—that of sophisticated *modern manufacturing*. Its products include industrial machinery of all kinds, consumer durables including automobiles, electronics, fine chemicals, etc. Here, obviously, Japan is extremely strong in global terms. The sector is the pride of the economy, the source of Japan's current export strength and the basis for future growth.

The clichés regarding Japan fit these businesses poorly. Competition is fierce. The traditional Keiretsu groups have generally failed in these businesses and the trading companies have no significant influence. Successful companies in this sector are profitable with low debt levels. Government direct support today plays a marginal role in the development of this sector, computers being the major exception.

All of these businesses were totally protected from import competition for a long period, but now all are open to import competition. There are instances of high tariffs, as in semiconductors and photographic film until recently, but even these are not critical to import sales performance. Leading companies in this sector—Toyota, Honda, Matsushita, Fuji Film, Shiseido, Seiko, Hitachi, and the like—are profitable, independent and quite well able to compete worldwide without assistance. The sector has its less luminous companies, but they seem unlikely to get special favorable treatment. The market decides the winners and controls the outcome.

There is still some barrier to imports from the United States and

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elsewhere in the approval procedures for products. The Japanese approval process does impede imports and compares badly with the explicit, readily available and independent procedures provided by Underwriters' Laboratories and other agencies in the United States. Most electrical and machinery items are subject to mandatory product testing for safety and other standards, in Japan as elsewhere, and products cannot be marketed until they have been approved by the designated agency. However, foreign manufacturers cannot apply for approval directly, but rather must depend on a Japanese entity to apply. Further, the testing must be done in Japan, while Underwriters', for example, maintains approval facilities in Japan for exporters to the United States. Finally, because the approval authority is not independent of the ministry concerned, there is substantial room for mistrust and misunderstanding.

For example, farm machinery must be approved by an agency of the Ministry of Agriculture. *Any* change in model specifications requires a new approval. The application must be accompanied by detailed drawings and specifications. The application goes to the end of the queue. Thus, a change in design of an imported product requires that the design change be made public, and a period of as much as 18 months may elapse before marketing approval is granted. A suspicion on the part of the importer that competitors may have time to study and meet his new design is not surprising.

This area is straightforward. There is no indication that the Japanese government will resist pressures to bring Japanese practice into line with that of the United States. And failure of the government of Japan to follow U.S. practice can easily be countered by a shift in U.S. practice toward the Japanese approach.

With the exception of product approval procedures, the area of modern manufacturing must be considered essentially open. The recent loss of share by the United States in nearly all the aggregate categories of trade in modern manufacturing must be laid to the competitive behavior of U.S. companies. To this we now turn.

VII

U.S. private corporations will ultimately determine the level of U.S. penetration of the Japanese market. As has been discussed, Japan has been doubly protected in the past from foreign products and investment—first by its own system of protectionism and controls, but also by the indifference of a great many U.S.

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companies toward Japan. The enormous flow of U.S. *technology* to Japan in the 1950s and 1960s reflected (and compounded) both protectionist trends. On the one hand, entry to Japan was difficult and the Japanese were eager to buy technology. On the other hand, the foreign company often had no real determination to enter Japan. The market seemed small and remote. Technology sales seemed inexpensive. The income from written-off investment in research and development (R&D) was attractive.

The result has been a disaster. Over the years, the cumulative cost to Japan of technology purchases from abroad—more than 25,000 contracts covering essentially all the technology the West had to offer, most of it from the United States—has been about six billion dollars. That is a little more than ten percent of the annual R&D expenditure of the United States. More to the point, that technology has nurtured competitors who now enter or threaten U.S. markets. And as a final irony, technology which might have been a lever to enter the Japanese market has been surrendered, and with it the advantage that might have made entry successful.

Shortsighted? Yes. But natural enough, for the U.S. business community was not alone in underestimating Japan's potential. Further, income from technology sales can be critical to a company that is under severe pressure to improve short-term earnings per share and to a manager under pressure to increase his return on investment. The income is nearly net, with little associated expense. And the investment is nil. Finally, given the current enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws, a number of U.S. companies particularly distinguished for their R&D performance are forced to make patents available worldwide to all buyers at a reasonable price. This continued access to U.S. developments is another of the self-imposed trade penalties under which the United States suffers.

The problems of perspective and of time horizon pervade the question of U.S. corporate performance in Japan. Part of the problem is the well-known issue of relative market size. Like the Dutch, Swiss and Swedes, the Japanese see (or have usually seen) their domestic market as small. Each foreign market is important, and the U.S. market as the largest is critical. To the U.S. company the domestic market is huge and each foreign market is relatively unimportant. Since the less well-understood foreign market also offers higher risks, a tendency to focus on the domestic U.S. market is natural enough. Japan, especially small and especially unknown, not surprisingly came well down on the priority list of most U.S. corporations.

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The performance of U.S. companies selling into Japan is mixed. Some have done very well, manufacturing from a U.S. base, hoarding their technology, investing in Japanese distribution, and both fending off competitors and preventing backward integration by customers. Nor are these necessarily large corporations. Du-pont, Boeing, Upjohn, Texas Instruments, and their like understandably have developed strong Japanese market positions through import. So, too, have the lesser known Omark Industries, Locktite and Memorex in their products.

Among those American corporations that have made an effort to crack the Japanese market—or now propose such an effort—it is common to hear complaints that the *Japanese distribution system* poses a barrier to market entry. In our judgment this complaint has only limited validity. It is useful to consider separately the distribution of industrial products, usually requiring sales engineering and after-service, and of consumer products sold into wholesale and retail distribution to the mass consumer. The problems are different.

For the industrial or large-ticket consumer item, the problem all too often results from an effort on the part of the exporter to Japan to obtain market entry without out-of-pocket expense. A trading company is often engaged as distributor, for example. Now, the general trading companies are many things, but they are not effective distributors of products requiring promotion and service. They are not staffed for that (with some exceptions); it is not their main business. The trading companies are effective in large volume transactions where financing and logistics are critical.

A frequent complaint about Japanese industrial distributors is that they demand too high a margin or, more often, that they exact too high a price in the market. This kind of complaint, like the complaint about an ineffective distributor, is surely naïve. Distributors have an interest in high margins and sales at minimum cost. The manufacturer is interested in building market share, market position, while maintaining adequate margins. To complain that a distributor in Japan is inadequate or unsuitable simply indicates that the exporter to Japan has not taken the trouble (that is, expense) to study the market, select the proper channel and motivate it appropriately.

There is nothing for either government to do in correcting basic business mistakes, although it would be useful to Japan-U.S. relations if the U.S. government were less prone to lend credence to these kinds of complaints. One area in which the U.S. government might play a useful role is in the review of tax laws that can

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make it difficult for an aggressive U.S. company to cut price into Japan. The issue here is transfer price between U.S. parent and overseas sales subsidiary and the degree to which price cutting from the parent is viewed as an effort to displace income to a different tax jurisdiction. The Internal Revenue Service can hinder U.S. companies from repaying the Japanese in kind and price cutting into the Japanese competitors' home market.

A case in point is a U.S. machinery manufacturer, a dominant and low-cost world producer. A major Japanese company entered its product area, and by aggressive sales of small-size products took a major share of the Southeast Asian and West European markets. By the time the U.S. producer awoke to the threat, its share in many markets was second to the Japanese company's. The threat is now being met by the U.S. company. But the most effective strategy is to attack the Japanese company in the Japanese market. The Japanese firm's sales there are large, the U.S. company's negligible. Sharp price cutting into Japan could cut off the cash flow that is supporting the Japanese company's worldwide attack. The U.S. company intends to do so, but because of U.S. tax laws has chosen to go into production in Hong Kong as a supply base for attacking the Japanese market.

This true story illustrates several themes: the late perception of the Japanese threat, the failure to be aggressive in the Japanese market, the Japanese pattern of moving first into the smaller world markets before engaging the American competitor in his home market, the Japanese pattern of gaining cost position in a sheltered domestic market and in third-country markets before moving to the jugular.

The Japanese market is large. It is fiercely competitive. Like any large, competitive market, it is expensive to enter. Too few U.S. companies are prepared to pay the price of entry, in large part because too many U.S. companies maintain an out-of-date view of Japan.

The retail distribution problem is different in some respects from the industrial distribution problem. Most complaints about Japanese distribution focus on this area. In truth, the Japanese distribution system is difficult. That the problems can be overcome, nevertheless, is demonstrated by the spectacular success of companies like Nestlé, Schick, Polaroid, Lipton, Coca Cola, and many others. However, in retail food distribution in particular, nearly all successes have been achieved through using the distribution system of a well-established Japanese company.

Japan, truly a nation of shopkeepers, has hundreds of thousands

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of retail outlets, most small and poorly financed. No company could conceivably bear the cost of reaching a significant number of these shops through direct distribution. And the large outlet or supermarket is still only a small part of total retail sales. Further, advertising and promotion costs are high, as would be expected in a developed and heavily populated market.

Still, to speak of the distribution system, however complex and costly, as a non-tariff barrier to trade is a curious use of the phrase. The Japanese language is a non-tariff barrier to trade if we are to interpret the term so loosely. The system was not designed to frustrate foreigners, although it may do so in practice. It can be equally frustrating to Japanese manufacturers, especially marginal competitors. To expect or insist on change because current practice inconveniences foreigners is, to put it mildly, unreasonable. And, as noted, the system can be dealt with successfully by those who take the time and expense to do so.

The expense issue leads directly to the question of the time horizon of U.S. companies. There is little *U.S. investment in Japan*. In fact, foreign capital-related companies (those with 25 percent or more foreign-owned equity) account for only four percent of total Japanese manufacturing sales and only two percent of total business sales. Some foreign investments have been stunning successes. Some have failed. Investment is relevant to the issue of trade because investment in Japan is a powerful stimulant to export sales to Japan. Foreign companies on average import more than seven times as much as the average Japanese company imports, while exporting much less from Japan than the average company. The issue here rests with the problem of undertaking acquisitions in Japan.

U.S. companies have traditionally entered advanced markets in Europe via acquisition, and European companies are now replaying the pattern in their U.S. entry. Acquisition of a successful company solves at one stroke the whole series of problems usually cited as obstacles to entering the Japanese market. A well-selected acquisition of a local company brings with it capable management and staff, effective government relations, and physical plant and facilities. Equally important, through acquisition the cost of entry can be capitalized and need not affect earnings.

Unfortunately, because of basic differences in corporate philosophy and in the concept of the company, it is the habit in Japan to envisage acquisition (from any source) only when a company is essentially bankrupt, and as an alternative to the bankruptcy court. This is hardly the sort of acquisition an entering foreign company

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will seek. This state of affairs, however, should not be interpreted as a barrier to foreign investment, since successful businesses are not available for acquisition by Japanese companies any more than by foreigners.

Because acquisitions of successful companies are not possible, the high costs of entry to Japan—acquiring land, warehouses and plant, searching out staff in a country with little job mobility, building a distribution system, establishing a brand position—all must be treated as expenses out of current earnings. And with dollar devaluation, the already high cost is rising rapidly to even higher levels. Few U.S. companies and few U.S. managers are in a position to undertake that sort of reduction in reported earnings for the sustained period necessary to establish a position in a highly competitive market. Further, U.S. share prices are directly related to earnings per share, and to short-term changes in earnings per share. U.S. executive compensation is importantly linked to share price levels. The combination makes financing entry into the Japanese market by expense investment extremely difficult.

It appears well worth exploring the possibility of changes in U.S. tax laws and accounting practices that would allow companies to capitalize the expense of entry into the Japanese market. Special handling of R&D expenses has been possible. And if the mind of man could conceive the original tax and accounting procedures, surely it can conceive constructive changes in them.

In the last analysis, U.S. trade success or failure depends on the decisions of a great many individual U.S. businessmen. Exhortation or criticism is not likely to be useful. If the trade problem with Japan is to be solved, specific actions helpful to U.S. business in the areas of tax and antitrust enforcement and information programs at the most senior level will be needed, as well as concerted effort by the U.S. government and business to work together.

VIII

Japan will be a major raw material, food and fuel importer and will be heavily in deficit in that trade for the foreseeable future. Further, Japan will continue to be heavily in deficit in the "invisibles" account for some years.[4] To pay for these goods and services, Japan will run a surplus in its manufactured goods trade account. These goods will go in large proportion to the United States, which, while declining in importance as a market for Japan,

[4] These invisibles include all kinds of services such as insurance, banking, tourism, and shipping. In 1977, Japan's net deficit in this area was $6 billion, or roughly one-third of its total surplus in visible trade. It is unlikely this will soon reverse.

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remains overwhelmingly the largest single market for manufactured goods exports.

Further, Japan will be an exporter of capital in rapidly increasing amounts to secure low-cost labor and to secure sources of raw materials and intermediates. It is in the interest of the United States and the world that Japan do so, for Japanese capital and technology, and the Japanese market, can do much to help in developing new raw material sources and to aid the economic development of host countries. However, this export of capital over time requires surplus on the current trade account to meet Japan's economic aspirations.

Japan's industrial policy is essentially the economically rational one of a steady effort to move to higher levels of productivity and higher levels of value-added. This means explicitly that some industries erode and absorb more imports while others grow rapidly in production and export. The government does not direct these things to happen nor does it any longer protect and generously nurture major modern manufacturing industries, except computers. But it does gear tax laws, depreciation schedules, trade policies, antitrust enforcement, and R&D subsidies to encourage structural change. It also exerts considerable informal pressure to that end. It remains a pleasant surprise to have minor bureaucrats address public meetings and discuss programs to cut back inappropriate sectors. The government typically buffers the decline but promotes it nonetheless.

In this framework, Japan's pattern of trade is rational and economically sound even if the current levels and balance of trade are not. Although Japan's import level relative to exports is highly inadequate, the pattern industry by industry reflects basic market forces and is consistent with the industrial policy. In industries where Japan has no future—textiles, heavy inorganic chemicals, low-end consumer electronics, aluminum, etc.—imports are rising significantly faster than exports. In industries where Japan is or is becoming the dominant international competitor—small-sized construction equipment, watches, materials-handling equipment, etc.—exports are growing faster than imports. In yet a third category where Japan's best companies are competing worldwide with strong Western firms and where the latter have made significant investment of late in the Japanese market—autos, computers, integrated circuits, large internal combustion engines, etc.—both exports and imports are growing fast, well above Japan's average.

Revaluation will reinforce this pattern over time as the various lags of perception and reinvestment cycles work themselves out.

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As this occurs, Japan's trade pattern shifts Japan's domestic production mix toward higher standards of living. It is worth, incidentally, pausing at the question of whether revaluation will go too far and choke off Japan's export growth. The yen can and will experience excessive swings in its value. However, in the longer run, the yen will move to generate a large net manufactured trade surplus. Japan's peculiar structure of trade and payments will make this so. Only a shift in the Finance Ministry's resolve to limit the yen's reserve currency role will change this.

These data need to be seen together with Japan's pattern of savings and investment to gauge future trade interaction. Japan's rate of investment has been for two decades higher by a considerable margin than that of other major economies. Productivity increases have been, correspondingly, roughly twice as rapid as those of other major economies. This is part and parcel of a shift to higher value-added, even though national income accounting typically disguises the data. Investment in the current generation of high-technology industries increasingly takes the form of R&D, applications engineering and software development, most of which is not capitalized as accounting investment like plant and equipment but rather is expensed in the period. The current fall in investments' share of Japanese GNP is therefore deceptive. Japanese firms retain their motivation to invest—appreciation of the value of market share, mobility of a skilled career labor force, and a healthy disregard for short-term movements of earnings per share.

Investment has, as its counterpart, savings. Japan saves in large amounts. Savings rates in all sectors—household, corporate, and government—have been high compared to other major economies. To the extent the United States tends to consume, rather than save and invest, it will consistently lose competitive advantage in the higher value-added sectors where trade among the advanced economies is concentrating. Investment means productivity, and productivity means cost reduction and superior product design.

This suggests that the trade problem with Japan will, first of all, continue, driven by Japan's need for a massive surplus in manufactured goods trade. It suggests further that the crises will continue to roll forward to more sophisticated items. Textiles were once the problem, more recently television sets and steel. Next autos? And next semiconductors? And next? There may be some political relief from the fact that Japan will begin exporting some products only Japan is producing. The videotape recorder is a current example. The trade balance problem will be no less intense,

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however, even though specific U.S. producers may not be in pain.

We must, however, also be prepared in the United States for an additional problem. Japan is serving as model and as engine for the whole of free Asia. And the pattern of trade described, of raw material, food and fuel imports and manufactured exports, applies not just to Japan but to Taiwan and Korea as well. Table II shows the very high rates of growth and of capital formation throughout Asia. U.S. policies formulated to deal with the trade issues arising from Japan will be sounder if they take into account the broader phenomenon of Asian economic growth. These economies are now competing very successfully against the United States for position in the Japanese market. That competition will not be limited to the Japanese market.

TABLE II

EAST ASIAN GROWTH RATES AND RATES OF CAPITAL FORMATION

	Annual Real Growth 1970-75 (percent)	*Gross Capital Formation as Percent of GNP, 1975*
Japan	5.4	33
South Korea	10.9	27
Taiwan	7.4	38
Hong Kong	5.8	21
Singapore	9.5	39
Indonesia	7.2	19 (1965 = 7%)
Malaysia	7.2	23
Philippines	6.3	24
Thailand	5.9	27
United States	2.1	15–16

IX

It is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects of fundamental improvement in the U.S. trade position with Japan. The root problem lies deep within the U.S. economy. For Japan to continue to be successfully competitive, it is required only that Japan hold to the basic policies it has been pursuing, and that it continue to encourage rather than attempt to interfere unduly with the workings of the market place. High levels of savings and investment, moving in response to market forces, will continue a high level of trade performance (always, of course, assuming no drastic change in world patterns).

Revaluation of the yen, within reasonable ranges, provides only limited relief as well. Revaluation is not linear. Japan's imports are dollar-denominated and revaluation provides negative inflation rates, which in turn add to competitiveness against inflating economies. The revaluation also forces restructuring of the Japa-

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nese economy, and painful Japanese political decisions regarding restructuring, more rapidly than would otherwise be the case. Given reasonable political stability in Japan, which appears likely still, the revaluation effects can be quite beneficial.

In many ways, this topic of the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance is a difficult one to address. Although an economic issue, it arouses high emotion. Yet dealing with it requires a rational policy. Japan must import, as must all of Northeast Asia. To deny a surplus on manufactured trade is to deny that import capability. What strategic value do we attach to continued close ties with Japan? What price, if any, are we prepared to pay for stability in Northeast Asia? The warning implicit in Japan's moves to increased trade with mainland China is clear enough. There is a central underlying strategic issue in all this that must be translated into trade policy.

A rational policy must also take account of multilateral balances. Japan is in trade deficit with Australia and Canada, with whom we are in surplus. What level of bilateral deficit with the United States is tolerable? None? How much?

These issues may well have been resolved by the U.S. government, and we are merely not aware of them. Assume we place a considerable value on Northeast Asian stability and prosperity. Assume we approach the issue multilaterally and are quite prepared for a bilateral deficit of substantial size for a long period. It would help the public temper in both countries if this position were more explicit. The reputation of the United States and U.S. companies in Japan has not been helped by recent events. A distinct note of irritation is in the air.

Finally, this review of the U.S. trade position with Japan leads to a conclusion that there is an urgent need for review of the U.S. international economic competitive position and for the development of policies to improve the U.S. position. That is a large task, but a review of the Japan situation makes it clear that the need is no less great.

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Crawford Young

ZAÏRE: THE UNENDING CRISIS

Karl Marx once wrote that history always repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. Zaïre in 1978 appeared an apt illustration of this aphorism, except the sequence was inverted; farce preceded tragedy. The 1977 invasion (hereafter Shaba I), from Angolan bases, of 1,500 raiders of the Front National pour la Libération du Congo (FNLC), lineal descendants of the old Katanga gendarmes, had the appearance of comic opera. They swept through southwestern Shaba with almost no resistance, then inexplicably stopped at the gates of the rich prize of Kolwezi, to evaporate with few armed encounters before the Moroccan-reinforced Zaïre Army.

In 1978, 4,500 FNLC irregulars seized Kolwezi in a well-executed operation (Shaba II) and were driven out only by a Franco-Belgian military invervention with American logistical support. This episode was in every respect a tragedy: thousands of Zaïrians perished, either in the short-lived FNLC occupation, the Foreign Legion reconquest, or Zaïrian "pacification" operations. Nearly all the 2,000 European residents fled, and at least 130 were killed. The mining industry, accounting for 75-80 percent of copperbelt output, was crippled for months. In the short-to-middle run, full operations would only be possible under the protection of non-Zaïrian security forces, adding Zaïre to the depressing list of African states whose survival depends on foreign troops (Chad, Mauritania, Ethiopia, Angola, among others).

While Shaba I appeared only a short-lived episode, Shaba II laid bare the deeper aspects of what appears to be a permanent crisis confronting Zaïre. What had once seemed a powerful and reasonably effective regime is overwhelmed by a deepening social crisis provoked by the pauperization of the mass of the populace, evaporating internal legitimacy and external credibility, a crushing debt burden, and the transparent unreliability of its numerous armed forces. The complex impasse was made more intractable by its internationalization. A most remarkable array of forces was activated: Americans, French, Belgians, Saudis, Egyptians, Chinese, Senegalese, Moroccans, Gabonese, Togolese, Angolans, Cubans, East Germans, Soviets, in one way or another, were drawn into the act. Most of these actors were reacting to stimuli that had nothing to do with Zaïre: the decadent imperialism of the capitalist powers, social-imperialism of the Soviet Union, expansive communist imperialism, in the diverse metaphors of different parties.

In the process, different African crises flowed together. The remarkable scale of the Soviet-Cuban plunge in the Horn horrified Western states and conservative oil powers of the Middle East, leading to a compulsive desire to confront Moscow and Havana on whatever terrain could be found. The specter

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loomed of an impending Zimbabwe impasse where the West could neither back the unworkable internal settlement, induce compromise on its "Anglo-American plan," nor wholly support the Patriotic Front, opening the way to Soviet-Cuban military backing for the latter with African acquiescence. The continued operation from Zaïrian bases of northern Angolan (FNLA) and Cabindan (FLEC) dissident movements, and the recently resumed flow of arms through Zaïre for the central and southern Angolan UNITA insurgents were deeply frustrating to Angola and its Cuban and Soviet backers. Morocco ventured its units partly in the hope of gaining greater Western support in its own annexation of the Western Sahara, as well as in opposition to Soviet policy. In the esoteric language of international power politics, a cacophony of "messages" were being telegraphed to sundry adversaries and allies, whose only common theme was their utter lack of relevance to the real crisis in Zaïre.

The time has come to peer through the fog of international politics and look clearly at the real dimensions of the Zaïrian tragedy. Contrary to the ill-considered declarations of President Carter and other Administration spokesmen, Shaba II was not spawned in Moscow, gestated in Havana, and hatched in Luanda; while there has undoubtedly been a degree of involvement by Soviets, East Germans, Cubans, and Angolans with the FNLC, the initiative was primarily the Shabans'; and more broadly, its capacity to attract sympathy within Zaïre and abroad derives from the political weakness of the regime and the poisonous social atmosphere in the country. Most African states have clusters of dissidents residing abroad; those who retain a reasonable effectiveness, whatever their ideological persuasion, are not greatly threatened (for example, Ivory Coast and Cameroon on the one hand, Tanzania and Mozambique on the other). The key questions to be explored are why the Mobutu regime is so vulnerable, and what policy responses are appropriate for the United States and Western powers.

II

As recently as five years ago, Zaïre would have belonged on the list of secure and stable African countries. While the regime has always had its critics, it had real domestic strength and a generally positive external image. Judged against the contrasting experience of the turbulent 1960-65 period, Mobutu appeared to have created a new and broadly legitimate political order. Many of his significant political opponents abroad had returned; while domestic support never matched the self-laudatory Kinshasa propaganda, there was quite genuine acquiescence to the Mobutist framework, and equally tangible appreciation for the elimination of the endemic fear, violence and insecurity of the first republic years. Internationally, Zaïre was no longer an object of scorn and ridicule, but a respected member of the African family of nations. Inflation had been halted; there was by 1970 a stable, convertible currency, negligible debt, and ample foreign exchange reserves. Real wages went up from 1968 to 1971 for the first time since early 1961; the GNP surged well beyond the pre-independence level after years of decline; and even agricultural production seemed on the way up. A massive inflow of Western capital was at hand. When President Mobutu spoke in expansive terms of a rendezvous with abundance in 1980, his vision of a manifest destiny of grandeur and prosperity was quite believable.

The key to this remarkable recovery appeared to lie in the political kingdom. In the collective consciousness, the first republic which Mobutu easily swept away in 1965 had become a veritable Hobbesian state of nature, an unending

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zone of disorder where life was nasty, brutish and short. For Hobbesian pathology, Hobbesian prescription: a leviathan state was resurrected from the ashes of the first republic. Conveniently at hand was the centralized, authoritarian heritage of the colonial state. To this was added a new political superstructure: a single national political party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR), stretching from the President outward to forcibly embrace every citizen; and an ideology, authenticity (later personalized into "Mobutism"), high in symbolic connotations of Zaïrean culture, though low in specific content.

By 1970, Mobutu had achieved complete personal ascendancy over the system he fashioned. He could free himself from the necessity to listen to advice from old first republic politicians who had backed his rise, ranking army officers, Western diplomats, or international financial advisers. The initial presidential secretariat of young, often radical, university graduate technocrats was replaced by courtiers. The aggregation of personal power was given juridical form in the 1974 Constitution, one of the most remarkable legal documents ever devised. The President headed the MPR, defined as "the nation politically organized"; the state was an appendage of the party. The President presided over the Council of Ministers, the legislature, and Supreme Judicial Council, as well as the party Political Bureau. In effect, the members of all these bodies were named by the President, whose words and thoughts cumulatively constituted the official doctrine of the country (Mobutism), and had the force of law. "Deviationism" was a constitutional offense. Policy pronouncements, formulated in isolation, were increasingly divorced from implementation, and for that matter reality.

The seemingly secure domestic base made possible an ambitious diplomacy. The bedrock support from the United States and—more ambiguously, with many oscillations—Belgium was a point of departure. The investment Klondike of the early 1970s was exploited to obtain expanding state revenues, and a diversity of Western interests tied to the longevity of the regime.

With his Western flank thus protected politically and economically, Mobutu could diversify his image and connections. A pilgrimage to Peking in January 1973 brought a pledge of $100 million in agricultural aid, significant mainly for its symbolic impact. North Koreans were brought in in 1975 to train new army units. A dramatic gesture toward the Arab world was made on October 4, 1973, when Mobutu announced at the United Nations his rupture with Israel (two days before the Yom Kippur War). The regime sought to shed its Western client reputation with more orthodox Third World stances on southern African and North-South issues. In private sessions at the September 1973 Algiers Afro-Asian summit, Mobutu pledged early decisive action to affirm the economic sovereignty of his country, promises fulfilled in the subsequent "Zaïrianization" and "radicalization" decrees of 1973.

III

From 1973 on, things fell apart, internally and externally. At first, many saw the difficulties as mere short-term calamities of conjuncture. In May-June 1974, the copper price, which had skyrocketed to record peaks in 1973-74 of over $1.40 per pound on the New York market, fell as low as $0.53, then stuck around the $0.60 mark, below production costs for a number of producers in Zaïre and elsewhere. The 1973 oil price rise hit Zaïre hard, as did rising grain prices. In August 1975, the Angolan Benguela railway, the cheapest export route for the Shaba treasure trove of mineral output, was severed for an

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indefinite period. In 1974-75 there was a $500-million turnaround in the terms of trade for Zaïre, which was a tremendous blow for a three-billion-dollar GNP.

Despite the significance of these conjunctural factors, they were only a part of the explanation. The deepening crisis is also tied to the very nature of the political system, and the escalating inequalities generated by its action. Many of these flaws have been identified publicly by President Mobutu himself, whose speeches at mass rallies are often remarkably candid and lucid self-criticisms of the system. On January 4, 1975, denouncing the personal enrichment of top political officials, Mobutu called on them to repatriate foreign bank accounts and turn their businesses over to the state, announcing he was "declaring war on the bourgeoisie." (Peace admittedly swiftly returned, as a February 1, 1975 speech conceded that stolen property could be kept, if it was invested in the country.) On July 1, 1977, the political defects of the regime were analyzed, and competitive elections promised for a fraction of the party Political Bureau, parliament, and urban councils. "Our system risks asphyxiation," declared Mobutu, "I believe the voice of the people is often stifled."

The most far-reaching critique of all was contained in his address to the MPR Party Congress in November 1977. Diagnosing what he termed the "Zaïrian sickness" (*mal zaïrois*), the political realm was portrayed as a cocoon of corruption, within which power and authority were transformed into winged wealth.

> To sum it up, everything is for sale, everything is bought in our country. And in this traffic, holding any slice of public power constitutes a veritable exchange instrument, convertible into illicit acquisition of money or other goods, or the evasion of all sorts of obligations.
>
> Worse, even the use, by an individual, of his most legitimate right is subjected to an invisible tax, openly pocketed by individuals.
>
> Thus, an audience with an official, enrolling children in school, obtaining school certificates, access to medical care, a seat on the plane, an import licence, a diploma, among other things, are all subject to this tax which is invisible, yet known to the whole world.
>
> Accordingly, our society risks losing its political character, to become one vast marketplace, ruled by the basest laws of traffic and exploitation.

To understand the "Zaïrian sickness" and the broader crisis of which it is a symptom, the nature of the state and its impact on society must be examined. To begin with, the state is very costly; in 1975, its expenditures were 44.3 percent of GDP, and 56.3 percent in 1976. In 1977, the deficit alone was 12 percent of GDP, very high figures for a developing country. While at the peak of the Mobutu years, a respectable proportion of government outlays were for public investment, increasingly these outlays represent mainly state payrolls. Government expenditures skyrocketed from 800 million Zaïres in 1971 to 1.87 billion Zaïres in 1974.[1]

Some other budgetary peculiarities of the Mobutu regime curtail the public impact of state outlays. Between 15 and 20 percent of operating budget outlays, and 30 percent of capital expenditures circuit through the presidency, without budgetary control. These disbursements are tied to the patrimonial nature of the regime; their exceptional scale has been the target of international critics of Zaïrian finances for years.

The impact of these outlays is problematic as well. A 1971 estimate suggested

[1] These figures are taken from Annual Reports of the Bank of Zaïre. The value of the Zaïre was equivalent to $2.05 in 1971—and, as of August 1978, to $1.23.

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that 60 percent of the 1971 operating budget was either lost, or diverted to purposes other other than those intended.[2] Some 22 percent of the budget is absorbed by the educational system (1975), whose remarkable quantitative expansion is not matched by its qualitative results. The next largest budget item (aside from the presidency) is the army. Despite much costly equipment acquired for it (for example, 17 Mirage jets in 1975), the inability of this 70,000-man force to protect the most critical economic installations in the country was dramatically revealed in Shaba I and II, confirming President Mobutu's December 30, 1974 stigmatization of the security forces as "costly and unproductive." About half the very modest health outlays go to two medical installations in Kinshasa, while 75 percent of the population is not served by public health facilities. Public works expenditures, primarily for roads, are consumed in a still-losing combat against deterioration of the highway network. While a few major links have been paved since independence (Kinshasa-Matadi, Kinshasa-Kikwit), the estimate of usable roads has shrunk from 140,000 kilometers to 20,000.

The corruption phenomenon so vigorously denounced by President Mobutu in his "Zaïrian sickness" speech is, of course, but the local manifestation of a universal problem. The President, angered at the bad press his regime received after Shaba II, lashed out at American critics, reminding them of the ITT, Lockheed and similar unsavory affairs. There is, however, a matter of scale—and here it is beyond dispute that the "Zaïrian sickness" has reached virulent proportions. When inflation took off in 1973, public sector employees suffered a swift erosion in the value of their nominal wages, and the "invisible tax" (graft), which was already widespread, became well-nigh universal.

What has been especially costly to regime legitimacy is the impunity with which members of what are known as the "presidential family," in and out of formal positions in the public sector, have been able to accumulate large fortunes.[3] One recent study showed that the Shaba Regional Commissioner was grossing $100,000 per month in 1975, of which only two percent was his nominal salary.[4] The size of the presidential fortune as well has been a matter of controversy in and out of Zaïre: a South African publication recently listed his property holdings in Switzerland, Belgium and elsewhere as $25 million, and cash holdings in Swiss banks at about $70 million.[5]

A dreary example of the impact of the state, both in its formal and "invisible" fiscal drain, lies in the 1976–77 coffee affair. The Brazilian frost in 1975, which caught the market without stocks, drove the New York green coffee price from the $0.60 per pound area, where it had oscillated in the early 1970s, to well over three dollars for much of 1976 and 1977. With reported production in these years of 80,000 tons, the potential foreign exchange bonanza for Zaïre could have been $400 million, all the more precious because the foreign exchange component in coffee production is negligible. This would have largely compensated for the disastrous drop in copper revenues.

[2] J. Ph. Peemans, "The Social and Economic Development of Zaïre Since Independence, An Historical Outline," *African Affairs*, April 1975, p. 162.

[3] A particularly cogent analysis is provided by Jean Ryneman, "Comment le régime Mobutu a sapé ses propres fondements," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May 1977.

[4] David J. Gould, "Disorganization Theory and Underdevelopment Administration: Local 'Organization' in the Framework of Zaïrian National 'Development'," *Annual Meetings*, African States Association, Houston, 1977.

[5] *To The Point*, July 7, 1978. These figures refer only to foreign properties; his holding company CELZA, acquired by expropriation of numerous plantations and other enterprises in Zaïre, employs 25,000 persons including 130 expatriates.

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However, while coffee foreign exchange earnings did increase from 27 million Zaïres in 1975 to 80 million in 1976, the latter figure should have been 272 million Zaïres.[6] The differential is represented by diverse fraudulent trading transactions (for example, under-graded coffee, fictitiously back-dated future delivery contracts) carried out by firms tied to a number of top figures in the regime entourage, including the presidential conglomerate CELZA. The "errors in judgement" that allegedly led to the sacking of highly regarded Bank of Zaïre Director Sambwa Pida in mid-1977 were partly related to central bank efforts to halt this exchange hemorrhage.

The distribution of benefits from the coffee bonanza is quite revealing. The producer price per kilo of dried robusta cherry, set in 1972 at nine makuta (then officially $0.18), was raised to 14.3 makuta in early 1976. When allowance is made for the 50 percent weight loss in further processing, this would be valued at 30 makuta per kilo. Regular export taxes, obviously levied only on that valuation officially exported, would have averaged 1.37 Zaïres per kilo, to which was added an export surcharge of 65 makuta. To this legal fiscal charge was added the "invisible tax" represented by fraudulent export schemes, which was at least one Zaïre per kilo. In the last analysis, this tax was levied on the peasant as the price increase received was less than the inflation rate, and the entire benefit of the world market price surge was diverted to the state and the politico-commercial class.

Two other disabilities of the political system require brief mention. As its legitimacy eroded, there appeared to be a swing to greater repression in 1977–78, betokened by the public execution of 14 accused leaders of a millennial rural uprising in Bandundu in February 1978; these hangings were accompanied by military reprisals in the villages concerned, which took at least several hundred lives. In March 1978, 13 civilian and military figures were executed on charges of conspiracy. Shortly thereafter, an estimated 250 middle-level officers were purged from the army. These were largely from regions deemed suspect, particularly Shaba, Kasai and Bandundu. Finally, the post-Shaba I and II army "pacification" campaigns created for the first time in Zaïrian history a large rural refugee exodus into Angola, which some estimate at more than 200,000.

The heightened repression was really a new departure. While the harshness of the state at the rural periphery had not changed much from the colonial pattern, in its years of prosperity the Mobutu regime bore no relationship to terror-ridden governments like Chile, Argentina, Cambodia, or Uganda. Its pressures for conformity on intellectuals and elites were subtle, and left them some latitude. Possibly the latest amnesty measures suggest a return to a milder pattern.

The personalistic nature of government and the concentration of power in the presidency have left the state prone to colossal policy miscalculations. The most serious of these were the 1973–74 Zaïrianization and "radicalization" measures, and the Angolan intervention. In the former instance, a wide array of commercial, plantation or industrial enterprises were confiscated from foreign owners and distributed to the political class, or operated by the state. Those measures were a calamitous failure; not only did they disrupt commerce and create widespread shortages, but the unseemly spectacle of the race for booty by the political class cost the regime dearly in its legitimacy. In 1976, the regime had the courage to confess the total fiasco of this experiment, and to invite the former owners back.

[6] "Le café et l'économie zaïroise," cited by Professor Kawata Bualum, *Elima*, November 4, 1977.

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The Angolan adventure was a second particularly costly blunder, encouraged by the United States. Several Zaïre Army battalions were committed to this battle, and disintegrated before the Cubans in November–December 1975. This action, unpopular in the army and the country, discredited and isolated Zaïre in the African arena, undoing years of careful diplomacy.

These diverse liabilities of the political system have high costs. Most important of all is the mass pauperization, which has reached frightening proportions. The plight of wage earners, whose numbers have stagnated in recent years, is shown in Table I. Since 1976, there has been a further decline of roughly 40 percent, as the 60–80 percent annual inflation rate continues unabated. In fact, comparison with wage movement data for the colonial period indicates real wages are below the 1910 level, and stand at the lowest point since any estimates have been made.

The rural pattern is identical. Table II gives a clear demonstration of the erosion of the real value of commercialized crops. As prices are fixed by the government, the decline in peasant well-being is directly attributable to state action. These figures, however, understate the full dimensions of the agrarian crisis. The experience of the early 1960s demonstrated that a major consequence of sustained inflation is to draw goods out of the countryside, as traders can dispose of their stocks at high prices and profits in the towns. State policy tends to sustain the pattern of the buying monopolies that characterized colonial agriculture; buyers often force villagers to accept well below the official prices if they are to come at all. Ubiquitous rural roadblocks erected by army units, party youth groups, or local officials make it difficult for peasants to carry their own produce to town without losing it. The fiscal impact of the state is very heavy; while precise calculations are not possible, if we add to the legal levies of local authorities, which may amount to 15–20 percent of cash revenues, de facto taxes implicit in export fiscal charges, artificially low prices fixed by government, and the "invisible tax" phenomenon, at least 50 percent of the meager revenues of the villagers are extracted from them. State agricultural services are imprisoned in the mentality of coercion inherited from the colonial period and paralyzed by lack of transport. When the government provides almost no services except primary schools to the village, the cynicism and distrust with which the state is viewed should be no surprise.

These figures make clear why production of most agricultural commodities is well below 1959 levels. Agriculture, which accounted for one-third of GDP in the late 1950s, had fallen to 18 percent by 1975, or less than 10 percent discounting the hypothetical value of subsistence output. The cost of food imports, negligible in 1959, rose to $300 million last year, or one-third of all foreign exchange

TABLE I

WAGE, PRICE, AND REAL WAGE INDICES, KINSHASA
(AT OFFICIAL MINIMUM WAGE)

(1960 = 100)

Date	*Wage Index*	*Price Index*	*Real Wage Index*
June 1, 1960	100	100	100
May 1, 1964	383	575.9	67
October 1, 1971	960	1,486.2	64
September 5, 1975	1,274	3,099.5	41
March 27, 1976	1,530	5,888.1	25

SOURCE: Union Nationale des Travailleurs Zaïrois, "Position concernant la politique des salaires," 1977, cited in Jean Ryneman, "Comment le régime Mobutu a sapé ses propres fondements," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May 1977.

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TABLE II

INDEX OF AGRICULTURAL GOVERNMENT FIXED PRICES, 1960–74

(June 1967 = 100)

Crop	*1960*	*1970*	*1974*
Maize, Shaba/Kasai	114.9	100.7	96
Manioc, Western zone	126.4	75.6	36
Rice paddy	157.9	109.2	104
Beans	137.9	90.7	43.2
Cotton (1st quality)	172.4	85.0	67.5
Palm oil (all except Bas Zaïre)	241.4	79.3	64.8
Robusta coffee, Bandundu	195.4	90.7	64.4
Arabica coffee	202	93.9	52

SOURCE: Guy Gran, "Policy Making and Historic Process: Zaïre's Permanent Development Crisis," *Annual Meetings*, African Studies Association, Boston, November 1976.

outlays. Palm oil and cotton, two of the major pre-independence exports, are no longer produced in sufficient quantities to reliably meet the needs of the domestic market.

The centralization of state power in Kinshasa has been accompanied by a pathological concentration of economic resources; the capital is a gigantic suction pump drawing wealth out of the hinterland. President Mobutu noted in the "Zaïrian sickness" discourse that "three-quarters of the money in circulation in the country is concentrated at Kinshasa; gas, food, pharmaceutical products imported from abroad remain at Kinshasa, while the exchange required to pay for them virtually all comes from the sweat of the industrial and agricultural populations of the interior." Of 92 investment projects approved in 1972, some 61 were situated in Kinshasa. Some 90 percent of energy consumption is in Kinshasa and the Shaba copperbelt. In 1972, 303 of 334 Zaïrian doctors, and 40 percent of all doctors worked in Kinshasa.

The catalogue of inequality should also record the high level of remuneration of expatriate personnel. The one percent of wage or salary earning employees who are expatriates still accounted for 30 percent of total wages and salaries paid in the early 1970s. Further, those working for larger companies were protected by indexing from the ravages of inflation, which Zaïran workers were assuredly not.

All of this adds up to a crisis of truly desperate proportions. For the last three years, the economy has experienced negative growth rates (−6.1 percent in 1975, −4.3 percent in 1976, −1.9 percent in 1977), with a sharp fall due in 1978 as a consequence of Shaba II. Inflation continues out of control, fueled above all by huge government deficits, which over the last five years have exceeded revenues by one-third. An enormous external debt has built up: extravagant borrowing for a grandiose development program, many of whose projects have doubtful prospects, was facilitated by aggressive lending by Western banks and contractors in the early 1970s. The result is three billion dollars of foreign obligations, with debt service liabilities in 1977 that were 43.4 percent of export earnings, and 49.5 percent of government revenues. Translated into human terms, the impact is mass impoverishment. Politically, the cost has been an evaporation of legitimacy at home, and of credibility abroad.

IV

How then is a regime so beset with calamity on all sides able to survive at all? While greatly weakened, the regime has some assets, which make it risky to

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discount wholly its capacity for survival. In the long run, there is the underlying solidity of the resource base, and the ever-flickering hope that the long-awaited upturn in copper prices is just around the corner. Indeed, the economic potential of the country is awesome. Zaïre is the world's largest exporter of cobalt and industrial diamonds (60–70 percent), and has maintained over the years a world market share in copper of five to seven percent. It has very large known reserves of copper, iron, tin, nickel, and a number of rare metals, such as cadmium and colombite. Oil production began in 1975, with 25,000 barrels a day, and there is almost certainly more to be found. The lower Zaïre River contains 13 percent of the world's hydroelectric potential. The agricultural promise is equally impressive; only one percent of the land surface is now cultivated; in the diverse ecological zones, a wide variety of food and industrial crops can be produced, if policies that stimulated rather than discouraged output were pursued.

In the more immediate political realm, the regime still has some remaining capital accruing from what might be called the Spanish civil war syndrome. The 1960–65 years were a time of fear and anguish, which directly touched the lives of most. Though a declining factor, fear of the unknown, of the potential for violence within the society, remains a powerful demobilizer. This, as well as fear of the army, explains why the FNLC invasion did not trigger uprisings elsewhere during either Shaba I or Shaba II.

Second, the regime has been exceedingly skillful at dividing its opponents, and filling political space. This is achieved through continued rotation of top political personnel, and repeated purges of the army officer corps. The MPR, a cooptative and preemptive instrument, smothers the political field. It is virtually impossible for clear-cut political alternatives to emerge within the system. This fact is adeptly used by the regime as an argument for its own perpetuation; the choice it endeavors to present is Mobutu or chaos.

Third, and perhaps most important of all during the years of permanent crisis since 1974, apart from the Angolan blunder President Mobutu has demonstrated consummate political skill in attracting external support, by raising the specters of Shaba separation or Soviet-Cuban scheming. The array of backers that flew to his support, especially after Shaba II, was truly extraordinary: Chinese and South Africans, Saudis and French, Belgians and Egyptians, Gabonese and Americans, Senegalese and Moroccans. Mobutu plays upon the divisions of his external supporters as well as he exploits the rivalries of the Zaïrian opposition: French versus Belgians, Belgians versus Americans. The very bonds of economic dependency have been used with virtuosity. The regime adroitly trades on the premise that its creditors can not afford either to see it fail, or to see Mobutu fall. Bankruptcy would be as inconvenient for the banks as for Zaïre; at each negotiating brink, a temporizing formula is found, the debt rolled over one more time, while all await the millennium of higher copper prices.

V

The calamitous difficulties besetting the country, by all logic, should be a potent stimulus to opposition groups, which had been virtually invisible during the prosperous years of the regime. Indeed, in the last two years anti-regime movements have become much more conspicuous abroad, though not at home. However, they remain fragmented, riven by personal, ethnic and ideological divisions. Ultimate change is far more likely to come from within.

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The most potent threat is the FNLC, because it is fundamentally a military grouping that has taken on the name of a political party, has had access to sanctuary in Angola, and has been able to acquire arms. However, as a political alternative it is severely hampered by its regional base and its chameleon past, having successively served Moïse Tshombe and European capital, white mercenaries, the Portuguese, and most recently the MPLA. Many secretly hoped it might be an anti-Mobutu detonator, triggering a chain reaction of events that would bring to power not Nathaniel Mbumba, but some other national leader or perhaps a transitional regime, like that of "Field Marshall" John Okello in Zanzibar in 1964.

Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's Vice Premier, has been at times backed by Luanda and Moscow as an ideological alternative to the present regime. He has led a succession of paper organizations, and speaking in the political metaphors of 1960, continues to insist that he alone enjoys a claim to apostolic succession to Lumumba. Mobutu's scornful characterization of him as "a stinking corpse whom only the Russians refuse to bury" is not entirely unfounded.

The Brussels-based Mouvement d'Action pour la Résurrection du Congo (MARC), led by former Provincial President and Regional Commissioner Monguya Mbenge, has some following in Belgium but little in Zaïre. The eclecticism of its leader is suggested in the dedication of his recent anti-Mobutist book to Lumumba, Kasavubu, Tshombe and Mulele—a spectrum of 1960 political figures that spans the entire ideological range.[7]

One insurgent movement within the country lingers from the 1964–65 wave of rebellions. Localized in the Fizi-Baraka area by Lake Tanganyika, this group—known in recent years as the Parti de la Révolution Populaire (PRP)—achieved notoriety in 1975 by kidnapping four Stanford students from a zoological research station in Tanzania. Its composition is ethnically restricted to Bembe, though its leader, Laurent Kabila, is a Shaba Luba. The movement now has only a few hundred followers, and has no possibility of enlarging its base of operations.

Otherwise, within the country political structures outside the official framework have been pulverized. In the early years of the Mobutu regime, the first republic politicians, many of whom had regional followings, were gradually replaced in positions of trust and authority by university graduates who had no independent political base. The first republic parties have long since disappeared, and no organization of any sort is permitted outside the MPR framework. Distrust is high, informer nets widespread. In these circumstances, there are many shadowy cliques, usually defined by ethnic affinities, but no organized groups. Yet latent opposition is everywhere, and scorn for the regime is much more openly expressed than it was a half-decade ago.

Repeated purges and rotation in office foster high levels of insecurity in the upper reaches of the state apparatus. Persons who become too conspicuous expose themselves to reprisal. A case in point was the treason trial in September 1977—on unconvincing charges—of former Foreign Minister Ngunza Karl-i-Bond, which resulted in the death sentence (commuted to life imprisonment, then amnesty in July 1978). His misfortune was to be publicly mooted in the Western press as a potential successor to Mobutu in the aftermath of Shaba I.

Pressed by his Western backers for evidence of political reform, Mobutu was able in late 1977 to devise an electoral formula that permitted a noisy and

[7] Daniel Monguya Mbenge, *Histoire Secrète du Zaïre*, Brussels: Éditions de l'Espérance, 1977.

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expensive electoral campaign, yet preserved the inchoate structure of mass politics. The ingenious formula provided for unlimited numbers of candidates within the single-party framework; thus there were 167 contestants for the 18 elected Political Bureau seats, and over 2,000 for the 270 parliamentary places. Each voter could support only one candidate; large ethnic groups had multiple candidates, limiting communal mobilization. The campaign did distract the public and political elite for several months; the winners were generally mercantile figures, in most cases persons who acquired their initial capital in politics. However, the introduction of electoral competition made no change in the exercise of power.

Symptoms of unrest do break through the surface. In the last two years, wildcat strikes have appeared in many enterprises in Kinshasa and Shaba. In February 1977, the normally docile legislative assembly, then composed of appointed members, refused to approve the budget, denounced presidential overspending, the oppressiveness of the regional administration, corruption, and mismanagement. However, these incidents remain episodic spasms.

Formless as political life may be, the social tensions spawned by the growing chasm between the privileged and the impoverished are becoming more intense. The potential for violence is necessarily high; if it occurs, it is likely to have a large element of spontaneity, and to flow along the major fault lines of the society—class and ethnicity. The 1959 Kinshasa riots and 1964–65 rebellions are suggestive of the sorts of assaults on buildings and persons symbolically associated with the system that might transpire. The toll of lives in 1964–65 was many thousands, and the brutalities unleashed demonstrated the force of social animosities already built up, when inequalities were much less pronounced than they have since become.

Regarding ethnic conflict the situation has changed in important respects since the early 1960s. Broader regional alignments have become more salient; this trend is reinforced by the remarkable pace of diffusion of the major linguae francae, especially Lingala and Swahili. In the urban centers, these are becoming first languages for the new generations.

Although the Mobutu regime has laid great stress on combating ethnicity, over the years its regional identification has become more marked. This is not evident in regional breakdowns of ministers or Political Bureau members; numerically, the ruling organs of the state are reasonably representative. However, among the key members of the immediate presidential entourage, and especially the security forces, the Equateur predominance is manifest. This provides an additional focus for animosities toward the regime.

While ethnicity remains a latent mobilizing principle, this does not mean that fragmentation of the country is a real likelihood. There is no serious secessionist sentiment among any significant group. At the level of instrumental politics, the issue is the distribution of social resources, not separatism. Within a context of violent conflict, regional and ethnic affinities, acting in complex and unpredictable ways, would be likely to define in part the lines of cleavage.

VI

The depth of the social impasse in Zaïre does raise the possibility of a dissolution of the fabric of social order, and an attendant political crisis whose ultimate outcome is impossible to forecast. The diversity of supporters Mobutu

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attracted when Shaba I and II raised the possibility of sudden political changes demonstrates that many are anxious to forestall this plunge into the unknown, even though skepticism about the capacity of the regime to reform itself is quite general. What is at stake for the outside world?

Economic interests—mainly involving debts, investments and resources—are evidently important. The most immediate pressures arise from the debt issue, especially that segment ($700–800 million) owed to Western banks. Repayment is now $175 million in arrears, and payments are being made only sporadically. The continuing need for debate on modalities of repayment, and the unending analysis of the new Citibank syndicate's $220-million loan keep the issue constantly alive. The banks are anxious to avoid any prolonged dislocation of the Shaba productive infrastructure, which generates most of the foreign exchange from which they hope to recapture at least current interest payments. They are resigned to rescheduling formulae, though in 1976 some would have preferred the bankruptcy route. More important than the size of the Zaïre debt per se are the implications formal default would have for other less-developed countries. The debt is spread among so large a number of financial institutions that no single one would be threatened by default.

Investor interests are more complex. The largest single stake, by far, is the $700 million in Belgian holdings. This is almost all pre-independence capital, and the enterprises involved have long been ambivalent toward the Mobutu regime. The roughly $200 million in direct American investment in functioning plant is divided among several ventures. The only really large undertaking, the SMTF copper venture, has 30 percent American equity, but is mostly mothballed awaiting better copper prices. French direct investment is only $20 million; the biggest French economic stake is the $85-million domestic satellite sale, the costly Voice of Zaïre construction contract, and Mirage jet sales. The major West German involvement is the mysterious OTRAG satellite testing facility, involving broad concession rights over a 38,000-square-mile tract in northeast Shaba, for an annual 25 million Zaïres rental. Reporters who have recently visited this site, the object of embarrassing attacks in leftist publications such as *Afrique-Asie*, came away convinced that it was in fact merely the commercial testing site it purported to be. Whether a successor regime would respect the unusual degree of delegated sovereignty involved in this undertaking is problematic, and the West Germans have discreetly counseled a firm Western response to the FNLC invasion. The Japanese interests, which total $185 million, much of it in the SODIMIZA copper venture, have maintained a very low profile.

It is worth noting that the large influx of Western capital has been primarily in the form of debt and contractor-financed projects, rather than long-run investment. The really gigantic projects, apart from SMTF—the $500-million Inga-Shaba power line, the $300-million second phase of the Inga dam, the $200-million steel mill near Kinshasa, the $480-million GECAMINES copper expansion—were financed in one way or another through bank loans.

Of Zaïrian resources, only cobalt is currently strategically crucial to the NATO countries. Zaïre has recently accounted for 70 percent of cobalt output outside the communist states, with 90 percent of this coming from the Kolwezi mines. (The price soared from six dollars per pound to $30 in the first two months after the Kolwezi crisis, and may go higher.) The metal is used in superalloys, whose most important single use is in jet engines; with huge orders being placed for new air fleets, demand is currently high. The unusual features

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of cobalt make it susceptible to political manipulation in a way that most commodities are not: it is essential for a narrow range of purposes, some security-related; there is one major producer; and the metal is traded in relatively small quantities. In an Armageddon scenario, assuming a Soviet client regime in Kinshasa, the Soviet Union could afford to acquire and hold the entire Zaïrian output. While conceivable, this is not very likely. Over time it could be met by substitution, bringing into production very low-grade deposits in the United States, which could be worked if the price were high enough. In addition, the United States has stockpiled about 20,000 tons, roughly equivalent to the amount annually traded internationally.

For the most part, then, these economic calculations played a much lesser role than political motivations in the Shaba crises. The surprisingly forceful gestures of Chinese support were evidently stimulated by belief that the evil hand of social imperialism lay behind the FNLC. Pressures for strong Western action from Egyptians and Iranians were similarly inspired. Anxieties created by forward Soviet and Cuban strategies, especially in the Horn, were probably the most important factor for the several moderate African states that urged Western intervention (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Togo, Gabon).

France has cultivated a close relationship with Zaïre in recent years, particularly warm since 1975. President Giscard d'Estaing has unusual personal influence over Mobutu, which perhaps gives France a particular stake in his survival. The cultural factor is significant as well; Zaïre is the largest officially francophone state outside France (though only a small minority speak French). The current activist phase in French African policy, of which the Zaïre operation is a part, appears aimed at demonstrating that moderate African regimes, within the francophone orbit, can count upon the protection of Paris, a patronage all the more valuable, it is whispered, as Washington is unreliable. Some Belgian officials would add to the list furtive designs on the mineral wealth of Zaïre, still largely under Belgian domination despite the diversification of investment. These paranoic fears of an imminent French lunge into Zaïre, shouldering the Belgians aside, extend back to Leopold II, and resurface regularly—during the Katanga crisis in 1960, the Union Minière nationalization in 1967 and Shaba I. The demonstrated substance of these suspicions is not very great.

The Belgians were very divided by the Shaba II crisis. Skepticism about the Mobutu formula is widespread, and animosity to his regime is found in many spheres. The left wing of the coalition partner Socialist Party is strongly critical, while there are many accumulated rancors in the business community—the Union Minière nationalization, loss to SMTF of a new Union Minière copper development bid in 1970, the Zaïrianization and radicalization measures of 1973 and 1974, among others. Recurrent confrontations between Mobutu and the Church have left resentments in Catholic milieux. While divisions in Belgium are so many that it is misleading to speak of a clear-cut policy, one can say that there is no consensus on strong support for the incumbent regime. The scale of the massacres gave Belgium little choice but to participate in the intervention; however, they visibly sought to circumscribe their role to rescuing their nationals.

American policy came full cycle in a remarkably telescoped time frame. Shaba I had been an opportunity for a carefully limited and measured response, with minimal rhetorical accoutrements and some distancing from the Zaïrian regime in the process of delivery of restricted supply assistance. Between Shaba

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I and Shaba II occurred the massive Soviet-Cuban Ethiopian operation, and the steady erosion of presidential credibility at home and abroad; the White House was acutely conscious of its image of weakness and ineptitude. The Kolwezi crisis was an opportunity to exhibit strength and decisiveness, presented as a sharp rebuff to Soviet-Cuban African enterprises. Within a week of the FNLC invasion, the White House was committed to the Cuban connection as policy *passe partout*, explanation for the crisis, and justification for the Western intervention. Remarkably quickly, the liabilities of this policy became clear. It sparked strong reactions from the Congressional Black Caucus, and from Tanzanian President Nyerere, each symptomatic of larger constituencies for the Carter African policy that were being fast alienated. By late June, the tone of policy pronouncements had dramatically changed. New overtures to Angola were announced, which appeared to betoken an abandonment of the post-Kolwezi hard line.

What role did Soviets, Cubans, East Germans, or Angolans play? There is no doubt that the Mobutu regime is viewed in these quarters as an instrument of imperialism, and its disappearance a consummation devoutly to be wished. They are also anxious to see the tenuous authority of the Angolan MPLA regime consolidated; maintenance of the Cuban force is costly, and Zaïrian sanctuary for FNLA and FLEC elements, as well as arms transit for UNITA, make stability for Angola as elusive as it is for Zaïre. The FNLC, from this standpoint, is certainly convenient leverage over Zaïre and its Western backers.

What is frequently overlooked is that it is also a nuisance. The 20,000 Cuban troops and Angolan Army are mainly deployed protecting the Gulf installations, Luanda, the dissident zones of UNITA and FNLA activity, and the southern frontier. In their encampment area, FNLC outnumber Angolans, and constitute a veritable state within a state, a constant irritation. Coping with the perhaps 200,000 refugees who fled the Zaïre Army operations after Shaba I is an additional burden for a regime facing all too many handicaps. Angolans and their allies can have few illusions about the ideological reliability of the FNLC; it is simply not a Marxist revolutionary movement. Luanda has tried without success to bring the FNLC under more sophisticated political and ideological leadership.

It is thus quite possible that both Castro and Carter were at least partly correct in the angry charges exchanged in late May. The FNLC certainly benefited from Cuban arms and encadrement during its participation in the Angolan civil war. There is every reason to believe that supply of light arms and training has continued. The faulty premise is that FNLC leader Mbumba takes orders from his patrons. Both Shaba I and Shaba II appear primarily the initiative of the FNLC. Thus, it may be at once true that FNLC has benefited from Cuban (and East German) arms supply and training, but that Castro tried to discourage the second invasion. Later stages of the Carter rhetorical offensive, which retreated to the allegation that the Cubans were guilty of failing to prevent Shaba II, are consistent with this interpretation.

The two common themes undergirding arguments for active support for the Mobutu regime are the purported threat of a radical Soviet-dominated alternative regime, or the risk of anarchy and disintegration which only Mobutu has the political skills to forestall. The likelihood of a militant Marxist-Leninist regime in Kinshasa is very small. To begin with, there is no Marxist intelligentsia, as in Ethiopia or Angola. A 1975 survey of university students in the Kisangani heartland of Lumumbism provides fascinating evidence on this score.

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The five African countries most esteemed, aside from Zaïre, were Senegal, Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania, Zambia, and Ivory Coast, in that order. The three most admired African leaders were Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor, and Felix Houphouet-Boigny.[8] It is clear that no ideological structure underlies these choices. An alternative regime is likely to be more assertively nationalist, as was the Mobutu regime itself in its earlier phases. Some 61 percent of the Kisangani students named Lumumba as the most important Zaïrian leader, with Mobutu coming in second with 11 percent.

In fact, no regime, of whatever ideological predisposition, could alter the country's external economic ties very much in the short run. Repudiation of its debts is not practicable for Zaïre any more than it is for equally debt-ridden North Korea. The export commodities provide the revenues and foreign exchange that will be the lifeblood of any regime. These can only be marketed in the West, and the irreversible copper-energy schemes are wholly tributary to Western technology and capital. These shackling constraints would be frustrating to any regime, as they are to the incumbents; only over a longer run period could they be mitigated. Anxieties over Soviet control of the resources and wealth of Zaïre, as well as its strategic location, are at best overblown.

Another argument frequently encountered is that only Mobutu stands between this sprawling country and a return to the disorder of the first republic years. As was argued above, the possibility of intense regional conflict, if a successor junta were unable to fully consolidate its power, cannot be wholly dismissed. If, for example, the FNLC had been able to execute its apparent plan to announce a revolutionary regime in Kolwezi, and appeal to friendly states for armed backing, dangerous scenarios are conceivable, leading to either a costly civil war with high international participation, or de facto separation of the Shaba redoubt.

More difficult than holding the country together will be fundamentally altering the patterns of social inequality that have so rapidly built up, and reversing the trend toward mass impoverishment. The atomization of political forces that has been a secret of survival for the present regime has been very effective. An alternative regime would at once be confronted with the demands of the army—upon which it would necessarily rely—and the entrenched habits of much of the politico-commercial class nourished by the patrimonial politics of the Mobutu era. With one leg shackled by the bondage of external dependency, and the other by the congealing though still-fluid class system, exceptional dedication and consummate skill as well as good fortune would be required for an alternative political formula to emerge from the morass. Among the top figures, in and out of office, both on the civil and military sides, there are a number who could play a leading role, though the fate of Ngunza shows that it is inappropriate to speculate as to individuals. Zaïre is no longer short of talented, able, and well-trained elites. The argument that a mandate of heaven is permanently vested in a single individual has outlived both its credibility and its usefulness.

VII

By way of conclusion, it may be useful to suggest some guidelines for Western

[8] Kasongo Ngoyi *et al.*, "Les étudiants et les elèves de Kisangani (1974–1974): Aspirations, opinions et conditions de vie," *Cahiers du CEDAF*, No. 7–8, 1977, pp. 112–114. This stands in intriguing contrast to a comparable survey a decade earlier, which found Zaïrian students to exhibit more ideological structure in their attitudes than their counterparts in other African countries: Otto Klineberg and Merisa Zavalloni, *Nationalism and Tribalism Among African Students*, Paris: Mouton, 1969.

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policy. In fact the crisis is so profound, and difficulties so immense, that the choices are quite limited, and no policy offers short-run hope of dramatic improvement. Several principles may be advanced, however, which collectively offer a framework for approaching policy choices.

First, it cannot be the task of the outside world to organize the demise of the current regime. The time is past, one may hope, when inconvenient or ineffectual governments are dealt with by unleashing the CIA, as in the days of Mossadeq and Arbenz.

Second, it is not possible, as some would advocate, simply to abandon the country to its fate by refusing all forms of aid. There are several reasons why this option cannot be entertained. The West in general, and the United States in particular, have been so heavily involved in Zaïrian political and economic developments that we bear a share of the responsibility for the present crisis. The Mobutu regime assumed power with full Western backing; the indebtedness occurred with the advice and consent of Western interests. The volatility of Western commodity markets is one dimension of the impasse. In addition, the internal violence that would probably follow the dissolution of the social fabric could trigger large-scale intervention from outside, with all the costs and consequences this would entail. Further, there can be no doubt that the collapse of Zaïre would have major diplomatic repercussions in Africa. The country is so heavily identified with the West in African eyes that such an outcome would necessarily be interpreted as the consequence of reliance upon Western associations.

If the economic collapse of Zaïre is to be averted, the Shaba productive infrastructure cannot be permitted to shut down. As the Zaïre Army is demonstrably unable to protect it against invasion from Angola, the presence of the primarily Moroccan African security force is indispensable until the threat is seen to have subsided.

Some additional financial resources will also be necessary. The long-awaited $220-million bank loan should eventually materialize; it will be directly disbursed by the banks for spare parts and supplies to keep productive enterprises operating, and will not pass through the state coffers. Any project supported should meet the criteria of income effect on the impoverished, as well as productivity.

Donors will need to coordinate their policies, to prevent aberrations such as the French scheme in 1975 to saddle the country with a wholly unnecessary domestic satellite project for $85 million, at a time when the debt situation was already desperate. This too will be difficult; the French have attached higher priority to preserving the incumbent regime than most others, and have been more inclined to indulgence.

Third, although aid efforts must involve continued cooperation with the incumbent regime, as long as it retains power, additional resources will serve no purpose unless they are associated with reforms and controls upon their utilization.

The effort to negotiate reforms, especially when they call into question the patrimonial structures of the regime, is no simple task. President Mobutu is a proud and stubborn leader, quick to take affront, skilled in the diplomacy of dependency. One must recall that he has expelled two American Ambassadors and, in 1975, publicly accused the CIA of trying to overthrow him.

A large role will be played by the team now being recruited for the central bank by the International Monetary Fund, including a deputy director. While

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the IMF has frequently provided technical assistance in personnel, including central bank directors, for newly established monetary institutions, on this occasion the scope of their mission is much greater. The team, whose recruitment is virtually complete, come from outside the Fund itself. As is customary in such IMF technical assistance operations, they will report to the Bank of Zaïre and Zaïrian authorities. External personnel for other financial organs of the state—customs, finance ministry—are being obtained from other sources.

The corrosion of the administration by the "Zaïrian sickness" has gone so far that there is no other way to limit the hemorrhage of capital occurring both through the Zaïrian politico-commercial class as well as foreign mercantile groups. Though the IMF role is officially technical, curbing exchange leakage will inevitably bring the group into conflict with the powerful political figures who are involved in capital flight. The outcome is evidently uncertain.

Fourth, it would be intolerable to allow external support for Zaïre to preclude any domestically generated political change. The purpose of Western aid should be promotion of the long-term political and economic viability of the Zaïrian polity, not the perpetuation of a particular regime. This is exceedingly difficult to translate into practice, as the regime quite naturally wishes to use the backing received from outside to guarantee its longevity. Yet without this perspective aid risks being a constant hostage to the short-run survival exigencies of a given regime.

Fifth, external assistance must aim at alleviating the distress of the mass of the population. Only escalated repression and terror could enforce further increases in mass impoverishment. There could be no greater indictment of Western policy than to have as its consequence a further lease on life for a given regime, and protection of external economic interests, at the price of further pauperization of the urban and rural poor. This means that some classic formulas for combating the inflation dimension of the crisis cannot be further employed. Wages cannot be further depressed, and prices for peasant output must be sharply increased.

Finally, probably the most effective way to curtail the regional instability that may lead to external intervention is actively to pursue U.S. diplomacy aimed at reconciliation with Angola, and to encourage the current thaw in relations between Zaïre and Angola. In the absence of reasonable political relationships, proxy destabilization campaigns, through external support and equipment to respective rebel forces in both countries, will be a continuing source of disorder. In fact, there is no reason why the divergent ideologies of Kinshasa and Luanda need to make harmonious coexistence impossible. Despite the at least rhetorical Marxist-Leninist commitment of Congo-Brazzaville, relations between Zaïre and its northern neighbor have been remarkably amicable since 1971. (It is worth noting that Congo-Brazzaville played no part in abetting either Shaba I or Shaba II.)The reopening of the Benguela railway would be a great boon to both Zaïre and Angola. Recent indications that Angola may be willing to disarm the FNLC and move the refugees away from the border, in return for comparable Zaïrian moves with respect to UNITA, FNLA and FLEC, may permit withdrawal or at least reduction of external forces from both countries.

The unending crisis in Zaïre is so serious that there can be no guarantee that these policies will succeed. They are put forth as the least unsatisfactory of the choices that are open. They will in the final analysis be justified only if the frightening burden of misery imposed upon the mass of the population is alleviated.

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Seth Lipsky
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INDONESIA: TESTING TIME FOR THE "NEW ORDER"

Shortly before President Suharto was sworn in last March for a third five-year term as President of Indonesia, he delivered a major state of the nation speech to the People's Consultative Assembly.

The trials of his second term, Suharto said, "have made us more mature and more realistic. These experiences have done away with wishful thinking, especially the illusion that development is not a struggle . . . . We grow more conscious that in implementing development we are sometimes confronted with alternatives — which road should we take so we reach our goal safely. At times this choice isn't between the good and the bad, but only which is less bad than others."

Little more than a decade ago, Suharto and the Army took power and ended the "guided democracy" of the Sukarno era as well as Indonesia's flirtation with the Soviet Union and China. At the time, Suharto made a monumental strategic decision — gambling the development of the world's fifth most populous nation on a partnership with the free market economies of the United States, Japan and Europe. His New Order brought political stability and some economic progress. Indonesia took more effective control of its own oil and other natural resources. Soon soaring oil prices brought a wave of optimism that convinced many that Indonesia might be able to hoist itself dramatically and suddenly from poverty. But then came a worldwide recession. The engine of Suharto's development program, the state oil company Pertamina, derailed, wrecking the illusion that somehow oil would prove a magic balm for the nation's problems.

Today, as Suharto begins what will probably be his last term, his New Order is facing a testing time. Indonesia's problems of population, food and jobs are looming more starkly than ever; around them center many of the themes voiced by his detractors at home.

The years ahead are likely, as well, to plumb the West's commitment to official aid programs, and to test anew the commitment of private enterprise to a responsible role in a nation that has always held a special allure for those seeking riches from the East. Suharto's third term is shaping up as a test of the very worthiness of the West as a partner in development.

II

The stage for all this was set early in the New Order, when Suharto brought in a team of Western-educated technocrats to run the nation's economy. These included a host of highly able officials, ranged under Widjojo Nitisastro, head of the national development planning agency, BAPPENAS, and sometimes called

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by Westerners the Berkeley Mafia.

Under their guidance, Indonesia faced up to formidable problems and recorded some impressive achievements. Over the course of a decade, real gross domestic product grew at an average of about seven percent a year to more than $44 billion in 1977. Inflation, which was running at more than 600 percent during the final days of Sukarno, has been wrestled under control, now running at about ten percent a year. Foreign trade has exploded; gross exports of $10.6 billion in 1977 were 12 times bigger than in 1967. The nation's crucial irrigation system was repaired; roads were built up. Schools and hospitals were constructed. Food distribution facilities have been improved, lessening the chances of isolated famine. Indonesia in 1976 inaugurated its own satellite telephone communications. Although average per capita income of about $240 a year still puts Indonesia among the world's poorest nations, most observers contend that living conditions in the absolute sense have improved for millions of Indonesia's citizens.

But during the early 1970s, the technocrats went into partial eclipse, while the development spotlight shone on oil, particularly on a one-time Army doctor, General Ibnu Sutowo. In 1968, Sutowo had been named by Suharto to head Pertamina, which had recently been reorganized as the state oil company with sole rights over the nation's oil and gas reserves and all subsidiary industries. Sutowo radically changed, and improved, the terms on which Indonesia was dealing with foreign oil companies, introducing production-sharing contracts that allowed Indonesia to share directly in oil taken out of the ground and put the burden of risk upon the foreign explorers. This put Indonesia in a stronger position than before and launched a new age in the nation's oil development.

Sutowo, however, operated outside the sphere of control of the technocrats; instead, he had the direct backing of Suharto himself. As oil prices began to edge upward and then to soar, Sutowo moved Pertamina quickly into vast projects far beyond oil. He signed huge contracts to hire and purchase a fleet of supertankers. He launched far-sighted projects to liquefy the nation's vast stores of natural gas so it could be shipped to foreign markets. Suharto assigned him the task of completing the big Krakatau steel mill, begun by the Russians but left unfinished after the attempted pro-communist coup of 1965. Pertamina also branched out into refineries, petrochemicals, fertilizer, airlines, hotels, highways, insurance, and even experimental farming. By 1974, oil export revenues had soared to $5.2 billion from $232 million in 1966. Pertamina was justifiably being called a national development company, the spearhead of the New Order's development drive.

Throughout the early 1970s, foreign businessmen scrambled madly to cash in on Pertamina's foray into the marketplace. A young reporter, arriving in Hong Kong in 1974, was told by an executive of a big multinational chemical company: "Go to Jakarta—it's the boom town of Asia." Suppliers of equipment, oil companies, engineering firms, consultants, tanker owners, and brokers and agents of all kinds lined up at Sutowo's door. As often as not, their sales were made on credit. The Indonesians believe, too, that many of the contracts written during those days specified prices that were far too high, and they complain much equipment purchased ultimately didn't work. Foreign banks, especially but not exclusively American banks, were particularly aggressive. They lent hundreds of millions of dollars to Pertamina on lucrative terms, despite the fact that a fully audited set of accounts for the company was not available.

This display was at once a demonstration of the enormous resources of

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multinational enterprise and of the alacrity with which it could move. But it was also highly dismaying to Indonesia's technocrats. They not only chafed at the way Sutowo was preempting their franchise over development, but they worried that Pertamina was becoming dangerously overextended. Their opinion was shared by both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In a standby agreement as early as 1972, the IMF went so far as to place limits on Indonesia's external borrowing and specific subceilings on credits to Pertamina. But the ceilings covered only medium-term loans. Many banks questioned the wisdom of the IMF controls. Hungry for borrowers, they began advancing huge sums in credits maturing in less than a year, just short of the IMF limits. It turned out to be a sad episode in the advance of Western banks into the developing world.

For Pertamina was a bubble. Much of its debt was to fund projects that would take far longer to build than the loans would run. The bubble burst in 1975, when the looming recession and conservation programs in the United States and Japan were eroding demand for Indonesia's oil and when international financial markets, frightened by the collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt of West Germany and Franklin National Bank of New York, were tightening up. The triggering event—Pertamina's failure to meet a payment on a $40-million loan at a time when it had $1.5 billion in foreign bank debt coming due *within a year*—plunged Indonesia into its worst financial crisis since the days of Sukarno. As the government sorted out the company's affairs, the lowest officially disseminated tally of Pertamina's obligations came to $6.2 billion. This included payments owed to banks, taxes owed to the Indonesian government, and credits owed to suppliers of goods and services, both at home and abroad. Additional obligations—largely promises to pay for its fleet of big oil tankers—boosted the total by some official counts to slightly more than $10 billion, an impossible burden for Pertamina to sustain.

The near-collapse of Pertamina, and the events that followed it, shook Indonesia profoundly. The nation awoke in 1975 to find itself being cited as the developing country where big Western banks came closest to getting seriously burned. The government was forced to mount an emergency bail-out to pay off the foreign banks, an effort that made Bank Indonesia, the central bank, the largest individual borrower of publicly syndicated bank loans in the world in 1975. Even so, Indonesia's reserves of foreign exchange plummeted to less than $450 million in September 1975 (the nation probably had negative reserves at times that year).

No sooner did Indonesia line up its bail-out financing than it ran into a nasty and humiliating battle to extricate itself from Pertamina's tanker contracts. Legal claims from a little-known Geneva tanker charterer, holding $1.266 billion in promissory notes personally signed by Sutowo, tied up Indonesian shipping and threw more than one billion dollars of its newly negotiated foreign debt into technical default. The battle undoubtedly contributed to what must have been one of the most painful decisions of Suharto's career—to fire Sutowo in March 1976. Before settling most of its tanker commitments, Indonesia itself revealed evidence of possible improper dealings between Sutowo and companies with which he put together the tanker fleet.

These events resulted in an important shift of power within the Indonesian government in favor of the technocrats, who obtained a virtual veto over Pertamina's plans. They in turn were forced to make hard decisions on a retrenchment of the company's ambitious goals. Their strategy was to limit

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Pertamina itself to the oil sector, and to strip it of businesses not related to oil. Some projects were cancelled outright, including a big deep-water port and oil transshipment terminal at Semangka Bay, South Sumatra. Others were deferred, such as an aromatics plant in southern Sumatra and an industrial complex on Batam Island, near Singapore. One by one, dozens of other Pertamina projects were transferred to other ministries of the government.

The government also decided to revise the production-sharing agreements themselves, perhaps Sutowo's proudest achievement. In mid-1975, aides of the IMF sent a brief memo to the Indonesian government estimating oil company profits per barrel in Indonesia at ten times the average in eight major members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and suggesting that both "historical and international comparisons" indicated "some scope" for Indonesia to increase its revenues by lowering profits of foreign oil companies. The IMF analysis was angrily disputed by foreign drillers. But another memo, by Price Waterhouse & Co., the international accounting firm, suggested ways the government might act. In early 1976, Suharto announced that the government would renegotiate the terms of its contracts with foreign drillers in an effort to boost its revenues. This touched off a bitter round of negotiations between the government and the oil companies and brought to a near-halt new exploration for oil in the nation. The government did not abandon the production-sharing concept. But eventually it demanded and won a more favorable split of oil with foreign contractors. To revive exploration, however, it was forced to announce a new and expensive round of incentives. In recent months, exploration has begun to pick up. But the experience taught the government how delicate is its relationship with the foreign drillers.

The Pertamina affair left Indonesia with a devastating sense of opportunity lost. It will probably never be known exactly what the collapse cost the nation in dollars and cents. One economist insists the Pertamina crisis dealt Indonesia "the greatest peacetime loss that any country has ever incurred." Other assessments are more modest. Addressing the Consultative Assembly, President Suharto himself probably put it best. The crisis, "which really was a most expensive experience," he said, "caused a decline in our ability to speed up the rate of development. The rise in the price of petroleum on the world market, which ought to have multiplied our capacity for development, proved not to bring benefits as large as we had originally hoped." The end of the illusion that oil would end Indonesia's poverty and provide development miracles was probably the most important legacy of the Pertamina affair.

III

It was understandable that the rise, fall, and finally the reconstruction of Pertamina so dominated the thinking about Indonesia's economy for much of a decade. The oil sector played—and plays—a pivotal role, carrying overall growth rates forward and paying about 50 percent of all the government's bills. Its apparent success spurred the government to almost open-handed spending, but also lulled it to complacency. Mainly, the attention, money and energy spent on Pertamina obscured Indonesia's performance on its most fundamental development problems. Now these are looming as the toughest tests for the New Order.

Indonesian government officials are well aware of this. In an interview in

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March 1977, Widjojo Nitisastro declared that the worst of the Pertamina crisis was over. "But," he said, "it's not just back to normal." Many problems confront Indonesia. These include difficulties in managing natural resources, raising government revenues, and servicing the country's heavy foreign debt load (with about $11.5 billion in foreign debt, Indonesia is probably the third most deeply indebted developing country after Brazil and Mexico). But three areas present planners with their biggest problems—population, agricultural development and job creation.

Policy decisions in these three areas now appear certain to shape the economic legacy of Suharto's administration and ultimately determine the success of his New Order. What looms ahead is not a sudden but rather a medium-term, creeping crisis. These are not the sort of problems that will be solved with big capital-intensive projects. Indeed, sorting out the priorities over a host of such projects that are attractive to Suharto is shaping up as one of the key orders of business in writing the nation's next five-year plan, Replita III, which is likely to be giving greater attention to the fundamentals. It will be a difficult road, for the record of Suharto's New Order in these vital areas is decidedly mixed. Impressive gains have been made in controlling population growth, but the record has been less impressive in the areas of food production and job creation.

Population is in many ways the most unsettling problem. Various projections estimate that if a net reproduction rate of 1.0 (which means averaging two children a couple) isn't reached until the year 2000, Indonesia will have a population of between 215 million and 225 million at the turn of the century and won't stop growing until it reaches between 330 million and 335 million.[1] If the attainment of the net reproduction target of 1.0 is delayed until the year 2021, Indonesia's ultimate population could reach as high as 500 million. Such numbers would mean incalculable strains on the nation's human and physical resources.

Indonesian officials are keenly aware of the problem. Suharto himself was an early convert to the need for family planning programs. In a sharp departure from the policies of Sukarno (who fostered the idea that large families were a virtue), Suharto has lent unstinting political support to family planning. The national family planning coordinating board is answerable directly to the president.

Largely as a result of such support, the program has shown impressive gains. In the eight years since Indonesia started a formal family planning program in the densely populated islands of Java and Bali (home to 90 million of Indonesia's 136.6 million residents), long-run estimates of population have been cut significantly. The total fertility rate in Java and Bali has dropped more than 20 percent and is still declining. Contraceptive use among eligible couples has gone from near zero to more than 40 percent on Java and has topped 60 percent on Bali. As a result, Indonesia's overall annual rate of population growth has slipped from more than two percent to about 1.8 percent, a significant decline. The results of the family planning effort are so impressive that demographers Terence Hull, Valerie Hull and Masri Singarimbun, in a recent monograph,

[1] Population growth, of course, is a function of mortality rates as well as birth rates. The net reproduction rate of 1.0 would mean that Indonesia's population would stabilize in terms of increase by reason of a high birth rate. But Indonesia's population growth has come in large part not because people are having so many more children as because the children are surviving longer and having children of their own. So, whenever a net reproduction rate of 1.0 is achieved, the population would still grow for some time.

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called it a "success story unrivaled in family planning history."[2] Planners heartened by the improving trend are accelerating efforts. The government is now aiming to cut the national fertility fate by 50 percent by 1990 so as to reach a target of one percent annual population growth ten years ahead of the schedule mapped out when family planning was begun.

But even if the country meets this revised goal, the latest government estimates put the population at about 210 million by 2000 and see it stabilizing at 275 million by the year 2100. By all analyses, Java and Bali, which together have an area a little more than a third of Japan, will have to carry well over 110 million people 20 years from now.

Thus, population distribution looms as a subsidiary problem. With heavy concentrations of people on Java and Bali, pressures on environment, social and economic systems are mounting. The World Bank, for example, recently reported that landlessness has increased "rapidly" in the 1970s, forcing increases in unemployment and underemployment levels. More and more rural people driven off farms are looking for work as laborers, turning to urban areas when it isn't available in the countryside. On Java, some studies estimate, as much as 75 percent, possibly 80 percent, of the population is landless.

The heavy population concentration in the rice bowl of central and east Java is also beginning to result in clear signals of ecological deterioration. Crowding in certain areas has driven the poor into the hills in search of land and firewood for fuel. In the process, wooded areas are being stripped, leading to erosion that saps the island of fertile soil and destroys water catchment areas. The result contributes to an increase in droughts and floods that plague low-lying rice lands and set off rounds of peasant bankruptcies. Some agriculturalists fear that unless the pressure can be relieved, much arable land will be turned to useless savanna grasslands within the next 20 to 30 years.

One hope for relief is rapid redistribution of population through internal migration. But so far more than 50 years of experimenting with various transmigration schemes have yielded meager results. In the years between 1905 and 1977 fewer than one million people were moved out of Java in official transmigration programs, while the population increased by 35 million. In Indonesia's second five-year plan (due to be completed in 1979), an original target of 250,000 families due to be transferred from Java to outlying islands was scaled down to 100,000. But in the first four years of the plan, only 54,000 families have actually been moved. Officials have ambitious plans to raise the number of transmigrant families to 500,000 in the next five-year plan. But even with massive increases in spending, historical patterns suggest that the target is not likely to be achieved.

Just how much money the government wants to sink into this program is one of the key decisions Suharto is facing this term, a decision that will be shared by the World Bank and other Western institutions backing Indonesian development. Most economists and officials have concluded that transmigration is not a panacea for demographic redistribution, or even a way to spread labor more evenly over the archipelago. The World Bank, in a study of the Indonesian economy this year, stated flatly that transmigration's direct contribution to "relieving pressures on the labor market in Java and to the development of the

[2] Terence Hull, Valerie Hull and Masri Singarimbun, "Indonesia's Family Planning Story: Success and Challenge," *Population Bulletin*, Vol. 32, No. 6, Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, Inc., 1977

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other islands . . . will be limited."[3] And another study—by Alden Speare, Jr.—analyzed the mix of population, urbanization and transmigration figures and concluded transmigration won't make much of a difference in labor force levels on Java by the year 2000.[4]

Nevertheless, officials and advisers believe that the transmigration effort must continue for two reasons. First, an official program of transmigration appears to pay some dividends in spurring voluntary migration out of Java. Second, economists and planners are concluding there are opportunities to boost food and commercial agricultural production in outer islands by linking transmigration efforts to specific rural development schemes intended to set transmigrants on their feet as commercial, not merely subsistence, farmers.

Indonesia's population situation has a direct impact on the two other key problems for Suharto's third term—agricultural development and employment. In these areas, gains under the Suharto government's first ten years were far less encouraging. In agriculture, food production, after some spectacular early gains under the so-called green revolution, has run into serious problems. At the same time, production levels of key traditional commercial agricultural crops—such as coffee, rubber, tea, pepper, and spices—have not improved significantly over levels reached in the early 1970s, and in some instances have declined. This combination hits Indonesia hard. A trend is emerging that has already made Indonesia the largest importer of rice in the world and, unless checked, could force the nation to use between ten percent and 15 percent of export earnings to pay for food alone. And export earnings themselves are limited by the stagnation in the production of commercial agricultural export crops.

What went wrong with food production in Indonesia? For quite a while the apparent answer was nothing. The green revolution, with its high-yielding rice strains, multiple cropping, increased use of fertilizers, and better irrigation systems, has brought a 50 percent jump in rice production over the past ten years and a 20 percent increase in per capita rice consumption.

But since 1974 production has risen at the scanty average annual rate of only slightly more than one percent, while consumption has continued to jump ahead. Acreage in rice is stagnating at early 1970 levels. Productivity, while high in relation to other Southeast Asian countries, is now increasing only marginally. The World Bank earlier this year warned that projections by "authoritative sources suggest the possibility of a rapidly widening gap between domestic production and demand for food."

A variety of factors contribute to this gap. One analyst insists that the Indonesians are "reaching limits of all kinds—human, technological and ecological." In recent years, bad growing conditions have put the nation far behind its target of 18.1 million tons of rice a year by 1979. A run of adverse weather and pest infestations have been the most visible causes. But some of these problems result not merely from bad luck. Droughts and floods, influenced by increasing deforestation and erosion, have become more prevalent. And the quickly mutating brown planthopper has ravaged millions of acres of high-yielding *padi*

[3] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development's Annual Report on Indonesian Economy, April 1978. This document is the latest of the reports the World Bank prepares each year for the spring meeting of the intergovernmental group for Indonesia. Restricted for the use of the Bank, it is not available in the generally published literature on Indonesia.

[4] Alden Speare, Jr., "Alternative Population Distribution Policies," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, March 1978, Department of Economics, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.

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since the mid-1970s. The high-yielding rice strains, double and triple croppings, increased irrigation and use of fertilizer that come with the green revolution—all have made it easier for the planthopper to flourish and survive the year round.

In addition, some blame the rice problem in part on shortcomings in government policies and implementation programs. Extension and research programs for pest control and other aspects of rice production have not reached enough Indonesian farmers. Other problems include a failure to extend irrigation channels to their final destination. An increase in absentee landlordism has cut into production, and government-controlled rice price ceilings are thought by some analysts to be too low to encourage increased production. But here the government is caught in a bind. It is battling continually against its ubiquitous inflation. And rice is already too expensive for many Indonesians.

In addition, programs set up specifically to spur rice production have shown discouraging trends. A rural credit program providing two-year loans in kind for fertilizer and other supplies through a state bank specializing in agricultural lending has run into difficulties after a promising start in the 1970s. Average yields per hectare in the intensification program were the same in 1977 as in 1972, loan repayment rates are beginning to slip, and overall participation is leveling off. One government economist feels the program has run into the law of diminishing returns. He and others worry that even with more help from the government, production in Java will increase only marginally.

There have been serious but isolated instances of starvation and hunger in Indonesia. On the island of Flores, northwest of Timor, as recently as early 1978, some people died of hunger due to three years of crop failures and a reluctance among embarrassed local officials to call for help from the central government. Students and other critics cite such instances, repeatedly and angrily, as evidence of the New Order's failure on food. Starvation is always horrible. But it is generally isolated in Indonesia, the result of local failures. So far the government has avoided a genuine food crisis by upgrading the country's storage and distribution network, building stockpiles as a hedge against shortages, and holding prices down. But in 1977 imports reached 2.6 million metric tons, or about two-thirds of the entire world market in internationally traded rice. This cost about $700 million. Prospects for the current year are slightly better, but the government is still looking at rice imports of about two million metric tons annually in the coming years, and a food import bill probably topping one billion dollars.

Other non-rice food crops—which account for 50 percent of total calorie intake by Indonesians—have also shown little or no production gains in recent years. Output of maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, soybeans, and other dry land crops has stagnated since the early 1970s. Simultaneously, export of these crops, which once made their cultivation a worthwhile proposition and provided jobs in the rural economy, has all but dried up.

Commercial crops, too, are worrisome. Their relative importance declined as oil and timber soared in the 1970s. But estate crops—principally rubber, coffee, oil palm, and tea—still account for about 30 percent of Indonesia's total exports, including oil, and provide employment for between 10 percent and 20 percent of the country's total workforce of about 50 million. With the sole exception of palm oil, trends in production are discouraging. In rubber, smallholders' production, about two-thirds of total output, is stagnating or declining. And overall rubber output remains at levels first reached in the early 1970s. Coffee, tea and pepper are showing similar trends.

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All these developments affect the third big problem facing Suharto—employment and job creation—which is already discouraging and is getting worse. About 65 percent of Indonesia's labor force works in rural areas. Various studies, including a spring 1978 report by the IMF,[5] estimate that 40 percent of this group is currently unemployed or underemployed. In urban areas, unemployment or underemployment is estimated at about 20 percent. The IMF this year estimated that in the 1960s and 1970s the labor force has increased at an average of three percent a year, while the number of persons employed rose by only 2.7 percent annually. The IMF concluded that the "increase in employment opportunities has probably been greater than envisaged, but progress in combatting unemployment has been retarded because of a more rapid than anticipated growth in the labor force."

The brunt of the employment burden will probably continue to fall on the rural sector, where the need to create new jobs in the next five years will be critical. Projections put the total work force in the year 2000 at about 87 million, with the rural work force still constituting between 65 percent and 75 percent. So far, modern manufacturing and service industries have absorbed only a small proportion of the increase in labor, and growing constraints on government spending threaten to block any dramatic expansion in public works employment.

To the dismay of planners, foreign investment (principally in export production) has brought little relief. The 1978 IMF report says that direct employment opportunities generated by foreign investment have been "relatively small." A confidential study recently completed for the state planning agency, BAPPENAS, was even more discouraging, concluding that because of a shift to capital-intensive extractive industries, especially oil, from labor-intensive non-extractive industries, the export sector has actually generated negative employment opportunities over the last seven years. The employment generated from exports in 1977, it found, fell by at least 60,000 jobs from the level of 1971, although the value of exports over the same period increased almost eightfold.

A constellation of problems in population, food and employment always sounds unreal in the abstract. To bring home their cumulative impact, take the lot of a typical family in Java. The Sukardis—as we might call them—have a 50 percent to 75 percent chance of not owning any land. Mr. Sukardi and his wife probably have about five children. One or two children probably died before they were five years old. Both Mr. Sukardi and his wife probably work as hired farm laborers, being paid in food; they probably only make a hundred dollars a year or so in cash. They likely live in a home with a dirt floor, and must look hard for firewood. If their children stay in rural Java, they can look forward to living an even harder life, with almost no hope of ever owning land. If they drift into the cities, their chances of finding any job are slim indeed and of finding a good job even slimmer. If they choose to accept transmigration to an outlying province, their lives as settlers will be as rough as that of any migrants in history—without the future promise that lured so many pioneers to, say, the western United States or migrants from Europe to America.

The plight of the Sukardis is now crowding in on planners in Jakarta at a rush. And as if that were not enough, the outlook is darkened by some other factors. For the first time since Suharto came to power, the prospects are bleak for continued healthy rises in foreign exchange earnings to fuel the govern-

[5] "Indonesia: Recent Economic Developments." Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, April 1978. This paper was prepared as part of the IMF's regular reporting on Indonesia. An internal IMF document, it is not part of the generally published literature on Indonesia.

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ment's development budget. Both the World Bank and the IMF are predicting that net exports will increase by a mere five to ten percent in the year now ending (1978), mainly because oil export revenues, which increased 30-fold in the past decade as both prices and production soared, are likely to stagnate and possibly decline. The IMF said the "major challenge facing the policy makers over the next few years is to maintain the pace of development in the non-oil sector despite the expected slowdown in oil revenues." "In the next few years," the World Bank forecast in its April 1978 report on Indonesia, "the development program will have to operate in circumstances which, in many respects, are significantly different from those prevailing earlier."

All this is forcing Indonesian planners—and ultimately Suharto—to make some difficult choices. As work progresses on the third five-year plan for 1979–84, a fundamental debate is being waged behind the scenes on what directions development should take. Planners are aware of Suharto's penchant for big projects that change the shape of the nation, and a whole galaxy of such projects is on the drawing boards. These include such schemes as the Bintan Island alumina project, which would cost a minimum of $450 million; the Batam Island oil refinery, which would probably cost $800 million; a new airport projected to cost hundreds of millions of dollars; a $600-million diesel engine factory; a $300-million urea plant that would be built as a joint industrial scheme with the other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); a $750-million refinery at Dumai in Sumatra; a possible $400-million expansion of the already operating liquefied natural gas plant at East Kalimantan; a $700-million possible expansion of the nearly completed liquefied natural gas facility at Arun in northern Sumatra (needed if Indonesia gains clearance to ship LNG to the United States); and a one billion dollar coal and power project at south Sumatra.

The President, says one of Suharto's associates, "likes to cut ribbons." He would like—as a long-time Cabinet member puts it—"to have his cake and eat it too." But increasingly his planners are saying priorities must be reordered to select the big projects that really matter, and that—even to fund these—waste will have to be cut from the administration's spending. Not only will increased external resources have to be mobilized, but greater domestic resources will have to be used and used more effectively. Sorting out these priorities will probably take place over several years. It is a critical exercise, one that, if mishandled, could leave Suharto with an economic legacy that is badly tarnished.

IV

Although these challenges express themselves in forms of economic planning, they have an enormous political dimension. When Suharto and the armed forces ousted Sukarno from power in 1966, brought in a team of Western-educated technocrats to restore order and a degree of Western-style planning to the economy and reopened the country to foreign investment, it amounted to a repudiation of 20 years of Indonesian history. For the first time since Indonesia wrested its independence from the Dutch, the politics of nationalism were no longer in command. Instead, the priorities were economic pragmatism and an accommodation with the Western industrialized powers and especially Japan.

In casting his lot with the major non-communist states, Suharto made a commitment that Sukarno had tried for two decades to avoid. He committed the nation to a dependence on trade and on aid from the major capitalist countries. He saw this as the best strategy to promote rapid economic develop-

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ment at home. But the move went against the dominant political themes in Indonesian history, and as such was a gamble. It opened Suharto's flanks to criticism from nationalists still suspicious of the motives of former imperial powers, to leftists who viewed the concept of liberal democracy as anathema and inherently exploitative, and to radical rightists who felt passionately, for reasons of culture and religion, that the influence of the West, with its secularism and corrupting materialism, must be staunchly resisted.

It must have been clear to Suharto when he made this commitment that, with the communists crushed, his biggest challenges would come from segments of Indonesian society brought up on and still harboring these political views. If he wanted to win over these latent critics, he would have to produce an economic and political record that offered indisputable evidence that his strategic shift brought more benefits than it did disadvantages. He had to deliver the goods. Now, as he enters his third term, the fact that basic development problems are still looming so starkly and a perception that he has not delivered the goods are fueling an increasing amount of criticism – notably from students and religious extremists.

Under Suharto (as indeed under Sukarno before him), the political development of Indonesia has progressed only slowly, in terms of both participation and accountability. Today the question of which individuals hold real power high in the government is almost as hard to pin down as in China or North Korea. What is clear is that although the technocrats play a key role in planning, and take a more public role than other officials of the government in dealing with the foreign press, business and diplomats, real power is generally held by military men. About half of the 24 Cabinet posts are held by members of the armed forces. It is these men the planners must convince. And most observers in Jakarta assume, accurately it seems, that nearly all important decisions are made by Suharto himself.

The key concept in the armed forces' view of the political system is that all legitimate political expression must be channelled through political institutions organized by, and firmly controlled by, the state. To provide an outlet for expression and a structure for parliamentary government, political parties were reorganized in 1971 into three groups.These are the pro-government Golkar (which stands for Golongan Karya); the United Development Party, an amalgam of four old Muslim parties; and the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, a collection of nationalist and Christian parties. These groups, the Parliament (which meets annually and which makes up half the People's Consultative Assembly that meets every five years to elect the President), and two national elections have provided a semblance of popular participation in the government and a partial outlet for dissent.

But the most influential political developments still originate outside the formal political structure – for example, in student movements, religious indoctrination or campaigns by dissidents. Although such outside expression may be tolerated briefly as a way to ease pent-up pressure, when it has persisted it has been firmly stopped by the military. This happened, for example, in January 1978, when, shortly before the presidential election, hundreds of students were arrested and the nation's major newspapers were closed for two weeks.

Indeed, in its more recent moves the government appears to be doing little that will diminish the distrust of its more vocal opponents. In a new Cabinet formed in April, technocrats are represented in about equal numbers with generals. But the Cabinet had only one new minister drawn from the ranks of a

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political party—he was from the pro-government Golkar and a general to boot. For the first time since 1971, the Cabinet included no opposition party leaders, this despite the fact that the Muslim party scored some significant victories in the parliamentary elections in May 1977, increasing its representation by several seats.

Twelve years after assuming power, the armed forces show no indication that they are prepared to return to civilian rule. Their numbers are sprinkled throughout the bureaucracy. Were Suharto to die during his current term, Adam Malik, who became Vice President in March, would become nominally—and quite possibly temporarily—President. But real power would be exercised by such men as General Maraden Panggabean, Coordinating Minister for Defense and Political Affairs, General Surono Reksodimejo, Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare, General Andi Mohammad Jusuf, Minister of Defense and Commander of the Armed Forces, General Widodo, Army Chief of Staff, and General Amirmachmud, Minister of Home Affairs.

At the end of his third term, Suharto would be almost 63 years old. In his August 1978 National Day speech, he said that one of the key political jobs of his third term would be to watch over a shift in the generations of leadership. "In or at the end of the next five years," he said, "the change of generations will begin to take place." Nonetheless, it is inconceivable to most Indonesians that the presidency could ultimately go to someone other than a general from Java. Among current senior officials, this leaves Surono and Widodo as the liveliest choices should something sudden happen. But lower ranking generals could move to the fore. Suharto hasn't, at least publicly, named a successor.

The apparent permanency of military rule has created a degree of malaise among intellectuals wanting to see a return to some form of government that would allow opportunities for civilian leadership. Though frustrated, those that we have talked with seem relatively comfortable in their university positions or their civilian jobs. The major challenges—if they can be called major—come instead from orthodox Muslim groups and students.

Of the two groups, the Muslims worry the government the most. In its 33 years of independence, the central government has fought several lengthy guerrilla wars against Muslim separatist groups or those calling for the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Although the country is nominally 90 percent Muslim, many Indonesians, especially in the political heartland of Java, leaven their Islam with a wide mix of other cultural influences. The Suharto government believes that should popular momentum ever build for a theocratic Indonesian state—which would presumably lead to a partial rejection of the Western-oriented development path—civil war might occur, wiping out the gains of the past 12 years.

That threat at this stage appears more perceived than actual. Muslim groups in the country are by no means unified. There are those favoring Western-style development as well as those wanting a return to Koranic law. At the moment, physical confrontation is occurring only in the province of Aceh at the northern tip of Sumatra. There a "liberation movement" has sporadically caused problems for the security forces. Aceh, however, has been a fanatically purist Islamic province for centuries and has traditionally resisted central rule from Java. In addition, the government claims that a shadowy group of Muslim extremists called the Komando Jihad (holy war command) is out to spread terror and disrupt government policies. About 700 or 800 alleged members of this group have been arrested. At trials of several of their alleged members, witnesses have

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testified that they received financial aid from Libya. Separately, and more recently, the government arrested several leaders of Jakarta's Muslim groups who had criticized the government for corruption and other abuses. On the Jakarta cocktail circuit, there has been sporadic talk of "Qaddaffis" in the lower ranking officer corps. But if there is evidence that they exist, it hasn't surfaced. All in all, although it is the threat taken most seriously, the Muslim threat does not appear to be an imminent danger.

The students, although more homogeneous, lack national organization and ideological focus. They are united in general distrust of the government, but are vague in proposing alternatives to the abuses they see. Their links to other segments of society are tenuous, although sympathy exists for their protests. The students, however, were dealt a severe setback in the January arrests of hundreds of their members who were speaking out prior to the election. Student organizations were banned and campus activities brought more firmly under government control. Since then, the student movement has been in low profile.

But while neither the Muslims nor the students are presenting the government with what appears to be a tangible threat at the moment, their political sniping touches the very themes with which Suharto will be struggling in his third term. (Military rule itself has also become a theme, but a secondary one.) Behind the complaints of both Muslim and student movements lies dissatisfaction with the results of the government's development strategy—including the links Suharto forged with the industrial powers. Both are calling for a rejection, or at least a moderation, of the turn to the West. One Indonesian stressed this several times to us. "Indonesians," he said, "feel uncomfortable with the dependence on the West . . . it would be a mistake to underestimate that."

High on the list of complaints are inequalities critics feel are exacerbated by the development program. Both students and Muslim critics claim the gap between the rich and poor is widening. They insist that foreigners and ethnic Chinese residents of Indonesia are reaping the gains of development, sharing them with corrupt generals and officials in high office. They charge that Suharto's administration has created a materialistic culture of corruption from top to bottom, enriching its elite through its partnership with the West. Suharto himself is under attack in student circulars because, they allege, his family has taken advantage of its position and become rich in the process. Specific evidence of corruption in the Suharto family has not surfaced.

In the 1977 parliamentary campaign, the Muslim party struck hard at the twin themes of religion and social justice. At mass rallies, it accused the government of coopting all legitimacy, power and privilege in Indonesia, of bartering away the country's natural resources, running up a massive debt, and charting development policies without reference to the desires of the people. On the floor of Parliament shortly before the presidential election in March, Muslim leaders launched the most direct attack yet on the government's economic policies. They called on the government to place top priority in creating jobs and raising income levels of the "bottom 40 percent." They said the government had perpetuated a colonial economic structure that was dependent on the export of oil and inflows of foreign aid.

The students are attacking along the same lines. One of their manifestos is the "White Book," a lengthy report by a particularly active group at the Institute of Technology at Bandung. The White Book, which was banned but circulated widely before the March presidential election, stated flatly that youth had lost

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faith in Suharto and didn't want him to be President. Its references to Suharto's family were derisive. It charged the country's development strategy has led it to insurmountable debts and a reliance on foreign advisers (Widjojo was accused of listening too eagerly to "whisperings" from Harvard and Berkeley). It criticized the reliance on foreign aid and the government's penchant for showcase capital-intensive projects. (Such themes were among those that led to the violent clashes between students and police upon the arrival in Indonesia in January 1974 of then Prime Minister of Japan, Kakuei Tanaka.)

There is a tragic irony to all this. Despite the heavy-handed way in which the government has reacted to the most vocal of the dissident leaders (Heri Achmadi, the Bandung student leader who signed the "White Book," was jailed, for example), government economic officials share many of the same concerns. Any number will promptly concede that the gap between the rich and the poor is a worrisome problem. But they contend that it is a temporary one, common to all developing countries as gains begin to take hold. They seem firmly convinced that the shift in development strategy they are now urging—a frontal attack on the fundamental problems of population, agriculture and employment—is the route best able to overcome the problems that worry the critics most. The question seems to be whether the shift is coming too late.

President Suharto himself seems acutely aware of the issues. In his state of the nation report, he specifically addressed the key ones in a lengthy defense of his development strategy. He hewed to his fundamental strategy of ties to the West. "Although I have explained the problems related to this matter repeatedly," he said, "questions are still raised about it by some ranks in society, not seldom accompanied by suspicion of the policies outlined and even, at times, with accusations as though we have sold ourselves to foreign parties or have pawned our beloved country." He then reiterated promises he wouldn't allow private enterprise and foreign investment to "dominate" Indonesian society. And he insisted foreign capital investment would be used only "so far as it doesn't cause constant dependence and isn't damaging to the national interest."

The problem, of course, is that the dependence is a reality. Indeed, the New Order and its development strategy for the next five years would collapse overnight were that partnership severed. It would be severely hampered if the partnership were curtailed. It's not that Suharto is entirely without options, but they appear few. Occasionally, for example, there is talk in Indonesia that maybe the nation should try what the Chinese tried—the road of self-reliance. But such talk is being increasingly eroded by the startling changes in China itself, which is shucking Maoist ideologies so quickly these days that it seems to be conceding a colossal blunder.

Suharto, too, could press for a greater alliance with other Third World nations. Sukarno took a high profile in the Third World. Indonesia, under Suharto, while active in Third World movements pressing for a new international economic order, has taken a lower profile. Yet there is a strong feeling in Indonesia about Third World solidarity. Even such a conservative man as Widjojo can talk—as he did in an interview with us last year—passionately about the importance of the southern voices in the North-South dialogue. But making Third World solidarity work for development isn't easy. Even on their most tangible industrial projects, the five members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand) are still squabbling, despite years of talk. Suharto has sought to raise significant capital in Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations. But he found that the Saudis

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(according to at least one well-placed aide to the government in Jakarta) had a price for their aid—a greater role for Muslims in Indonesia. This was every bit as unacceptable to Suharto as any other strings on aid from any other nation.

So, Suharto has no realistic place to turn—except to hurry the pace of development in rural areas, working at resuscitating agriculture and at creating jobs. Sketching the outlines of the coming five-year plan for the first time, Suharto, in his National Day state address in mid-August, confirmed these areas would be taking greater priority. The plan would emphasize more "equitable distribution" of the benefits of economic growth. The economic and political challenges, he said, make the next five years "important and decisive." To meet these challenges, Suharto will also have to hack away at corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude and inertia that also fuel dissent. If he appears at times to be failing in this, protests could increase to the point of confrontation again (as in early 1974 and early 1978). Each time this happens, Suharto's image would be a bit more tarnished. But the likelihood that he would become such an embarrassment that his fellow officers would remove him appears, at least for now, to be slim.

V

If Suharto is on the spot now, so is the West. And for those who would like to see the West remain an attractive ally of Indonesia in particular and the developing world in general, this must rank as the most important fact of Suharto's third term.

Foreign aid—both multi- and bilateral—will probably have to be provided in greater amounts than in the past if Indonesia is to grapple successfully with the fundamental problems it is now facing. This is true even if Indonesia successfully mobilizes, as it must, a far greater amount from its own resources. Foreign aid played the dominant role during the New Order's first five-year plan, Replita I, which ended in 1974. Such assistance financed more than half of the three billion dollars in development expenditures under that plan. This ratio began to decline in the mid-1970s, as oil revenues began to pour in. During the current five-year plan, Replita II, the World Bank estimates, development expenditures will amount to some $22 billion, of which about $7.6 billion, or only 35 percent, is expected to be financed by external sources.

But the work now facing the New Order—population, food and jobs—is precisely the type for which private multinational corporations are least fitted, at least in terms of any direct approach. As the World Bank noted:

> In view of the moderate expectations concerning oil revenues during the next five years, and despite expected continued success in mobilizing other domestic revenues, the desire to attack poverty on a broad front is likely to increase the need for reliance on external sources to finance development expenditures.

Given the need for "continued prudence" in external borrowing, it said, "an expansion of the Government's development program will undoubtedly require an increasing flow of foreign resources on concessionary terms." In addition, the World Bank has suggested it might become "increasingly desirable" for external aid to finance not only foreign expenditures, but also part of local expenditures as well.

Requests for such aid will largely be going before, in addition to the World

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Bank, an array of nations belonging to the Intergovernmental Group for Indonesia (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, Britain and the United States in addition to Indonesia). But in many ways the toughest decisions will be faced by the United States. Requests for aid will be going before an Administration in Washington increasingly seeking to use its favors in pursuit of human rights.

If the Carter Administration, or Congress, chooses to make an issue of human rights in Indonesia (which it has so far refrained from doing), it will find a ripe target. Since the abortive pro-communist coup of 1965, Indonesia is holding more political prisoners than any other developing nation allied with the West. Last year, it released about 10,000 of the detainees. It is releasing another 10,000 this year and plans to release the remaining 10,000, by its count, in 1979. But that won't end its vulnerability. In its crackdowns in 1974 and 1978, the government has shown no hesitation to resort to mass arrests, detention without charges or trial, or other breaches of Western notions of civil rights. There is scant sign that the law enforcement or legal system is making an effort to safeguard basic rights of citizens or to assure them of fair or rapid trials. It would be surprising to see any of these change radically during the next five years.

Many Indonesians resent outside pressure on the human rights questions. At a press conference in Jakarta two and a half years ago, a visiting Dutch politician who sought to lecture on morals was almost booed by Indonesian reporters every bit as liberal-minded as their Western counterparts. If, during the home stretch of the New Order, the United States chooses to press the human rights issue, the result could sunder the partnership.

The role of multinational enterprise is going to become more difficult, too. Indonesia is currently enjoying the confidence of foreign businessmen. Not only are the oil companies resuming exploration, but the nation's access to foreign private capital markets, following the recovery of Pertamina, is easier than it has been for a long time. Indonesia recently raised funds on the international bond market for the first time, opening a new source of funds that has been difficult for developing nations to tap. Mining firms, timber cutters, equipment suppliers and companies in other fields are looking at a variety of new projects. But the mood in Jakarta is far different than during the days of the oil boom. Technocrats now negotiating terms with foreign business are imbued with the memories of Pertamina. They are wary of the sort of high-pressure lending pursued by foreign banks in the early 1970s. They are skeptical of the big-ticket equipment purchases. They are apt to fight far harder for a stronger position for Indonesia in joint ventures.

Traveling back to New York from Jakarta after settling Indonesia's billion-dollar tanker dispute, Raymond Burke, Sr., the New York shipping lawyer who fought the battle for Indonesia, made an apt comment on the overall impact of Pertamina. "I do believe," he said, "that the Western adventurers no longer can come to Indonesia and get an easy deal." He wasn't suggesting—nor are Indonesian officials suggesting—that the nation is closing its doors to foreign investment. On the contrary, planners in Jakarta seem more eager than ever to do business with foreign companies. But in negotiations over terms, the burden of proof, largely as a result of Pertamina, has shifted to the outsiders. One of the themes Mike Mansfield has been sounding since his arrival in Asia as U.S. Ambassador to Japan is the need for multinational business to forget about the

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"quick buck" in Asia. Nowhere does this seem more appropriate advice than in Indonesia, where all too many foreign companies—particularly banks—have sought their biggest bucks the quickest. By no means have all foreign companies followed such a route; many have launched major investments on which it will take years to realize a return. But overall it's yet unclear whether foreign business as a whole will prove merely a fair weather friend to Indonesia. The next five years will probably go a long way in telling.

Undoubtedly, there are those who will scoff at the suggestion that any time is crucial for Indonesia, or even that Indonesia is crucial for the West. For, to succeed in its development struggle, Indonesia will have to overcome generations of history. From the days when the Dutch first headed for the Spice Islands, the archipelago has seemed a particularly easy and lucrative land for exploitation. Its cornucopia of resources is the fullest and most enticing in Asia. Access to them has often been made easier by corruption, mismanagement and poverty. There is a view among many friends of Indonesia that the nation itself has gotten off rather lightly, considering the size of the mistakes it has made, and its failure to wipe out the corruption and bureaucratic abuses which have so frequently sapped its development effort. But it would seem a major setback for the West if Suharto's New Order, which gambled on the West, were to fall short of its goals because the West fell short of its promise.

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COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

A PALESTINIAN STATE?

To the Editor:

In his article, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State," in your July 1978 issue, Professor Walid Khalidi postulates the existence of a single Arab nation, and further asserts that, since Israel is dividing the Arabs in Asia from those on the African continent, it constitutes a threat to the whole Arab nation. The Palestinian question is, therefore, a problem of the entire Arab nation, and this is the reason for the Arab war against Israel.

Having established this postulate, Khalidi, nevertheless, pursues the proposal for an independent Arab state on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip. He sees it as a solution for peace with Israel, though Israel would continue to serve as a dividing line breaking the link between the Arabs of Asia and Africa. This contradiction does not appear to shake the faith of the author in his concept.

The aim of pan-Arabism, as Mr. Khalidi notes, is Arab unity. However, the Arab states have been engaged for centuries in internecine wars among Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad, and between the Arab rulers in Iberia and those in the Maghreb. Rivalry among the Arab states continues today; and some of them are periodically in a state of war, like Morocco and Algeria, Egypt and Libya. Syria and Iraq are often on the verge of fighting. A war between Syria and Jordan was prevented in 1970 by a threat of intervention from Israel under U.S. instigation. Yemen, Kuwait and the emirates on the Persian Gulf are, continually, on a near war footing. The internal war in Lebanon, likewise, has its origin in these Arab rivalries, as does the conflict with Israel.

The record shows that the Arab world has been and remains an inherently tribal society. The Arab tribes acted as a unified force and as a nation when they emerged from the Arabian Peninsula to spread Islam, but this unity lasted only for a comparatively short historic period. The Arab tribes began to be divided by dynastic, geographic and economic differences; this has continued throughout the centuries.

Pan-Arabism is, in essence, of foreign origin. The only instrument of pan-Arabism, the Arab League, is a creature of Great Britain. Sir Anthony Eden was its godfather in the early 1940s, and he formed it as a force against Zionism. As for its Palestinian brand, Great Britain fostered and used it as an instrument against France in the Levant and Africa, and, mainly, against Zionism in Palestine.

Colonial Britain relied on Islamic support to hold its possessions in Asia and Africa, and it felt that a Jewish Palestine would alienate Great Britain from the Islamic people and weaken its hold on the colonies. Britain turned, therefore, as a mandatory of the League of Nations in Palestine, to the Arab community. It elevated Amin Husseini, imprisoned for his part in a pogrom against Jews in Jerusalem, to the position of Grand Mufti. He quickly began, with tacit British support, to organize the Arab population to oppose the Jewish homeland by attacking Jewish settlements. He cemented his leadership through acts of terror against Arab notables and their followers.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization is using the same methods on the

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West Bank and in Gaza, as well as in the Arab states, to prevent the rise of opposition to its leadership and its dominance. The PLO is engaged in assassinations of Arab leaders who opposed its brand of pan-Arabism and its aspiration to its leadership.

The PLO is also an outside creation, not an integral outgrowth of the Palestinian Arabs striving for nationhood. It was formed in the middle of the 1960s by the Arab states, who, unable to win against Israel on the battlefield, created the PLO for terroristic warfare against the Jewish state.

It was not until the 1970s, however, that the idea of an independent Palestinian state emerged. The Arabs never claimed Palestine as a separate Arab entity. It was always described as southern Syria. Damascus always considered Palestine as a province, which it sought to rule. From 1949 to 1967, when the West Bank of the Jordan was annexed by the Hashemite kingdom, none of the Arab states recognized this annexation. The fact that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were in Arab hands prior to the 1967 War was not adequate to their purposes, which were in conflict with each other. Each of the Arab states—Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt—aspired to possession of the territory called Palestine and wanted to keep the others from acquiring it. Each one of the Arab states had a political and a strategic reason for wanting to possess Palestine.

The motive for fostering the idea of Palestinian statehood, once it emerged, was to use the popular principle of self-determination to create a strong Arab public relations position against Israel. The Arab states and the PLO did not call for self-determination for the West Bank and Gaza Strip population when these areas were occupied by Jordan and Egypt. The Arab world rejects the concept of self-determination for minorities in their midst. The Kurds in Iraq, the Copts in Egypt and the blacks in Sudan are denied autonomy and equal rights with Islamic Arab majorities. The case of Lebanon, where Islamic Arabs seek to eradicate the Christian population, is a striking example of the Islamic attitude toward the principle of self-determination.

The Arabs on the West Bank and in Gaza do not possess the geopolitical requirements and qualifications for a viable nation. As such, a state made up of these two noncontiguous entities would be an artificial creation; and useful, chiefly, as a pawn in the political and strategic games of its neighbors and of big power rivalry, and as a threat to the peace of the area.

Professor Khalidi pleads for an independent Arab state on the West Bank and in Gaza as an instrument of peace. However, he agrees that such a state will be a PLO state. He assures us that it will be independent from the Soviet Union and will not serve as a base for the expansion of Soviet power in the area. Blessed are the believers; only the very naïve or the cynical can be expected to accept this.

Professor Khalidi is certain that the establishment of this independent Arab state will solve the problem of the Arab refugees. He does not explain, however, how this thickly populated territory can absorb "the millions," whom the Arabs claim as Palestinian refugees. Why should we believe that the Arabs on the West Bank and in Gaza will be more compassionate toward their brothers than the Arabs in other states, who refused to absorb their brothers from Palestine, notwithstanding their wide spaces and ample resources? Unlike other nations in Europe and Asia—West Germany, France, Italy, and India—who absorbed millions of compatriots after the Second World War, the Arab states dealt cruelly with the Palestinian refugees, for whose fate they bore responsibility.

Professor Khalidi rejects the possibility that an independent Palestinian state

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"would be taken over by radical groups." He writes that "any Palestinian regime would be subject to several constraints." He offers an international "global context of settlement" in which the Soviet Union should be a partner. The idea of guarantees, especially of an American guarantee, is offered Israel, something that Israel cannot consider seriously after the Vietnam experience. Certainly, a guarantee in which the Soviet Union is a partner cannot be taken seriously.

When British assistance to the Arabs against Israel ended with Nasser's expropriation of the Suez Canal in 1955, the Arabs turned to the Soviet Union, which began to arm the Arab states and put them under its diplomatic, protective umbrella. The wars of 1967 and 1973, however, convinced the Arabs that the Soviet Union does not have the power to conquer by proxy and to subdue Israel; the Arabs, therefore, turned to the United States to serve as their Hessians in their battle with Israel.

The Carter Administration, in its zigzag Middle East policy, favors an independent Arab state in part of Palestine. However, it is meeting with a strong Israeli consensus against this idea, and it is illusory to think that Israel could change its attitude or that the United States can force Israel to agree to have a dagger poised at its heart.

It is inconceivable for the American people to acquiesce in the use of coercion against Israel, thereby forcing it to commit national suicide.

Judging by the general instability of the Arab governments, the peaceful assurances of any one of them must be taken with great skepticism. There is no continuity, and any new Arab government, after toppling the previous one, will map its own direction. As usual, each successive Arab administration will follow the policy directions of its benefactor, the outside nation that helped it come to power. In the past, more often than not, this power has been the Soviet Union.

Israel, and for that matter the United States, must bear all this in mind. In each case, the policy of the three Arab regimes surrounding Israel rests on one man: Sadat in Egypt, Hussein in Jordan, and Assad in Syria. Should they retire or be forcibly removed from office by an upheaval—a frequent occurrence in the Arab states—it is doubtful whether those who will take their place will be bound by the commitments that the predecessors have made for peace and tranquillity.

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Mr. Khalidi replies:

Mr. Epstein misses the thrust of my analysis of pan-Arabism and its relationship to the Palestine problem. My proposition was that Arab perceptions have substantively changed in spite of the traditional framework within which the Palestine problem has been viewed by the Arabs, and the traditional functional role this problem has played in Arab politics. My point was that contemporary Palestinian and Arab acceptance of partition, with all its implications for Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli coexistence, is the paradoxical result of this change.

In arguing for a Palestinian state I discussed the four principal objections to it. (1) The state's limited absorptive capacity: my point was not that the state could absorb all the Palestinian refugees but that it would have a considerable alleviative impact, on both a physical and even more so, on a psychological level.

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(2) The state's economic viability: I detailed my reasons for thinking the state would have a fair chance, but Mr. Epstein's only rejoinder is that the noncontiguity of the West Bank and Gaza Strip renders the state "artificial". (3) The issue of radicalization: I argued from (a) the centrist character of Fatah; (b) the confluence of factors (which I enumerated) that will encourage Fatah's centrism and (c) the refusal of the rejectionists to participate in the Palestinian government. (4) The military threat posed by the state: I argued from (a) the local balance of power that will be crushingly in favor of Israel and tried to show how, in the circumstances, the state's geographical configurations reduce it to a sitting duck; and (b) the changed perception of the Fatah leadership with regard to the limits of armed struggle.

I further argued for (a) acceptance by the two superpowers and their clients, as well as the Arab states party to the settlement, of the "nonaligned" status (à la Austria) of the state, particularly with regard to military alliances; (b) the defusing of specifically Syrian and Egyptian irredentism by a return to the 1967 frontiers in the Golan Heights and Sinai Desert, but without the return of Arab armies to these frontiers; (c) the stationing of U.N. troops along the frontiers and at the orifices of the state; and (d) the qualitative and quantitative limitations of the state's national forces to, say, one-half to one-third of Jordanian strength.

I find no acknowledgment, much less serious discussion, in Mr. Epstein's communication of any of these points. It is sad to reflect that what he has to say in spirit, and (barring references to recent events) in letter, could have been written by an exponent of the cause he represents at any point since the first Zionist Congress in 1897.

ETHICS AND INTELLIGENCE

To the Editor:

I enjoyed very much reading E. Drexel Godfrey's article in the April issue on "Ethics and Intelligence." In the first half of his article, Professor Godfrey very clearly outlines the ethical dilemmas that confront intelligence officers who go into the field to collect information and intelligence analysts who process that information into estimates and evaluations. He poignantly brings out how the actions of individuals in handling their ethical dilemmas and the pressures of the bureaucratic structure have led to problems and abuses (and presumably to achievements).

In the second half of his article, Professor Godfrey gives his prescription for grappling with these ethical issues in the future. In essence, he advocates abandoning all political action (the effort to influence events in foreign countries) and all clandestine collection of intelligence information abroad. Instead, he believes, we must rely exclusively on technical means of collecting intelligence and open sources of information. He incorrectly attributes to me a recognition that technical means of collecting intelligence are supplanting the clandestine human means. I do not accept that thesis. Human intelligence collection has been with the world for centuries. It still has unique contributions to make which technical systems seldom can equal, especially in uncovering intentions, aspirations and plans of others. More important, Professor Godfrey's proposed solution is not, in my opinion, a solution after all. Rather than grapple with the ethical issues of intelligence, he would simply attempt to bypass them. I say "attempt" because I doubt that even his proscription on political action and clandestine collection would accomplish that.

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Instead, I believe that we should think more deeply about the ethical issues of how far one will go in either efforts to influence events in other countries or to collect information about them clandestinely. Our nation's intelligence community is evolving in that direction. There are new laws from the Congress, rules from the President, and regulations from the Director of Central Intelligence governing various facets of this, e.g., there will be no planning or conduct of assassinations. What we are attempting to do is to draw a fine line between such explicit proscriptions that the intelligence community is bound hand and foot and cannot do its task and such lack of guidance that the full weight of the ethical dilemma rests upon the individual intelligence officer and analyst. We are now engaged in establishing a new and American concept of intelligence. There is no reason that we cannot achieve this. The ethical dilemmas of intelligence are no different in gender or quantity from those which many other professions face: for example, the military man must decide whether it is right to kill in a given circumstance; the executive in a multinational corporation must decide whether a favor can be justified; and a negotiator in diplomacy must decide whether to practice deception as a tactic. I would welcome the assistance of future authors in your journal in helping us to grapple with the ethical issues of intelligence in explicit terms.

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R&D BALANCE

To the Editor:

The article by Colonel Richard G. Head, "Technology and the Military Balance," in your April 1978 issue, contains many valuable observations. But I must take issue with the author's comparisons of weapons and technology acquisition in the two countries. He seems predisposed to see good features in Soviet military research and development (R&D) that are lacking in U.S. programs. This predisposition leads him to attribute to the Soviet Union a preference for a process described as evolutionary development or incremental product improvement, while he charges the United States with preferring completely new weapons directed toward maximum performance, which have been "overly complex, less reliable than past models and increasingly expensive."

Such views are not uncommon in the United States, but they are usually based on unwarranted generalizations from particular types of weapon systems and particular periods of history. All of the evidence of Soviet weapon systems developed over the past 25 years points to a consistent effort to utilize all of the technology available to them and generous resource allocations, to achieve as high a performance of military systems as they deemed to be needed to meet their priority strategic and tactical force objectives. This has involved the development of entirely new weapon systems as often as in the United States, rather than the incremental improvement of older systems. Such new Soviet systems have also, in their turn, often been characterized as overly complex, less reliable and increasingly expensive, the latter characteristic being the least arguable.

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Comparisons of new fighter and attack aircraft designs put into production by the Soviets and the United States since 1960, for example, clearly illustrate no disinclination on the part of the Soviets to produce completely new aircraft. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have put into production and deployed seven new designs from 1960 to 1977[1]; the Soviets have introduced four air defense interceptors, moreover, while the United States has introduced none. The United States has deployed aircraft having a greater diversity of air-to-ground and air-to-air mission capabilities; perhaps for this reason the Soviets have put more stress on available technology to achieve high performance in range and speed. Their Foxbat is a case in point, as is the Fiddler, at 100,000 pounds the world's largest and heaviest operational interceptor.

The Soviets have also deployed many new radar-directed surface-to-air missile systems since 1960, including the SA-3, SA-4, SA-5, SA-6, and the SA-8, whereas the United States has limited itself to improvements of the Hercules and Hawk missile systems. Nor has the United States matched the essentially new Soviet armored fighting vehicles introduced in recent years, including the BMP armored personnel carrier and the ZSU-23-4 self-propelled quad antiaircraft system, although there are some relevant developments underway which will not result in operational equipment for some years to come. Both the BMP and the ZSU-23-4 are much more "complex and expensive" than the nearest approximations to U.S. counterparts, the M-113 and the Vulcan.

Soviet industrial technology has admittedly been quite different from ours, particularly in such fields as electronics and precision work with high-alloy metals. Certain system technologies such as look-down, shoot-down, air-to-air fire control and missile systems, first operational in the United States in the Bomarc B (1962), thus failed to appear in the Soviet Union for many years, and equivalent systems may not have been deployed there even today. This and similar lacunae in the Soviet arsenal have led many U.S. observers to assume that the omissions were deliberate, meant to keep military equipment cheap, reliable and simple to maintain. Similarly, the design simplicity that Colonel Head cites in the T-62 tank, with its manual transmission and manual lever-type steering mechanism, may result from deliberate constraints on complexity by Soviet R&D planners, as he implies. But, more likely, it results from the lack of an industrial base such as we have in the United States, which produces millions of automatic transmissions and power steering mechanisms each year.

Moreover, the values of affluent societies inevitably reflect their particular standards of comfort, safety and convenience. Soviet citizens accept much less living area per person than their counterparts in the United States[2] and they accordingly accept more crowded quarters in barracks, ships and aircraft than Americans. Soviet citizens must also accept more requirements for brute force in their work, be it operating a tractor, a tank or an aircraft. (More than half of all Soviet industrial workers perform manual labor.) However, these socioeconomic and industrial factors aside, there is little reason to conclude that Soviet tanks are designed on the basis of anything but the traditional design trade-offs between armor, mobility, firepower and ammunition load. In fact, since the beginning of World War II, the differences between the tank preferences of the

[1] The new Soviet designs are the Firebar, Fiddler, Flagon, Foxbat, Fitter C/D, Flogger, Fencer, and Forger; the U. S. systems are the F-4, A-D, A-7, F-111, F-14, F-15, and A-10.

[2] Brezhnev's statement at the 24th Party Congress called for providing about 90 square feet of living space per person in new housing. U.S. average living space in new construction is three or four times greater.

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United States and its allies on these technical and operational grounds have been as great as or greater than their differences from Soviet tanks.

Contrary to the other half of Colonel Head's thesis, U.S. military R&D programs over the past two decades or so have relied as much on evolutionary development or incremental improvement as most corresponding Soviet programs, and in many areas more so. He admits that his "rule" may have been reversed since 1967 in the ICBM case. It certainly has, with only two major improvements in Minuteman since it reached deployment in 1962–63, as opposed to Soviet deployment since 1963 of the SS-9, SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19, all completely new systems, in addition to numerous incremental improvements in these and earlier systems. As another example, the latest U.S. tank series, the M60, introduced in the early 1960s, descends directly from the M48, introduced in 1955, which in turn owed much to the M47, introduced even earlier. The latest versions of these designs will constitute the major fraction of U.S. tank forces into the late 1980s.

The prime example commonly used to show the evolutionary development of Soviet aircraft is the MiG-21. The F-4 history in the United States, as Colonel Head himself states, completely parallels it. But also still in production in the United States are versions of the A-4 (first deployed in 1956), the A-6 (1963), the F-5 (1964), the A-7 (1965), and the C-130 tactical transport (1954).

The United States has also matched Soviet re-use of weapon components many times over. For example, the General Electric J-79 engine has been used on the F-104, B-58, F-4, and on the Convair 880 and 990 transports. The Pratt and Whitney J-57 engine was used on no less than six operational fighter-attack aircraft and on the early 707 and DC-8 transport aircraft. The Pratt and Whitney TF-30 engine was used on all versions of the F-111, including the FB-111 as well as on the A-7A, and is currently in production for the F-14 fleet air defense interceptor.

The F-14A derived not only its engine but also the variable sweep-wing technology and AWG-9/Phoenix fire control and missile system from the F-111B program. This pulse-doppler, look-down fire control system, as well as the associated long-range missile technology, goes back to the development of the AN/ASG-18 fire control system and GAR-9 missile for the cancelled F-108 program of the late 1950s. The AWG-9 Phoenix air-to-air fire control and missile system is an excellent example of how a basic system technology can be (and, in fact, had to be) implemented several times over using three or four generations of electronics technology. The obsolete Sage computer (FSQ-7), on the other hand, which employs tens of thousands of vacuum tubes, still functions unimpaired as part of the U.S. continental air defense system.

The United States has also used equipment across service and mission lines. The M-61 Gatling gun is not only installed in seven tactical and naval fighter aircraft but also in the Army's Vulcan mobile antiaircraft gun and the Navy's Phalanx close-in air defense system for ships currently in procurement. Some critics of U.S. gun programs have pointed to our almost complete dependence on this one relatively old weapon in the 20-millimeter class as evidence of deficiencies in our gun R&D program.

One can agree with some of Colonel Head's recommendations even if his premises imply a need for unwarranted, radical changes in U.S. research and development. The need for high-low force mixes, recently highlighted in the case of the F-15/F-16, will obviously remain. Navy attack aircraft mixes have for many years included the A-4, the A-6 and A-7, covering a very considerable

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range of performance versus cost trade-offs, and the projected U.S. tank program is weighted heavily toward cheaper tanks through the 1980s. But varying priorities, mission requirements and adequacy of available technologies make these mixes less urgent for some mission areas; also, overwhelming manpower and other operating costs sometimes rule out systems that perform less well.

The proposed military appropriations for U.S. fiscal year 1979 continue to reflect the U.S. practice of evolutionary development. In addition to the tank programs already discussed, the TOW antitank missile mounted on an M-113 armored personnel carrier hull is being procured as is the latest version of the CH-53 helicopter, first deployed in 1966. The budget even proposes to reopen the production line for Lockheed U-2s of mid-1950s vintage.

In conclusion, the United States clearly continues to use, where appropriate, evolutionary development and incremental product improvement, common components in many weapons, and high-low force mixes. There are few major differences on this point between the United States and the Soviet Union during the past two decades.

U.S. policies and practices in weapon acquisition are far from perfect and continuing efforts to improve them are certainly in order. Lessons learned from Soviet acquisition programs may be useful, but we must guard against making invidious comparisons and unwarranted generalizations as to the weaknesses of our programs or the strengths of Soviet programs. The lure of a Soviet panacea for U.S. weapons programs can only mislead the American public.

Worse, the assumption that a formula for cheap and easy R&D victories exists can stimulate the imposition of still more management controls on U.S. acquisitions and force all programs to fit in one procrustean bed.

Social and economic differences and differences in military doctrine and objectives often play more of a role than technology in shaping the respective R&D programs. No technological constraints stop either the United States or the Soviet Union from developing systems such as the mobile intermediate range ballistic missile or antisatellite interceptors. All that is needed is a decision to proceed, a decision dependent primarily on policy objectives and resource allocations, not on technology.

Foolish and wasteful as it may seem to us, the Soviets may have adopted an R&D strategy of "blanketing" virtually all areas of science and technology having potential military, economic or national prestige applications. This Soviet strategy, their doctrinaire approach to decision-making, their rigid five-year planning process and their bureaucratic control of human and material resources seem to have led to their envisaging a projected steady continued growth in the proportion of resources devoted to research and development.[3] In the West, by contrast, the good life, including health and education, has taken increasingly larger shares of national income, while expenditures on science and technology, both civilian and military, have remained relatively static in real terms. Whether this Soviet R&D strategy will, in fact, be maintained in the face of overall long-term resource limitations and growing demands from other sectors of the Soviet economy remains to be seen. Even if this massive and indiscriminate science and technology investment strategy is maintained,

[3] For an apparently serious Soviet discussion of exponential growth of "scientific research and experimental designing" to a level of 10–50 percent of the entire labor force, see N. A. Lomov, *Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs*, Moscow, 1973 (English translation published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force).

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whether there will eventually be sufficient payoffs to the Soviet economy and society in the military and civilian sectors to justify the investments is an even more interesting and difficult question.

Yet, while we must remain alert to the possible impact of Soviet developments on our military, political and economic interests, we should not and cannot emulate the Soviet investment strategy. Our response must meet our own situation and our allies', and even the most intelligent and effective use of our technology will not provide cheap and easy solutions to the problems we face. Only the informed judgment, wisdom and collective will of the body politic can deal with those problems.

ALEXANDER H. FLAX
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Dr. Flax served as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development from 1963 to 1969. The views expressed here are entirely his own.

Colonel Head replies:

I would like to thank Dr. Alexander Flax for his substantive and well-documented letter on my article. He is a knowledgeable critic and one whose service in the Department of the Air Force saw many weapons systems begin their development. My purpose was to increase the awareness that the development of technology is an important factor in the military balance, but even more important than comparing levels of technology in the abstract is the examination of how technology relates to doctrine, tactics, and training to form what I called an R&D style in developing military capabilities. Dr. Flax and I agree that the basic management problem is getting enough equipment into the hands of the user on schedule, at plant cost, and at high enough quality.

His basic argument, if I understand it correctly, is that it is not useful to generalize about R&D styles; further, he sees little distinction between U.S. and Soviet styles. Specifically, he argues that the Soviets have shown no disinclination to produce completely new systems, and conversely, U.S. military R&D programs have shown as much or more evolutionary development as most Soviet programs. Finally, he says that I seem predisposed to see "some good features" in Soviet research and development.

Dr. Flax argues that the Soviet Union seeks energetically to develop entirely new weapons systems and applies a "consistent effort to utilize all of the technology available to them." I must disagree. From what we know about the nature of the weapons acquisition process, Soviet engineers are not as free to select from among a wide range of "available" technology as are U.S. engineers. Soviet design handbooks present a constrained list of approved materials, component parts, structural designs, and production techniques that are updated only periodically and severely restrict weapons design. That is, what is technologically "available" to the Soviet weapons designer is considerably less advanced than what is understood in research circles. Similarly, designers are often inclined not to use all the technology that is "available " to them. A. S. Yakovlev, the famous Soviet aircraft designer, tells in his revealing autobiography, *Target of Life*, of Stalin's insistence that the designer protect the integrity of his designs by avoiding "the epidemic of improvement."

Flax's list of both fighter and attack aircraft since 1960 shows that the Soviets have introduced eight new designs, while the United States introduced nine.

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My count (from the Defense Science Board's *Summer Study Report*, 1977) suggests the F-5, F-104, F-105, and F-106, should be added to the U.S. list, bringing the number to 13. Going back further, since 1945 the United States has produced 38 "essentially new" fighter and attack aircraft, while the Soviet Union has produced only 25. What has happened over the last 30 years is that the United States has changed its acquisition style such that we now initiate major projects less frequently.

He supports his argument that the Soviets developed large numbers of new weapons with a listing of the many new air defense missile systems, the BMP infantry-fighting vehicle and the ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft gun system. Unfortunately, these examples are not valid categories of comparison since they represent three areas where the U.S. decision-making process (because of its preoccupation with Vietnam and other priorities) has systematically rejected army pleas for weapons development. With the high priority given to NATO defense, the Department of Defense is now accelerating the development of air-defense missiles, infantry-fighting vehicles and antiaircraft gun systems.

Dr. Flax also argues that examples of Soviet design simplicity probably come from a lack of industrial base, rather than from deliberate constraints on complexity by R&D planners. My observation was not directed solely at the latter to the exclusion of the former, but rather at the mutually reinforcing nature of user-oriented requirements for reliability and maintainability and manufacturing-oriented incentives for mass production. Dr. Flax acknowledges that societies reflect distinctive sets of values, but he sees "little reason to conclude" that Soviet tanks (and by implication other weapons) are therefore designed differently from those in the United States. One example that I think illustrates the significantly different Soviet approach to the design trade-off problem is their tendency to accept smaller crew quarters in order to obtain more firepower or reduce vulnerability. Thus, the cramped compartments of the T-62 and T-72 tanks are acceptably designed because they permit a tank silhouette nearly one meter lower than comparable U.S./NATO tanks. The data on ship design are even more startling. An official U.S. Navy study has shown that Soviet preferences for habitability have come fifth among priorities (after weapons, propulsion, electronics, and range), while on U.S. warships crew space ranks second (after electronics). A specific comparison of the *Oliver Hazard Perry* class frigate with the *Kara*-class guided missile cruiser shows the U.S. preference for 19 cubic meters per man, while the Soviets allow only 12 cubic meters. I do not imply that we should emulate Soviet R&D style or that we adopt their sense of priorities, but neither should we depreciate the ability of Soviet tank crews to fight for prolonged periods because of the lack of crew space when there is no data to support such contentions. In fact, after the 1973 Middle East War, the U.S. Army ran a series of comparative tests at Aberdeen to evaluate crew performance. The tests showed that once trained to use a Soviet tank, U.S. tank crews were just about as effective in it as they were in a U.S. tank, and further, their performance did not deteriorate over time.

The other half of Dr. Flax's argument is that the United States has relied as much on evolutionary development as the Soviet Union. I agree with his long list of examples of U.S. incremental improvements, but once again this is a case of relativity. As mentioned, the lack of a definition of incremental change hampers the discussion, but most observers of the Soviet scene see more examples of incrementalism and fewer examples of revolutionary change than in the United States. Aside from the BMP, the ZSU-23-4, and the latest models

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of ICBMs, the Soviet Union does not seem to produce the systems that promise the military capability payoff of the SR-71, AWACS, F-15, F-16, NAVSTAR, XM-1, the Advanced Attack Helicopter, precision-guided artillery, or the Trident ballistic missile submarine. This is not to unduly disparage Soviet Research and Development, but only to note that the U.S. acquisitions process has a tendency to reward advocates of the new system and to neglect funding instrument improvements or component part developments not associated with a particular weapons system. U.S. contractors know this, and attempt to sponsor a host of related or partially related component developments under the "umbrella" of a major weapons system. That is one reason, but certainly not the only one, why weapons systems cost so much in the United States. It is simply a social system characteristic which derives from the conscious decision in the late 1950s to adopt a project management approach to weapons development.

In conclusion, Dr. Flax and I agree that U.S. policies and practices are far from perfect, but they certainly should be open to suggestion. I do not believe one has to be predisposed to see merit in Soviet practices to seek methods to improve our own procedures, for product improvement should be adopted regardless of who else uses it. Personally, I am impressed by Dr. Flax's data and his general thrust that there may be less distinction between Soviet and U.S. styles than I implied. At the same time, if we cannot differentiate between the characteristics of our potential adversaries' R&D processes and those of our own, we become susceptible to the notion that "they are just like us"—a notion my professional judgment argues is not supported by the data, is misleading, and quite possibly dangerous.

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John C. Campbell

INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Friedrich V. Kratochwil. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 298 pp. $20.00.

An approach that relates theory not to an unattainable world order but to practical progress toward accepted rules of the game in interaction between states. A long disquisition on the determinants and the pattern of U.S.-Soviet behavior since World War II, with which some will quarrel, is more than just another opinion about responsibility for the cold war; it forms a basis for new conceptual thinking rooted in international reality. A stimulating book.

STABLE PEACE. By Kenneth E. Boulding. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978, 143 pp. $9.95.

Deftly written essays (originally lectures) by a noted economist-sociologist who has devoted much thought to man's condition and future. His proposals for moving from a state of conflict toward stable peace are modest, but still sound utopian in today's world.

PEUPLES ET ÉTATS DU TIERS MONDE FACE À L'ORDRE INTERNATIONAL. Edited by Alain Fenet. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978, 209 pp.

In separate essays six authors treat political and judicial questions of interest to the Third World (e.g., the North-South dialogue, Law of the Sea, nonalignment and intervention), all of them concerned with changing international rules and practices that favor the more powerful.

TERRORISM AND THE LIBERAL STATE. By Paul Wilkinson. New York: Halsted Press, 1978, 257 pp.

THE TERRORISM READER. Edited by Walter Laqueur. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978, 304 pp. $15.00.

The widespread use of political terrorism and the vulnerability of our societies in the face of it have set scholars as well as governments to searching for its cause and cure. Wilkinson's book tells much of the story of recent terrorist campaigns and episodes, points up the dilemmas of counteraction and sees a constant struggle ahead. Walter Laqueur's *Reader* is a handy compendium of writings on the subject from Aristotle to Laqueur.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES. By Guy S. Goodwin-Gill. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, 324 pp. $34.95.

An exemplary monograph that brings international and local law (on aliens)

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up to date, with many references to new legislation and cases. The author is Legal Adviser in the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASES OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT. By Barrington Moore, Jr. White Plains (N.Y.): Sharpe, 1978, 540 pp. (New York: Pantheon, distributor, $17.50).

True reciprocity, or justice, in social relations has widespread appeal, but, as Barrington Moore shows in his impressive historical study of the nature and limits of authority and the flashpoints of protest and revolt, it never exists in human society. His main subject is class relations and workers' attitudes in Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but he also ranges farther afield both geographically and in generalization.

RECOGNIZING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS: THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES. By L. Thomas Galloway. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978, 191 pp. $4.75 (Paper).

A summary of U.S. policy and practice over the years, on a country-by-country, case-by-case basis. It charts a gradual change whereby the question has lost political and legal importance as the United States has tried to avoid defining its relations with newly established governments in terms of recognition or nonrecognition.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Richard G. Head

CRISIS IN COMMAND: MISMANAGEMENT IN THE ARMY. By Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage. New York: Hill and Wang, 1978, 242 pp. $10.00.

These authors, both former Army officers, argue that the U.S. Army is in deep moral crisis, brought about by the erosion of officer ethics and exemplified by the lack of unit cohesion under the stress of combat in Vietnam. They wrestle with the vital issue of whether the officer corps should continue to reflect civilian "managerial" values or return to a traditional military ethic. Although this hard-hitting indictment is well grounded in facts, the authors come very close to a single-factor explanation for a complicated problem, and they fundamentally misunderstand the nature of a military academy education.

SUMMONS OF THE TRUMPET: U.S.-VIETNAM IN PERSPECTIVE. By Dave Richard Palmer. San Rafael (Cal.): Presidio Press, 1978, 277 pp. $12.95.

A very fine, readable book that frankly addresses the tortured history of America's involvement in Vietnam. The aspects discussed include national policy, political restrictions and domestic dissent, but the author is really at his best when relating the intent and the lessons of the military campaigns and battles.

WAR ON THE MIND: THE MILITARY USES AND ABUSES OF PSYCHOLOGY. By Peter Watson. New York: Basic Books, 1978, 534 pp. $20.00.

This is a fascinating descriptive analysis of the rapidly growing number of psychological techniques being applied to military purposes. Main topics include combat psychiatry, leadership and selection, and psychological warfare. A remarkably comprehensive and powerful study.

GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE 1980s. Edited by Bruce Palmer, Jr. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978, 112 pp. $3.25 (Paper).

One of the most pervasive criticisms of the current Administration has been its lack of a coherent national strategy. These five retired officers—Bruce K. Holloway, Theodore R. Milton, Bruce Palmer, Jr., Maxwell D. Taylor, and

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Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.—propose a series of objectives around which to build one. The most comprehensive plan is by General Palmer, outlining the need to develop an energy policy, maintain strategic nuclear deterrence, defend NATO, assure access to strategic resources, and maintain technological superiority. Serious policy proposals from well-informed professionals.

STRATEGIES, ALLIANCES, AND MILITARY POWER: CHANGING ROLES. By the Faculty and Staff of the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Leiden: Sijthoff, 1977, 371 pp. $32.00.

A wide-ranging anthology of political-military articles providing professional analysis of such issues as morality, alliances with dictators, terrorism, strategic deterrence, as well as an examination of U.S. policy toward Western Europe and other regions. Thoughtful exploratory pieces.

IMBALANCE OF POWER: SHIFTING U.S.-SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTHS. By John M. Collins and Anthony H. Cordesman. San Rafael (Cal.): Presidio Press, 1978, 316 pp. $6.95 (Paper).

AMERICAN AND SOVIET MILITARY TRENDS SINCE THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. By John M. Collins. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1978, 480 pp. $10.95 (Paper, $6.95).

Two impressive studies of U.S.-Soviet military structures and strategies.The former begins with Collins' major report to the Senate Armed Services Committee but includes section-by-section net assessment appraisals by Cordesman, which are extremely perceptive about Soviet/Warsaw Pact limitations and tend to balance off Collins' pessimism. The second book is Collins' updated and expanded report. His key arguments are that for the United States, military trends are adverse, deterrence is being eroded, and freedom of action is being curtailed. Regardless of one's personal view of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations, these two books provide a wealth of information, a compendium of systematic analysis, and a series of structured arguments that illuminate the debate.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT. By Lawrence Freedman. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 235 pp. $22.50.

A useful introductory analysis of the diversity and competition in the U.S. intelligence community, correctly concluding that the perception of U.S. vulnerabilities strongly influences most estimates of the Soviet threat. Focused as it is on the U.S. policy process, the book does not provide satisfactory explanations for the substantive problem: the continuing long-term Soviet military buildup of strategic power. Its detailed examination of the issue of ICBM vulnerability does refute several simplistic, but common, myths.

MILITARY EXPENDITURE LIMITATION FOR ARMS CONTROL. By Abraham S. Becker. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977, 352 pp. $17.50

One of the first formal arms control studies to attack head-on the issue of military spending. It offers a standard accounting model, with over three-quarters of the volume devoted to a documentary history of recent pleas and proposals. Near-term possibilities for international restraint appear to be dim, especially since, as the author says, the Soviet Union remains immune to the argument.

ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN WEAPONS AVAILABLE FOR EXPORT. By Tom Gervasi. New York: Grove Press, 1978, 240 pp. $19.50 (Paper, $7.95).

A lavishly illustrated survey of more than 500 weapons currently in U.S. service, many of which have been sold or given to other nations. The weapons' characteristics, costs and sales data appear accurate. The book is grounded in

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the assumption that the United States produces more weapons than it needs from a war economy that it cannot support.

GERMAN GENERALS OF WORLD WAR II. By F.W. von Mellenthin. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978, 300 pp. $8.95.
HITLER'S GENERALS. By Richard Brett-Smith. San Rafael (Cal.): Presidio Press, 1978, 306 pp. $12.95.

Von Mellenthin, a German major general, author of *Panzer Battles*, served with all of the 14 Wehrmacht generals he writes about. His accounts are historical, biographical, anecdotal. Brett-Smith, a former British officer, discussing 82 Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe generals, is more analytical, sketching a full range of contextual and sociological factors. His primary focus is on professionalism, the acceptance of moral responsibility. Many historians credit most of Hitler's military triumphs to the superb talent of his generals; these two authors scrutinize their talent and its characteristics, while stressing that the lack of a strong spirit of independence made them susceptible to Hitler's machinations.

THE SECRET OF STALINGRAD. By Walter Kerr. New York: Doubleday, 1978, 274 pp. $10.00.

An account of this decisive battle by the then Moscow correspondent for *The New York Herald Tribune*, which stresses Russian secrecy, gross German underestimation of Red Army manpower, and Stalin's deception of Allied wartime leaders. Worthwhile reading for the non-expert.

FROM APES TO WARLORDS. By Sir Solly Zuckerman. New York: Harper, 1978, 447 pp. $20.95.

An autobiography by the distinguished British scientist who helped found the field of operational research, participated in the planning of the combined air offensive against Germany, and later became chief scientific adviser to the British government. The account is detailed, objective, and extensively cross-referenced to autobiographies of other wartime leaders.

THE WIZARD WAR: BRITISH SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE, 1939–1945. By R. V. Jones. New York: Coward McCann, 1978, 556 pp. $12.95.

Whereas Zuckerman narrates the vagaries of high policy in true scientific fashion, Jones pens his memoir of British operational intelligence with the flair of a fine fiction writer. All the excitement of wartime intelligence is here. His description of the birth of electronic warfare, from the Battle of Britain to the fall of Berlin, is a most valuable addition to the record. First rate.

THE NAZI CONNECTION. By F. W. Winterbotham. New York: Harper, 1978, 222 pp. $8.95

Already known for his pioneer 1974 account of the breaking of the German Enigma cipher and its significant role in World War II (*The Ultra Secret*), Group Captain Winterbotham comes off well in the much more precise and scholarly volume by R. V. Jones (reviewed above). This account, however, of his prewar attempts at semi-covert intelligence collection in Germany seems thin, overly self-centered, and at times politically naïve—not to be compared, for example, to the first volume of the late John Wheeler-Bennett's memoirs, *Knaves, Fools and Heroes* (1975). Although Winterbotham in the end became the channel for authentic and valuable sources, much of his high-level activity raises the question of who was playing games with whom.

W.P.B.

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General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND AMERICAN INTERESTS. By C. Fred Bergsten, Thomas Horst and Theodore H. Moran. Washington: Brookings, 1978, 535 pp. $18.95 (Paper, $8.95).

Agnostic and eclectic are words for this valuable and remarkably comprehensive study. The first applies to the analysis, which rejects generalizations about foreign investment and registers doubt about its net effect on the American economy. The policy prescriptions are eclectic. A number of measures are aimed at governmental neutrality toward most investment. But taxes and O.P.I.C. are to be used to push U.S. companies out of the ownership of foreign raw materials and into selling their services on contract. Development of the poorest countries is to be helped but other foreign subsidies to American investment are to be resisted. Transactions with communist countries are to be licensed. The authors have done original research on a number of points and have especially good chapters on taxes and the relation of foreign investment to domestic market positions and profits. Much familiar ground is surveyed at length and some of that space ought to have been given over to a fuller discussion of proposals, made in the last 30 pages, for U.S. leadership in international agreements and a case-by-case system of U.S. supervision that could lead to the banning of some investment.

LA GRANDE MENACE INDUSTRIELLE. By Christian Stoffaës. Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1978, 345 pp.

The threat to French industry is that it will be caught between the low labor costs of the developing world and the high-technology production of Germany, Japan and the U.S. The way out, this excellent book argues, is a new kind of national industrial policy that, by strengthening the strong points and eliminating the weak ones, will make the French economy internationally competitive. The many different measures this might require and the necessary mix of government intervention and freer play for private industry are thoughtfully discussed. Explanations of the vicious circles created by past measures and the difficulties democracies have in dealing with long-run problems lend a proper air of skepticism. The analysis is deeply set in a comparison with Germany and Japan, and the conclusions apply to other countries as well. The author is a young economist in the Ministry of Industry.

THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM: COORDINATING ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WORK. By Martin Hill. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978, 252 pp. $31.50.

At the core of this book is a very useful paper prepared in 1974 by a most experienced international civil servant. Left incomplete at Martin Hill's death was his endeavor to take account of the changes in the U.N. system resulting from the Seventh Special Session and other recent events and, though edited by colleagues, this part is only partially successful.

BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY: FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL STATES. Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978, 344 pp. $17.50 (Paper, $6.95).

The relation of domestic structure to foreign economic policy is the integrating theme of this valuable set of papers by younger scholars. Originally it was an issue of *International Organization*.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES. Edited by Steven J. Warnecke. London: Macmillan, 1978, 245 pp. £12.00.

Subsidies are the real subject of this book. The ten papers by authors from

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seven countries are very timely at a moment when the world will have to judge how well the negotiators at Geneva have done in making new rules for the use of these ubiquitous instruments.

MARKETS, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT: THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Yair Aharoni. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977, 352 pp. $20.00.

It was a good idea to pursue the subject of the subtitle and Professor Aharoni of Tel Aviv is particularly good on publicly owned enterprises. However, too many subjects are treated in a textbook-like way.

THREE DECADES OF DECISION: CANADA AND THE WORLD MONETARY SYSTEM, 1944-75. By A. F. W. Plumptre. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1978, 335 pp. $6.95 (Paper).

Years of experience in key posts made the late Professor Plumptre a major authority on the "love-hate relationship" between Canadians and the "world monetary system which they worked so hard to build, strove so tenaciously to keep alive, and yet found so difficult to live with." He ably covers a wider range of Canadian policy as well, and is particularly good on Canada's interest in international organizations and its relations with the United States.

THE MONETARY APPROACH TO THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. Edited by Jacob A. Frenkel and Harry G. Johnson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978, 388 pp. $35.00 (Paper, $10.95).

This is the basic book for an influential set of ideas. Naturally the emphasis is on theory.

LE SYSTÈME MONÉTAIRE INTERNATIONAL EN VOIE DE RÉFORME: LES TRAVAUX DU COMITÉ DES VINGT. By Duncan Cameron. Ottawa: Éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1977, 173 pp. $6.00 (Paper).

Partly a discussion, by a Canadian official become an academic, of issues raised by the Committee of 20 in the early 1970s, but more a parallel discussion of various elements of monetary reform plus a commentary on the Jamaica agreements.

COMPARATIVE MONETARY ECONOMICS: CAPITALIST AND SOCIALIST MONETARY SYSTEMS AND THEIR INTERRELATIONS IN THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SCENE. By J. Wilczynski. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, 270 pp. $18.95.

The meat of the volume is in the very thorough and systematic account of money and its functions in socialist systems, and how Marxists think about it.

ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS: THEORIES, FACTS, AND POLICIES. By Wassily Leontief. White Plains (N.Y.): Sharpe, 1978, 161 pp. $15.00.

The presidential address taking the American Economic Association to task for its reliance on "theoretical assumptions and nonobserved facts," the Nobel lecture on the structure of the world economy, and some thoughts on planning are high points here for the nonspecialist.

ECONOMIC ISSUES AND NATIONAL SECURITY. Edited by Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager. Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1978, 330 pp. $7.50 (Paper).

A very good set of papers dealing with power and its limits, interdependence, vulnerability, security, and where food, energy, trade, and money fit in.

THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE: VALUE CONFLICTS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. By Denis Goulet. New York: IDOC/North America, 1978, 320 pp. $5.95 (Paper).

Seeing technology as both a "bearer and destroyer of values," the author, "a

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philosopher of development," is more concerned with people's ability to control it and to know what they really want than with the questions more commonly asked in this field. Some provocative perceptions result.

ENVIRONMENT: NORTH AND SOUTH—AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION. By Charles Pearson and Anthony Pryor. New York: Wiley, 1978, 355 pp.

This first-rate, tough-minded book compares the environmental problems of industrial and developing countries. It torpedoes quite a few loose generalizations, describes significant differences, and argues that there need not be a fundamental North-South clash although their interests are not altogether common or equal.

TARIFF PREFERENCES IN MEDITERRANEAN DIPLOMACY. By Alfred Tovias. New York: St. Martin's, 1978, 153 pp. $13.95.

Analysis of the somewhat messy European Community arrangements with Mediterranean countries is set against a discussion of the erosion of principles of equal trade treatment, and the not very well-developed ideas about the political value of these arrangements. This is a good addition to the limited material on a troublesome subject.

WORLD FOOD PROSPECTS AND AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL. By Marilyn Chou and others. New York: Praeger, 1977, 399 pp.

A generally optimistic Hudson Institute study that covers many angles.

TAXATION OF MULTINATIONALS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. By Paul Jonas. New York: Praeger, 1978, 88 pp.

A neglected subject, but the author's contribution gets somewhat lost in his comments on the larger setting.

THE EVOLUTION OF OPEC STRATEGY. By Fariborz Ghadar. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1977, 196 pp. $18.00.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OF THE DEMAND FOR ENERGY. Edited by William D. Nordhaus. Amsterdam and New York: North-Holland, 1977, 340 pp. $26.00.

U.S. AND WORLD ENERGY RESOURCES. Edited by Ragaei El Mallakh and Carl McGuire. Boulder (Colo.): International Research Centre for Energy and Economic Development, 1978, 272 pp. $12.50 (Paper).

The major interest of Ghadar's book is its study of the national oil companies of Iran, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. The contributions to the Nordhaus volume deal with forecasting methods. The third volume contains papers on a wide variety of subjects from the Third International Conference held late in 1976.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

PRIMACY OR WORLD ORDER: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE COLD WAR. By Stanley Hoffmann. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978, 331 pp. $12.50.

A distinguished authority on international affairs argues that the U.S. must make the enhancement of world order, rather than balance of power, hegemony or isolation, the goal of foreign policy. But he is so realistic and unflinching in describing the difficulties of doing this that the reader is left doubting that it can ever happen. He laments, incidentally, the narrow perspectives and declining numbers of those being trained in the United States in international affairs.

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NEVER AGAIN: LEARNING FROM AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY FAILURES. By Earl C. Ravenal. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978, 151 pp. $10.00.

A critique of four types of "lessons" being drawn from the Vietnam War: (1) the instrumental (we can launch successful interventions with better methods); (2) the proportional (costs should not be out of line with possible gains); (3) the consequential (we neglected domestic priorities); and (4) the fundamental (we were immoral or doomed by our institutions). The author's own preferred lessons are "strategic": intervention cannot succeed; we must pursue henceforth a policy of defensive disengagement. Ravenal is even less hopeful than Hoffmann.

THE ILLUSION OF PEACE: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NIXON YEARS. By Tad Szulc. New York: Viking, 1978, 822 pp. $20.00.

The most comprehensive account of this immense subject yet to appear. The author has interviewed extensively, read indefatigably, and had access to considerable inside information. There is much new material, for example, on the retaliatory bombing that was almost unleashed on North Korea in 1969. Szulc has a sharp eye for misrepresentation and deplores the "extraordinary immorality" of U.S. leadership. One reservation: the thinking and behavior of foreign leaders are relatively neglected.

RN: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978, 1120 pp. $19.95.

One of the better presidential memoirs of this century—which is faint praise. Nixon writes more clearly than Truman, Eisenhower or Johnson, but he whines more and seems incapable of sustained analysis, irony, humor or any grasp of larger philosophical or historical dimensions. The book is less a thematic narrative than a collection of short memoranda chronologically arranged. The words ring true as an expression of the former President's character and perceptions.

THE ENDS OF POWER. By H. R. Haldeman. New York: Times Books, 1978, 326 pp. $12.50.

The focus is on Watergate. Haldeman's implicit conclusion is that he could have saved Nixon if only the President had turned the whole problem over to him from the beginning. The treatment of the ex-President is a mixture of scorn and admiration.

CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE: THE DRAFT, THE WAR, AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION. By Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss. New York: Knopf, 1978, 312 pp. $10.00.

A compelling, revealing analysis of the generation of American males who came of draft age during the Vietnam War. The authors were high staff members on President Ford's clemency board. They demonstrate, among many other things, that wealthy, educated, well-connected men had many legal ways of avoiding military service in general and Vietnam in particular. There was a high correlation between low socioeconomic status and Vietnam combat service. An important book.

CONTAINMENT: DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN POLICY AND STRATEGY, 1945–1950. Edited by Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978, 449 pp. $25.00 (Paper, $7.95).

The world was fortunate that the early cold war years did not erupt some time around 1950 into World War III. The Korean War was terrible enough, but American policymakers were fearful of and preparing for something far worse—as this outstanding collection of documents, most of which have only

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recently been declassified, demonstrates. The editors include two fine essays on the organization of national security and the concept of containment.

THE DECISION TO DIVIDE GERMANY. By John H. Backer. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1978, 212 pp. $9.95.

This book shows with admirable scholarship that the division of Germany, a fait accompli by early 1947, was, on the American side, the result of "disjointed incrementalism" rather than a grand design as some revisionist historians claim. The author emphasizes the influence of historical perceptions. He was a member of the American military government and later a Foreign Service officer in Germany.

MULTIPLE EXPOSURE: AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR'S UNIQUE PERSPECTIVE ON EAST-WEST ISSUES. By Jacob D. Beam. New York: Norton, 1978, 317 pp. $10.95.

Toward the end of a long diplomatic career the author was Ambassador to Poland, then Czechoslovakia, and ultimately the Soviet Union. His memoirs are discreet, spare, somewhat wooden.

THE JAPANESE THREAD: A LIFE IN THE U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE. By John K. Emmerson. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978, 485 pp. $16.95.

A man of deep culture, sensitivity to people, and personal character, the author tells a fascinating story of fateful events in East Asia between 1935 and the early 1950s. Thereafter, Emmerson's honest reporting, especially from Yenan, stunted his career in the rancid 1950s, and he treats only briefly of his later service. The book shows the working Foreign Service at its best; the vivid picture of the successive stages in the transformation of Japanese society is particularly valuable.

W.P.B.

TALES OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE. Edited by Ralph Hilton. Columbia (S.C.): University of South Carolina Press, 1978, 176 pp. $9.95.

The Foreign Service equivalent of "sea stories": light, humorous anecdotes concerned with human predicaments rather than high policy. Refreshing.

SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 1979 BUDGET. Edited by Joseph A. Pechman. Washington: Brookings, 1978, 319 pp. $12.95 (Paper, $5.95).

The ninth annual analysis and critique of the President's budget. The authors are as usual illuminating. This volume contains a discussion of five-year projections.

STATE OF THE NATION III. By William Watts and Lloyd A. Free. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books (for Potomac Associates), 1978, 238 pp. $13.50.

Compact, professional, and with well-written individual chapters on events from 1974 to 1976, the volume gains added force from its consistent use of essentially the same polling methods for 1976 as in 1972 and 1974, and in a few cases going back to roughly 1960. Both a good browse and an important source for the changing preoccupations of Americans in a troubled time. The material on foreign policy attitudes and the public credit of institutions and groups is particularly telling.

W.P.B.

WILSONIAN MARITIME DIPLOMACY, 1913-1921. By Jeffrey J. Safford. New Brunswick (N.J.): Rutgers University Press, 1978, 282 pp. $16.50.

A competent history of the efforts of the Wilson Administration to create a preeminent American merchant marine. The author adds convincingly to the picture that has been emerging in the last 20 years of Wilson as a President concerned with enhancing American power.

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THE PEACE SHIP: HENRY FORD'S PACIFIST ADVENTURE IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR. By Barbara S. Kraft. New York: Macmillan, 1978, 367 pp. $14.95.

In late 1915 Henry Ford gave his name, presence and financial backing to a much-ridiculed attempt by some pacifist publicists to end the European war by sending a delegation to neutral capitals on a chartered vessel—the "Peace Ship." Several books have been written on the subject but this is the best: serious and yet entertaining, critical and compassionate.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE KISSINGER ERA. By Harry M. Joiner. Huntsville (Ala.): Strode, 1978, 308 pp. $7.95 (Paper).

An uncritical survey for unsophisticated readers. The principal sources of information and interpretation are Kissinger's public statements.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

THE UNSUSPECTED REVOLUTION: THE BIRTH AND RISE OF CASTROISM. By Mario Llerena. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978, 324 pp. $12.50.

In this authentic and well-written analysis, the author (formerly a representative abroad of the Castro movement) attempts to explain " . . . how it was possible for an originally middle-class reform movement to be transformed by an unprincipled, charismatic leader and a handful of close associates into a full-fledged Marxist-Leninist revolution." Leading roles in this metamorphosis are attributed to the "unpremeditated and yet perhaps decisive" activity of radical liberals and intellectuals who had envisioned something entirely different.

CUBA IN THE 1970s: PRAGMATISM AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION. By Carmelo Mesa-Lago. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, revised ed., 1978, 187 pp. $9.95 (Paper, $4.95).

This is an updated new edition of a significant work published in 1974, reflecting the evolution of recent years. The author notes the increased political and economic influence of the Soviet Union, and the absence of any substitute for it, concluding that dependency will continue. Institutionalization and professionalism will grow. Vested interests render unlikely any return to the earlier radical idealism and mass mobilization.

UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE CARIBBEAN. By John Bartlow Martin. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press (for the Twentieth Century Fund), 1978, 420 pp.

The ex-Ambassador to the Dominican Republic argues for a special Caribbean-U.S. relationship, with preferential market access and aid policies. He also favors political pluralism and insulation of the Caribbean from U.S. global policies and interests. He therefore urges nonintervention, but, recognizing its difficulties and ambiguities, he adds " . . . in most times and at most places." And he supports a strong U.S. naval presence and military training assistance programs.

PERU: A SHORT HISTORY. By David P. Werlich. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978, 434 pp. $17.50.

A first-rate performance, balanced in tone, thoroughly detailed and yet well structured, beginning with colonial times and stressing post-World War I developments. Although the author portrays the "rightward retreat" after Velasco, the study ends with 1976 and thus necessarily omits description of the accelerating decline of the 1968 revolutionary experiment in the past two years.

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BRAZIL: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS. By Peter Flynn. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 560 pp. $28.75.

Extending back to monarchical times, this lengthy review concludes that the preeminent influence in shaping Brazilian political institutions and in explaining the "bonapartist" intervention of the armed forces since 1964 has been the contention among social class interests. The author also finds that the post-1964 economic model and a repressive political system are linked, and that there is no necessary correlation between an authoritarian system and economic growth and control over inflation.

LATIN AMERICA: STRUGGLE FOR PROGRESS. Critical Choices for Americans, Vol. XIV. Edited by James D. Theberge and Roger W. Fontaine. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1977, 205 pp. $13.95.

This overview presents condensed, no-nonsense summaries of Latin American problems and choices, and their significance in terms of U.S. interests. The book is organized under such headings as Critical Problems, Options, Background, U.S. Policy.

LATIN AMERICA AND WORLD ECONOMY: A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER. Edited by Joseph Grunwald. Beverly Hills: Sage (for the Center for Inter-American Relations), 1978, 323 pp.

Fourteen essays by well-known contributors are organized into five sections: Latin American relations with industrial countries, chapters on Mexico and Brazil, regional integration and Third World relations, financing and multinational corporations, and commentary. The quality is high.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE: 1940–1975. By Peter Calvocoressi. New York: Pantheon, 1978, 253 pp. $8.95.

A distinguished work that describes and analyzes the postwar decades with wit, pungency and unconventional intelligence. In brevity and scope, in judgment and flair, it will be hard to surpass. The record that emerges is mixed. While "the principal weaknesses of postwar Britain are inequality and secretiveness . . . British democratic instincts and institutions remain intact."

THE RUSSIA COMPLEX: THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY AND THE SOVIET UNION. By Bill Jones. Manchester (U.K.): Manchester University Press, 1978, 229 pp. £8.95.

A short readable account of the enchantment with which much of Labour viewed the Soviet experiment—though not the British Communist Party—and the slow postwar disenchantment that Ernest Bevin demanded and Stalin facilitated. A sensible contribution to the always fascinating study of left-wing perceptions.

BRITISH PRIME MINISTERS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. VOL. I: BALFOUR TO CHAMBERLAIN. Edited by John P. Mackintosh. New York: St. Martin's, 1978, 282 pp. $14.95.

A collection of essays on British Prime Ministers and their relations with their Ministry and with the Commons. There is a valuable introduction by a well-known Scottish M.P., who is also a professor of politics. The essays provide fresh assessments, including a quite favorable view of Neville Chamberlain.

BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARIES SINCE 1945. By Avi Shlaim, Peter Jones and Keith Sainsbury. North Pomfret (Vt.): David & Charles, 1978, 266 pp. $14.95.

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A collection of informative essays, with pride of place to the greatest of British postwar Secretaries, Ernest Bevin. An undemanding introduction.

POLITICAL INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE BRITISH ISLES. By Anthony H. Birch. London and Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1978, 183 pp. $16.25 (Paper, $7.50).

A lucid examination of the forces of disintegration in Britain today, with some trenchant comments on government proposals concerning devolution. Written by a well-known political scientist but destined for the general reader: a commendable work.

A PLACE AMONG THE NATIONS: ISSUES OF IRISH FOREIGN POLICY. By Patrick Keatinge. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1978, 287 pp. £11.55.

A brief history and analysis of Ireland's relations with foreign countries, seen in a broad and persuasive perspective. By an Irish political scientist.

LE GAULLISME. By Michel and Jean-Louis Debré. Paris: Plon, 1978, 180 pp.

A brief, admiring evocation of the substance of Gaullism and its implementation by the General in power. The themes are familiar: a certain idea of French grandeur, independence, and moral mission in the world. The rhetoric remains impressive and, given Michel Debré's place in the world of Gaullism, the survey is authoritative and politically significant.

DE GAULLE ET LE SERVICE D'ÉTAT. Edited by Bernard Tricot. Paris: Plon, 1978, 384 pp. (Rego Park, N.Y.: Ideal Foreign Books, distributor).

A collection of essays by former aides and present admirers of de Gaulle. De Gaulle as thinker and practical statesman is presented with considerable awe. A helpful introduction to political reality and posthumous legend.

WARTIME ORIGINS OF THE BERLIN DILEMMA. By Daniel J. Nelson. University (Ala.): University of Alabama Press, 1978, 219 pp. $11.95.

A brief examination of the European Advisory Commission which in 1944–45 sought to coordinate Big Three policies for postwar Germany. The EAC was hobbled by governmental suspicion, especially by Roosevelt's reluctance to give U.S. representatives the necessary instructions and authority. Much of the work is informed by the author's close contact with Philip Mosely, who was a U.S. member of the EAC.

GERMANY AND EUROPE 1919–1939. By John Hiden. New York: Longman, 1978, 183 pp. $13.50 (Paper, $6.95).

A survey with few surprises, but with a useful bibliography.

STRESEMANN: EIN LEBENSBILD. By Felix Hirsch. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1978, 335 pp. DM. 48.

A biography of Weimar's major statesman, by an admiring contemporary.

REPUBLICAN PORTUGAL: A POLITICAL HISTORY, 1910–1926. By Douglas L. Wheeler. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978, 340 pp. $20.00.

A judicious account of Portugal's first experiment with political democracy. It failed.

MODERN GREECE: FACETS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT. By Nicos P. Mouzelis. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978, 222 pp. $25.75.

A collection of rather ponderous essays on Greece's economic development—or lack of it—in the light of modern, especially Marxist, theory. Useful perhaps for economists, or students of Marxist theories.

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF WEST EUROPEAN SOCIALIST PARTIES. Edited by Werner J. Feld. New York: Praeger, 1978, 149 pp.

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Political scientists from various countries review foreign policy attitudes and descisions in the leading socialist parties of Europe.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

THE SOVIET SYNDROME. By Alain Besançon. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978, 128 pp. $8.95.

An extended essay that deals with some familiar themes—e.g., the central role of ideology in the Soviet system (although nobody believes the ideology), the unity of aim and diversity of method in foreign policy, the lessons the West has failed to learn—in an arresting and sometimes original way.

STRATEGY OF SURVIVAL. By Brian Crozier. New Rochelle (N.Y.): Arlington House, 1978, 224 pp. $8.95.

A more conventional book along the same lines as Besançon's, with stress on the West's passivity and failure to cope with the Soviet threat, and the need to wake up.

SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY. By Thomas B. Larson. New York: Norton, 1978, 308 pp. $13.95.

A general and low-key background book covering the main aspects of Soviet-American relations since World War II and drawing the obvious parallels and contrasts. Larson knows his subject, having served in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and in research on Soviet affairs in the State Department.

THE SOVIET THREAT: MYTH AND REALITIES. Edited by Grayson Kirk and Nils H. Wessell. New York: Academy of Political Science, 1978, 182 pp. $5.95 (Paper).

Differing contributions by scholars and former officials make this, an assessment of détente as well as of the Soviet threat, an interesting and sometimes baffling collage.

THE RUSSIAN NEW RIGHT: RIGHT-WING IDEOLOGIES IN THE CONTEMPORARY USSR. By Alexander Yanov. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978, 185 pp. $3.95 (Paper).

Yanov, one of the most perceptive and stimulating Russian political writers now resident in the West, here describes and documents the current of neonationalism present in Russia among non-Marxist dissidents and also in some tendencies of the regime. His conclusions regarding the importance of this current for the post-Brezhnev period deserve a careful reading in the West.

THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO: THREE. By Alexandr I. Solzhenitsyn. New York: Harper, 1978, 752 pp. $16.95.

The third and final volume of Solzhenitsyn's powerful epic of the Soviet labor camps. He concludes that "rulers change, the archipelago remains."

KOLYMA: THE ARCTIC DEATH CAMPS. By Robert Conquest. New York: Viking, 1978, 254 pp. $10.95.

Conquest's horror-studded book on the labor camp complex in northeastern Siberia supplements Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago,* giving the experiences of 17 former prisoners largely in their own words.

SOVIET SCIENCE. By Zhores A. Medvedev. New York: Norton, 1978, 288 pp. $10.95.

SCIENCE POLICY: PROBLEMS AND TRENDS. By Y. Sheinin. Moscow: Progress, 1978, 331 pp. (Chicago: Imported Publications, distributor, $4.80).

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In his brief history of Soviet science, Medvedev, a biochemist now living in the West, dwells both on the achievements of the scientific community and the persistence of political intervention and direction. *Science Policy* presents the official line on how the Soviet government has adapted to and managed the scientific and technological revolution.

TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY UNDER LENIN AND STALIN: ORIGINS OF THE SOVIET TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA, 1917–1941. By Kendall E. Bailes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, 472 pp. $30.00 (Paper, $12.50).

An admirably detailed study of the formation of the "technostructure," the social elite that adapted Western technology to Soviet conditions and produced the managers of the Soviet economy and the top political leadership in later years.

STUDIES IN SOVIET ECONOMIC PLANNING. By Aron Katsenelinboigen. White Plains (N.Y.): Sharpe, 1978, 224 pp. $22.50.

A former Soviet economist now emigrated to the West draws on his personal knowledge to write a series of informative essays on the Soviet economy (and economists) going beyond the subject of planning.

SOVIET OIL, GAS AND ENERGY DATABOOK. By Petro Studies. Stavanger (Norway): Noroil, 1978, 239 pp. $125.00.

Essentially a book of statistical tables with little accompanying text, this volume put out by a Swedish research center is worth mention here because of its comprehensive coverage of a subject of great global importance and very elusive facts.

THE POLISH UNDERGROUND STATE: A GUIDE TO THE UNDERGROUND, 1939–1945. By Stefan Korbonski. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978, 272 pp. $16.00.

The "story of a secret state" retold by one of the main actors in the drama. Its authenticity and the wealth of factual information make this a valuable reference work.

THE STRANGE ALLIES: THE UNITED STATES AND POLAND, 1941–1945. By Richard C. Lukas. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1978, 230 pp. $12.50.

A detailed monograph based on an exhaustive search for material but bringing nothing very new by way of fact or interpretation. The real story is not the U.S. alliance with Poland (then under German occupation) but U.S.-Soviet relations as they affected, and were affected by, the Polish question.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. By Miklós Molnár. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 168 pp. $16.50.

This is indeed a short and necessarily sketchy history, done from the outside and without adequate material except on the very early period, but it will be useful until a more thorough study can be written.

DIE GRENZEN DES WANDELS. SPIELARTEN DES KOMMUNISMUS IM DONAURAUM. By Paul Lendvai. Vienna: Europaverlag, 1978, 398 pp. 198 schillings.

An Austrian editor, journalist and long-time keen observer of the Danubian scene has gathered in one volume his best articles written over the past 15 years on Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria, with a concluding piece on the limits of change.

THE YUGOSLAVS. By Dusko Doder. New York: Random House, 1978, 256 pp. $10.00.

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An American correspondent's report on his three-year tour in Yugoslavia. Informal and anecdotal but also balanced and thoughtful, the book captures the spirit and variety of the country and the complexity of its politics and problems.

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

MENAHEM BEGIN: THE LEGEND AND THE MAN. By Eitan Haber. New York: Delacorte, 1978, 321 pp. $9.95.

A sympathetic but not adulatory biography by an Israeli journalist. The many illustrations of the strength of Begin's Revisionist Zionist convictions and the consistency of his actions through the years of struggle against the British, the Arabs, and Ben Gurion and the Labor establishment leave no doubt as to the uncompromising character of Israel's present leader.

WHO STANDS ACCUSED? ISRAEL ANSWERS ITS CRITICS. By Chaim Herzog. New York: Random House, 1978, 277 pp. $10.00.

A selection of public speeches and statements made by General Herzog during his term as Israel's Ambassador to the U.N.

WEST BANK/EAST BANK: THE PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN, 1949–1967. By Shaul Mishal. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978, 129 pp. $9.50.

A brief but meaty study by an Israeli scholar of the relations of "delicately contained conflict" between the West Bank Palestinians and Amman. The key questions of power, legitimacy and leadership were largely unresolved in the period of Jordanian rule, as they remain today under Israeli occupation.

THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR PALESTINE. By Elias H. Tuma and Haim Darin-Drabkin. New York: St. Martin's, 1978, 126 pp. $15.95.

In an unusual collaboration, an Israeli Jew and a Palestinian Arab propose that historical "Palestine" is economically capable of sustaining both a Jewish and an Arab state. Much aid, trade and planning, however, will be necessary for the Arab state to be viable.

FROM JUNE TO OCTOBER: THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN 1967 AND 1973. Edited by Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1978, 419 pp.

A mixed bag of essays, written in 1973–74 and therefore dated, but of generally high quality, covering greater power interests, strategic questions, developments in the Arab world, and the Persian Gulf. The authors are the usual team of Israeli experts plus a few Americans, including William Quandt, Geoffrey Kemp and R. K. Ramazani.

THE RAMADAN WAR, 1973. By H. Badri, T. Magdoub and M. D. Zohdy. Dunn Loring (Va.): Dupuy, 1978, 239 pp. (New York: Hippocrene, distributor, $14.75).

Description of the military operations and political aspects of the October War by three Egyptian officers, interesting to compare with Israeli accounts of the same events.

ANATOMIIA BLIZHNEVOSTOCHNOGO KONFLIKTA. By E. M. Primakov. Moscow: Mysl, 1978, 327 pp. Rubles 1.40.

One of the U.S.S.R.'s foremost experts and advisers on the Middle East examines the Arab-Israeli conflict over the past 30 years, but mainly since 1967. Much of the space is taken up with the usual catechisms of the sins of aggressive Zionism and U.S. imperialism, but Primakov's knowledge of the subject shines

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through the boilerplate, and his book is also revealing as to Soviet thinking.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE COMING DECADE: FROM WELLHEAD TO WELL-BEING? By John Waterbury and Ragaei El Mallakh. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations/1980s Project), 1978, 217 pp. $9.95 (Paper, $5.95).

Two thoughtful essays look at the Middle East and its future in the context of North-South relations. The political scientist (Waterbury) is generally more skeptical than the economist (El Mallakh) on the possibilities of constructive statemanship and regional cooperation.

SAUDI ARABIA 2000: A STRATEGY FOR GROWTH. By Jean Paul Cleron. New York: St. Martin's, 1978, 166 pp. $18.95.

This is no flying carpet to a developed economy in the next century, but a professional economist's structural analysis based on a complicated simulation model, which by its very complexity is intended to serve as a planning tool, insurance against new or inaccurate data and changing conditions, and a means of measuring and judging alternative growth strategies. Hard going for the general reader.

SOCIALIST IRAQ: A STUDY IN IRAQI POLITICS SINCE 1968. By Majid Khadduri. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1978, 265 pp. $12.85.

Once again Professor Khadduri puts Western readers in his debt. In completing his trilogy on the politics of Iraq since independence, he uses his unique qualifications and sources to provide a wealth of information on the little-known recent history of that country. With scholarly objectivity he generally lets the documents and the main actors – Baathists, Communists and others, many of whom he interviewed – speak for themselves. The result, for better or for worse, is to present the regime almost at face value.

COMMUNISM AND AGRARIAN REFORM IN IRAQ. By Rony Gabbay. London: Croom Helm, 1978, 240 pp. £8.50.

A painstaking monograph on the Iraqi Communist Pary's advocacy of and involvement with agrarian reform, and its contribution to the radicalization of Iraqi society, based mainly on the party's own literature.

IRAN UNDER THE PAHLAVIS. Edited by George Lenczowski. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1978, 550 pp. $19.95.

IRAN IN THE 1980s. Edited by Abbas Amirie and Hamilton A. Twitchell. Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies/Menlo Park (Cal.): Stanford Research Institute, 1978, 447 pp.

Together, these two volumes give a comprehensive and generally favorable picture of Iran from World War I to the present, and on into the future. The Lenczowski book, more solid than the usual jerry-built symposium, covers everything from politics to poetry. *Iran in the 1980s*, with Iranian and American contributions varying widely in content and quality, is the full and often informative record of a conference held in October 1977.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

DELUSION AND REALITY. By Janos Radvanyi. South Bend (Ind.): Gateway, 1978, 330 pp. $10.95.

A rare and fascinating insider's view of Russian, East European and Chinese roles in the Vietnam War. The author, prior to his defection in 1967, was Chargé d'Affaires of the Hungarian Embassy in Washington. Particularly for the 1965–

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67 period, the author sheds considerable new light on Sino-Soviet relations, Soviet foreign policy, matters of internal Soviet politics such as the ouster of Shelepin, and on the way in which East European diplomats gathered and evaluated information. The account is particularly detailed on various Polish and Hungarian interventions in the relationship between Washington and Hanoi which, in the author's view, were not sanctioned by the North Vietnamese but were designed to encourage U.S. concessions and to enhance the prestige of the East European diplomats. There is little evidence that the Russians were prepared to play the role of honest broker in these years. Rather, Moscow's central objective was to wean Hanoi away from Peking by making the North Vietnamese increasingly dependent upon sophisticated Soviet weapons supplies. Finally, what emerges from this intriguing account is the supreme confidence of the Hanoi leaders that they could defeat the United States, no matter how many American troops were sent, because of American inexperience in fighting a jungle war.

CHINA AND JAPAN: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE. Edited by Alvin D. Coox and Hilary Conroy. Santa Barbara (Cal.): ABC-Clio Press, 1978, 468 pp. $19.75.

U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS AND THE SECURITY OF EAST ASIA: THE NEXT DECADE. Edited by Franklin B. Weinstein. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 318 pp. $14.00 (Paper, $7.00).

The first collection of essays will be of interest primarily to historians; the second contains a number of excellent articles on the contemporary strategic situation in East Asia. But only one of the essays in either book—the final chapter in Coox and Conroy—makes a stab at analyzing the two triangular relationships involving the two superpowers: China-Japan-United States and China-Japan-Soviet Union. As that essay points out, power politics in East Asia today is closely integrated into the larger international system in which the controlling relationship remains that between the two superpowers. There can be no adequate understanding of East Asian international relations today without studying the impact of these two triangles.

CHINA-WATCH: TOWARD SINO-AMERICAN RECONCILIATION. By Robert G. Sutter. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978, 155 pp. $10.95.

Drawing heavily on the analyses of Chinese Communist communications during the past 30 years by the FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service), Sutter throws fresh light on several aspects of Chinese policy, particularly on the dialogue with Washington in 1955–57 over Taiwan. The chapter on the ambassadorial talks in Geneva suggests that Peking demonstrated much greater flexibility on the Taiwan issue at that time than is generally assumed. It is particularly relevant to current discussions about the prospects for U.S.-China normalization.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1966–1977. By Robert G. Sutter. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 176 pp. $15.00.

Flawed by pedestrian writing and the lack of a conceptual framework, this volume is nevertheless one of the most detailed studies of the critical changes in Chinese foreign policy during the past decade. It is another example of the value of the recently declassified FBIS series of weekly reports on communist media. By using these reports, Sutter has been able to pinpoint the origins of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict several years before it broke out into the open, to trace the recent evolution of the Sino-Soviet relationship in considerable detail, and to show how Chinese policy toward the United States began to change in the late 1960s.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

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Report of the 16th Congressional Delegation to the People's Republic of China. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, 95 pp.

This is the report of a joint Senate-House committee's visit to Peking in January 1978. The majority of the ten-member committee, headed by Senator Cranston, recommended establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic, breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and ending the Mutual Defense Treaty. Significantly, only two of the separate statements appended to the report explicitly dissented from this particular recommendation.

THE POLITICS OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: A CASE STUDY. By Hong Yung Lee. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, 382 pp. $16.00.

An intriguing study of the Cultural Revolution which demonstrates, quite convincingly, how it started with a leadership conflict over how to deal with the widening gap between elites and masses in a socialist China. The author argues that those who attacked the status quo during the Cultural Revolution were expressing dissatisfaction with their own social positions, while those who defended the status quo generally belonged to favored groups. For those interested in the social stratification of communist societies, this is one of the few books on China to even scratch the surface.

THE CHINESE CONNECTION. By Warren I. Cohen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978, 320 pp. $16.50.

A very readable account of U.S. attitudes toward East Asia in the first half of this century, based on the stories of three Americans—Roger S. Greene, Thomas W. Lamont and George E. Sokolsky—who played key roles in shaping American opinion about the Far East.

DOING BUSINESS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. By Bohdan O. and Maria R. Szuprowicz. New York: Wiley, 1978,449 pp. $18.95.

A useful industry-by-industry assessment of the Chinese economy, geared to Western businessmen interested in the China market.

JAPAN'S FOOD PROSPECTS AND POLICIES. By Fred H. Sanderson. Washington: Brookings, 1978, 100 pp. $2.95 (Paper).

Since World War II, Japan's food system has undergone a radical transformation as the Japanese diet shifted from a diet of rice and fish to a Western-style diet with a large component of livestock products. Because it is deficient in the resources needed to produce livestock feed, Japan now depends on imports for half of its total food requirements, a situation that has caused some uneasiness in Japan. Sanderson concludes that the only way to meet Japan's legitimate concern for a secure food supply is through international arrangements.

YAPONIIA V SISTEME MIROVYKH KHOZIAISTVENNYKH SVIAZEI. Edited by Yu. S. Stoliarov and E. S. Khesin. Moscow: "Nauka," 1977, 303 pp.

This collection of essays by Soviet specialists on Japan's foreign economic relations is testimony to the growing importance attached to Japan by the Russians. It is extraordinarily detailed and there are useful charts on Japan's key trading partners and the commodity composition of Japan's trade. Part I deals with Japan's expanding role in the world economy and Part II analyzes Japan's bilateral economic relations with a variety of countries, including China. Two concluding chapters discuss Soviet-Japanese economic relations.

HISTORY OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNISM, 1925–1976. By Douglas Pike. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1978, 181 pp. $5.95 (Paper).

Relatively strong on the history of Vietnamese Communism but very weak on Hanoi's foreign relations. Completely misses the Hanoi-Peking schism that has been brewing for several years and the incipient rivalry between Vietnam and Cambodia.

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POLITICAL POWER AND COMMUNICATIONS IN INDONESIA. Edited by Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, 445 pp. $18.50.

The book jacket says that although the many authors span a wide spectrum of viewpoints and present various interpretations of Indonesian society, they support one of the editors' pet theses – that Indonesia is "a bureaucratic polity." In fact, these essays flail about in different directions and support another thesis – that the editors didn't make much of an effort to integrate them.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

THE ANGOLAN REVOLUTION. VOL. II: EXILE POLITICS AND GUERRILLA WARFARE, 1962–1976. By John A. Marcum. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978, 473 pp. $25.00.

ANGOLA UNDER THE PORTUGUESE. By Gerald J. Bender. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, 315 pp. $15.00.

IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES: A CIA STORY. By John Stockwell. New York: Norton, 1978, 288 pp. $12.95.

Black nationalist politics, white colonial policy and U.S. clandestine pugilism provide the widely varying foci for these three important books on Angola. Marcum's superb history completes his account (begun in *Vol. I: The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of an Explosion*, published in 1969) of the Angolan nationalist struggle from its early days to independence. The book is a virtuoso performance, drawing together a mass of precisely limned detail into patterns which define the characteristics of each nationalist movement, their largely abrasive interaction, and their respective roles in the struggle against the Portuguese. Bender's book demolishes the theory of "lusotropicalism," according to which Portuguese colonialism was characterized by racial tolerance; it depicts the institutionalized relationships between black and white, including the settlement of Angola by Portuguese convicts and white disruption of black agriculture through expropriation and wartime resettlement. Stockwell's engrossing story vividly pictures insurgent leaders Roberto and Savimbi, their bases of operations and the atmosphere of wild abandon surrounding CIA operations out of steamy Kinshasa; most significant is its contention that a spoiler's role (to prevent a "cheap" Soviet victory) provided the main rationale for U.S. involvement in the Angolan civil war.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER. By John Dugard. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, 470 pp. $27.50 (Paper, $12.50).

This detailed examination by a distinguished South African jurist of the main body of apartheid legislation and the judicial system that interprets it constitutes a definitive contribution to the study of jurisprudence concerning human rights – with broad application to theory and precedent in Britain and the United States as well as in South Africa. Moreover, because law so heavily permeates South African life, Dugard's legal analysis etches the outlines of that society with compelling precision.

THE ROOTS OF RURAL POVERTY IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. Edited by Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, 448 pp. $16.50 (Paper, $5.95).

This group of essays focuses on a little-known area – the pre-colonial economies and their alteration under the impact of white rule – providing a useful background for understanding development patterns today.

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SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN TANZANIA, 1964–1973. By W. Edmund Clark. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, 319 pp. $25.00.

After an exhaustive survey of Tanzanian government spending, which documents the disjunction between Nyerere's rural-oriented development strategy and the allocation of government revenues (through 1973), Clark proposes that the *Ujamaa* program be "institutionalized" through strictly legislated guidelines for public spending. He fails to indicate, however, how his approach would circumvent the internal political problems which, as he himself points out, have thus far delayed and distorted Nyerere's goals.

SANCTIONS: THE CASE OF RHODESIA. By Harry R. Strack. Syracuse (N.Y.): Syracuse University Press, 1978, 296 pp. $15.00.

This study assesses the effectiveness of sanctions from a variety of perspectives—giving them mixed grades—but is most valuable as a compendium of information on Rhodesia's extensive international connections, overt and covert, since sanctions were imposed.

BLACK HEART: GORE-BROWNE AND THE POLITICS OF MULTIRACIAL ZAMBIA. By Robert I. Rotberg. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, 359 pp. $15.00.

A tale well told about a British aristocrat, leader of the white Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia, and the evolution over more than 50 years of his rather conventional white upper-class attitudes toward the "natives" into a fervent support for African nationalism that put him at political odds with virtually all his fellow settlers.

AFRICANS OF TWO WORLDS: THE DINKA IN AFRO-ARAB SUDAN. By Francis Mading Deng. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978, 244 pp. $15.00.

As the son of a Paramount Chief from southern Sudan and a diplomat and minister in the traditionally northern-dominated (Arab) Sudanese government, Deng is well placed to understand the ethnic cleavages he describes and to assess the possibilities for overcoming them. Although too much of the book is taken up with transcripts of disquisitions by southern chiefs, the first and final chapters perceptively analyze methods for integrating diverse nationalities into one nation.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN SIERRA LEONE. By John R. Cartwright. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978, 308 pp. $17.50.

This thoughtful account of the contrasting political styles of the traditional conservative Dr. Milton Margai and his "bourgeois" brother Albert, who successively led Sierra Leone during much of the 1950s and 1960s, considers the Margais' records on political and economic development in relation to that of other (and more "radical") African leaders. The author concludes that the obstacles to development are so complicated and formidable that ends and even means bear only a tenuous relationship to results.

SOLDIERS AND OIL: THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF NIGERIA. Edited by Keith Panter-Brick. London: Cass, 1978, 375 pp. (Totowa, N.J.: Biblio, distributor, $24.00).

This group of essays represents a successful attempt to fill in broad gaps in current analysis of postwar Nigeria; most interesting contributions are on military reorganization by Ian Campbell and Nigerian "commercial capitalism" by Terisa Turner.

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Janet Rigney

SOURCE MATERIAL

I. DOCUMENTS

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ERRATA

July 1978

1. In Colin Gray's "The Strategic Forces Triad: End of the Road?": on page 777, footnote 8, for "This point is now conceded by," read "Note the judgment in."

2. In Recent Books on International Relations: p. 894, the review of Robert G. Sutter's *China-Watch: Toward Sino-American Reconciliation* (Johns Hopkins University Press) was inadvertently run under the title of the same author's recently published work, *Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1977* (Westview Press).

3. In Fritz Stern's "Between Repression and Reform: A Stranger's Impressions of Argentina and Brazil": on page 811, line 28, the editors' inadvertently attributed the saying to Voltaire; specifically, for "Voltaire's saying," read "the proverbial saying: 'The best is the enemy of the good.'"

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